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ABSTRACT
Walter Elliot was one of the most gifted Conservative
politicians of the generation which was decimated by the First
World War. Trained as a doctor in his native Scotland, Elliot
was inspired to a political career by his experience in the trenches.
Entering parliament as Coalition Unionist M.P. for Lanark, he
established himself on the radical wing of the Conservative Party.
Elliot* s ability was quickly recognised. He was given junior
office in January 1923» Defeated in December 1923, he was
returned at a by-election in May 1924 as M.P. for Glasgow Kelvin-
grove and was again given junior office in the Baldwin Government
of 1924-1929' In August 1931, he was appointed Financial Secretary
in the National Government, entering the Cabinet as Minister of
Agriculture a year later. In 1936, he became Scottish Secretary
then Minister of Health in 1938. He returned to the backbenches
in May 1940 with the fall of Chamberlain and never again held
Ministerial office but remained an M.P. until he died in 1958.
Elliot was in his day one of the best known and popular
politicians and public figures. Tipped by many as a future Prime
Minister, he was known as a Tory philosopher and intellectual as
well as a man of considerable wit. In ary study of twentieth
century progressive Conservatism, he must feature prominently. He
sought to shake off conventional restraints and strove for more
state intervention for the betterment of social and economic life.
His experience of Clydeside combined with his innate humanitarianism
enabled him to understand the emotions behind socialism. His
years at the Ministry of Agriculture represent the zenith of a
full but in the last analysis an unfulfilled political career.
Elliot transformed British Agriculture from a highly
individualistic, fluctuating industry into one of order and
security through the vehicle of producer controlled marketing
boards.
Elliot's contribution as Minister of Agriculture and in
more general terms as a member of the National Cabinet in the
early 1930*s is the main consideration of this thesis for it was
those years that marked the highpoint of a long political career.
1936 marked the end of his term at the Ministry of Agriculture.
It was too the year of the Rhineland occupation and Nlliot's
failure to resign then or later over the appeasement policies of
the Cabinet in all probability cost him his political future.
Unfamiliar to the author's post-war generation, Nlliot is
remembered by their elders as one of the best loved and able
politicians of his time- The Conservative Party and the
country as a whole but especially his native Scotland were the
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The Formative Years 1888-1929
Walter Elliot Elliot was born in Lanark on 19th September
1888, into one of the oldest and most famous sheep farming Border
families. His father William also owned Lawrie and Symington
Auction Mart, one of the largest of its kind in Scotland. When
he was four, Elliot* s mother died giving birth to his brother Dan
whereupon the two boys and their two sisters were sent to Glasgow
to be brought up by their maternal grandmother. For a long time
the family were kept in mourning and required to make intensive of
the bible but the presence of their eccentric uncle brought some
measure of relief. Dr. Shiels practised medicine simultaneously
in London and Glasgow, prescribing some rather unorthodox cures, but
it was as an inventor that he became somewhat of a legend. His
most fantastic notion was to be his ruin - he believed that baser
metals could be transmuted into gold and established a company,
Kosmoids for that very purpose. Dr. Shiels' over-powerful
imagination, however, did have a beneficial effect on his nephews
and nieces, countering the very strict and religious attitude
adopted by his mother. He used to talk on all manner of things and
it was from this that Elliot developed his own immense ability to
discourse on all topics knowledgeably and with a high degree of
originality. It was his uncle's influence, moreover, that led
Elliot to study medicine.
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As a result of the ill-fated Kosmoid venture, Dr. Shiels
became bankrupt and the family moved back to Lamrk. Elliot
attended Lanark High School before being sent to Glasgow Academy,
arguably the leading public school in the city. To his relief,
he was not forced to participate in school sports. Elliot was a
man of huge physical strength but extremely myopic and unable to
play any ball game. Moreover, he hated all sports except
swimming and preferred to walk for miles or sit with his nose
buried in a book. At the Academy, Elliot met Osborne Mavor, who
later wrote under the pseudonym of James Bridie and who became a
lifelong friend. With Mavor, Elliot participated in the school's
OTC with great enthusiasm. Another fellow pupil was John Keith,
later chairman of the BBC. Reith*s personality, however, was not
congenial to the young, carefree Mavor and Elliot who considered
him "a crashing bore"."'" Elliot had by no means a distinguished
academic record at the Academy, shining only in General Knowledge
but he was very industrious, determined to go on to Glasgow
University to study Medicine. This he duly did with Mavor in 1905*
Glasgow University was at that time a very different place
from what it became after World War I and even more so after World
War II. Elliot himself perceived profound changes and was wont
to write in the later stages of his life of the University of Then
2
as opposed to the University of Now. It was possible then so
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Andrew Boyle: Only the Wind will listen: Reith of the B.B.C.
p.51 (London: Hutchinson, 1952).
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Glasgow Herald 6 January 1951-
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long as fees were paid to stay at the University for a very long
time before fading from the scene or settling down: to work for a
degree. So pleasant was the life that it was not unknown to
spend fifteen years paying only courtesy visits to lectures and
the rest of the time in contemplation of the world's ills and
philosophic principles."'' The passing of "Chronics" as they were
known was bemoaned by Elliot in later life. He was greatly
aggrieved that by the terms laid down for national service, the
Ministry of Labour and the Education Authorities "extinguished the
race of the Chronics." Elliot regretted that the "active,
turbulent, brief, student existence from its yellow-beaked chicken-
hood to its black-gowned fulfilment" usually only took three years
by the 1940's and 1950*s.^
In the first decade of the twentieth century, G-lasgow Uni¬
versity was a place of high spirits with a lifestyle all of its
own. Elliot was very much one of its characters. He lived in an
elegant flat in Blythswood Drive in the Park Ward, later part of
his constituency, which was by then the family base in G-lasgow
although rarely frequented except by the younger brother. It
served as a place of refuge for fellow students suffering from the
effects of late-night gatherings in the Union. Legend has it
that one could hail a taxicab any-here in the city and giving the
direction "take me to Walter's" would duly arrive. Osborne Mavor
^
Colm Brogan: The Glasgow Story p.141-2 (1952 Frederick Muller).
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Walter Elliot: The Dow Lecture "Adventurer's Coast or The Two
sides of the Tay", given during Dundee/St. Andrews controversy
12th Oct. 1953- 'WE papers Box 2.
penned a verse on this use of Elliot's flat as an asylum for
drunken friends which was remembered half a century later by
former fellow students although in differing versions."'"
The zest for life expressed itself too in the "Rectorial
Election campaigns, during which the university area known as
G-ilmorehill became the setting for running battles and forays into
the opposing camps but always in the very best of spirits. The
only exception to the good natured if over-exuberant behaviour in
Elliot's student days came not during a Rectorial Election but on
an occasion at the Coliseum music hall when a quack doctor,
Walford Bodie, who had come out badly of a court case,made offensive
remarks about medical students. Their reaction, the bombardment
of Bodie with tomatoes and peasemeal, degenerated into a minor
riot with the police having to intervene. Sir John Boyd, one of
Elliot's contemporaries at the University, recalled "Walter taking
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off his glasses and proceeding to the fray."'"
Elliot did not become involved in party politics during his
years at G-lasgow University. He was a member of the Eabian
society, membership of which was not confined to socialists and he
played a prominent part in the Liberal Augustine Birrell's
Rectorial Election. Elliot was, however, mainly active in
internal university politics, being with Mavor the moving spirit of
the Students' Representative Council. In 1911, he was the
See appendix I.
p
Sir John Boyd to Colin Coote April 1963 WE Papers Box VII.
Much of my information on Elliot's early life comes from this
source. It was too the basis for the first chapters in Coote*s
Companion of Honour. (London: Collins, 1965)
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unanimous choice for the President of the Union. He made the
occasional post-prandial speech in this capacity hut other than
that played little part in the Union debates for which Glasgow
University is still famous.
Elliot was also very much involved with the student news¬
paper, Glasgow University Magasine. During Elliot's time, G.U.M.
reached its peak in literary originality and brilliance as a
result of having a series of truly excellent editors. The most
notable was Osborne Mavor whose talents attracted other gifted con¬
tributors. The G.U.M. flat in North Frederick Street was the
setting for constant bustle and activity and discussions far into
the night. Elliot upon hearing that it had been bombed during
the Second World War commented wryly, "I always knew fire from
heaven would fall upon that flat.""'" Elliot was himself a regular
contributor using the pseudonym "Parvus". Indeed,Elliot was one
of Mavor's sub-Editors in session 1908/9 and became Editor for
1909/1910. Elliot's poetry was mostly simple and amusing, usually
on the subject of food. His prose was somewhat dull and his
editorials showed little of the unique style and use of imagery
2
he later developed to become such an effective writer.
Apart from Elliot's activities on G.U.M. and the S.R.C., he
spent most of his time outwith studying reading anything and every¬
thing that came to hand and indulging in deep discussions on
Sir John Boyd. Ibid.
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Glasgow University Magasine 1908-1910. Some of Elliot's food
poems are reprinted in Univ. Verses (1st selection). "Pisces
Benedicite" included in Douglas Young's "Anthology of Modern
Scots Poems."
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philosophy as well as topical issues, with his fellow students
including James Maxton who became a lifelong friend."'" During
vacations, he would set off on walking tours with friends such as
2
John Boyd, George Buchanan Smith and William Renwick. On one
occasion, they sailed as crew to Nantes and spent six months in
the Pyrenees ending up penniless and having to borrow money to get
home.
Elliot's years at Glasgow University had an incalculable
effect on his future career. He had a lifelong love for his Alma
Mater and was immensely proud in later years to be its Rector
during its fifth centenary celebrations in 1951- It was, however,
the city of Glasgow itself that made a profound and lasting impact
on "Elliot. The second city of the Empire had great industrial
wealth and grand dwellings but it also had, apart perhaps from New
York, the worst slums in the Knglish-speaking world. Elliot1s
first-hand experience of such social deprivation and deficiencies
in health and sanitation combined with his medical training to
give him a passionate desire to improve the living conditions of
the urban working class. Although Rlliot did not accept the
Socialist solution, his years in Glasgow enabled him to understand
the emotions that motivated those who preached it especially the
Clydesiders like Kirkwood and Maxton. Klliot in 1913, however,
in the year he gained his MB.ChB, had not thought of a political
1
Rlliot delivered a very moving obituary on Maxton's death on
radio 23rd July 19^.6.
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Son of Principal &. Adam Smith. Killed at Loos.
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care sr. With Mavor, he went to the Royal Infirmary as a house¬
man. Within a year, however, he found himself being sent to the
Front in the First World War.
Elliot rarely spoke of his personal war experiences. These
four years, however, determined the course of the rest of his
life. In August 191^, he was called up from the Royal Army
Medical Corps Reserve which he had joined in April of the previous
year. He set sail for France, landing at Nantes which he recog¬
nised from his University adventure. In December 1914 he was
sent to the Front as Medical Officer to the cavalry regiment, the
Royal Scots G-reys, after their previous M.O. had been killed at the
first battle of Ypres. By all accounts, Elliot showed constant
courage and devotion to duty. He was awarded the M.C. in
April 1917 for endlessly tending the wounded whilst under fire at
Wancourt near Arras and then he received his Bar in November of
the same y^ar for his efforts at Cambrai. Five weeks before the
end of the war, Elliot was wounded in the foot at Bohain and sent
home."'" He had lived through the holocaust which decimated the
ranks of his generation, killing many of his friends and his
younger brother who died at Callipoli. The future leaders of
society, producers, consumers, fathers and husbands were killed in
their thousands leaving a giant vacuum in British society. Elliot
was determined that such a tragedy should never recur and saw his
The main source of my information on Elliot's experience in
the First World War is Colin Coote: Companion of Honour p.36-44.
Elliot's courage and some of his exploits are also referred to
in R. Pomeroy et al«: The History of the Royal Scots Grevs
1914-1919 (publisher unknown, 1928).
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mission in life to endeavour to influence the course of peace¬
time reconstruction in such a way as to effect progressive
social and economic measures towards the real and lasting improve¬
ment of British democracy and society.
During Elliot's last few weeks in France, he received a
telegram asking him to stand as parliamentary candidate for his
home constituency of Lanark at the forthcoming G-eneral Election.
He wired immediate acceptance with the words "Yes, which side?"^
There is no doubt he was attracted by both the Conservative and
Liberal Parties, eventually electing to stand as a Coalition
2
Unionist. With the benefit of the Coupon, Elliot was returned
with a majority of over 7000.
Walter Elliot entered Parliament in 1918 as one of the war
generation determined to build a land fit for heroes in a non¬
partisan atmosphere. Traditional party labels meant little or
nothing to young M.P.s like Elliot back from the trenches deeply
imbued with a spirit of fraternity and dedication. They were
determined to carry the spirit of war-time comradeship and
cooperation over into the realm of peacetime social and economic
3
policy-making. This sentiment of unity and common purpose
Baroness Elliot in conversation with the author 9th Oct. 1976
and the late Sir Colin Cooie in correspondence 23/8/78.
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Elliot refers to this decision he had to make in a letter to
K. Tennant later Baroness Elliot 18th May 1931 in the possession
of Baroness Elliot.
^ Elliot in conversation with J.M. McEwen. See the latter's
Ph.D. thesis: 'Unionist and Conservative Members of Parliament
1914-1939* 1939, London, p.153-
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expressed itself in political terms in the formation of various
political groupings that took place within the "^alition frame¬
work soon after the General Election. "Clliot took a leading
part in several of these groups including the New Members
Parliamentary Committee"*" which was formed on 7th April, 1919-
Led initially by Oscar Guest, brother of Lloyd George's Chief
'Thip, its secretaries were Liberal M.P. Colin Coote and Oswald
Mosley who was shortly succeeded by Elliot himself. The forty
strong group held weekly lunches to discuss their objectives. The
primary aim of this all-party group was to work towards the
formation of a new centre progressive party, in the belief that
it was "desirable permanently to maintain the principles which
2
brought the Coalition Government into existence," in effect the
radicalisation and consolidation of the Coalition itself on a
permanent basis. Nicknamed 'the Babes' by the press, the activities
of the group drew the attention and support of certain of the
Cabinet notably Churchill, Birkenhead, and Lloyd George himself.
In August 1919» Elliot married Helen Hamilton, the daughter
of a R.A.M.C. colonel. Tragically, she died in a climbing accident
during their honeymoon in Skye. After this terrible blow* Rlliot
set up house with Colin Coote in 'Vilfred Street. "Slliot and
Coote became lifelong friends, indulging in constant political and
philosophical discussion and argument. Both quickly became
Also referred to as the New Members Coalition Committee.
2
Part of the group's constitution, reprinted in the press
e.g. Glasgow Herald 25 July 1919*
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Parliamentary Private Secretaries, Coote to Edwin Montagu at the
India Office and Elliot to Sir J. Pratt, Under-Secretary for Health
in Scotland. The difference in parties was totally irrelevant
with the two young M.P.s sharing several ventures until Coote's
defeat in the 1922 General Election after which he became a
journalist and ultimately Editor of the Daily Telegraph.
With Coote, Elliot became involved in the activities of the
League of Nations Union led by Lord Robert Cecil. In June 1921,
the two M.P.s were appointed to the Executive Committee which met
2
fortnightly. The following year Elliot attended two international
conferences in Prague and Buenos /tires as a League of Nations
Union delegate. Elliot and Coote also played a considerable part
in the prevention of a major strike in 1921. The miners*
reaction to the government* s withdrawal of subsidy and control at
the end of March 1921 was to strike immediately. ifter a few days
of deliberation, the railwaymen and the transport workers announced
their intention of taking sympathetic strike action. With Lloyd
George having declared a state of Emergency and called up the
reserves* there was a meeting between the leader of the coal
owners and the backbenchers. Elliot who had large numbers of
miners as constituents in Lanark, stood up and proposed that the
leader of the miners* federation, Frank Hodges, should receive a
similar hearing. On that occasion, Hodges, speaking contrary to
his executive's instructions, declared his willingness to discuss
I am indebted to the late Sir Colin Coote for talking and writing
to me about Elliot's early years in Parliament.
O
League of Nations Union Minute 5t>2.
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a short-term settlement of wages on a district basis. Upon
hearing this, Elliot and some colleagues rushed +0 Downing Street
and woke the Prime Minister. In the event, Hodge's offer did
not receive the endorsement of his colleagues and was instrumental
in breaking up the triple alliance with the transport workers and
railwaymen withdrawing their support thus averting a serious
strike."'"
The Irish nuestion was another issue that Elliot and Goote
cooperated on at this time. 7hen the Government of Ireland Bill
was presented to the Commons in 1920, Elliot and Coote examined
its every detail and submitted several amendments which met with
the disapproval of the Home Secretary, Sir Edward Carson. One
such amendment was intended to give the new parliaments control
2
of their armed forces. This was rejected without division as was
that to grant commercial treaty-m king powers.'' The attitude
adopted by Coote and Elliot reflected their belief that Ireland
could be on the road to disaster and that in the hope of saving
the situation, Britain should be prepared to go to extreme lengths
of trust. Events, however, overtook the bill. Such was their
concern that at the height of the violence in March 1921>Elliot
and Coote formed part of a delegation including the Archbishop of
1
Colin Coote: Editorial (London: Eyre &. Spottiswoode, 1965),
p.108-9-
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2 June 1920, 129 H.C. Deb 5s. Coote moved the amendment
with Elliot seconding, Cols 1911-1915.
'
Amendment moved by Elliot cols 950-932.
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Canterbury to the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Birkenhead, to
protest against the use of terrorism to counter terrorism.'*'
Elliot was also prominent in the body of radical young
Unionists known as 'The Group*. The original members included
Edward Wood, Sa.rauel Hoare, Walter Guinness, William Ormsby-Gore,
and Philip Lloyd-Graeme. The vast numerical superiority of the
Coalition after the Coupon Election led inevitably to a relaxation
in party discipline. This encouraged these young Conservatives
to become self-appointed watchdogs to guard against the Government
becoming complacent and pursuing retrogressive policies. They met
frequently to discuss policy and to coordinate their parliamentary
speeches and questions. One of their number, Edward Wood later
the Earl of Halifax, recalled the mutual support techniaue he and
his colleagues developed:
rtAt all points we tried to support each other, and
if a minister tried to fob one of our number off
with an evasive reply, another of the group would
immediately be on his feet protesting against such
cavalier treatment fjf a serious suggestion of my
Honourable friend."
Their two principal concerns were housing and Ireland. Their
activities rescued them from back-bench obscurity, gained them
recognition as a small but influential force in the House below
the gangway, and generally injected a little more life into the
proceedings. Moreover, although not its main raison d'etre,
*The Group* drew attention to and enhanced the political reputation
George Cockerill: What Fools We Vere (London: Hutchinson Co.,
1944) p.99.
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Lord Halifax: Fulness of Days (London: Collins, 1957) p«87-
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of its members. Certainly it advanced the cause of their
political aspirations. In reply to his Principal Private Secre¬
tary's assertion that there was a dearth of potential Conservative
Ministerial material, Bonar Law listed six of the Croup including
Elliot as future Cabinet Ministers."1" In the event,most of the
original members achieved that rank.
Elliot had made his maiden speech on 26 February 1919 on the
bill to establish the Ministry of Health - ironically, it was to
2
be the last Cabinet Office he would hold over twenty years later.
His second speech two months later, however, was more impressive.
Elliot spoke in full support of the Women's Emancipation Bill
introduced by a Labour M.P. to enable women to hold civil and
judicial appointments, to sit and vote in the House of Lords, and
by amending the Representation of the People Act to put them on
the same footing as male electors. Elliot's speech included a
passionate indictment of the older generation for their pre-war
short-sightedness and their preoccupation with domestic souabbles
to the detriment of the nation's defences.
"If there is one class of people who have suffered
from the arrogance of their elders it is the
generation between twenty and thirty years of age
in the British Islands- The young men have
suffered and bled and the young women have
suffered in tears because the white-haired and
hoary antediluvians who were governing our
country alike in the trade unions and in
Parliament were unable to see what lay as
clearly before them as the noses on their faces.
Time and again they were shy of taking decisions
Nourah Waterhouse: Private and Official (London: Jonathan Cape,
1942) p.214- —
2 26 Feb. 1919, 112 H.C. Deb 5s cols 1888-1891.
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because they were afraid of them. Their blood,
ran cold. They had hot heads and cold feet."
Elliot if anything felt that the bill did not go far enough. As
well as civil and judicial appointments, he believed that women
doctors and nurses should receive military commissions just as
they did in other parts of the British Empire instead of the
humiliating situation whereby experienced and long-serving female
military personnel were outranked by callow young male officers.
On this theme, he struck a prophetic note.
"Equal pay for equal work is a good maxim, but
it should carry with it eoual honour for enual
work, and that should be one of the maxims in
future."
Elliot took his support for the bill as far as to vote for its
mhird Reading thereby contributing to a G-overnment defeat.
The Women's Emancipation Bill was negatived in the House of
Lords after the G-overnment introduced the one clause Sex
Disqualification Removal Bill which covered only the opening of
all professions to women and making them liable for jury service.
The latter provision, however, allowed judges to exclude female
jurors from hearing particularly grim cases. Elliot condemned in
the Commons the double standard of treatment accorded to women.
He attacked the Victorian attitude that while one must not say things
to women, one could do them. The actual facts of life were far
worse than anything women were prevented from hearing under "the
conventions of sham chivalry which have grown up." He accepted
1




that current conventions prevented for the time being the bringing
of certain evidence before mixed juries but declared that it was
not an attitude with which to proceed through the 20th century.'*"
Hlliot made a considerable impact in his first four years
in Parliament. 4side from his role as one of the leading spirits
in the Group and the New Members Parliamentary Committee, he
acted as Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Under-Secretary
for Scotland, Health, and had much to do with the establishment of
a dining club called the alternative Government Group consisting
of M.P.s performing similar functions for other Ministers. Their
2
motto was somewhat disrespectful, "Remplapons." Hlliot*s
parliamentary work and obvious ability brought him to the attention
of his party hierarchy as well as of the press. Herbert Side-
both am, the famous political commentator who wrote for the Times
under the pseudonym 'Student of Polities' considered Hlliot the
only newccner worthy of inclusion in his book of biographical
sketches and observations from the press gallery, "Pillars of the
State" written in 1921. Sidebotham began by considering Hlliot's
speech characteristics. He had a glorious melodious voice with
a most attractive Scottish Lowland burr. He tended to talk faster
than he thought but while he was apt to get somewhat distracted
from the main thread of his argument, his speeches were always
interesting, original and often humorous. Sidebotham declared
that with Klliot "a proposition begun in a quizzical drawl will,
1
27 October 1919, 120 H.C. Deb 5s col 386/7-
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Colin Coote: Companion of Honour p.46.
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like a mountain stream issuing from a bog, end in a spate."'*'
Elliot was one of the representatives of the lost generation
who had ccme back from the trenches and gone straight into politics
taking with them a combination of youthful enthusiasm and realism
developed through their traumatic wartime experiences. This
combination, asserted Sidebotham, could be of lasting advantage
to British government and politics. He cited Elliot's attitudes
on Ireland and the coal strike as examples of the blurring of
party lines that had occurred in the aftermath of the war. Side¬
botham felt that whether Elliot moved up the ranks of a reformed
Liberal Party or a different Conservative alignment was open to
question but whatever his eventual party label, he would in all
probability attain high political office.
Away from 'Westminster, Elliot kept up his interest in medical
and scientific research. During the 1921 parliamentary recess,
he took up an invitation to do some research work at the Rowett
Institute in Aberdeen, set up two years earlier as a centre for
studying nutrition and farm animals with special consideration of
mineral requirements. Elliot first concentrated on the calcium
requirement of the pig. From that, he went on to write a thesis
entitled 'Study in mineral metabolism with special reference to
rickets and similar bone lesions in other animals and in the
human' for which he received a D.Sc. in 1923* Boyd Orr* Director
of the Rowett Institute, in later years described Elliot's thesis
as a brilliant work which held out exciting and original ideas for
■*"
Herbert Sidebotham: Pillars of the State (London: Nisbet & Co.
Ltd. 1921;. tj.237.
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further research. Elliot also participated in the Institute's
investigations into the mineral content of pastures with a view
to discovering deficiencies and devising remedial treatment-
The knowledge and experience Tlliot obtained at the "Rowett proved
invaluable a few years later when he became involved on the Empire
Marketing Board. It proved too of great advantage when still
later he became Minister of Agriculture.^"
In the meantime, however, clouds had been fathering over
the Coalition Government. "/ithin the Conservative Party, grave
doubts had been growing over the advisability of continuing to
cooperate with the Liberals. Many Conservatives had begun to
feel that their party was losing its identity and that its
association with Lloyd George was detrimental to the cause. Of
course there had been a hard core of opposition to the coalition
for some years. But by the middle of 1922 the feelings of the
extreme right or "Pie-Hards" were shared by others towards the
centre of the party. "fithin Tlliot's young Unionist set known as
"the Group", support for a return to pre-war party politics was
almost total. Tlliot alone held firm. In April he had spoken
strongly in favour of preserving the status auo during the debate
on the motion brought by 3ir Joynson-Hicks that the lack of
coherence and continuity in the Coalition Government could only
be remedied if a Ministry of those united in political principle
p
was established.~ On that occasion, the coalition received the
^
The information on Blliot's work at the Rowett comes from Boyd
Orr's obituary of •V.H. in Royal Society Biographical Memoir 1958*
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15 April 1922, 152 H.C. Deb 5s cols 2534/87-
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endorsement of the large majority of the M.P.s who voted but this
proved to be but a temporary respite for as ep"> week passed the
campaign to withdraw gathered momentum within the Conservative
Party.
Hlliot had already in the same month outlined in an article
his reasons for his continued support of the coalition.^" He
started from the premise that Britain was confronted with more
problems on both the foreign nnd domestic fronts than in the past
fifty years. Unemployment, the poor standard of living, and high
taxation were the issues most apparent to the electorate but they
were by no means the only questions taxing the government.
Ulliot asserted that the Coalition was the best vehicle for tackling
these problems but declared that at present it offered no long-
term, coherent policies. He felt it essential that the coalition
should be refashioned without delay and preferably before the
next General Election. He recognised the potential impact of the
Labour Party. It at least had a philosophy and a message. It
had too a future as the alternative government party. The Con¬
servative Party had to seek a philosophy to combat that of the
Socialists. "No party," contended Ulliot, "will grow without a
taproot in metaphysics."
Klliot took India as an example of an issue for which no
party offered a realistic solution. He made a vehement attack on
his own party's delusory claim of hereditary interest in and
understanding of the complexities of the Hast.
Valter Hlliot: Problems and Politicians in The Nineteenth
Century April 1922.
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"It has shown nothing to make one trust it
with these huge estates, and this not from
tenderness to its Liberal colleagues but from
its own vast amorphous, wallowing, incredible,
cala.mitous, carelessness and stupidity
Neither the Liberal nor Conservative Party offered on its own
the prospect of effective government with policies to deal with
contemporary problems. The coalition, therefore, had to be
maintained for the time being but improved. Nlliot insisted
that the Labour Party had come to stay and would get over "the
scarlet fever of its infancy" to become the alternative government
in the re-emergence of the two party system.
The envisaged Centre Party which Nlliot and colleagues of
similar persuasion had hoped would develop out of the Coalition
as the alternative to Labour di<i not materialize. The concept
was to recur many times during the inter-war period especially
during 1929-1931 hut by 1922 any immediate prospect had evaporated.
Opposition to the continued existence of the Coalition gathered
momentum. It took two forms with distrust of Lloyd G-eorge figuring
highly in both. His more moderate Conservative critics supported
most of the government policies but harboured a desire to regain
independence and form a Conservative administration. On the
extreme right of the party, however, hatred of the Liberal Prime
Minister was combined with opposition in principle to coalition.
Nlliot was one of only 86 Conservative M.P.s who voted in
favour of maintaining the Coalition at the Carlton Club on 19
October 1922. He did so in the belief that the post-war situation
particularly in domestic affairs reouired constructive legislation
20.
and also that the achievement of the Irish settlement justified
its perpetuation. There were however other influences such as
his antipathy to the Diehards, prominent among the majority who
voted to disband the Coalition. To a young M.P. like Elliot
radicalised by the experience of war, these right-wingers repre¬
sented the biggest threat to post-war progress with anachronistic
imperial views including their virulent opposition to Irish Home
Rule and their bitterness towards Lloyd George and the Liberals.
It is important moreover to note that the majority of Scottish
Unionist M.P.s also voted in favour of the Coalition. Indeed
their numerical strength of 18 meant that of those who voted with
the Conservative Leader, Austen Chamberlain, 21% sat for Scottish
constituencies."1' This can be explained by the fact that not only
were Scottish Conservative M.P.s generally more radical than their
English counterparts but also that many of them, by virtue of
the coupons and electoral pacts of 1918, represented constituencies
with inherent Liberal majorities in what was* after all* a land
of strong Liberal traditions. In Elliot's case, his political
sympathy with and the influence of Liberal colleagues in the New
Members Coalition Group served only to harden his attitude.
There was at no time any doubt that he would not vote for the
Coalition.2
In the days following defeat, Austen Chamberlain and his
^
Best source for voting pattern at Carlton Club is Michael
Kinnear: The Fall of Lloyd George p.222-242 (London:
Macmillan, 1973)*
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Sir Colin Coote had no need to try and influence his friend,
as he recounted in a letter to the author 23 August 1978.
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supporters licked their wounds. A, hard core of around fifty
remained loyal to the man who had been elected Leader of the
Conservative Party in March 1921 and who now made way for Bonar
Law. On the same day as the vote, Elliot signed a declaration
against the ingratitude shown towards Lloyd George and the
Coalition Liberals. The signatories went on to disassociate them¬
selves from the new regime and reaffirmed their support for
coalition.^" Four days later on 23rd October, Chamberlain's
supporters including Elliot honoured their leader at a dinner
which served to give further notice that their loyalty remained
undiminished.
It seemed for a while that this group might provide the nucleus
of the Centre Party of the future. The Chamberl-inites hoped to
hold the balance between the Conservative administration and the
Opposition but this aspiration was short-lived for Bonar Law
received an absolute majority at the General Election of 15th
November 1922. Elliot held Lanark with a considerably reduced
majority over the Labour candidate. Elsewhere in Scotland the
Socialists made a spectacular electoral advance leaving the Conser¬
vatives with only 16 M.P.s, half the number returned in 1918*
Glasgow in particular went 'red' with passionate ILP street orators
like James Maxton, David Kirkwood, Campbell Stephen, and George
Buchanan being returned to Parliament. The Chamberlainites them¬
selves were ouite successful but the Lloyd George Liberals were
Maurice Cowling: The Impact of Labour 1920-1924 (Cambridge
University Press, 1971) p.252.
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routed, Elliot's closest friend, Colin Coote, being one of the
defeated. On 13th December the Conservative i~r'vels met in St.
Stephen's House on Thames Embankment to consider future strategy.^
Some favoured guerilla tactics but the majority agreed that while
no favours would be given, nothing should be done to rock the
boat of the Lav; administration. The Earl of Birkenhead was the
driving force behind the Chamberlain group with ex-Ministers like
Sir Robert Home, Sir Ernest Pollock and Sir Leslie Scott among
those most closely involved. Their professed aim was to reform
the Coalition with Lloyd G-eorge at its head but in reality their
prime concern was to present themselves as the alternative leaders
of the Conservative Party. Certainly they were not lacking in
talent and experience. All those present at the business meeting
agreed to remain aloof from the Law administration and refuse
portfolios. This resolution however did not stand the test of
time and within two years after various manoeuvres the Chamber-
lainites were back in the Conservative camp and reunification was
complete.
Elliot was in fact one of the first to be detached. In
January 1923 he was offered and accepted junior office as Parlia¬
mentary Under-Secretary of Scotland, Health. With the exception
of the period of the first Labour Covernment; Elliot was junior
2
Minister at the Scottish Office until 1929* It was not the
"*■
Indrew Boyle: Only the Wind Will Listen: Reith of the BBC p. 118.
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With the status of the Scottish Secretary being raised in July
1926 to Secretary of State, Elliot became Under-Secretary.
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most propitious department from which to advance further up the
political ladder hut it did offer uninue and comprehensive
experience in social and economic policy making. Moreover,
Elliot was dedicated to its fundamental aim in the 1920's, that of
radically improving the deplorable social and economic conditions
of his native land. As a medical man, he could appreciate all
too clearly the terrible effects on health of living in a squalid
urban environment especially that of Glasgow with its appalling
slums. The first major measure he was involved with was
Chamberlain's housing bill introduced in April 1923 to extend the
powers of the local authorities and subsidise private and council
housing. The Scottish Office fought in vain for separate assess¬
ment instead of receiving the flat-rate S6 per house subsidy.
Elliot winding up the Second heading made no attempt to conceal
his disappointment. He went on, however, to defend the inclusion
of Scotland in the same bill as England and rales on the grounds
that once the argument for separate financial treatment had been
lost, there was no justification for two bills."'" Elliot himself,
looking back on later years, considered this speech to have been
2
his best parliamentary effort of the period.
In May 1923> the ailing Bonar Law was succeeded as Prime
Minister by Stanley Baldwin. The man who was destined to
dominate the British political scene for most of the inter-war
years had been a relatively unknown Minister in the Lloyd George
1
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Government who had suddenly come to the forefront of the Conser¬
vative Party in the fateful autumn of 1922. ^ 1dwin had played
a leading role in the destruction of the Coalition, being more
opposed to Lloyd George on grounds of personal morality than
anything else but this in no way categorised him as a right-
winger. On the contrary, Baldwin had taken on the post-war
attitudes of the younger men in his party and led from left of
centre. He believed his mission in life to be the elimination
of every possibility of a class war by promoting social reform
and the education of the Labour Party in parliamentary behaviour,
easing its transition from a revolutionary pressure group to the
alternative government. This recognition of the legitimate
aspirations of Labour and of the need for progressive social and
economic policies was of course shared by Tlliot who rapidly
developed a lasting admiration of and loyalty for Baldwin. Their
personalities had many common facets such as a dry sense of humour
and the ability to get on with anyone regardless of political
persuasion. Both men were wont to sit in the smoking room in
earnest conversation with Socialist M.P.s, often the Clydesiders
with whom Klliot had a special relationship which was consolidated
in later years after he himself had become a "Clydeside" M.P.
albeit a Tory one. How different was the attitude of another
man who was destined to play a crucial role in British inter-war
politics and in Hlliot's career, Neville Chamberlain.
Chamberlain as Minister for Health was Hlliot's immediate
superior in the Commons for part of 1923 since the Scottish
%
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Secretary, Viscount Novar, was in the Lords.This meant that
he and Elliot worked together at close nuarters for much of the
time. Elliot later recalled how he was struck by Chamberlain's
2
administrative genius and work capacity. There is no doubt
however that in their political and personal attitudes they were
poles apart. This is aptly illustrated by their contrasting reac¬
tion to an incident involving the Clydesiders. The occasion was
the debate on the Scottish Board of Health Estimates towards the
end of June 1925* James Maxton made a passionate bitter attack
on the Government's earlier withdrawal of maternity milk and food
grants and of hospital accommodation for some child illnesses like
measles and whooping cough. The child mortality rate in Scotland
was much higher than south of the border. With much emotion,
Maxton spoke of the anguish of Scottish parents watching their
children fight for their lives. He spoke of his personal tragic
experience - he had in fact seen his own wife die after successfully
fighting to save their child.3 He did not accept the official
argument that the high figures for 1922 were due to an epidemic
which occurred in the last few months of the relief grant's
availability. He lambasted the Government for having gone through
with the cuts in these circumstances. Those M.P.s who had
supported the measure were, declared Maxton, "murderers"A
Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer in August 1923
and was succeeded at the Ministry of Health by Joynson-Hicks.
2
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Sir Frederick Banbury, the cantankerous die-hard M.P. for
the City of London, objected to the use of this non-parliamentary
language. He himself had incensed Maxton by calling "hear hear"
when the latter ouoted the Government as saying it was necessary
to economise. His point of order concerning Maxton's use of the
word "murderers" only made matters worse. Maxton refused to
withdraw and told Banbury that he was one of the worst. At this
point Maxtor.' s fellow Clydesider, John "Hieatley, joined in and
repeated the controversial word. Blliot tried in vain to calm
the situation by attempting to dilute what Maxton had said,
explaining it as a heat of the moment outburst. In the end after
Wheatley and Maxton had refused to withdraw or leave the Chamber,
they were named by the Speaker and after a division were suspended.
Scarcely had the M.P.s settled again after the vote when a third
Clydesider, Campbell Stephen, stood up and repeated the forbidden
word. He too was suspended. Stephen was followed by George
Buchanan although for a different reason. He had accused the
Speaker of partisanship since he did not suspend the Conservative
M.P. Sir G. Hamilton for calling out "Jew" while Hmmanuel Shinwell
was defending the attitude of his expelled colleagues.
The storm eventually died down. In his winding up speech,
however, Blliot made a sympathetic reference to the incident.
He asserted that Maxton's personal experience explained his bitter¬
ness and use of non-parliamentary language. Further, he declared
that Maxton was "one of the most sincere, sympathetic, and one of
the finest characters in the House.If these remarks showed
1
27 June 1923, 165 H.C. Deb col 2421.
27.
"the grace and even greatness" of F.lliot* s character,"'" they
astonished and infuriated Neville Chamberlain. Unlike Elliot,
he could not appreciate the emotions and mental processes of the
Clydesiders nor indeed could he even understand Socialism as a
political creed. He wrote of his incredulity to his sister,
Hilda:
"I cannot understand the psychology of some of
our men who walked across to their benches and
endeavoured to reason with them nor of Klliot who
said in his next speech that Maxton was one of the
most sympathetic and finest characters in the
House. I think this sloppy sentimentality is
quite as bad as Hamilton's rudeness and I shall
take an opportunity of telling Baldwin so when
I get a chance."
Chamberlain was further annoyed by Klliot five months later,
this time over moves to reconcile his brother, Austen,and his
supporters. Baldwin had by the autumn of 1923 decided to seek a
mandate for Protection. This prospect horrified the Free Trade
stalwarts in the party such as Salisbury and Lord Robert Cecil
who were even more shocked upon discovering that the Prime Minister
was set upon an immediate election. On 13 November however,
something much worse came to light - moves towards "reunion" and
the imminent inclusion in the Cabinet of the T?arl of Birkenhead
3
and lusten Chamberlain. Salisbury and his colleagues threatened
resignation. Flliot and Ormsby-Gore were two of the Under-
Secretaries most opposed to the manceuvres. "Slliot was at this
1
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time a free trader but not fanatically so. Hit objection was
that Birkenhead was such a scurrilous character Neville Chamber¬
lain took the view that moves towards "reunion" had gone too far
to be reversed by order of the Under-Secretaries. He felt that
"the interests of the country outweighed personal considerations"
and that the Junior Ministers should be "told that to put their
personal dislikes first at such a crisis was disloyalty to their
chief"."'" In the event, however, Baldwin was convinced by reports
from the constituencies that the time was not ripe for recon¬
ciliation. On an ironic note, Hankey's attitude at this time to
the management of the Conservative Party was that "Baldwin has
nerve but scant capacity, and I fear will not last long".
The General election of 6 December 1923 was a disastrous
one for the Conservative Party. Baldwin had snuandered a
perfectly adeouate majority in an attempt to get electoral release
from Bonar Law's Free Trade commitment and secure a mandate for
protection. Many Ministers were defeated including Sir Montague
3 1+5
Barlow, Sir Robert Sanders, J.C.C. Davidson, and Major Boyd-
g
Carpenter. Flliot too was a casualty losing in Lanark by 230
votes to the Labour candidate, Thomas Dickson. His loss was a
blow for the Conservative Party which needed all the gifted
personable young Members it could get. Fven Chamberlain, so often
critical of the younger man at this time, was moved to express
"*"
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"You have made such a position for yourself
in the House that we can* t afford to lose
you especially in Opposition where your
debating powers wo^ld have full scope.
So don't be long."
Elliot did not have long to wait before an opportunity to
return to Westminster presented itself. William Hutchison,
Conservative M.P. for Glasgow Kelvingrove, died and Elliot was
adopted as Tory candidate in the by-election to be held on 23 May
1924. Elliot knew Kelvingrove only too well. G-lasgow Academy
stood on its northern dividing line, Great Western Road, while
the University was situated on its western boundary, the River
Kelvin. The constituency had professional, middle-class areas
within it particularly in the north and west. Tt had too, however,
one of the poorest wards in Glasgow, Anderston, which consisted
of streets and streets of slum tenements described by Elliot as
2
"these great, gaunt rookeries". Overcrowding and appalling
sanitation made Anderston which extended down to the Clyde one of
the most deprived parts of the City.
The by-election campaign was rowdy and unruly with Elliot
waging a constant battle to make himself heard. Among those who
came to speak for him was Nancy Astor. Elliot wrote from his
favourite hotel, the Central, to enlist her help signing the letter
"in partibus Bolshevorum". He declared that she was about the
only colleague he dared ask to face Glaswegian hecklers - his
NC to 'WE ouoted in Colin Coote: Companion of Honour p.83-
2
Observer 20 December 1925*
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friend, Ormsby-Gore, for instance, had "no presence to stand up
to the Clydeside Bolshies."^" Lady Astor duly arrived in Glasgow
2
and spoke in the last three days of the campaign. " Polling day
was 23 May. Elliot was elected with a majority of 4321 over the
Labour candidate, Aitken Ferguson, four times greater than that
of his predecessor. It was a sensational result for the Conser¬
vatives with a 3«8% swing from Labour and a Liberal lost deposit,
coming as it did only a day after Labour with a 4.6$ swing had
taken Liverpool 'Vest Toxteth. It marked the turning point in
the Conservative Party's by-election fortunes during the first
Labour government for of the remaining four single member seats
that fell vacant, the Conservatives gained two and held one with
Carmarthen retained by the Liberals."^ Kelvingrove was,too, a
personal triumph for Elliot. He was to hold the seat for most of
his life. Defeated in 1945» he returned to the House of Commons
the following year in the Scottish Universities by-election and
then in 1950 he recaptured Kelvingrove and held it until he died.
Elliot returned to a Parliament very different from that of
1923« For one thing the complexion of the government had changed
and the Labour Party was in office. Baldwin had lingered on until
mid-January 1924* The Conservatives were after all the largest
single party but it was to the Socialists that the Liberal Parly
had turned and thus Ramsay MacDonald had formed the first Labour
^
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administration. The new Government, inexperienced in practical
policy formulation, nevertheless pursued a cor*--+ructive policy
abroad, and at home, although unable to offer ary solution to
the unemployment problem, it did take some positive action, the
most notable measure being Wheatley's Housing Act. It was however
a minority Government totally dependent on the support of the
Liberal Party. By autumn with this Liberal support wavering it
was evident that another election had to be held and this was
precipitated by the Government's handling of the Campbell case.
The Conservatives were united and eager for office. The recon¬
ciliation between Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain and Birkenhead had
eventually taken place in February and the two former rebels had
been received back on to the Shadow Front Bench. Protection had
been dropped from the party manifesto. Instead it offered a
constructive programme of social and economic reform, focussing on
housing, local government and pensions.
Klliot found himself fighting his second election in five
months, his third in less than a year. On polling day, 29 October
1924 he was again returned as M.P. for Kelvingrove with the
increased majority of 5190. The Conservative Party won with
considerable ease, aided and abetted by the Zinoviev Letter.
Among those returned to Parliament for the first time were several
young Tories of high calibre and potential. The election of men
like Oliver Stanley, Harold Macmillan, Duff Cooper, Robert
Boothby and John Loder greatly encouraged Rlliot. Baldwin too
welcomed the influx of more young war survivors with social ideas
32.
and political prejudice far removed from the old style politics
at Vestminster. Baldwin had of course the onerous task of
Cabinet-making. His most controversial appointment was that of
Churchill, who had gone his own way since 1922, as Chancellor of
the Excheiuer. It was a shrewd, calculated move on Baldwin's
part to contain the other's trouble-making potential. Chamberlain
who had been at the Treasury during the last few months of the
previous Conservative administration was not aggrieved as he wished
to return to Health. He did however object to the apparent
hastiness Baldwin showed in wishing to name his team and his
failure to consult his senior colleagues.
"He is unfit to be leader, that is the long and
short of it and I foresee splits in the
Cabinet, resignations .and the destruction of
our great power before long."
From Tom Jones's diary, we know that Baldwin considered
making Blliot Minister of Labour but thought better of it and
chose Steel-Maitland instead, a somewhat unpopular choice. In
reply to Jones's nuery about Hlliot for Labour, Baldwin replied
"Well, I had him in mind, but my courage failed me." One can
only speculate as to what exactly Baldwin meant by that remark.
Hlliot was still very much a political tyro and perhaps Baldwin
felt reluctant to put someone without much experience into such a
sensitive office. Perhaps, too, he was concerned at Flliot's
tendency to stray from conventional party behaviour for although
NC Diary 6 November 1924.
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he was essentially a Baldwinian Conservative, Elliot did some¬
times appear to show unreasonable sympathy wi+h Tiberal and
Labour arguments. Baldwin knew that to have made Elliot Minister
of Labour would have caused a furore on his right wing. More¬
over, to promote so quickly a young man who had voted against him
at the Carlton Club would have made Baldwin very unpopular with
those who had supported him. In the end, he decided that Elliot
would benefit from a few more years of political apprenticeship
to smooth the rough edges, and perhaps also to moderate his
impulsiveness and to dilute his reputation as one of Westminster's
humorists. Consenuently, he sent Elliot back to the Scottish
Office.
Elliot's new chief was Sir John Gilmour. He too had voted
in favour of the Coalition in 1922. Industrious and straight
forward, he was a man always loyal to those with whom he worked.
Undoubtedly, Elliot had a far superior intellect but the two men
combined well together, working long and hard to tackle Scottish
problems. The major ouestion was still housing. To Elliot,
housing legislation was just one example of a sphere of life in
which government intervention could be a pov/erful force for good.
Rising building costs and the 1910 land tax proposals had brought
housing construction to a standstill before the First World War.
It was now estimated that 150,000 working class houses were
reouired. The average annual construction rate was 6,000 and
since a rate of 10,000 was needed just to maintain the position,
the situation was worsening. It was not surprising, therefore,
that G-ilmour and Elliot were eager to investigate any possible
34.
remedy. Steel houses seemed to have much to commend them.
With Chamberlain, they embarked on a campaign to have the steel
house accepted as part of the national building programme. The
obstacles were many. Most of the Labour Party regarded the
houses as unsatisfactory while the building unions objected
strongly that unskilled labourers were employed to erect them.
In Scotland, the position was somewhat different. Union oppo¬
sition was found there too but Scottish Socialists took a more
favourable view. \fter all, it was John Wheatley, Scottish
Secretary under MacDonald, who authorised the construction of a
model house at Cathcart, Renfrewshire in September, 1924- Despite
public utterances to the contrary, the Scottish Labour M.P.s took
the view that steel housing was better than nothing.
In December 192^., Chamberlain visited the firms in Scotland
offering steel housing construction."'" It was intended, subseauently,
to have local authorities build demonstration houses. Union
oppesition, however, delayed construction and led to a court of
inquiry which vindicated the G-overnment. In May 1925, Chamberlain
had to tell the Commons that only ten local authorities in England
and Wales had started on demonstration steel-houses and that only
2
four had been completed. Elliot and G-ilmour, however, pressed
Baldwin to give them the go-ahead to inaugurate a steel house
construction programme in Scotland. Chamberlain recognised that
Scotland presented "a far more favourable background for the fight
The Times 8 December 1924.
2
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with the T.U.s than England..." The English housing situation
had improved considerably whereas in Scotland the position was
worsening rapidly. Chamberlain, characteristically, felt he
could make a better job of handling the problem than the Scottish
Secretary.
"I wish I had the conduct of affairs instead of
G-ilmour. He is thoroughly honest, courageous
and well meaning but he strikes me as lacking^
in knowledge of how to 'deal with his people."
Chamberlain was none too complimentary either about Elliot.
Commenting on the Cabinet decision to agree to a Scottish housing
subsidy and to authorise G-ilmour to order houses direct in the
absence of local authority action, Chamberlain wrote to his sister
that he had "very little confidence in the Scottish Office which
will always make a bungle if it is possible to do so or in Walter
2
Elliot who is a clever windbag."
On 18 December, Baldwin announced th© Sovernment decision to
finance the construction of 2000 steel houses itself through the
Scottish National Housing Company, an agency of the Scottish Board
of Health established in 1914 to build homes for workers at the
naval yard at Rosyth, Fife.3 It was the 50%> allocation given to
the Weir Engineering Company of Cathcart that provoked the most
bitter controversy over his insistence on employing unskilled
labour. Indeed the Scottish Socialists were not so much hostile
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to the idea of steel houses but to William Weir himself and his
anti trade-unionism. The Supplementary Estimates to finance
Scottish housing including the steel houses were debated on 11
February and 3 March 1926, Elliot making excellent speeches on
both occasions."'" He proved beyond all doubt his ability to
produce a serious, well-structured case if the occasion demanded.
He showed too his ability to deal with the interruptions of skilful
debaters like Ramsay MacDonald, Tom Johnston, and David Kirkwood.
The housing debates confirmed Elliot's all-round parliamentary
skill and increased his standing in Westminster and without.
The General Strike of May 1926 delayed construction of the
steel houses. Elliot as a junior Minister was of course subject
to restrictions on public utterances, having to adhere to the
official line. Of his personal views, there is little indication
other than that he was horrified at the prospect of a bill hostile
to the trade unions being rushed through Parliament at such a
2
time. A.s time went on, union opposition to Weir collapsed and
building was able to proceed. . Chamberlain took less and less
interest in the project as it had become increasingly evident that
such a scheme was not going to get off the ground in England.
Gilmour and Elliot therefore were left to get on with it. In July,
the status of Scottish Secretary was upgraded to Secretary of
State. Elliot was made Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,
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thus becoming Oilmour's deputy in all affairs north of the Border.
Despite problems including the financial troubles of Weir and
CFlasgow city council's refusal to take over a factory geared for
large scale construction, steel house building did make some
contribution towards easing Scotland's housing problem."*"
The many aspects of public health and housing preoccupied
the Scottish Secretary and his assistant in the late 1920*s.
G-ilmour was full of praise and admiration for the energy and
ability shown by his Under-Secretary. Elliot was, he asserted,
2
"a tower of strength to any Office." There was certainly plenty
of opportunity for Elliot to shine in the unique atmosphere of
the Scottish debates. The annual consideration of the Scottish
Board of Health estimates occasioned lengthy, argumentative
debates which were however always conducted in a good-natured
manner. Woe betide any poor Englishman who tried to get a word
int He was liable to be told by Elliot or Kirkwood that he had
no right to interrupt while Scots were discussing a mstter of
concern only to themselves.3
Kirkwood like the other Clydesiders was extremely vocal on
the question of Scottish housing. He had made a bitter personal
attack on Lord "reir as he sat in the gallery during the first
debate on steel housing.'*4' His speech in July 1927 on the
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Scottish Board of Health estimates contained all the usual
ingredients, contrasting the life-styles of the poor and the
rich and accusing English M.P.s of caring nothing about the fate
of the Scottish working class."'" Elliot who spoke shortly there¬
after was constantly interrupted by Kirkwood who he had indicated
at the beginning of his speech could learn from his colleague,
Maxton, with his "masterly manner" how to keep within the rules of
2
a debate. Elliot agreed that poverty was the root of all
problems of modern industrialism and civilisation. He did not
shy away from "that festering sore" namely "the desperate and
appalling state of housing" in many parts of Scotland.^ In reply
to criticism of two-roomed house construction, Elliot pointed
out that the previous Labour administration had not acted to
prevent it and that three rooms was the minimum in any scheme
directly sponsored by the Government including the steel houses.
In fact Elliot felt that two-roomed houses could be condoned so
long as they represented an improvement on what they replaced.
Such were conditions in the 1920*s, that there were many dwellings
that would have been condemned even by previous lower standards.
Elliot believed that until the worst were demolished, it was point¬
less to undertake reclassification. He went so far on a later
occasion as to say he would be willing to accept one-roomed
apartments in these desperate circumstances, to ease overcrowding
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particularly in Glasgow.^" Through the skill and hard work of
the Scottish administration over 20,000 houses were being built
per annum by 1929* This feat served to dilute the criticism of
the Opposition and to enhance the political reputations of the
two men responsible.
Elliot had one other major concern during his years of
political apprenticeship. In March 1926, Baldwin established
the Empire Marketing Board on the recommendation of the Imperial
Economic Committee. Chaired by the Dominions Secretary, Leo
\mery, the Board was an enterprising and enthusiastic body. No
one contributed more to that than Elliot who quickly became one of
its moving spirits. His scientific training, ideas, energy and
boundless enthusiasm were invaluable. For three years he was
Chairman of the Research Grants Committee which concerned itself
with all aspects of agricultural production and provided grants
for scientific research with an allocation of 25/& of the Board's
budget. Elliot was most directly concerned with research into
the relationship between the mineral content of pastures and their
2
nutritive value. One of his pet projects was the establishment
of a "parasite zoo" with a view to breeding and despatching
throughout the Empire those parasites which kept down the numbers
of harmful insects, in effect redressing the balance of Nature
that the diversity of Imperial agriculture had upset.^
1
11 June 1928, 218 H.C. Deb 5s col 769.
2
Sir John Boyd-Orr and Sir Stephen Tallents obit, of WE in
Royal Society Biographical Memoir 1958, p.76-79-
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The Times 21 June 1927.
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Elliot1s work for the Empire Marketing Board fitted in
with his special interest in agricultural science and economics
as did a trip to Palestine with Boyd Orr and Bussell^" in April
1927 and his leadership of a three-man delegation to Nigeria
during the winter of the same year under the auspices of the
Empire Parliamentary Association. Elliot was never a dogmatic
Free Trader although he did not become a convinced Protectionist
until the late 1920's by which time it seemed to him that nothing
else would arrest unemployment or the potential collapse of
British agriculture. In the years before the 1929 General
Election, however, Elliot was more concerned with promoting the
aims of the non-political Empire Marketing Board to encourage
voluntary preference on the part of British consumers for Empire
products than he was to participate in the arguments already
beginning to be heard again in his party for and against Protection.
One thing that he did feel strongly about was the need to re¬
organise the Government departments responsible for imperial
affairs. He believed that having one Minister for Empire and two
for Europe was the wrong way round. He suggested to Tom Jones
that there should be separate Dominion and Colonial Ministries
with in addition the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster becoming
Chairman of both the Imperial Economic Committee and the Empire
Marketing Board. Of the three Empire Ministers, one should be
continually travelling throughout the Empire and thus only two
Sir John Russell, Director of Rothamsted Experimental
Station.
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would attend the Cabinet.
Elliot had seen what a government could accomplish in a
wartime situation freed from its normal self-imposed restraints
in peace time on intervention in mapy aspects of social and
economic life, in particular industrial production and efficiency.
He and marjy of his fellow young Conservatives were determined
that there would he no return to pre-war laissez-faire Conservatism.
Instead, they ware determined to convince their party that large-
scale intervention was not only necessary for Britain's economic
progress hut moreover for apy real improvement in industrial
relations and the general social condition of the people. Four
of these progressive Conservatives namely Hobert Boothhy, Harold
Macmillan, John Loder, and Oliver Stanley published in 1927 a
political tract which set out proposals for improving the mechanism
of consultation between government, trade unions* and management
on the principle that the state must play a more positive role in
2
the reorganisation of industry.
Elliot too made a literary contribution in 1927 but his
"Toryism and the Twentieth Century" was of a far more philosophical
and complex nature."* ^ter treating his readers to a highly
individualistic whistle-stop trip down the ages of parliamentary
Walter Elliot to Tom Jones 23 July 1928 in Tom Jones
Whitehall Diary Vol II, p.140-141•
2
Industry and the State: \ Conservative View (London: MacMillan,
1927).
^ V7alter Elliot: Toryism and the Twentieth Century (London:
Philip A.12anA Co. Ltd., 1927-J
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and party history, Elliot expounded the belief that instinct
and observation of life must be the guide in the major politioal
task of formulating the conditions of the industrial state.
Twentieth century industrial problems should be solved by
voluntary association instead of the alien, dogmatic theories of
Socialism. Elliot's main objective was to provide his party with
a philosophy, fundamentally related to instinct. Toryism, he
asserted, was not and could not be a creed of logic. Indeed
its strength was and must be that it was based on the irrational
in man. \fter all, life, love, and death were all irrationalities.
Elliot's theories created considerable political controversy
among older Conservatives. Baldwin wrote a eulogistic intro¬
duction but even he could not go as far as accepting Elliot's
conclusion that "biology is the logos of Toryism"."'" For Elliot
the scientist, Toryism was kinetic, a moving philosophy which
should adapt itself to changing circumstances in the same way as
did nature itself. Only to a very few Conservatives was Toryism
a philosophy of life as it was to Elliot. Press reaction was
for the most part excellent. A,round the time of publication*
Elliot was mentioned as a candidate for the post of Financial
Secretary to the Treasury following Ronald McNeill* s move to the
Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster in place of Cecil who
resigned over the failure of the Disarmament Conference. Mary
papers saw the fact that Baldwin had written the preface as
significant. The Manchester G-uardian had already declared that
Toryism and the Twentieth Century p.154-
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Elliot was known at Westminster to be "the ablest brain that has
accrued to the Conservative party in the present political
generation."^" Baldwin's introduction served to confirm the
Manchester Guardian's belief that Elliot was favourite for the
vacancy. tt any rate it proved "that his intellectual abilities
and especially his unusual combination of the scientific with the
political mind, are fully appreciated by the head of the Govern¬
ment."^
The Daily Sketch gave Elliot a rapturous review. It asserted
that he expounded his theory "with a provocative liveliness that
3
makes his book capital reading." The Times asserted that it
showed "how fertile are the minds which the modem Conservative
Party attracts and contains."^ The Daily Telegraph. felt it
proved that it was not in Elliot's nature "to wield a dull pen
any more than it is to make a dull speech in the House of Commons."
The Daily Express took the idiosyncratic view that the book
represented "a medical vindication of his political views'1^ while
the G-lasgow Herald trumpeted it as "Major Elliot* s joyous challenge
7
to philosophy." The Observer wished that "all Conservatives
Q
were as enlightened" while The Sunday Times, forgave what it saw
Manchester Guardian 20 Oct. 1927.
2-
Manchester Guardian 26 Oct. 1927.
^ Daily Sketch 26 Oct. 1927.
The Times 26 Oct. 1927*
^
Daily Telegraph 26 Oct. 1927«
^
Daily Express 27 Oct. 1927*
^ Glasgow Herald 27 Oct. 1927-
Q
Observer 30 Oct. 1927-
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as some hasty generalisations for its flashes of real insight."''
Peter Ibbetsen of the Nation and Athenaeum was "stupefied by its
audacity" with the division of mankind into two groups - Whigs,
mathematicians, rationalists, philosophers against Tories,
2
biologists, evolutionists and intuitionists. The New Statesman
commenting on its complexity, asserted that many readers "after
several desperate attempts to understand what it is all about,
will probably conclude that they are having their legs pulled."
Elliot's argument was "an adventure that takes one's breath
„3
away.
If this "metaphysical handbook on Toryism"confounded margr
of his Conservative colleagues by getting down to first principles,
it certainly showed that Elliot was not stagnating intellectually
during his time in the political backwater of the Scottish Office.
On the contrary, Elliot was at this time giving much thought to
the need for the Conservative Party to introduce progressive
reforms not only for economic and social reasons but also to dilute
the political appeal of Socialist Utopianism. Writing in the
first issue of the Kelvingrove Unionist Magazine, Elliot stressed
the importance and potential of adult education. It had been
recognised from the beginning by the Socialists who had established
colleges and the Workers' Educational Authority. Elliot asserted
that the future of Britain and the Conservative Party depended to
The Sunday Times 30 Oct. 1927-
2
Nation and Athenaeum 12 Nov. 1927.
^ New Statesman 19 Nov. 1927-
^ Westminster G-azette 27 Oct. 1927.
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a large extent on the degree to which Conservatism adopted and
used the weapon of adult education. Everyone should study and
debate the great issues of the day be they economic, political,
constitutional or social in nature. Therein lay the future.
"In discussion upon all these problems the
citizen trained and educated by interest
and study will inevitably lead. And the
citizen who leads in interest and study
to-day will lead jn determination and
action tomorrow."
Elliot despite all the speculation did not get the post of
Financial Secretary to the Treasury. Instead it was given to
A.M. Samuel. He, however, proved somewhat of a failure.
Churchill who had selected him fell out with him within a short
2
space of time. In May 1928, in anticipation of a heavy workload
and difficult debates, Elliot was appointed to help Churchill and
Samuel with the Budget and Finance Bill. The appointment was
seen as recognition of Elliot's ministerial calibre.^ His
performance greatly impressed Churchill. Writing to Baldwin, he
expressed concern for the party's future asserting that "without
a stream of new talent we cannot hold our ascendancy." Of the
junior Ministers, "Walter Elliot is by far the best."^ Elliot
enhanced too his reputation with younger colleagues and members
of the Opposition. Labour M.P. Rosslyn Mitchell acknowledged
Kelvingrove Unionist Magazine Nov. 1927 Vol No.l.
2
NC to Hilda 20 August 1929- NC Papers 18/1/666.
Elliot played a major part in the Committee and Report stages
of the Finance Bill: 25/26 June 1928, 219 H.C. Deb and 23 July
1928, 220 H.C. Deb.
^
G-lasgow Herald 2 May 1928.
**" Churchill to SB 2 September 1928. SB Papers vol 36 f.76/7«
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all the predictions of a brilliant future for Elliot and stated
that he was "chuckling his way through high politics tinted with
science and a benevolent humanism."''" "Robert Boothby praised him
in a broadcast on the popularity of Scottish M.P.s.
"Where would you find a more typical Scotsman
than he? He has one of the most fertile
brains in politics today. He it was who,
like Horatius on the bridge, met single-
handed and repulsed the first onslaught of
the Clyde men in the Parliament of 1922. ?
\nd they like him all the better for it."
Elliot had yet another opportunity to win his spurs with the
conduct of the Local G-overnment (Scotland) Bill during the winter
of 1928/1929' A.fter prolonged argument in the Cabinet over the
derating measures with Chamberlain and Churchill the main pro¬
tagonists, separate bills for Scotland anfl England were introduced
in Parliament, with Chamberlain producing one of his finest
speeches on the Second Reading of the English Bill. Elliot told
his constituents that the parliamentary progress of such a contro¬
versial bill proved "the strength of the position which Mr.
Neville Chamberlain has won for himself both in the House and in
the party." It was "a striking example of what can be done by
sheer character and competence." His Second Reading speech had
assured the passage of the bill and had brought him within "the
very small circle of potential Prime Ministers.""^ The Scottish
measure was more radical than its English counterpart. The
Daily Record & Mail 5 May 1928.
^
Baily Express 14 Nov. 1928.
3
Kelvingrove Unionist Magazine Vol 2 No.9 January 1929.
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Opposition having committed itself to wider changes produced no
effective objections to the 75?& derating of productive industries
and the reduction of agricultural rates to the point where the
farmer was liable only for 1/8.
The Scottish local Government Bill produced thirteen days*
strenuous debate with most M.P.s objecting to certain aspects.
Fundamentally the bill's aim was to centralize responsibility for
quasi-national services by transferring them from the multi¬
plicity of authorities to the county councils.^ The five services
affected were the police, roads, health, education, and the poor
law. With the exception of education, a similar transfer of
control had been effected in "England. The debates proved that
the Scots were "clearly by nature and tradition a disputatious
2
race." Discussion centred on the abolition of the various
authorities and the transfer of functions to the county councils
and the burghs. Derating had been exhaustively debated during
the passage of the "English bill and figured very little in the
3
Scottish debates. Elliot produced sterling performances. With
Gilmour becoming ill midway, Elliot was left to 3ee the bill
safely through. In the middle of it, he suffered further personal
The bill set out to abolish 1,064 of the 1,298 authorities.
All parish councils, district boards of control, district com¬
mittees, educational authorities and standing joint committees
were to be scrapped leaving only 33 counties and 201 burghs. In
the event, Gilmour made a concession whereby district councils
were set up to deal with purely local matters.
2
Saturday Review 9 February 1929*
3
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5 December 1928, 223 H.C. Deb 5s cols 1240-1254-
11 March 1929, 226 H.C. Deb 5s cols 925-944.
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loss with the death of his father.
As the life of the 1924 Parliament drew to a close and the
1929 General Election approached, the press followed its tradition
of assessing the work of the Commons and the performance of its
Members. Elliot was widely acclaimed. The Sunday Times asserted
that Elliot would go furthest of the young M.P.s of the 1924-1929
Parliament having enhanced his political reputation in spite of
the relative obscurity of the Scottish Office."'" The Glasgow
Herald too recognised that Elliot had become "a Parliamentary
gladiator'' despite spending years in a department which was
universally regarded as disadvantageous to further political
2
promotion. Elliot still tended to speak in a rush with words
tumbling out in great profusion. Hore-Belisha, a future Cabinet
colleague quipped at this time that Elliot spoke so rapidly that
he had "completed a column of Hansard before you have heard his
name called by the speaker."^ Such a defect, however, was very
attractive given his most pleasing voice with its Scottish lilt,
his exuberance, and his humour. Elliot's speech characteristics
figured prominently in contemporary profiles. 'Janitor* asserted
that it was Elliot's "unfailing good humour, his geniality and
his genuine love of his fellow beings, oombined as these qualities
are with a gift of vivid, picturesque language which makes him the
most engaging and stimulating of companions."^ Another profile
^
The Sunday Times 12 May 1929.
^
Glasgow Herald 14 May 1929*
^ The Evening Standard 24 May 1928.
^ 'Janitor'; The Feet of the Young Men (London: Duckworth, 1928).
7^.95.
49.
written around the same time though published somewhat later
asserted that Elliot became overwhelmed with ideas and could not
weld them together into a cogent, concise argument. This explained
the fact that "his style is hurried, impetuous, broken, and
suggests a turbulent Highland stream plunging over the rocks."
Again, however, the author felt that Elliot's harmonious voice and
endearing manner redeemed this technical imperfection.^
It was widely believed within Parliament and the Press that
Elliot was destined for promotion if his party were returned at
the General Election. Baldwin was impressed by his performance
at the Scottish Office and was now seriously considering giving him
a Ministerial appointment. His name cropped up in Cabinet-
making discussions that Baldwin had with Tom Jones from as early
as Autumn 1928. Jones suggested that Elliot be made Minister of
2
Agriculture after the election. Baldwin* however* was once
more thinking of Elliot as a possible Minister of Labour."' It
was* of course, not to be.
The major issue of the May 1929 General Election was
unemployment. The policies put forward by Lloyd George and his
temporarily united Liberal Party based on the report of the
Liberal Industrial Inquiry had dominated the scene. The "Yellow
Book" included proposals for the expansion of joint industrial
councils, the use of the Bank of England"s controls over credit to
maintain steady trade, the establishment of an Economic General
^
James Johnston: A Hundred Commoners (London: Joseph, 1931). "0*36
p
Tom Jones Diary 24 October 1928 and 25 February 1929, Vol II
p.154 & p.172.
^ T.J. Diary 5 March 1929.
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Staff within the government and the placing of industries of
public concern under public boards.^" The Liberal programme,
however, especially emphasised a fifth aspect of the report,
namely that of attacking unemployment with a large-scale programme
of public works. Labour, for its part, offered what appeared to
be another version of the Liberal programme spiced with socialist
rhetoric.
The Conservative party was in far greater difficulty. As
a government, it had a difficult record on which to campaign for
despite the fact that in mary ways it had been the most progressive
administration for a generation, its achievements were obscured
by its comparative failure to reduce unemployment. With the
Liberals proffering unorthodox and potentially electorally appealing
policies and Labour quickly jumping on the bandwagon, the Conser¬
vative Parly was in danger of losing the initiative. The
unfortunate choice of the slogan 'Safety First' did not appeal to
an electorate only too aware of the increasing unemployment problem
particularly in those areas already badly depressed by the slump
in heavy industry. The government went to the country offering
a rather dull programme of more slum clearance* better maternity
welfare schemes* and more technical education while promising no
introduction of Protection or food taxes but instead the simpli¬
fication of the safeguarding procedure and the consideration of
its application to any industry. The Conservative Government,
it seemed, had simply run out of steam.
C.L. Mowat: Britain between the Wars 1918-1%0 (1955)
(London: MethUen Edition, 1972), p.3W«
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The Conservatives were defeated arxl Ramsay MacDonald formed
the second Labour Government. Elliot was returned for Kelvin-
grove with the reduced majority of 1,858. He at least survived
in the decimation of the ranks of the young progressive Tories.
Of the central core of the group calling itself the 'YMCA' which
had Elliot's sympathy although office had prevented him from
more definite affiliation, only Robert Boothby and Oliver Stanley
survived with Harold Macmillan, John Loder, Noel Skelton, Duff
Cooper, and Terence O'Connor all going out. There was however
considerable consolation for Elliot in the Conservative defeat
in that he was freed from the restraints of office and could now





Almost immediately after their election defeat came the first
signs of the bitter intra-party recrimination that would plague
the Conservatives for many months. It took the form of attacks
on the leadership that were of an infinitely more serious nature
than merely the natural grumblings in the aftermath of defeat.
Criticism of Baldwin came from various groupings for differing
reasons. Those leading the opposition on one aspect of the
leadership's policy could be Baldwin's most ardent supporters on
another. The progressive wing, for instance, were critical of
their leader for not expounding more reformist policies in public.
It felt that the party had shown "unimaginative smugness" by
campaigning on its "Safety First" slogan.'*' The radical Tories,
however, supported Baldwin all the way on and admired his attitude
to the Indian question. This was the rajson d'etre of another
set of opponents, namely the traditional Conservative imperialists,
vociferously led by Churchill and Birkenhead. These two
together with Austen Chamberlain worried Baldwin further with
their revived notions of a rebirth of the Liberal-Conservative
coalition with Lloyd George. Baldwin's main problem, however, vras
the thorny issue of Protection. He had to contend with ardent
advocates of full-blooded tariff protection like Leo Amery and
Anthony Fden: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962),
p.11. —
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more discreetly Neville Chamberlain but, while a tariff man himself,
Baldwin had to balance them with the Free Trade wing. The
unrest within the Party was in the months to come exacerbated to
crisis level by the manoeuvres outside it of two press barons, Lord
Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere.
In the autumn of 1929, the various murmurs of discontent
were becoming louder with Amery clamouring for a full-blooded
tariff policy while Colonel G-retton and his Diehards hit out
against the inertia of the Front Bench in its first months in
Opposition. Baldwin was given a taste of things to ccme on the
Indian question when he aroused considerable controversy within
the party by announcing his full support for the Irwin Declaration
which promised Dominion status before the Simon Commission had given
its opinion which in the event turned out to be unfavourable. In
the meantime, Lord Beaverbrook discarded the idiosyncratic campaign
for railway modernisation, that had occupied him quite harmlessly
in the previous months, in favour of a return to his old cause of
Empire Free Trade. The basic difference between the as yet
publicly unpronounced policy of Baldwin and that of Beaverbrook
was the latter*s advocacy of food taxes, "thai ancient albatross
that had plagued the protectionist cause from the beginning."
Elliot played no part in the early stages of the leadership
troubles. In August 1929, he went to South Africa to represent
the Empire Marketing Board at the Pan African Agricultural Board
and Veterinary Conference in Pretoria. He addressed the Assembly
^
T.F. Lindsay M. Harrington: The Conservative Party 1918-1970
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on the Board's work with particular reference to recent advances
in animal husbandry and entomological research. .liile there, he
received an honorary degree from the University of South Africa.
This episode served to refresh Hlliot after the commotion that
always surrounds a G-eneral Election. He did not return to
Britain until early October having followed the Cape to Cairo
route. Once back, he made speeches and wrote articles calling
uneauivocally for the introduction of a general tariff incorporating
Imperial Preference and tacitly for more radical policies and
stronger opposition than was offered by the party leadership.
Harly in 1950, Hlliot and five of the other brighter prospects
on the left-wing of the Conservative Party got together and decided
to hold weekly dinners and to work together in the belief that
Opposition was the time for young politicians to make their mark.
The other five were Oliver Stanley, Ormsby-Core, Noel Skelton,
W.S. Morrison and Anthony Hden. They espoused similar views on
domestic policy, promoting social and economic planning and co¬
partnership in industry. In the years to come, with the exception
of Noel Skelton who died in 19 35» these progressive Tories would
find themselves on the anti-appeasement side of Chamberlain's
Cabinet. It was during one of their discussions that what later
became a familiar phrase, "a property-owning democracy", was coined
by Skelton.
Around this time too, some of the progressive Tories including
Anthony ^den: Facing the Dictators p.12-13.
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Blliot started discussions with young politicians from the other
two parties. The central figure in these talks was Oswald
Mosley. In January 1930, Mosley, then Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster, submitted an unemployment policy memorandum to the
Prime Minister. His proposals included public works, the
development of agriculture, tariffs and import restrictions, a
more liberal credit policy with government control of banking, and
the rationalization of industry under public control. If
Mosley's memorandum did not represent a comprehensive alternative,
it certainly called for drastic changes to be made in traditional
economic policy values. The memorandum caused a considerable
stir among the Cabinet which eventually rejected it in May leading
to Mosley's resignation from office.
During 1930, Mosley had frequent discussions with young
politicians of various political shades. Hlliot, Buchan and
the four authors of Industry and the State were among those
progressive Conservatives who agreed with the principles behind
Mosley's ideas. They shared the frustration that although the
efficacy and potential of direction and planning had been demon¬
strated by the large-scale intervention of the state in wartime,
the contemporary orthodox thesis was that government could do
little to solve the immediate crisis let alone undertake economic
and industrial reconstruction. Harold Nicolson took note of
one gathering of the unhappy young men in ,'ebruary 1930 at
Oliver Stanley* s composed of Stanley himself, Tlliot, Mosley,
O'Connor, Moore-Brabazon and Boothby. "They talked about the
decay of democracy and parliamentarianism. They discuss whether
56.
it would be well to have a fascist coup. They are most dis¬
respectful of their party leaders This reference to
fascism is interesting for it must be remembered that at this
time fascism was not the dirty word it later became. On the
contrary, Mussolini was seen by many Conservatives as the saviour
of Italy from Communism and the initiator of a new industrial and
patriotic spirit resulting in a vast improvement in his country's
material well-being. Buchan in an article bemoaning the dearth
of new men and ideas cited Italy as the one exception: "But for
the bold experiment of Fascism the decade has not been fruitful
2
in constructive leadership."
Despite considerable disillusionment, Elliot and his
colleagues believed that national reconstruction could be achieved
through the parliamentary process with the right politicians
following the right policies. It was difficult for them to
maintain confidence in the reforming potential of the leaders of
either of the main parties. On the other hand,an alliance or
at least a declaration of agreement between an all-party group
might force the issue. If some form of centre-party was to
emerge from all the intrigue and private discussion* then it
seemed quite probable that leadership would go to a man in a
position to exert influence, like Lloyd George or Churchill who
were themselves continuing their perennial coalition discussions.
On the other hand, there was some speculation that the leader of
R. Skidelsky: Oswald Mosley p.224.
2
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a new party composed of progressive centre elements would come
from the group of young dissidents Itself. Mosley was one name
mentioned, Blliot another. At the time, it was written that
TClliot was "a man of ideas, imagination, and considerable flexi¬
bility of mind, which might lead him and his followers into
situations very difficult to interpret according to the old party
traditions."
In March 1950, Elliot attended a small and somewhat unusual
gathering. With Stanley and Ormsby-Gore, Wlliot had dinner with
Sidney and Beatrice Webb to discuss the latter's idea of dividing
the machinery of government into two. Tom Jones acted as con¬
venor. This strange ensemble discussed the practicability of
creating two parliaments, to deal respectively with home and
foreign affairs. Beatrice Webb was struck with how "oueerly
unconventional" such a party was. As for the actual discussion,
she noted the following in her diary.
"The talk was good and to the point. They were
all theoretically in favour of some such
partition. But Blliot, who alone thrashed out
the details, brought out the difficulty of
finance - of allocating the power to levy
taxes and the responsibility for expenditure
between the two assemblies and executives.
Also he demurred to the inevitable
^
emasculation of the existing local government."
Of the progressive Tory trio, Beatrice Webb was most impressed by
Blliot, asserting him to be "the dominant figure" of the three.
She declared to Tom Jones that "the Scot is worth the two of them
Time and Tide 25 April 1930.
^
Beatrice Webb Diary vol kb- 7 March 1950. BLP^S.
58.
put together.""*" Jones, himself, had taken a keen interest in
Elliot's political career from the very beginning and had frequently
discussed his prospects with Baldwin. In early 1930, his
estimation of Elliot was extremely high as conveyed in a letter to
his daughter in which he stated that "Walter Elliot and Oliver
p
Stanley are among the most promising for the very front line."
Meanwhile relations between Baldwin and the Press Lords had
become steadily worse despite the mediating attempts of Neville
Chamberlain. In February, Beaverbrook and Rothermere formed the
United Empire Party. There were occasional truces like the
agreement in March that should the Dominions favour food taxes, the
issue would be put to a referendum. Neither Baldwin nor Beaver¬
brook, however, was happy with this compromise and soon Central
Office was issuing assurances that there would be no such taxes.
Beaverbrook was keen to draw Elliot into his campaign. His
biographer notes an extraordinary meeting in November 1929 between
Beaverbrook, Boothby, Macmillan, Edward Hulton, and Elliot.^
The last named was said to have favoured a crusade against
Communism. This does not somehow ring true. Elliot took a far
more tolerant view of the Soviet Union than most Conservatives.
He could admire the 5 year economic planning although he detested
the harsher side of the Stalinist regime. Taylor goes on to say
that the rest of the gathering favoured Empire Free Trade and
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showed willingness to ditch the old brigade of Baldwin, Lloyd
George, Churchill and Birkenhead in favour of Mosley, Keynes,
Jowitt, and Beaverbrook himself.
In any event, Beaverbrook was eager to enlist Klliot.
Certainly 1?lliot was excited at the possibilities of imperial co¬
operation and research on a wide range of issues from entomology
to public health. He was also convinced of the worthiness of
the principles of Hmpire wree Trade. "lliot's experience at
the Hmpire Marketing Board lent weight to his belief in the potential
of the Kmpire as a prototype common market which he believed could
really be effective if based on the rationalisation of industry,
regarding the Hmpire as a single entity. In April 1930, speaking
to the Primrose League at the Albert Hall, Tlliot praised Beaver¬
brook and his followers for their ideals, asserting that they had
set themselves a. standard ''which is as it is right for Crusaders
to do - a high and difficult standard of attainment and one which
may take a long time to a.ccomplish."Two months later on 6
June, less than three weeks before the first Carlton Club meeting*
Beaverbrook sent Klliot the following astonishing letter.
"I like the prospect of your leading the Kmpire
Free Trade movement more than 1 can tell you ...
Horne won't lead, and Neville Chamberlain
won't lead ... While I have tried them both, I
would rather have you to lgad it than either*
so far as I am concerned."
Beaverbrook also wrote to Amery in similar terms1 Klliot wisely
replied that Beaverbrook himself wis "the leader of this show,
Evening Standard 4 April 1950.
2 ~~
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and the whole of the leader, and rightly and inevitably so."
Despite his April speech, Elliot in common with most Conservatives
did not publicly support Beaverbrook's Hmpire Free Trade Campaign
as such.
In the summer of 1930, there was a significant development,
if only of short-term impact, in the internal Conservative Party
nuarrel. J.C.C. Davidson had been persuaded to resign as Chair¬
man of Conservative Central Office and Neville Chamberlain was
appointed his successor. Chamberlain, himself, had visited
Davidson and suggested he should go."*" He had however, or so it
appears from his papers, no real ambition to aspire to the position.
His brother Austen suggested Kingsley Wood, Fyres-Monsell or
Flliot as possible candidates. In the end, however, Chamberlain
accepted it "as an expedient to preserve the unity of my party."'
(living this job to Chamberlain was a very shrewd move on Baldwin's
part for it meant that in effect he took his heir-apparent
prisoner, tying his hands in any future raancruvres hostile to the
leadership^ and intensifying Chamberlain's problem of conflicting
loyalty and ambition.
The removal of Davidson helped prepare the way for Baldwin's
triumphant performance at a party meeting convened in the Carlton
Club on 2k June 1930 which was in effect a test of confidence in
the leadership. In a brilliant speech, Baldwin spoke against
food taxes and attacked certain sections of the press, Lord
^
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Rothermere in particular, for trying to dictate party policy.
Baldwin's performance might have been "one of the most shattering
triumphs of his entire political career"''' but this success only
gave him temporary respite. During the summer months, increasing
pressure was put on him by Tories to clarify in public the
official party line on the whole question of tariffs. In October,
Baldwin endorsed a policy statement inspired by Neville Chamberlain
which represented the long-awaited unenuivocal commitment to
protection and Imperial Preference and which was designed to
give the party a 'free hand' on the whole question including even
2
duties on foodstuffs. This 'free hand' policy was carried
unanimously but for Beaverbrook at the second Carlton Club meeting
on 30 October. 41though Beaverbrook's candidate won the
Paddington South by-election held the same day* the real victory
belonged to Baldwin. Once again, however, it was shortlived and
the general atmosphere of party intrigue continued.
4 few days before the Carlton Club meeting and the Paddington
South by-election, Cliveden had been the setting for an informal
gathering of some of the young disgruntled Tories. Rlliot was
there along with Boothby, Macmillan, O'Connor, Ormsby-G-ore* and
Brendan Bracken. They discussed the forthcoming Commons debate
on the King* s Speech and considered the idea of Blliot introducing
an amendment damning all three political parties! All seemed to
be annoyed at Baldwin for apparently running after Beaverbrook
K. Middlemas & J.Barnes: Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1969), p.573-
^
NC Diary 11 October 1930.
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and Elliot read MacFlecknoe's verses that appeared in that week*3
Nation and Ithenaeum to the amusement of all."*" Tom Jones was
left with the impression that "the tide has turned very much in
favour of L.G. because of his incomparable executive power, and
I think most of this group would follow him if he could be got
2
into the saddle again." The Liberal leader himself was playing
the double game of officially supporting the MacDonald Govern¬
ment but privately holding discussions with Churchill, Mosley and
the young Tories. In December 1930, Lloyd George and Archibald
Sinclair along with several young progressive Conservatives
attended a private dinner given at a London hotel by Fobert
Boothby. This gathering aroused the atten- ion of the popular
press which interpreted it as a move towards the formation of a
centre party, with one paper describing it as "the genesis of
3
the National Party idea: perhaps also its nucleus." Any
political significance was however denied by those present.
Speculation that a new political party was in the making had
been heightened by the freauent gatherings in the autumn at
Oswald Mosley1 s house in Smith Scuare.*4" Mosley at this time
reached his zenith within the conventional party system in terms
of personal and political standing. At the same timej however,
he was coming to believe that while left-wing Tories were eager
to discuss their frustrations and talk of possible political
realignment in the form of a centre progressive party, they looked
Nation and ithenaeum, 25 October 1930. See Appendix II.
^
Tom Jones '"/hitehall Diary Vol II 19 2 5-1930 p.275*
3
"Evening Standard 11 December 1930.
L
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to have every intention of remaining within the Conservative Party
in the hope of influencing its attitudes and policies from within.^
In December 1930, Mosley took a step in a different direction
in his search for a power base when, with sixteen fellow Labour
M.P.s and Arthur Cook, he published a manifesto in the national
press. Basically, it declared that the Government must adopt
certain of the interventionist elements of the Conservative and
Liberal programmes to evolve a national plan. Failure to do so
would result in Britain very soon facing a balance of payments
and budgetary crisis. The major differences between the manifesto
and Mosley's memorandum of January 1930 were that tariffs were
now espoused as was a Cabinet of five, both alterations repre-
2
senting a move towards progressive Toryism.
Flliot with Macmillan, Boothby and Moore-Brabazon took the
bold step of sending letters of generous praise to the press.
Flliot in his letter of 11 December declared that Conservatives
could fully agree with Mosley's call for import control through
tariff or licence and the necessity for inter-Imperial planning.
As for Mosley* s proposal of a five-man Cabinet without portfolio
acting subject only to parliamentary veto, Flliot declared it was
"a reform which many of us would consider almost essential if
responsibility is to be fixed and vigorous executive action
facilitated." Finally, Flliot commended the courage of Mosley
and his colleagues in publishing the manifesto and asserted that
*
R. Skidelsky: Oswald Mosley p.232-236.
2
For details of the Manifesto see R. Skidelsky: Oswald Mosley
p.237-239* K.Middlemas & J. Barnes: Baldwin p.606.
"courage, whether right or wrong, is no quality to he light-
heartedly dismissed under the prospect in which we stand to-day.
Less than a week later, Elliot repeated Mosley's manoeuvre by
making his own appeal in a letter published in the national press
this time in conjunction with Robert Horne, John Buchan, and
Oliver Stanley. They called for a programme similar in marry
respects to that of the Mosley manifesto. This involved rigorous
economy with no further expansion of the social services for the
time being, the protection and rationalization of industry, and
the re-establishment and extension of oversea markets through a
■twin policy of imperial planning and bilateral agreements. The
quartet called for national effort and sacrifice. The present
dire situation required a change in attitudes with "the renunciation
of creeds which are hallowed to mary by sentiment and tradition"
and "the abandonment of the secular habit which constrains
parties to bid against each other with the people's money."
There must be compromise in politics and industry in order to
facilitate consensus action on the economic crisis. "Democracy
itself was at stake and the suspicion was growing that represen¬
tative government might be inconsistent with efficiency. There
was no truth in this but action had to be taken to allay such
2
doubts.
Baldwin, speaking at the Constitutional Club, tacitly repri¬
manded the authors of the various letters. He emphasised that
Letter published in national press 11 December 1930. See
Appendix III.
2
Letter published in national press 17 December 1930. See
A.ppendix IV.
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there was already a national party representative of all the
people - the Conservative Party - and he took the opportunity to
remind all present that political zigzagging often led to young"
politicians being passed over for promotion."'" It was with
paternal concern however and not annoyance that Baldwin rebuked
Elliot and his colleagues. The fact was that despite all the
speculation, the young radical Tories remained fundamentally
loyal to Baldwin in the belief that "his leadership would keep
our party truly national, both in the sources of its strength and
2
the objectives of its policy." Baldwin himself was both
accessible and sympathetic to his young men. It was their
impetuosity that he questioned and not their loyalty. His reply
to Elliot's written apology for having implied the inadequacy of
Conservative policy spelt out the fact that he saw Elliot and
his colleagues as those who would shape the Conservatism of the
future.^ ' •»
In the final analysis, the participation of the young
progressive Conservatives in freouent discussions across the
political spectrum was never more than a flirtation, a reflection
of their youthful enthusiasm and political frustrations. It was
only common sense, however, to keep their options open just in
case Baldwin was in fact overthrown. The progressive Conser¬
vatives played little part in the last serious challenge to the
leadership. It came as always from the right wing, sparked off
1
Daily Express 19 December 1930.
2
Anthony Eden: Facing the Dictators p.12.
Colin Coote: Companion of Honour p.118. See Appendix V for
Baldwin's reply.
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by disagreement over Baldwin's declaration in favour of responsible
federal Government in India and Churchill's ensuing resignation
from the Shadow Cabinet- After a series of events during which
he came close to resignation himself, Baldwin embarked on a
spirited counter-attacking campaign which re-established his
mastery of the Party and diminished the influence of the press
lords. His triumph was followed by the resounding victory of
the progressive Conservative Duff Cooper at the St. Q-eorge's by-
election which spelt the effective end to the Conservative
leadership struggle-"'" Baldwin, the Talleyrand of the twentieth
century, had survived and the Conservative Party itself during
the last five remaining months of the Labour Government was to be
more united than it had been since the 1929 G-eneral Election.
Elliot was naturally relieved that the leadership struggle
was finally over and the P°rty reunited for by March 1931 he had
considerably advanced his claim to Cabinet Office in the next
Conservative Government. Elliot had somehow managed to con¬
solidate his position within the Party without having had to stifle
his own views to so do. This he achieved by treading a path
somewhere between the official party policy and his own progressive
beliefs. As we have seen, Elliot did on occasion incur Baldwin's
irritation at his divergence from the official line but in general
he did not maintain such a critical standpoint as say Boothby
inside the parliamentary party and Macmillan outwith. The fact
1
See K. Middlemas & J. Barnes: Baldwin p.587ff* for a detailed account
of the leadership crisis of February/March 1931- Best source for
the by-election itself is Gillian Peele: 'St. George's and the
Empire Crusade' in C. Cook & J. Ramsden (ed.): By-Elections in
British Politics.
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was that during the years 1929-1931, Elliot successfully com¬
bined his activities as one of the progressive Tory group with
his role as an official Opposition spokesman on economic affairs.
/Vs a result of the 1929 election defeat, Elliot had been
freed from the restraints of a particularly restrictive office.
Baldwin, in appointing Elliot a front-bench economic spokesman,
presented him with the ideal opportunity to show his wider
talents and his matured capacity for debate. Elliot's first
assignment came in November 1929* The former Minister of Labour,
Sir irthur Steel-Maitland, had been defeated at the G-eneral
election while his former Parliamentary Secretary, Sir Henry
Betterton, was in Palestine as a member of the Commission sent
out to investigate the recent riots. In their absence, Hlliot
was made Chief Conservative spokesman on the bill on unemployment
insurance, an issue that was to pre-occupy Hlliot throughout the
term of the second Labour (Government. Indeed, it was his skilful
handling of this complex question that did more than anything
else to enhance his political reputation and prospects during his
period in Opposition.
Hlliot moved the motion of rejection of the Second Reading of
the Unemployment Insurance Bill on 21 November."'" He made a
long and diffuse speech which nevertheless inspired the Spectator
to attribute to him "the most interesting mind in politics today"
and predicted a "commanding political future and possible leader¬
ship" whether or not he developed the ability to order his
1
21 November 1929, 222 H.C. Deb 5s cols 752-767-
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speeches.This last comment referred to Flliot's tendency of
talking faster than he thought and being distracted from the main
thread of his argument. The section of the Unemployment
Insurance Bill that caused the most trouble was Clause 4 which
sought to modify the "genuinely seeking work" condition of
receiving benefit to the position where payment would be withdrawn
if work was refused. In response to vehement opposition by over
thirty left-wing Socialist M.P.s led by Maxton, the C-overnment
withdrew the clause. The redraft disqualified applicants for up
to six weeks if work was refused but for this purpose employment
was not deemed suitable if it was available due to a strike or if
it offered lower wages and poorer conditions than the applicant's
previous work. It was undoubtedly a victory for Labour's left
wing as was emphasised by Elliot in his Third Reading speech
when he asserted that while the Chancellor had endeavoured to
tighten the restrictions applying to the Unemployment Insurance
Fund, Maxton had pulled in the opposite direction.
"Like the web of Penelope, everything that the
Chancellor weaves during the day the hon.
Member for Bridgeton undoes during the
night."
Flliot's conduct of the Conservative attack on the Unemploy¬
ment Insurance Bill was widely praised in the Conservative press.^
He played a prominent part in other Bills at this time, particu¬
larly in obstructing the progress of the early stages of the
1
Spectator, 30 November 1929-
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Small Landholders (Scotland lets) Amendment Bill, a Liberal
measure which was the subject of much controversy well into
1930 with Elliot in the middle of the fray. Rlliot was a
skilful obstructionist and enjoyed every minute of it. For
once, his speech characteristics were perfect for the part.
The Nation commented wryly that "Labour members should know by
this time that to interrupt "Walter is like fighting the Hydra;
for every sentence you cut off ten grow in its place.""'"
Flliot also eagerly introduced a private bill on 26 November
to enable Scottish education authorities to supply cheap or free
2
milk to children. In 1927 under the auspices of the Fmpire
Marketing Board after representations from the Scottish Office
with Rlliot as the link between the two, he and his nutritionist
friend John Boyd-Orr, had carried out experiments in feeding milk
to school children in certain areas. As a direct result of
receiving more milk, the weight and general health of the
children concerned greatly improved thus suggesting the need for
such a bill as that which Rlliot now introduced having seen it
crowded out of the legislative programme of the Conservative
Government of 1924-1929. '"/ith full support from the nexv
Secretary of State, "/illie Adams on, and his Under-Secretary, Tom
Johnston, who themselves were to commence similar experiments in
Lanarkshire in February 1930 again under the auspices of the
B.M.B., Rlliot's Rducational (Scotland) Bill "passed through the
"*"
Nation and Athenaeum 21 December 1929«
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Committee stage on oiled castors.""'" it went on to receive a
Third Reading without division in May at a time when many other
private measures fell by the wayside and came into effect shortly
thereafter.
In the meantime, the Labour Government was conducting an
increasingly desperate search for a panacea for rising unemploy¬
ment now over the two million mark. There were plenty of ideas
around but none that appealed to a majority of the Cabinet.
Snowden was the main reason behind the apparent bankruptcy of
ideas on the part of the Government. He was in too powerful a
position to permit an expansionist policy but at the same time he
was not strong enough politically to enforce the policy of
deflation in which he really believed. TTius it was that a
Socialist Cabinet found itself intellectually paralysed in the
face of what seemed to be the long awaited collapse of capitalism
2
in Britain. One problem in particular which was worrying the
Government early in 1930, was the increasing debt of the Unemploy¬
ment Insurance Fund.
The Cabinet first discussed in March the possibility of
appointing an all-party committee to consider the insolvency of
the Unemployment Insurance Fund.3 Towards the end of July,
Margaret Bondfield, the Minister of Labour, set up a three-party
committee with Vernon Hartshorn,^ ^rthur Greenwood and herself
"*"
Scotsman 21+ May 1930.
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representing the Government and Ernest Brown and Isaac Boot the
Liberals. For the Conservatives, Baldwin nominated Hlliot and
Sir Henry Betterton, describing them as "two of the most capable
and best men 1 have who are familiar with the subject.""'" Their
selection was popularly received by the Conservative press, summed
up by the Bvening Standard's assertion that "no two clearer-headed,
better-informed and more courageous members of the Opposition
2
could have been chosen."
'lliot had, in response to the Minister of Labour's call
earlier in the debate, indicated Conservative willingness to
participate in all-party talks given the right conditions during
the Second Reading of the Unemployment Insurance (No.4) Bill on
23 July. On the problems arising from over-production, "lliot
emphasised that the solution would not be found in any gospel of
hate.
"If we attack these Questions in a spirit of
bitterness and hostility, we shall deal with
the question of the surplus all right. 'Ve
shall destroy the surplus and there will be
nothing for either of us to have. To enjoy
what modern medicine and modern science have
put into the hands of the human race - that
is the problem before every one of us."
On the question of the Unemployment Insurance T,und, Flliot made
his feelings quite clear. He was completely at one with the
official party line which was that the Fund must be made solvent
again as soon as possible, that this should be achieved by either
Morning Post 28 July 1930.
^
Fvening Standard 29 July 1930.
3 23 July 1930, 241 H.C. Deb 5s cols 2199-2200.
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an increase in contributions or a decrease in benefits or indeed
a combination of both, and further that the Fund should be put
back on to an actuarial basis with separate provision being made
for those no longer eligible for benefit. Indeed this auestion
of the future of the 300,000 in receipt of transitional benefit
paid by the ^xcheauer was a major issue the Committee was to
consider.^ The Committee was given the status of an advisory
committee to the Cabinet and its proceedings, therefore, were
2
secret. ~ it had too the assistance of the Cabinet Secretariat.
■\fter a preliminary session, the Committee adjourned until the
beginning of September to allow the Ministry of Labour to prepare
reouested data, information and documents."^
During his curtailed parliamentary vacation, llliot was as
much in demand as ever as a writer and speaker. One major
appearance was a lecture he gave early in August to the ILP summer
school held in V'elwyn, Hertfordshire. Tlliot accepted this
invitation to speak with great pleasure. Often lamented as a
"lost soul", he was extremely popular among the left and enjoyed
the personal friendship of many especially the Clydesiders who
had a high regard for him as a fellow Scot. Indeed at this time
in Parliament, there was an unusually high degree of 'clannish-
"Transitional" referred to those who had paid 8 contributions
in two years or 30 at any time. To be fully insured, one had
to have paid 30 in two years.
2
Proceedxngs of the Advisory Committee on Unemployment
insurance: Cab.27/429 ACUI (30).
^ ACUI (30) 1st meeting 28 July 1930.
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ness' among the Scottish members. Elliot's warm personality
of course further commended him to his political opponents.
Despite all these factors, hovever, to be asked to speak at the
1LP summer school was remarkable for a Conservative M.P.
In his lecture entitled "The Twentieth Century - a Tory point
v
of view", Elliot set out uneouivocally his belief that "the huge
sleeping partner of the State in modern industry is not a
phenomenon which will last very long." The first decisive step
towards making the State a 'live' partner had, he suggested, been
taken by the derating legislation passed by the late Conservative
G-overnment. intervention by the State on a large scale was
renuired to deal with the current problems of capitalism. There
was for instance the twentieth century problem of glut caused by
the capitalists' production of "mountains of goods which we cannot
deal with." Elliot advocated the use of tariffs to control
foreign trade in preference to import boards as favoured in
Socialist circles and which he considered would be more likely
to lead to international complications. Finally, and most
importantly, Elliot appealed for more continuity in the legis¬
lation passed by different governments.
"The State must be continuous. One of our
difficulties now is the danger of rapid
reversals^of problems from one side to
another."
In effect Elliot was advocating • the middle way* or a centre
progressive policy between that of State ownership and laissez-
^
Manchester Guardian 7 \ugust 1930.
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faire capitalism and based on a managed mixed economy. 'Vith his
fellow progressive Tories, perhaps the younger duo of Macmillan
and Boothby in particular, Elliot represented the early 1930's
version of the Butskellite of the 1950's.
Early in September, the three-party committee resumed its
discussions on the Fund. v/ithout reaching any definite con¬
clusion at its second meeting, the committee examined possible
courses of action on the ouestion of transitional benefit. It
was agreed that it was imperative to restore the prestige of the
Unemployment Insurance Fund and to take steps to put it on an
actuarial basis. The obvious political difficulties of raising
contributions or reducing benefit led the committee to consider
the alternative, that of limiting the number of unemployed who
qualified by taking those in the transitional category out of the
scheme. They would be dealt with under a totally separate scheme
possibly administered by the Employment Exchanges but with the
machinery for evaluating claims and rates of payment being quite
distinct from the insurance scheme. Greenwood suggested that a
Royal Commission should be appointed to consider the whole
problem. Elliot did not object in principle to a full ennuiry
but felt it wrong in the meantime to have to seek to increase
further the borrowing powers for the Fund without making some
alteration to the current regulations. He felt that legislation
should be introduced as soon as possible to separate the tran-
sitionals from the insured and to make the Fund self-supporting.
He pointed out, too, that public opinion might not tolerate the
75.
continuation of the current anomalies and abuses or an increase
in the Fund's deficit.^"
An account of the committee's proceedings at its second
2
meeting appeared in The Times the following day. 'Vhether
Elliot was responsible for this leak is open to nuestion.
Certainly he discussed the progress of the committee with Colin
Coote by now on The Times who wrote a trilogy of leaders on
3
unemployment later in September. At the third meeting, the
committee agreed not to make any statements whatsoever to the press.
It could not agree, however, on what intermediate action should
be taken pending a full-scale investigation. The Labour repre¬
sentatives advocated extending the borrowing powers of the Fund
and the conditions of transitional benefit and the Liberals
reluctantly contemplated a reduction in benefit. Elliot and
Betterton conceded that the transitional period should be extended
and the Fund authorised to borrow further but asserted that any
Bill to effect such proposals should make provision for reducing
the numbers on the Fund, remedying minor abuses, and clarifying
the distinction between unemployment insurance and transitional
benefit.^ At the fourth meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Unemployment Insurance on 23 October it was agreed that the repre¬
sentatives from the three parties should submit their views in
3
secret memoranda as soon as possible. The Conservative and
ACUI (30) 2nd meeting, 8 September 1930.
2
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Liberal committee members were given no indication whatsoever of
recent developments within the Labour Cabinet concerning the
unemployment insurance question. On 15 October, the Minister
of Labour had submitted a memo to the Cabinet in which she
asserted that there was no short-term alternative to increasing
further the Fund's borrowing powers and extending transitional
benefit. She recommended that a Royal Commission be appointed to
look into the whole field of unemployment insurance and other
arrangements for assisting the able-bodied unemployed. In the
meantime, the Cabinet should decide whether to act to end the
worst abuses, thereby reducing the numbers covered by the Fund."'"
It the next meeting of the Cabinet, Bondfield's proposals were
2
referred to a panel of Ministers. This body reported back to
the Cabinet on 22 October, the day before the fourth meeting of
the three party committee.^ It recommended that there be no
increase in insurance contributions nor reduction in benefit
pending the report of a Royal Commission which it advocated should
be set up to review the whole euestion of unemployment insurance,
making interim reports on abuses and transitional benefit. Its
conclusions were accepted by the Cabinet.
The Conservative and Liberal Parties were astonished to
learn for the first time in the King's speech that a Royal
Commission was to be set up. They were incredulous that such a
Memo by the Minister of Labour. CP 318 (30) submitted to
Cab 60 ( 30) of 15 October 1930.
2
Cab 61 (30) of 17 October 1930.
5 Cab 62 (30) of 22 October 1930. CP 354 (30).
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step had been taken before the memoranda of the representatives
on the Advisory Committee had even been considered. The
Cabinet, it seemed, had simply swept aside the Committee's work.
This summary treatment infuriated the Opposition while the
referral to a Royal Commission without any intermediate legis¬
lation was widely interpreted as a delaying tactic, yet another
instance of the Government's unwillingness to take decisive
action on the economic crisis.
Rlliot took the first opportunity to protest in parliament at
the Government's behaviour when he spoke on the second day of
the debate, following Baldwin in putting the Conservative case.
He condemned what he saw as the relegation of the question of
unemployment insurance to a Royal Commission and the Government's
apparent volte-face on its proclaimed policy of inter-party
cooperation. The Government just did not have the courage to
act on this most urgent nuestion. Rlliot was annoyed that
MacDonald in his speech had seemed to suggest that referring the
matter had been the committee's idea. This was nonsense, he told
the House, and what made matters worse was the fact that the
Committee's reports had been tossed aside without having even been
considered. The committee had tried to face facts and to produce
a common front on certain drastic measures that seemed necessary.
In brushing this attempt aside, the Government was discrediting
parliament."'" Hlliot followed up this speech by writing to
1
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Margaret Bondfield to complain about the treatment of the
Committee."'' He protested once more with Betterton and Foot at
2
the final meeting of the Committee on 5 November. The protests
were in vain and the appointment of the Royal Commission went
ahead without arty amendment of the law to remedy abuses or to
separate the transitionals and the insured. Indeed, the only
immediate measure introduced by the Government was one to
further increase the borrowing power of the Fund.
Elliot at this time was giving much thought to certain wider
aspects of economic policy, in particular those relating to
Empire. In a lengthy article in The Sunday Times. Elliot
argued in favour of industrial planning and development on an
imperial basis.
"Inter-Imperial rationalization, the recognition
that every small state should not strive to be
universally self-sufficient, is the political
and economic discovery which our sprawling
confederation is specially fitted to work out
and proclaim."
In other words, economic nationalism must not be taken to extremes
if the Empire as a whole was to prosper. Secondary industry
development in the Dominions should be recognised for they were
determined on it and, in conjunction with the expansion of
primary production, it should in fact act to provide a bigger
market by expanding purchasing power. Hovrever, the Empire did
offer the possibility of planning a quarter of the world through
1
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rationalization and it would make little economic sense to have
the same plants, some unprofitable and requiring G-overnment aid,
in every dominion. The recent Imperial Conference had recog¬
nized the desirability in principle of industrial rationalization
on an Empire basis but Elliot declared that with Snowden at the
Treasury, the Labour G-overnment would not even consider a fiscal
policy to stimulate inter-Imperial trade far less that of
organizing industrial production along inter-Imperial lines.
Elliot condemned the G-overnment for paralysing the Conference
and declared that "we must not go to Ottawa with the same hoof-
handed Ministers who are wrecking the opportunities of to-day."
In conclusion, Elliot declared that a general tariff could be so
planned as to secure subsequent industrial and urban development
while at the same time the unions and middle classes could be
drawn closer together.'*'
Another question that greatly concerned Elliot towards the
end of 1950 was that of Palestine. The G-overnment in October
published a Vhite Paper to the effect that JeWish immigration
must virtually cease until productivity improved in order to
prevent the displacement of Arabs. This enraged Zionists
including Elliot who was a life-long Gentile Zionist and a friend
of Chaim Yeizmann. The controversial nature of the T?hite Paper
resulted in all-party recognition of the need for the Government
to clarify its attitude to the Mandate. Elliot and Amery put
The Sunday Times, 23 November 1930.
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the Conservative case that the Vhite Piper nullified the Balfour
Declaration."'" Vera Teizmann in retrospect recalled that
2
"Walter Elliot was wonderful and. spoke on a very high level."
In the event, the Yhite Paper presaged "but did not cause the
later curtailment of Jewish immigration for in February 1931
MacDonald made a statement which greatly modified its intended
restrictions.
In the first Quarter of 1931, Flliot was kept busy in
Parliament for, apart from fulfilling his own role as spokesman
on unemployment insurance and related matters, he and the Scottish
^hip, Sir F.C. Thomson led the Conservative Party in Scottish
affairs owing to the indisposition of the Shadow Secretary, Sir
John Cilmour. As we have seen, the first three months of 1931
was a time of internal crisis in the Conservative Party which
however emerged at the end of it more united than it had been
since its defeat in 1929. The conclusion of their troubles had
also the effect of stirring the Conservatives into more vigorous
Opposition. This was clearly demonstrated by their reaction to
Snowden* s Budget and the subsequent Finance Bill during the
debate on which they made considerable use of snap division and
obstruction tactics.
Snowden was for Flliot as for most Conservatives the villain
of the piece, the immovable force behind Labour's intransigence
on economic policy. His budget towards the end of April 1931
1
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was intended as a stop-gap measure. Elliot asserted that
Snowden was "in the position of a man who has been on the edge
of a precipice and has looked over and is terrified at what he
has seen" and was merely taking steps to try and hold the
position."'" The main feature of the Budget and the Finance
Bill was the Land Tax clause which caused heated argument and
debate. Elliot was especially involved in the acrimonious
debates on clause 30, the application of the provision to Scotland.
The Lord \dvocate was subjected to fierce personal and political
attack from the Opposition benches. Apart from abhorrence of
land tax in principle, Elliot and other Scottish Conservatives
were aghast at the Government's apparent intention to alter
Scotland's age-old land valuation system and align it with that
2
south of the border. The Conservatives also vehemently opposed
the income tax clauses designed to collect 75% of the tax under
Schedules B, D, and E in January and the remaining cuarter in
July instead of the current 50/50 arrangement. Elliot,
protesting vigorously at the guillotine invoked on them^was called
to order no less than seven times.^ The increase on petrol tax,
however, was a protectionist measure and as such was welcomed
by the Conservatives. In effect, the Budget was not so much
the last Free Trade one but more the first Protectionist one.
This did not, however, encourage the Conservatives to review their
1
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assessment of Snowden and Elliot continued to declare throughout
the country that Snowden must not be in a position to introduce
a third budget. Ironically, when Snowden did just that in
September, Elliot was by his side on the Treasury Bench as his
Financial Secretary!
The Conservative Party organized an extensive platform
campaign throughout June on a four point programme of economy,
protection of industry, gmpire Trade, and assistance for agri¬
culture. This basically educational campaign was designed to
attract that large proportion of the electorate which, while
disillusioned with the Labour government, was not nuite convinced
that the Conservative Party would be any better. Flliot was
one of the major speakers in this campaign. \t Knutsford,
Cheshire, he made a rousing speech to an audience in the region
of 10,000. While forcefully criticising the Labour government,
glliot directed much of his attack against the Liberals who were
preventing an election to settle the Protection issue and who
were in the classic position of having power without responsi¬
bility."^ This theme he repeated at Spondon, Derbyshire, a week
later on 27 June comparing Lloyd george's relationship to the
Labour government with that of a nurse and a naughty child in a
pram. In another analogy, he compared Snowden's use of the
nation's capital for current expenditure to that of a person
selling his dining-room table in order to buy meat. This
2
"rake's progress" would if not halted bring the nation to disaster."
"^Cheshire Daily Fcho 22 June 1931-
2
Derbyshire advertiser 3 July 1931.
83.
Elliot's last major parliamentary speech before the fall
of the second Labour Government came early in July 1931 on the
Second Reading of the Unemployment Insurance (No.3) Bill which
was based on part of the Report of the Royal Commission which
had superseded the three party tdvisory Committee on Unemployment
Insurance towards the end of 1930. The most important aspect
of the bill was its intention to transfer to an extra-parliamentary
advisory Committee the responsibility of defining conditions
under which benefit was to be granted and refused. Rlliot did
not make the usual kind of party political speech but instead
offered "an interesting and unconventional contribution to the
philosophy of the whole subject.""'" Rlliot declared that the
Bill was a D.O.R.'U for unemployment insurance, a confession of
parliamentary incompetence to deal with the question in the
usual way. He felt however that the removal of control in
this matter from parliament, the administrative attempts of which
had hitherto been economically unsound, to an outside body
deserved trial as an experiment. The proposal did at least
signify that the Labour Government was at last trying to do sane-
thing constructive and deserved qualified support for at least
2
being better than nothing.
r,he story of the last weeks of the Labour Government of
1929-1931 is well known. It fell due to dissensions as to how
to save the pound. The proposed measures to survive the world
1
Daily Telegraph 9 July 1931.
2
8 July 1931, 254 H.C. Deb 3s cols 2112-2121.
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slump were reductions in benefits and rigid financial orthodoxy -
the traditional solution. Finance caused the crisis but did
not determine its outcome. That was shaped by politics and
personalities."'" The parts played by the central characters and
their motives have been ever since the subject of great historical
debate. Flliot played no part in the behind-the-scenes drama.
Its end product, however, the formation of the National Govern-
ment, brought him the appointment of Financial Secretary to the
Treasury. This post was traditionally considered to be the
stepping stone to Cabinet office: Flliot had just over a year
to wait.
For a detailed account of the formation of the National
Government see K. Middlemas & J. Barnes: Baldwin; R. Bassett:
1931: Political Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1958): and R.
Skidelsky: Politicians and the Slump (London: Macmillan, 1967)*
65.
Chapter 5
Financial Secretary 1951-19 52
The formation of the National Government on 24 August 1951
was intended as a temporary expedient to facilitate the imple¬
mentation of the measures of economy thought necessary to remain
on the Gold Standard and to balance the Budget. This objective
was regarded as the sole, immediate task and r-ison d'etre of
the coalition. Once achieved, there would be a return to
previous political alignments and an election would be held,
the main issue of which would be Protection versus Free Trade.
This then was the generally held interpretation of the develop¬
ments of late August 1931. Flliot was sceptical from the
beginning, believing that the coalition would endure for rather
longer. Privately, he was in no doubt as to the true complexion
of the new administration.
I
"In fact this is not a National Government
and does not begin to be a National
Government. It is a perfectly ordinary
straightforward bourgeois bloc, which will
naturally attract the 'relentless hostility'
of the Opposition
The supposition that this bloc will
automatically dissolve itself in a few
weeks* time is fantastic. Whatever its
nominal dissolution, it will in fact
remain."
Flliot had of course worked since entering Parliament for
more inter-party cooperation and even for a centre progressive
^
to Chaim Yeizmann, 27 August 1951. WB Papers Box IF.
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bloc. He therefore approved of what he termed "the coalition
of Coalitions," the nature of which however astounded him:
writing to his future wife following his acceptance of the post
of Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Elliot admitted that
despite being "a hardened coalitionist," a coalition of himself,
Snowden and Archie Sinclair had not entered into his calcu¬
lations. One appointment evoked sarcastic comment.
"Do you realise that your ex-party actually
has shoved Lord Crewe (I) into this Govt,
in a major post, Secy, for 'Var. Crewel!
He was past his work in Asouith's day.
Bracken lost £1 on declaring that he was
dead and John Boyd declares he _is, dead
& has been appointed as a measure of
economy."
Elliot asserted that the new G-overnment as constituted could
only last a short time on account of the party position in the
House of Commons. He declared it was impossible to rebuild
sterling on a 20-50 seat majority and that the longer the
Government hung on, the less chance it, the right-centre bloc,
had of winning an election.
Elliot attended the Conservative Party meeting held in the
Kingsway Hall on 28 August in order that Baldwin could explain
his reasons for committing the party to coalition. At the
gathering, the strict limits of the Government's task, its short
life expectancy and the nearness of an election were underlined.
Baldwin spoke in terms of part 1 and part 2. The former repre¬
sented the proposed economy legislation and the balancing of the
^
TE to Katharine Tennant, 28 August 1931. In the possession of
Baroness Elliot.
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Budget. Baldwin stressed that alone was the raison d' etre of
the National G-overnment.
"After that, our agreement ends and we
part company, because we then get to
part 2, the tariff."
In other words, once the measures of national economy had been
carried, the Conservatives would fight the inevitable election
on a Protection platform.
The following day, Elliot made his first public speech
following the formation of the National G-overnment and his
appointment as Financial Secretary to the Treasury. The venue
\
for the speech, which had been arranged long before the dramatic
developments, was Carluke in the constituency of Lanark which
Elliot had represented when first elected to Parliament in 1918.
He praised MacDonald, Snowden and their Liberal/Labour colleagues
for putting the country before their parties. Explaining his
own appointment as assistant to Snowden, he asserted that National
G-overnments made strange bedfellows. Elliot denounced the
policy of the last G-overnment, some leaders of which he now sat
alongside in the House of Commons. He recused them of ignoring
the warning signs of the imminent economic blizzard.
"We do not blame them along for the storm but
what we do say is that, seeing these signs
of distress and danger in other countries,
they have drifted and drifted and dallied
with the situation until we find ourselves
within twenty-four houj;s of a collapse of
the British currency.""
1
Manchester G-uardian 29 August 1931.
2
Daily Record & Mail 29 August 1931.
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He looked forward to the inevitably impending election at which
he hoped a mandate would be given for taking the necessary albeit
unpleasant measures to rescue the country from its deep-rooted
economic malaise. Hlliot stressed that once the immediate
crisis was over, reconstruction would demand a radical economic
re-thinking with all previously held axiomatic beliefs and
orthodox economic theories being subjected to a complete
re-evaluation.
The House of Commons met on 8 September when a motion to
set up the Committee of Ways and Means was treated as a vote of
confidence which the National G-overment won by 309 votes to
24-9- In the next few days, the G-overnment introduced its
programme of economy taking powers to make Orders in Council to
effect reductions in expenditure. On 10 September,a frail
Philip Snowden, solicitously attended by Klliot, introduced the
Budget in one of his greatest parliamentary performances. It
inspired the greatest ovation a Chancellor of that era had
received, with the somewhat bizarre spectacle of rows and rows of
cheering Liberals and Conservatives while across the floor
Snowden's former colleagues booed and hurled abuse. The measures
themselves were severe with cuts in unemployment benefit, child
allowances, educational expenditure, and the pay of the armed
services, civil service, police and teachers. Income tax was
to be increased and the exemption level lowered while the price
of beer, tobacco, petrol and entertainment went up. Finally,
G-lasgow Herald 29 August 1931-
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the Government sought power to reduce the interest on the £2000
million block of 5% far Loan. The Budget was in fact almost
identical to that proposed by Snowden to the former Labour
Cabinet.
The National Government had ostensibly been formed for a
limited period to achieve a specific objective, namely to balance
the Budget and keep the £ on the Gold Standard. In the days
that followed Snowden's Budget statement, it became clear that
events might not go as planned. Unrest including the mutiny at
Invergordon over the proposed pay cuts was blown up by the foreign
press into a crisis of the first dimension. The drain on gold
accelerated into a deluge. On 19 September, Sir George Harvey,
deputising for the absent Montagu Norman, advised the Government
to go off gold. Two days later, the Gold Standard ( Amendment)
Bill was passed suspending the 1925 A.ct by which Britain had
returned to gold. This followed the Government's announcement
that pay cuts would not be more than 10JS2. The Government's
action had far-reaching repercussions throughout the world, with
a sharp decline in international liquidity and a further con¬
traction of trade. In Britain itself, however, it caused hardly
a stir. Pew appreciated that it heralded the beginning of a
new era, an unconscious revolution in economic thinking reflected
in the rejection of the orthodox response of severe deflation.
Irr his speech on the bill, Hlliot appealed for calm and caution.
"There is no greater danger to the nation than
the loss of a balanced mind. There are three
important balances: there is the balance of
the Budget, the balance of trade and not less
vital, the balance of mind. Unless we can
90.
maintain a balanced mind in face of these
potential dangerj they may easily turn into
actual dangers."
glliot in those critical days proved to be a very able
lieutenant and source of strength to Snowden. His experience
in assisting Churchill with the 1928 Budget stood him in good
stead. He proved skilful in avoiding Opposition booby traps
on the Budget resolutions themselves and on 23 September, made
an impressive major speech when winding up for the Government on
the Second Pending of the Finance Bill.
The following day, "glliot attended a meeting of the Conser¬
vative Party Business Committee at which Baldwin declared in
favour of going to the country as soon as possible on a united
2
national platform. The ten man Cabinet had agreed a week
earlier that there should be an immediate election but at that
time it still seemed likely that the coalition would break up
and the parties would fight on separate platforms. To begin
with, Baldwin had felt obliged to stick to the original agreement
made at Buckingham Palace,J and despite his readiness to work
with anyone towards Protection, he looked forward to the freedom
of fighting the election on a party basis. By mid-September
however, under increasing party pressure, he could no longer
resist the politically attractive idea of an early General
Election on the basis of a national appeal by the National
1
21 Sept. 1931- 256 H.C. Deb 5s col 1356.
2
NC Diary, 24 Sept. 1931-
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Government. At a meeting of the 1922 Committee on 21 September,
a motion in favour of an emergency tariff and an early General
Election was passed unanimously. This served to reinforce
Baldwin's attitude and the manoeuvres to maintain the National
Government began in earnest.
The Business Committee meeting of 24 September accepted
that MacDonald should lead during and after the election on a
national programme seeking a free hand but including wide-scale
Protection. Neville Chamberlain felt that this decision proved
truly that the Conservative Party was "a wonderful embodiment of
good sense, patriotism & honesty."1 The National complexion of
the Government would be preserved by MacDonald as Prime Minister
with his National Labour colleagues on the Government benches.
As for the Liberal P«trty, it was by this time irrevocably split
into the dogmatic Free Traders led by Samuel and the more
conciliatory Simonites with Lloyd George on the sidelines recovering
from an operation. A. few days earlier, Simon had come out in
favour of an emergency tariff and by 23 September no fewer than
29 Liberals had signed a memo to MacDonald in support of any
measures thought necessary by the Cabinet majority to restore the
2
balance of trade. The Conservatives therefore could accep^ as
a likely consequence of planning an early election on a full
tariff platform, the alienation of the Samuelites. Indeed many
Conservatives positively wanted rid of Samuel and his colleagues.
Leo Imery, admittedly biased as an arch-Protectionist, noted that
1
NC Diary, 24 September 1932.
2 s
Middlemas & Barnes p.641-2.
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at the Business Committee meeting "we were all agreed as to the
great importance of pitching our tariff demands high enough to
make sure of getting rid of Samuel and, if possible, Heading.""*"
Elliot and his progressive friends too had little love for
Samuel. Ormsby-Gore had feared as far back as the date of the
formation of the coalition that his party might be compromised
by its association with the Liberals and had told his leaders of
2
his mistrust of "a twister like Herbert Samuel."
In the days that followed, the Conservatives wooed and won
MacDonald. He was not unnaturally concerned that he was being
used and might be cast aside at any time. In the end, however,
he agreed to lead the Government into an early election on a
free-hand manifesto or doctor's mandate. His decision was
influenced by his bitterness at being expelled with all his
National Labour colleagues from the Labour Party. He did
however insist on Liberal approval. There was no problem with
the Simonites who a few days later officially severed their links
with the other Liberals. The Samuelites found themselves in an
unenviable position: if they resigned as advised by Lloyd George
then they could be charged with deserting the national cause and
provoking the return to party warfare: on the other hand, to
accept what the Conservatives were proposing went against their
principles. In the event, they did the latter. After discussions
between Samuel, MacBonald and Chamberlain, the Liberals
"*"
Leo Amery: My Political Life Vol III 1929-1940 (London:
Hutchinson, 1955) p.68.
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relinquished their objections to an early General Election.
Chamberlain and other leading Conservatives felt that Samuel
had completely surrendered while they had conceded nothing and
while they might have preferred not to have to include them, in
the circumstances there was little option as "though we saw most
serious difficulties in working with the Free Trade Liberals we
could not keep them out if they swallowed everything we put
before them.""'" There was still, however, the question of a
manifesto. A.fter three or four days of intense negotiation, it
seemed that the Samuelites would after all leave the Government.
\t the last moment, however, at the dramatic Cabinet meeting of
4 October, agreement was reached that the three parties in the
coalition should produce separate manifestos. On this somewhat
bizarre note, Parliament was dissolved and an election called
2
for 27 October."
In effect there was only one election issue, whether in
principle there should be a National Government. 'Hie verdict
was overwhelmingly yes. The Labour Party and the ILP were
reduced to 52 seats while the coalition won 556 seats. No
sitting Conservative lost and many Tory candidates who had
contested 'safe* Socialist seats suddenly found themselves at
Westminster. It was however a victory for the National
NC Diaiy, 1 October 1931.
2
For a fuller account of the discussions and manoeuvres of late
September and early October 1931 which culminated in an agree¬
ment to fight the General lection on a National platform with
three separate manifestos see David Trench: 'The National
Government 1931-1935*, Ph.D thesis, Univ. Coll. North Tales
1973 p.27-56. Also Middleaias & Barnes: Baldwin p.640-647.
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Government and not a party victory for the predominant
Conservatives. Cabinet-making was particularly complex on this
occasion with MacDonald determined not to have a Cabinet totally
dominated by Conservative Ministers. He had too to treat the
Liberals as two separate, epual factors. Samuel was left at
the Home Office but to balance things, Simon}who turned down the
Board of Trade, was made Foreign Secretary."'" This latter appoint¬
ment proved extremely unpopular and indeed most of the political
intrigue and speculation over Cabinet changes in the next four
years concerned the removal of Simon from this post. For all
that, MacDonald's Cabinet of 1931-1935 proved to be one of the
most stable of our time with only a very few changes in personnel.
This and the fact that three parties were involved reduced
considerably opportunities of promotion for young Conservatives.
Rlliot, who scored a resounding victory in Kelvingrove with a
majority of 9066 over his Labour opponent, was by this time,
however, well and truly on the threshold of Cabinet office. He
would undoubtedly have been made a Minister in 1931 in a
Conservative administration. \s it was, he was reappointed
Financial Secretary, and found himself with a new chief, Neville
Chamberlain, who succeeded Snowden as Chancellor of the Rxchecuer.
On the morrow of the election victory, Conservative Ministers
in the new Cabinet began to press for the tariff legislation they
believed essential to economic recovery. Walter Runciman had
been appointed President of the Board of Trade in order to balance
1
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the Free Trade and Protectionist interests in the Cabinet, the
latter chiefly represented by Chamberlain at the Treasury.
Runciman, however, followed Simon in accepting the use of a
tariff as a temporary expedient. Accordingly, in December,
the Commons was treated to the spectacle of a Liberal Free Trader
introducing a measure which in effect heralded the beginning of
a political revolution, giving a Minister wide protectionist
powers. The measure in ouestion was the Abnormal Importations
Bill. This empowered the Board of Trade to impose duties up
to 100% ad valorem on mamfactured goods entering Britain in
abnormal quantities. Immediately the bill became law, duties
were put on such items as cutlery, typewriters and woollen goods
followed by cameras and electric lamps. Shortly afterwards,
the Ministry of Agriculture acquired similar powers to intervene
in the importation of fresh fruits, vegetables and flowers after
the passage of the Horticultural Products (Emergency Duties)
Act.
With this breakthrough achieved, the Conservatives in the
Cabinet felt justifiably that they were well on the road towards
their aim of introducing a general tariff. A few obstacles
stood in their way, in the form of their Cabinet colleagues from
the other parties in the National G-overnment. Runciman did not
present any problems, indeed having introduced the first measure
of protection he and his department went on to give full support
for a general tariff. Simon, too, accepted the arguments in
favour of protection as an expedient to alleviate the country* s
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economic ills. The President of the Board of Trade and the
Foreign Secretary joined Chamberlain and Cunliffe-Lister on
the six man Balance of Trade Cabinet Committee which was there¬
fore loaded from the start against the free trade interest
represented by its other two members, Herbert Samuel and Philip
Snowden. Thus, the Committee appointed ostensibly to give
exhaustive, impartial consideration to the whole nuestion of
import policy did no such thing and proved merely to be the
vehicle through which the protectionists formulated the steps to
be taken to implement their policy aims.
The majority recommendation in January of a general tariff
occasioned a Cabinet crisis, with threats of resignation from
Samuel, Snowden, Sinclair and Maclean. Chamberlain had been
sceptical from the outset of the Committee's deliberations that
Protection would scare off the Free Traders. He believed that
" Archie Sinclair and * our Herb* will stick to their offices like
leeches."'*" There was certainly a great deal of argument within
the Cabinet in January 1932 but in -the end as Chamberlain
predicted no resignations took place. Instead a somewhat
bizarre arrangement suggested by Hailsham was made which was
known as the agreement to differ. Under such a formula* Cabinet
Ministers would be free to speak and. even vote against measures
forthcoming to implement the Balance of Trade Committee's
decision in favour of a general tariff. It was an historic
1
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abdication of Cabinet responsibility but passed with scarcely a
ripple in a nation searching for reconciliation in domestic and
foreign affairs. Half a century earlier, the switch to
Protection would have been sensational provoking widespread
public reaction. In 1932, however, all emotion had gone out of
the Free Trade-Protection debate. Neville Chamberlain alone saw
the Protectionist victory in emotional terms, the fulfilment of
his father's dream.
The Import Duties Bill proposed a 10% ad valorem tariff on
almost all foreign imports except those already dutiable and
certain other goods which were now specifically exempted. \mong
items on the free list were foodstuffs like meat, maize and milk.
Imperial products were exempted pending the Ottawa Conference to
be held during the summer. The bill also provided for the
creation of the Import Duties Advisory Committee upon the recom¬
mendation of which the Treasury could order the imposition of
additional duties. Neville Chamberlain introduced the money
Pesolution on 4 February. He made a powerful speech at the end
of which he paid moving tribute to his father whose ideal it was
that was being put into practice.
Herbert Samuel's speech was not merely a reaffirmation of
his Free Trade belief but was in fact an all-out attack on the
proposals put forward by the Government in which he was Home
2
Secretary. He had not been prepared to resign at this juncture
J.P. Taylor: English History 1914-1943 (Penguin Fdition,
1970) p.Ul.
^
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but his speech emphasised his virulent opposition to the import
policies of his Conservative colleagues in the Cabinet. He
criticised the general ad valorem duty of 10?, as being unnecessarily
wide to effect cuts in specific areas of surplus. He also
pointed out that the measure would not be temporary and that if
the Ottawa conference resulted in a continuation of exemption,
then the legislation could not freely be repealed as it would
then prejudice formerly agreed Imperial preference. Samuel
proposed instead the alternative strategy of an industrial
commission to draw up efficiency schemes and a very temporary
period of protection with parliamentary sanction reouired for
each proposed action.
Tlliot winding up for the Government dismissed the arguments
Samuel had put forward. He declared that specific prohibitive
duties would provoke more bitter reaction and repercussions than
a general import duty and^in answer to Samuel's point about
British industries being badly affected by the tax on raw materials^
pointed out that such materials imported from the Hmpire were
not dutiable. Hlliot went on to assert that all the old
emotions and convictions behind the Protection versus Free Trade
argument had gone and it was time to try out the various options.
Parliament had to move on to consider the truly greater problems
of the 20th century and in order to do so had to clear away the
outdated considerations of a bygone age.
"The House knows that this great ouestion has
been argued out to a conclusion, that the time
has come to test it by experience. The House
is hungry and longing to get onto the greater
problems before us. "¥e shall not succeed by
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shelving the problems of currency and foreign
policy. The things we are discussing tonight
must be cleared out of the road before we can
come to the great questions of the 20th
century - the reorganisation politically,
socially and economically which this country
will have to go through; the rising spirit of
the younger generation; the contribution
which youth has to make to the future of our
country. Our efforts in those directions
are being 'cribbed, cabin'd and confined'
by those dusty and fusty remnants of 19th
century problems. Let us clear them out of
the way."
Elliot made another impressive speech introducing the
Second Reading on 15 February, a few days after being made a
Privj Counsellor, when he again counter-attacked the arguments
2
put forward by the Home Secretary. The Bill spent five days
in Committee. Discussion on the First Schedule, the so-called
free list of goods exempted from duty, took up considerable time
with amendments mainly from the Conservative benches to add or
subtract items from the list which included wool, metallic ores,
copper, coal, maize, beef, mutton and pork. Strictly time¬
tabled, the Bill received its Third Reading on 25 February.
Controversy over the free list, however, and the means of future
amendment to it re-emerged during the debates on the Finance Bill.
The Budget resolutions of Vpril 1925 and the Finance Bill
which followed gave Elliot a wonderful opportunity to enhance
his already considerable claim to future Cabinet office for
Chamberlain was struck down by gout leaving Elliot to conduct
these measures through the Commons. Chamberlain introduced his
1
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Budget on 19 April.There was no change in taxation and the
provisions of the emergency budget of September 1931, including
the unpopular beer duty, were retained. The Chancellor did
however propose a 4d duty on tea with a 50^ Empire preference
and with a 2d excise duty on stocks over 1000 lbs already in
the country. The feature that aroused the most interest was the
proposal to stabilise the exchange by holding adequate reserves
of gold and foreign exchange to meet sudden withdrawals and to
discourage speculation. For this purpose, Chamberlain was to
ask for powers to borrow up to £150 million to form the Exchange
Equalisation Account.
Chamberlain suffered the first attack of gout a few days
after his Budget speech. It was his worst attack for a long
2
time, rendering him unable to walk. He could not, therefore,
attend the House on 25 April to move the resolution to set up
the Exchange Equalisation Account. Elliot deputised brilliantly.
He compared capital to a ship. The new fund would erect bulk¬
heads and prevent reaction to sudden movement. He accepted that
there were risks but it was a worthy experiment and he adroitly
fobbed off inquiries as to whether it was intended to stabilise
3
the £ at a certain level. Elliot's confident handling of the
resolution which then formed some of the clauses of the Finance
Bill was matched by his competence during the Deport stage of
the Budget resolutions held on the following two days.
1
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Elliot's skilful conduct of the resolutions won the
approbation of his leader Baldwin.1 Chamberlain too was
2
impressed." He recovered sufficiently to lead the debate on
the Second Heading of the Finance Bill but then suffered another
major attack, leaving Elliot to take charge of the whole of the
four-day Committee stage. Clause 1 which put the duty on tea
provoked a long discussion, with the provision to tax those
holding more than 1000 lbs again being strongly opposed by
Labour as it had been at an early stage. Another clause
vigorously attacked was that which empowered the Import Duties
Advisory Committee to remove items from the Free list. In
response to a recommendation by the Committee, the Treasury would
impose a duty on a hitherto untaxed item and only then would the
Commons be asked to approve the Order. This provision had in
fact only been left out of the Import Duties Act due to a
technicality• The Government's intention, however, had been
quite clear and it had thought the issue settled but nevertheless
the relevant clause was contended.
The third day of the Committee stage was given up to debate
on the clauses concerning the establishment of the Exchange
Equalisation Account. An amendment was proposed from the G-overn-
rnent back benches by Mabane, a National Liberal, and seconded
by Boothby to omit the proviso in clause 21 to wind up the fund
1
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upon the expiry of the Gold Standard ( Amendment) \ct. This
was taken to mean that the Government intended to return to
gold. Elliot denied this asserting that as long as gold
behaved as it was doing, there could be no question of a return.
He did however promise to re-think the wording of the clause
and indeed on the Report stage, the offending words were removed
and replaced by the proviso to operate the Fund until the Commons
decided otherwise. Finally, the clause to suspend the land
value tax was criticised by Conservative M.P.s who sought its
abolition altogether. Baldwin asserted that while a Conservative
Government would indeed have sought to abolish what was after all
only a dead letter on the statute book, the proposal to merely
suspend it was made in deference to its initiator, the current
Lord Privy Seal, Lord Snowden.
Elliot's exemplary conduct of the long Committee stage of
the Finance Bill and his grasp of the difficult economics it
involved once again commended him to his political elders.
Ramsay MacDonald wrote to congratulate him."'' Chamberlain was
2
"delighted with the way Walter has handled his problems.""
If in the past he had doubts about Elliot's political maturity,
his deputy* s handling of such important legislation in his
absence impressed him very much indeed and he conveyed this to
the Prime Minister.
"Walter Elliot seems to have done extremely
well over the Finance Bill. He has not
RM to WE, 31 May 1932, MacDonald Papers PRO 30/69/5A-3-
^
WC to SB, 30 May 1932, Baldwin Papers vol 167.
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only shown his accustomed brilliance but also
a restraint & caution which comes less
naturally^to him. I am delighted at his
success."
Chamberlain wrote in similar terms to his sister concluding that
it showed "how responsibility tests a man" with the man
crumbling if he really was below his reputation but if he had
the right stuff in him, the responsibility brought it out as it
2
had with Elliot. Klliot*s friends too of course rejoiced
that he had made so much of his opportunity to enhance his
already bright political star. His old colleague John Boyd Orr
wondered humourously if medical science could somehow "induce
gout in Neville's other toe."^
Chamberlain returned to the House in time for the final
stages of the Finance Bill when he publicly congratulated his
Financial Secretary on his handling of affairs during his
enforced absence.^ Ellliot was highly flattered, comparing his
5
chief's praise to a mention in dispatches. The main item of
contention on the Report Stage was the retention of the beer
duty. This particularly annoyed Conservative agricultural
interests which had been pressing Chamberlain unsuccessfully for
a reduction. It had not been discussed during the Committee
stage of Bill since the sponsors of the Conservative amendment
had been caught unawares by the speedy consideration of preceding
1
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amendments and had failed to be in the Chamber in time to move
their motion. A, similar lack of success met their attempts on
the Report Stage which passed off smoothly for the G-overnment
as did the immediately proceeding Third Reading.
Elliot was left officially in charge of Treasury matters
for most of the summer of 1932. This was because Chamberlain
was absent first at the reparations conference at Lausanne and
then at the Ottawa Conference."'" The Chancellor did however take
a break from Lausanne to announce the conversion of the war loan.
This had in fact been anticipated in Snowden's Finance Bill in
the autumn of 1931* The interest rate was to be reduced from
5f0 to 3^% with the redeemable date put back five years to 1952.
Those unwilling to convert could have their loan redeemed in
December at the old interest rate if claimed within three months.
Chamberlain, however, was confident that most of the three million
stock holders would elect to convert and offered them the
inducement to do so quickly by giving a SI cash bonus for every
2
G100 stock converted before 31 July. in the event, about 90%
was converted by this date thus effecting considerable savings
in national expenditure. The conversion was achieved easily
in a favourable atmosphere of patriotism. The Labour Party fully
supported the measure which had it introduced when in G-overnment
would have received a very different reaction.
*
The Ottawa Conference is discussed in Chapter 5a.
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In June, a further strain was put on the already tense
relationship between the Free Trade Liberals and their Cabinet
colleagues with the death of Sir Donald Maclean, the Minister of
"Education. Samuel sought to have another of his Liberal group
appointed to keep their Cabinet representation at three, the
other two being himself and the Scottish Secretary, Sir Archibald
Sinclair. Simon, however, as leader of the other Liberals who
accepted Protection as a necessary expedient suggested that
Elliot should fill the vacant post with one of his own men, Hore-
Belisha,becoming Financial Secretary."'' In the event,the former
Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin,succeeded Maclean at the Board of
Education.
The final straw for the Samuelites was the outcome of the
Ottawa Conference. Samuel and Sinclair prepared to resign
along with Snowden despite entreaties from MacDonald who saw
himself more and more as a tool of the Conservatives. Samuel
did not resign at once but issued the ultimatum that unless the
quest for ratification of ths Ottawa agreements was postponed
until after the world Economic Conference, his group would resign
2
en masse. For the Simonites, Ottawa and the threatened
resignations clarified beyond all remaining doubt that "there
is no future for us but ultimate absorption into the Conservative
3
Pariy." They sought to protect their position with "Runciraan
1
NC to Annie, 21 June 1932, NC Papers I/26/46I.
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suggesting that two of the three imminent Cabinet vacancies
should be filled by National Liberals.
"This is partly for the look of the thing -
preserving the broad base - and partly to
keep alive loyalty to the Goverhment in^
circles which had Liberal antecedents."
On 28 September, Samuel and Sinclair did indeed resign
along with some junior Ministers. Snowden went too but the
three other National Labour Cabinet Ministers stayed, namely
Sankey, Thomas and of course the Prime Minister himself. Only
one of the three vacant posts was in fact filled by a National
Liberal with Sir Godfrey Collins becoming Scottish Secretary.
The post of Lord Privy Seal was taken over by Baldwin. Sir
John Gilmour was moved to fill Samuel's place at the Home Office.
Hlliot at last was given his chance, being appointed to succeed
Gilmour as Minister of Igriculture and Fisheries. He was more
than ready to meet the challenge of Cabinet office.




National G-overnmgnt Cabinet 1932-1936
a.) Cabinet colleagues
Walter Elliot was in Geneva as a delegate to the League of
Nations when he heard the news of the resignations of the
Samuelites and his own appointment to the Cabinet as Minister of
Agriculture. As he started back for London, the Cabinet changes
were publicly announced with his promotion being everywhere
acclaimed - in the press, within the Conservative Party, and
by the nation's farmers.
The Scottish newspapers were not surprisingly especially
enthusiastic about the Cabinet changes. After all Elliot's
appointment increased the already disproportionate Scottish
Cabinet representation with his succeeding Sir John Gilmour who
in turn was promoted to one of the major posts namely the Home
Office in succession to Herbert Samuel with Sir Godfrey Collins
taking over the Scottish Office from Archibald Sinclair. The
Glasgow Herald diary commented wryly that Great Britain's destiny
seemed to be Scottish controlled with of course apart from
Elliot, Gilmour and Collins, Ramsay MacDonald at its head.'*'
Elliot's oi,ra droll comment on this state of affairs made upon




Glasgow Herald, 29 September 1932.
^
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Beaverbrook's Daily Express declared that Elliot's appoint¬
ment was to be welcomed on every score, stating that "no man in
the Conservative ranks has better deserved promotion to the
Cabinet."^" It proclaimed astonishnent at Cilmour's promotion
on the grounds that he had not been particularly successful at
Agriculture. Beaverbrook saw in his successor determination
to speak and act for the protection and encouragement of the
agricultural industry. Elliot wrote to Beaverbrook to thank
him for the enthusiastic attitude adopted by the Daily Express.
Elliot had no doubts that the press lord's unreserved approval
was ephemeral and that once his policies were formulated, the
Daily Express would offer frequent criticism. However that
notwithstanding, he declared that the leader had "warmed the
cockles of my heart like a clap on the shoulder from an
2
unexpected friend."
The Economist would not be moved from its laissez-faire
and anti-Ottawa stance. It made no specific comment on Elliot's
promotion merely observing that the changes in Cabinet should
enable it to function more smoothly* "The Government car has
been fitted with a new cylinder in place of one which was not
firing; the brakes can hardly function worse than before; the
steex'ing gear has been tightened by the insertion of a few more
3
Conservative screws." The Conservative Party's reaction to
the Cabinet changes was generally extremely favourable. Of
Daily Express, 29 September 1932.
o
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course, the resignation of the Samuelites meant that ary semblance
of the Government being a true national coalition had totally
disappeared - after September 1932, the Government was national
in name only. The result of the Cabinet reshuffle with Baldwin
now combining the post of Lord President and Lord Privy Seal
together with Irwin's succession to Sir Donald Maclean in July
meant that whereas the Conservative Party had received 11 out of
20 Cabinet seats after the General 'election of October 1931, it
now had 13 out of 19* The six non-Conservative members of the
Cabinet comprised of three National Labour made up of the Prime
Minister, J.H. Thomas and Lord Sankey and three Liberal
Nationalists or Simonites consisting of Sir John Simon himself,
"falter Runciman and the new Scottish Secretary, Sir Godfrey
Collins.
Any Conservative fears that the resignations would rock the
National Government boat were outweighed by expectations that
it would now sail on a more even keel. Samuel had after all
been a thorn in the Government's flesh since the formation of
the coalition in August 1931 and no Conservative^save the remnants
of the free-trade wing, was sorry to see his departure. The
resignation of Sir Archibald Sinclair was viewed with much
greater regret as the Caithness M.P. was a very popular figure at
Westminster. The appointment of his successor, Sir Godfrey
Collins, came as a surprise to almost all political pundits,
plucked as he was from obscurity on the back-benches and pitched
straight into the Cabinet. Elliot's promotion as a result of
the Ottawa debacle had been taken for granted given that he was,
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as Financial Secretary, next in line as it were and extremely
gifted with it. There was, however, powerful Conservative
support for him to succeed Sinclair at the Scottish Office^ and
some disappointment when he did not: Sir Robert Horne wrote to
Baldwin regretting the appointment of Collins whom he saw as
incapable of curbing the growing disouiet in Scotland. The
combination of certain sections of the press supporting a
Scottish Parliament with what he termed "the distress & defeatism
in Scottish industry" suggested to Horne that the Government
would face a serious situation there. He wrote that he had
"felt sure you would give it (the Scottish Office) to Walter
2
Elliot who would have saved it."
Elliot's entrance into the Cabinet was particularly pleasing
to that section of the party which might be termed progressive.
Consisting in the main of members of the war generation who had
manceuvred towards a centre party in the 1920's and again during
the second Labour government, the progressive Tories saw in
Elliot a man who understood the vast change in political realities
that had taken place in the past twenty years, attributable
mainly to the First World War. The Labour Party might be at a
low ebb at the moment but its role as the alternative government
was established. Twentieth century life with all its new
complexities like economic nationalism and political upheavals
throughout the world required a new approach unfettered by
^
Daily Express 28 September 1932.
2
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traditional Conservative unwillingness to make the role of the
state in society a more positive one. Macmillan, Boothhy,
Stanley, Eden, Skelton - all these young Tories believed with
Elliot that there not only was a viable system between unbridled
capitalism and full-blooded socialism but moreover that it was
absolutely necessary to strive towards its achievement not so
as to keep the party abreast of the times although that would be
an incidental result but to create a truly just democracy in
G-reat Britain which would take account of the nation's industrial
and social requirements. They expected that the new Minister
of Agriculture would not merely attend to the needs of the
farming community but moreover would be a strong and persistent
progressive voice in all Cabinet affairs particularly concerning
the major social and economic issue of the day, unemployment.
Already one young progressive Conservative, William Ormsby-Gore
held Cabinet rank. The addition of a man of such standing as
'/alter Elliot could only, it seemed, bring nearer the attainment
of etatiste Conservatism, of what was regarded as but not yet
called "the Middle Way" between a society based on private
enterprise and unbridled individualism and that of industrial
nationalisation and national welfare.
There can be little doubt that had the government formed in
1931 been a purely Conservative one, Elliot would have gone
straight into the Cabinet. As it was, he was extremely fortunate
to get appointed when he did - there was to be only one further
change while MacDonald remained Prime Minister, that of Henry
Betterton's replacement at the Ministry of Labour by Oliver
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Stanley, and in addition the post of Paymaster-Oenera.1 held by
Neville Chamberlain's protege, Sir Kingsley Vood, was given
Cabinet rank. It is indeed astounding that while cataclysmic
political upheavals were affecting mary other countries, in
Britain there were so few changes in the administration.
Elliot's first Cabinet meeting took place on 11 October
1932. It seems apposite here to look at the calibre of some of
his leading Cabinet colleagues."'" The Prime Minister, Ramsay
MacDonald has until recently been most unjustly treated by
2
historians. David Marouand's biography,'" however, while by no
means perfect, has done for MacDonald what John Barnes and
Keith Middlemas have done or even over-done for Baldwin, namely
pronounced a much more favourable and in the author's opinion
more credible judgement. The portrayal of MacDonald as a
traitor to both the Labour party and the working class, and as a
vain and self-seeking man, is no longer regarded as accurate
except perhaps by the most dogmatic and uncompromising Socialists.
MacDonald in the autumn of 1932 still felt uncomfortable
leading a Conservative dominated Cabinet. He confided to his
3
diary tha.t "this is nae my ain hoose". "/hile he remained
absolutely convinced that his action in forming the National
Covernment was totally justifiable, it had cost him dearly. The
entries in his diary written at this time show his profound
unhappiness at not being with his old colleagues and his great
See Appendix VI for list of Cabinet Ministers 1932-1936.
2
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hurt at their contempt for and bitterness towards him. This
sensitive Scot who had made his way up from rural poverty while
remaining unshaken in his Utopian socialist creed had seen the
course he followed in August 1931 as his national duty in a
time of unprecedented economic crisis. It is widely acknowledged,
not least of all by his son Malcolm, that Ramsay MacDonald
stayed far too long as Prime Minister for his mental and physical
abilities declined considerably in his latter years in that
office. At the time of Flliot's promotion to the Cabinet,
however, he was not at all the mere figurehead he later became.
Per contra, although not giving much of a lead in home affairs,
his influence on foreign policy was considerable and indeed
absolutely crucial given the ineffectualness of his Foreign
Secretary.
The Lord President, Stanley Baldwin was an enigmatic
personality whose influence over government policy-making was
boundless yet so unobtrusive that it was often not detectable
as is explained so aptly by Middlemas and Barnes:
"The mark he made in Britain in the twentieth
century is like the footprint of a colossal
dinosaur, so wide that commentators seeking
traces of the man, scurry about inside it
and for want of evidence set hiin down as
unimportant, a pawn in the h^nds of his
more powerful subordinates."
Baldwin's strength lay, as David Margesson put it, in the fact
that he only 'ticked over' normally at half speed and had
therefore the capacity of 'revving up' his engines whenever any
Middlemas <& Barnes: Baldwin p. 1074.
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crisis occurred, and bringing into play great reserves of energy.
Baldwin was indeed a skilful political tactician and the best
Party manager ary party has ever had. Under MacDonald,
Baldwin's role was absolutely crucial. Free of departmental
worries, he not only had the weighty responsibility of being
Conservative Leader holding together the various groups within
the party itself but moreover he was the lynchpin in the unity
of the National Government Cabinet.
Whereas Baldwin was in the closing stages of his political
career, his youngest Cabinet colleague it seemed was just
beginning. To say Hlliot was a progressive Tory and a Bald-
winian Conservative is not at all a contradiction in terms.
From his high position, the older man considered much of what
his young left-wing followers called for in the way of planning
and co-operation in economic, social and industrial affairs not
only to be the right way along which to proceed but indeed the
inevitable road Britain would take as the twentieth century
progressed. Flliot regarded Baldwin as his political mentor
and teacher. From early days after the short hiatus -which
followed their enlistment under opposing banners at the Carlton
Club in 1922, Flliot had looked up to Baldwin admiring his
humanitarianism, social awareness and political perception.
They were of different generations certainly but the political
philosophy Flliot had moved irresistibly towards as a result of
his experience of the First World War had too been reached by
^
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Baldwin almost instinctively, realising that post-war priorities
were of a different kind altogether from those of the age in
which he had been reared.
Elliot saw Baldwin essentially as a man of the 19th
century who found himself bringing to birth the 20th. His
political raison d'etre to the exclusion of practically all else
was to liquidise the danger of class war, the spectre of which
he felt close behind him. In Blliot's words Baldwin was "of
the generation of the White Marxists who preceded the Fed,"
Marxist in the sense that he saw as a real possibility "the
permanent split of Britain into the haves and the have-nots -
the two Nations of Disraeli.He had extraordinary political
antennae with which he could judge exactly the mood of the
people. His brand of Conservatism, his understanding of the
emotions behind Socialism and his acceptance of the Labour
Party as the alternative Government was endorsed wholeheartedly
by Hlliot. Unquestionably the two men were similar types of
human beings - politics apart, they had the same wry humour,
genial manner and humanitarianism.
A. different proposition altogether was the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain. Hlliot had in the 1920's
seen at close quarters "the unending power of work, the vehemence
2
of conviction which were bound to bring him to a foremost place."
VIS reviews of the G-.M. Young and A.W. Baldwin biographies of
Baldwin in Time & Tide 15 Nov. 1952 aiyf Daily telegraph
20 Jan. 1956 respectively.
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Then of coarse, for the past year Elliot had been directly under
Chamberlain as Financial Secretary to the Treasury.
Undoubtedly, the younger man respected the extraordinary admini¬
strative abilities of his elder but their personalities and
political attitudes were so very different that it is not
difficult to understand why there never existed a close friend¬
ship between them nor why their working relationship was not
always harmonious. Chamberlain was a man of such reserve that
it almost amounted to impenetrable aloofness. In the words of
Ronald Tree, a Conservative M.P. at that time, Chamberlain was
"temperamentally unable to mix with the crowd,""'" while Lord
Home, who was later to become his PPS, recalls that "to lure
him into the smoking room in the House was like catching the
wariest bird, and aijy meetings so arranged, stilted and arti-
2
ficial, and he would escape at the first possible excuse."
Lord Home goes on to say that when Chamberlain did unbend in
private, he made a fascinating companion with his knowledge of
and interest in nature and the countryside but this redeeming
side of his character was totally concealed from most of his
colleagues at Westminster.
Chamberlain's rather patronising air in Parliament alienated
the Labour Party - unlike Baldwin he did not hesitate to give
his opponents short shrift and savage them when they were down.
Already he was the dominant force in the National Covernment
Ronald Tree: '.'hen the Moon was high (London: Macmillan, 1975)
p.118.
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producing meticulously planned policies on all matters and not
only on Treasury affairs. The result was, as Malcolm MacDonald
recalls, that many of his Cabinet colleagues on issues not
directly their concern would accept Chamberlain's case verbatim,
their sole contribution to the debate being to say "I agree with
the Chancellor.""'" MacDonald confirms Samuel's recollection
that in Cabinet Chamberlain "was always willing to listen to
2
arguments with a friendly spirit but a closed mind." Put
another way, once he reached his decision, his mind "clicked
shut like the door of a safe, and nothing that anyone could say
or do could make him change it."'' This aspect of his character
did not bode well for a true partnership in Cabinet with Elliot
who would not take kindly to undue interference in his depart¬
mental affairs and who would not acquiesce without a real battle
in social policies he did not agree with - after all Chamberlain's
orthodox restrictionist economics represented to left-wing
Tories the unsmiling face of Conservatism. To Elliot and
his colleagues, Chamberlain was a liability at the Treasury.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Chamberlain's
opinion of Elliot had improved drastically since the days when
he thought him just "a clever windbag".^ Indeed, so impressed
had he been with the performance of his Financial Secretary over
^
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the past yeaiv especially as for part of that time Elliot had had
to deputise for him, that Chamberlain -wrote a hearty letter of
congratulations upon his promotion to Cabinet.
"Sorry though 1 am to lose you, I sincerely
rejoice in your elevation and at the fact that
you will no?/ join us in the Cabinet.
You have one of the most interesting and
important of all offices. Not many
Ministers have been a success there: but
you have qualities which enable me to
prophesy with confidence that you will be
an exception and that you will enhance still
further your already brilliant reputation.
I also want to thank; you most deeply and
gratefully for the help you have given me
here. You have been undefeatable in the
House of Commons and while always keeping
your end up, you have never said anything
to cause me embarrassment. I don't think
any Chancellor has been better served in my
time, and 1 am all the more indebted to you
because my unfortunate indisposition put
exceptional burdens upon you."
There were two Cabinet colleagues in particular that Hlliot
had to work in conjunction with in departmental concerns.
J.H. Thomas at the Dominions Office was MacDonald's most intimate
colleague in the Cabinet. Indiscreet and indecorous, the
former railway union leader had a tough task on his hands trying
to facilitate good-humoured negotiations between the mother
country and her increasingly nationalistic Dominions. Walter
Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade was a very
different man indeed - a Liberal National old-fashioned Free
Trader who nevertheless accepted with Simon the use of a tariff
as an expedient to meet the peculiar circumstances of the times.
Colin Coote: A Companion of Honour p. 125-
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A shrewd, competent and hard-hitting politician, Runciman was
concerned with Britain's trade relations with foreign countries.
The agricultural aspect of his responsibility often led to
contrasting political interests to that of both the Dominion
Office and the Ministry of Agriculture: as far as the latter
was concerned, opinions would become increasingly polarized as
Rlliot fought for more protectionist legislation for home
agriculture which inevitably was bound to lead to difficulties
with foreign suppliers and therefore problems for the Board of
Trade.
Of his remaining Cabinet colleagues, TClliot was closest to
Ormsby-Gore in his political beliefs and objectives. The two
men had been friends and close colleagues since their early
days in 'the Group'. Ormsby-Gore, Rirst Commissioner of
""forks in the National Government Cabinet since 1931, had been
brought up in an extremely wealthy background - he was in fact
the heir to Lord Harlech. Gifted with a brilliant mind, he
could master complex briefs overnight and employ telling
phraseology in his speeches. 'foat he did lack "s indeed did
Oliver Stanley, another of Rlliot's close colleagues who entered
the Cabinet in 1934, was what might be described as the human
touch. Both Orrasby-Gore and Stanley came across altogether too
aristocratic and stiff upper lip. TSlliot in contrast was truly
a man of the people, a Briton of Britain.^
I am indebted to Malcolm MacDonald for his assessment of the
personalities of Ormsby-Gore, Stanley and of course Klliot.
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The three men did share a belief in the necessity for
planned Capitalism and a revolution in social welfare. This
'lost generation' trio did not accept the orthodox fiscal
theories being put into practice at the Treasury. On the
contrary they were fundamentally expansionists at a time when
the watchword of the Chancellor was caution. In Cabinet,
Elliot, Orasby-G-ore and later Stanley were forthright in their
disagreement with certain aspects of Chamberlain's economic
policies. They were too^always ready to speak their minds on
social and foreign policy. On the latter, their war-time
experience coloured their attitude. Their determined and
persistent intervention on matters outwith their own departments
irritated Chamberlain who considered they lacked the necessary
experience and political judgement and who tagged them "the
Boys' Brigade"."1"
The rest of this chapter deals with the attitudes of one
member of the Boys' Brigade namely Elliot himself towards
certain aspects of domestic and foreign policy in the years
1932-1936. His work in his own department, the Ministry of
Agriculture, is considered nuite separately in the next two
chapters.
1
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b) Elliot and certain aspects of
National G-overnment 1932-1936
The major social policy debate of the decade was without
doubt that which took place on the question of unemployment
assistance. Elliot as a leading progressive voice in the
Cabinet became centrally involved in an issue which divided the
Cabinet and which lad to heated argument and considerable ill
feeling. In the House of Commons it provoked angry scenes and
all night sittings. The outcome, a national unemployment
assistance scheme, was a milestone in the development of the
20th century welfare state, paving the way both in terms of
laying the groundwork for and preparing attitudes for the
acceptance of the social legislation of the 194-0' s.
In October 1932, a Cabinet Committee was appointed to act
on the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on Unemployment
Insurance. This recommended the creation of new assistance
committees at local council level to take over all the able-
bodied unemployed whether formerly in the transitional category
or uninsured altogether. The Ministry of Labour would provide
somewhat vague supervision but the local committees would retain
discretionary powers and the right of varying the rates of
assistance paid. By the time this scheme was put forward^however,
Neville Chamberlain had produced one of his own. In Chamber¬
lain' s plan only the sick and those receiving indoor relief
would be assisted at local level - all the rest, excepting of
course those covered by insurance, would be handled by a
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national commission loosely linked to the Ministry of Health.
As Miller has written, these proposals were certainly rational
but politically untenable with their bringing together the
regular poor with the industrial unemployed into one category to
be treated on what appeared to be Poor Law principles practised
at national level.
That Chamberlain did not get his way was the result of
fierce opposition from certain members of the Cabinet spear¬
headed by Sir Henry Betterton, the resolute Minister of Labour,
who immediately launched a determined counter-attack against
the Chancellor and his marionette, Hilton-Young^who was Minister
of Health. Betterton first put forward a plan of continuing
the Public Assistance Committees but despite the support of
Collins, the Scottish Secretary, and Irwin at the Board of
Education, he was outvoted in the Cabinet Committee and the
idea of putting assistance on a national level was accepted as
the basis of the Government's unemployment assistance policy.
Chamberlain and Hilton-Young sensing victory went ahead and
by March 1933 produced a draft bill which was endorsed by a
majority of Cabinet Committee for submission to the whole
Cabinet.
Chamberlain was confident of victory believing his opponent
to be considerably weakened: "The Minister of Labour still kicks
2
but more feebly." The Chancellor was however completely
P.M. Millar: "National Assistance or Unemployment Assistance"
in Journal of Contemporary History April 1974 Vol 9 No.2.
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mistaken in his anticipation of surrender- Betterton recorded
in the strongest terms his total opposition in principle stating
that despite modifications made to the proposed plan, he was
still convinced that to adopt the scheme wculd be a political
blunder. It was "the application of Poor Law principles to
large classes of the unemployed who have hitherto been free of
them.""'' At the Cabinet meeting of 7 April 1933,Betterton was
supported by only one of his colleagues on the Cabinet Committee,
Sir Godfrey Collins. The Prime Minister certainly had his
doubts about Chamberlain's scheme, writing in his diary that it
was "full of pitfalls", that it "savours too much of Poor Law"
2
and that it would cause "great revolt." MacDonald however
was unwilling to fight against his Chancellor on this issue.
Two members of the Cabj.net, however, who had not been on the
Committee hastened to Betterton's defence - the "Boys' Brigade"
duo of Blliot and Ormsby-Gore.
Clliot had been considering the whole nuestion of unemploy¬
ment assistance and insurance for some time. He had after all
deliberated upon the thorny subject at some length as Betterton's
Conservative colleague on the abortive all-party Advisory
Committee on Unemployment Insurance in 1930. He must have felt
considerable frustration at not being a Member of the Cabinet
Committee that had been appointed in October 193? but he had
used every opportunity to convey his feelings when the matter
Memo, by the Minister of Labour CP90 (33) 4- April 1933 in
Cab.24/239-
2
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was discussed by the whole Cabinet. Now that the Committee
had approved Chamberlain's scheme and had submitted it for
Cabinet approval, Betterton's supporters had to pull out all
the stops if they were to live to fight another day. Elliot
rose to the occasion magnificently. \ny national scheme, he
asserted, which was affiliated to the Ministry of Health would
inevitably smack of the Poor Law. Only under the Ministry of
Labour could the right atmosphere for the overhaul of unemploy¬
ment assistance be secured. This attitude was recorded most
succinctly in the Cabinet minutes.
"For administrative reasons he preferred
the scheme should be under the Ministry
of Labour but for psychological reasons
he considered it essential."
2
4t the next meeting of the Cabinet three days later,
something happened which can in retrospect be seen as the turning
point in the struggle between Chamberlain, Betterton and their
respective supporters. It was decided to ask the Cabinet
Committee to re-examine the matter, to come to an agreed scheme
and decide which Ministry was to be responsible for the operation.
The big difference was that Elliot and Ormsby-G-ore were added
to it. This meant that the Unemployment insurance Policy
Committee now consisted of eight members, two of whom, G-ilmour
and Thomas, played only minor roles, their respective support
for Betterton and Chamberlain cancelling out. This left the
1
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six leading participants with Chamberlain and Hilton-Young now
up against the powerful combination of Betterton, Elliot,
Collins and Ormsby-Gore. Baldwin saw the two sides as being
fairly evenly matched although he considered the nuarteb some¬
what of an unknown quantity. He expressed these sentiments in
a note passed to Chamberlain in Cabinet.
"You and Hilton-Young have the subject at your
fingers' ends. You are strongly in favour.
Thomas supports you. This is all very
weighty. Then Labour opposes strongly.
Grant that they hate Health and are
jealous: yet Horace Vilson, for instance,
is very wise and would not be wholly affected
by such feelings. Scotland is a real
difficulty. Elliott ( sic) and Gore who
have worked on the subject seem dubious, but
don't suggest. I don't know how far H.B.
will carry his opposition. If and when a
decision is taken, we must all-push behind
together and with enthusiasm."
The fundamental issue at stake was the future status of the
transitional class, that was those persons who had been in
insured occupations but had exhausted their unemployment benefit
rights. Chamberlain in his scheme wished to put them in the
same category as all other unemployed except those receiving
indoor relief while Betterton was determined that there should
continue to be two completely separate groups. At the first
meeting of the reconstituted Committee on 3 May 1933, these
conflicting viewpoints were reiterated with Hlliot supporting
Betterton's argument that some division of function and of
2
responsibility could and should be made.
SB to NC, note in Cabinet NC Papers 7/lO/lJ>.
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The Minister of Labour had by this time, with new-found
confidence due to the favourable alignment of the reconstituted
Committee, seized the initiative and come up with a scheme of
his own to create an Unemployment Assistance Board to handle
all those able-bodied persons normally working, leaving the
majority of those at present dealt with by the Public Assistance
Committees where they were. In response to this, the
Charaberlaip/Hilton-Young bloc produced a new plan at the second
meeting"'" proposing that both groups receiving outdoor relief
should be handled by one national commission but subjected to
completely separate regulations with the Ministry of Labour
responsible for the first category or employables and that of
Health responsible for those persons though able-bodied who were
unemployable. Tlliot was not at this meeting but had expressed
forcibly to Chamberlain his doubt whether it was practicable for
any such Commission to act in two capacities. Betterton felt
that for the moment the Government should confine itself to
legislating for those unemployed in the industrial field, covering
the present transitionals and all other able-bodied persons
belonging to trades as yet uninsured. He persisted with his
opposition and produced the strongest worded memorandum on the
2
subject that had been drawn up by either side. fhile he
considered that many of his objections had been met, he found it
impossible to agree to the establishment of one Commission to
1
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cover the whole spectrum.
It seemed to be a stalemate but private discussions during
the month of June produced a compromise by which Betterton's
scheme was accepted as the basis for discussion. There can be
no doubt whatsoever that what must be regarded as a victory for
Betterton over the formidable personage of Neville Chamberlain
at a time when the latter was indisputably the dynamic force
behind much of Cabinet policy, was due primarily to the fact
that his own tenacity had been complemented by the determination
of some of the most persistent members of the Cabinet. Chamber¬
lain must be given the credit for the administrative framework
of the approved scheme but his logic had been rejected by the
Cabinet in their acceptance of the Betterton-Blliot approach to
social and political realities. Victory for the Minister of
Labour and his progressive colleagues had only become a feasible
outcome after the reconstitution of the Cabinet Committee which
gave them the edge. Ironically, it had been Chamberlain who
had suggested that the issue be remitted back to the Committee
and that Elliot and Ormsby-G-ore should be added to it.^ By
giving Betterton these powerful reinforcements, the Chancellor
had destroyed his own chance of victory. He was learning the
hard way that there were some of his Cabinet colleagues who
would not be intimidated into silent acquiescence by his
powerfully presented and thoroughly prepared arguments.
The Unemployment Insurance Bill was laid before parliament
^
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early in November 1933- It was in two parts, the first amending
the insurance scheme which was made permanently solvent and the
second which appointed the Unemployment Assistance Board to give
relief to the able-bodied unemployed. The Board was given the
task of drawing up standard regulations governing the rates of
assistance and the resource allowances of the household means
test. Predictably the Labour Party opposed the bill root and
branch, even resorting to an all-night sitting on 14-/15 December
on an uncontentious bill"'" to protest against the (Government' s
use of the guillotine. The passage of the bill however did not
end the controversy within the Cabinet and in Parliament over
unemployment assistance. On the contrary,the struggle was just
beginning. If the battle between Chamberlain and Betterton had
been fiercely fought, it was a mere skirmish compared with what
was to take place over the rates and regulations that would be
drawn up by the U.A.B. All the old campaigners would be in
action with Tlliot again to the fore of the progressive battalion
against the forces of caution led by Chamberlain. The supreme
irony however would be that Betterton would fight against the
"Boys' Brigade", from his position of first Chairman of the
Unemployment Assistance Board.
In the autumn of 1933, foreign policy considerations occupied
most of the Cabinet's time. The critical issue was the
worsening situation at the Disarmament Conference in (Geneva which
To impose direct rule over financially troubled Newfoundland.
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had begun in February 1932 but which now threatened to break
down owing to the incompatibility of the German enuality of
rights claim and France's security anxieties. Ministers were
recalled in late September to an emergency Cabinet meeting to
formulate a reply to the French Question as to what Britain's
attitude would be if Germany proved to be engaged in re-armament.'
The Foreign Secretary John Simon stated that the alternatives
appeared to be to allow Germany a certain amount of re-armament
by convention or to make no such agreement in which case Germany
would just re-arm to what extent and in what weaponry she chose.
The Cabinet were united in their doubts as to whether France
really had any intention of disarming. The majority were
unwilling to commit Britain to specific action if Germany broke
the rules and wanted the reply to France to be in vague terms.
Flliot objected most strongly to this line and stated his
opposition in no uncertain terms. He feared the possible
recurrence of the 1914 situation when, because Britain had not
declared her position, she had been charged with failing to
prevent the outbreak of war. The critical situation at the
Conference was now such that the Government could no longer hedge
its bets but should make it clear perhaps just what Britain's
reaction would be to a German violation of a clisarmament agree¬
ment. The issue had to be faced fairly and souarely. Hlliot
declared his opinion that if Germany did begin to re-arm in a
flagrant manner, such action would seem to afford a casus belli.
Cab. 51 (33) of 20 September 1933-
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Those Ministers chiefly responsible for foreign affairs
namely MacDonald, Simon and the Under-Secretary, Anthony Gden,
who was present at this particular Cabinet meeting,were not
willing to go further than asserting that were it to be proven
that G-ermany had violated a disarmament treaty, then the other
parties to the agreement would be released from their commitments.
At the next Cabinet Meeting on 9 October, however, the Ministers
had a completely changed situation to consider."'" Chat had
happened in the interim was that G-ermany had conveyed privately
through Prince Bismarck that she would not accept a period of
probation and that regarding those weapons not subject to restric¬
tion for the other nations, she would not just renuest samples
but would demand no limit on her eouipment of them. There could
no longer be any doubt as to Germany's intention - she was set
on re-armament come what may. The Cabinet had to act forcefully
and with all due haste. The decision was reached that Germany
should be warned not to act to wreck the Disarm,ament Conference
or to menace peace and further that if she did not modify her
position, it might be necessary for Simon to publicly reveal the
demands at Geneva. At this second Cabinet, Glliot maintained
his pressure for definite decisions and positive reaction instead
of talking round the whole situation. He conveyed his anxiety in
a letter to Katharine Termant.
"Cabinet was rather woolly about our position
vis-b.-vis Germany. They keep deciding that
Germany shall not be allowed to re-arm and
considering how we can argue Germany into an
1
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impossible dialectic position. All I keep
saying (and I have said it now for five
weeks and two Cabinets) is ""/hat if Germary
says 'be damned' to us? Do we swallow the
insult, or stand in with France or what."
That is whjt they have so far refused to
say
Elliot's attitude towards the international situation was
that more or less of the entire radical section of the Tory
Party. The only real difference in foreign policy attitudes
between .'alter Elliot and men like Robert Boothby, Harold
Macmillan and others was that whereas the latter group of M.P.s
were backbenchers, Elliot was a senior Minister having to balance
his personal convictions with departmental interests and the
doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility. From an exami¬
nation of Cabinet Committee and private papers of the decade it
is absolutely clear that Elliot and some of his later Cabinet
colleagues principally Oliver Stanley, Duff Cooper and ''/.S.
Morrison, were as opposed to certain elements of the National
Government's foreign policy as those parliamentary dissidents
outwith the Cabinet. Their pressure for a strong line was
continuous from the mid-1930's and is evident noticeably in the
Defence Policy Committee minutes as well as those of the whole
Cabinet. Their anti-appeasement campaign did greatly intensify
after the occupation of the Rhineland but the rumbles of their
discontent were to be heard much earlier than that. Elliot's
contribution to the discussion on the Disarmament Conference can
clearly be seen as the opening shot in a long struggle by him and
WE to Katharine Tennant 13 October 1933 in the possession of
Baroness Elliot.
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later in conjunction with other younger Cabinet members of
similar persuasion for a better defined, more forceful foreign
policy.
In the event,what happened after the second Cabinet meeting
on the Disarmament Conference was that Simon made a strongly
worded speech at Geneva on 14 October which was used as the
excuse for Germany* s immediately ensuing withdrawal not merely
from the Conference but fx-om the League of Nations as well.
Disarmament continued to be a major item on Cabinet agenda with
Chamberlain noting ia his diary the "long and tedious discussions"
held on the subject.^" In the light of Germany's actions, the
Cabinet had to consider how to achieve a greater degree of
security against possible aggression. Elliot was extremely
concerned with all aspects of foreign policy and defence and did
not hesitate to assert his views both in Cabinet and in the
Ministerial Committee on Disarmament which later became the
?
Ministerial Committee on Defence Policy and 'Requirements.
His interest was not only personal for in 1933 he was appointed
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of
War set up in 1929 as a Standing Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. In May 1933^11101 set up a sub-committee to
examine the question of putting economic pressure in the form of
sanctions on another nation in a situation not. involving a
formal declaration of war and secondly to ascertain to what
NC Diary January 1934-
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extent existing preparations could be adapted. Apart from
Elliot who remained the Chairman of the main Committee until
1939, the Sub-Committee on Economic Pressure, which held sixteen
meetings between May 1933 and. March 193£>\ consisted of high
ranking civil servants from the Foreign Office, the Board of
Trade, and the Admiralty.
By January 1934, the major foreign concern was the
possibility that Germary would take over Austria by subversion.
Th«s latter planned to appeal to the League of Nations but of
course Germany had already walked out of the League and was
therefore not there to answer the charge. Elliot's Sub-Committee
on Economic pressure had already produced in October 1933 a
report on the problem of putting sanctions on Germany in a
2
situation not involving the formal declaration of war. The
Committee had assumed that certain countries would cooperate
while others would not. Its conclusion was that it was
extremely doubtful whether it would be possible to take economic
action against Germany which would be effective. Moreover,
Britain and her Dominions would themselves suffer the reactions
of the sanctions to a considerable and perhaps lasting extent.
The Sub-Committee referred to the possibility of the League of
Nations using economic pressure instead of just a few nations
acting in concert and offered to prepare another report on this
hypothesis if so desired. This offer was taken up by the
1~
Proceedings of the Sub-Committee on Economic Pressure
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Cabinet and the Committee got to work on its task and produced
a second document on 25 January,"'" the conclusions of which
2
Elliot had already reported orally to the Cabinet. It was
thought extremely doubtful that a League of Nations boycott of
Germany could be effective. It might be advisable to consider
action through trade in the absence of agreement on stronger
measures. The Committee felt,howevery that economic pressure
could not be effective without belligerent operations to enforce
it.
The Cabinet began in late March a series of discussions
on all aspects of security and defence. In the interval, that
is during the month of February, the popularity of the National
Government was at a low ebb. The first real sign of the
Government's fall in favour had come in the astonishing East
Fulham by-election of late October 1933 followed by the losses
in the municipal elections of 1st November. The failure of the
Disarmament Conference could well have been a contributory
factor. The Labour Parly blamed the Foreign Secretary for the
estrangement of Germany and accused him of war-mongering.
However it seems more likely that the major factors were housing
and unemployment with of course the inevitable swing back to
normalcy after the unique circumstances of the 1931 election-^
Since unemployment had peaked at 2.93 million in Jamary 1933,
1
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the economy had shown signs of improvement but the atmosphere
of recession lingered on and the Means Test rankled. To
combat this discontent, the Cabinet held a series of meetings
beginning in late January 193k to defend the policies of the
National Government. This did not prevent two very dis¬
couraging by-election results in February in Cornwall and North
Portsmouth both of which were held by the Conservatives but with
greatly reduced majorities.
Apart from this general air of discontent, speculation
abounded on a Cabinet reconstruction. By February 193k, rumours
of a reshuffle had ccme to a head. Most of the speculation
centred on the unpopular Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon.
The Liberal National leader was unquestionably a brilliant man
but totally unsui+ed to the Foreign Office. His demeanour was
one which did not inspire confidence - it was a case, in the words
of Ramsay MacDonald, of "here manners destroyeth the man.""'"
A. suave and aloof man, Simon had the inability temperamentally
to give a strong lead when a difficult international situation
arose. If he did suggest some form of action, it was often
unwise and ill thought out and most of the time the Cabinet had
to think things through without the benefit of a reasonable
policy proposed by the Foreign Secretary. "rith the collapse of
the Disarmament Conference and the uneasy situation in Furope
generally, it was a particularly unfortunate time to have a man
like Simon at the Foreign Office. Ramsay MacDonald had been
^
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obliged to appoint Simon to the post in order to balance the
parties in the Cabinet formed after the 1931 election. The
appointment had been widely disapproved. Malcolm MacDonald has
recalled being "shocked** at his father's decision and there is
no reason to doubt that many other politicians from all parties
shared this attitude."'" By early 1934, most if not all of the
Cabinet were unhappy with the Foreign Secretary. F,lliot and
Ormsby-G-ore's attitude was one of total despair and alarm. With
others including Anthony Hden recently appointed Lord Privy Seal
outwith the Cabinet, the "Boys' Brigade" prevailed upon Austen
Chamberlain to discuss the situation with them at the beginning
of February. The elder statesman shared their concern, as is
evident in a letter to his sister relating the meeting with the
young Conservatives.
"The fact is (and it's no use my pretending
anything else to you) that Simon is a very
bad Foreign Secretary. He has no policy,
is very pleased with himself and wholly
unconscious of the effect he produces on
others."
Apart from Simon, there was another Minister who had not
been a conspicuous success, namely Sir Fdward Hilton-Young.
In his case he had been appointed to a Ministry, that of Health,
about which he knew very little and spent much of time reouesting
guidance and assistance from the expert on these matters, Neville
"*"
Malcolm MacDonald in conversation with the author, 16 August
1977.
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Chamberlain. Moreover, in his parliamentary speeches he seemed
to give the false impression of uninterest in his work instead
of mere unfamiliarity.
"lliot was severely critical of some of the less energetic
Cabinet Ministers. In an astonishing passage in a speech he
made to the Constitutional Club on 13 February, at the very time
that more senior Cabinet Ministers were embarking on the campaign
to defend the Government's policies throughout the country,
Elliot attacked the inertia of sane of his colleagues.
"Unless Ministers will give a clear and vigorous
lead they will be swept aside by any party
which will give them the capable^and vigorous
lead for which they are crying."
This startling comment aroused considerable controversy, his
subsequent attempts to explain it not being convincing. It
was truly remarkabxe that Elliot should give such a public
admonition. It was an illustration not only of his forthright-
ness but of his occasional indiscretion.
Elliot felt that a mere reshuffle of the Cabinet would not
suffice to give inner energy nor to create confidence within the
nation. He believed the best move ?/ould be to bring Lloyd
George into the Cabinet. Lloyd George himself was aware that
2
Elliot would not oppose his inclusion. Elliot discussed this
and other possibilities in a confidential talk on 21 February
with his friend and freouent host,Waldorf \stor. Elliot
Morning Post 11+ February 193^.
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favoured bringing Robert Cecil into the Cabinet to appeal to
the strong peace sentiment prevalent in the country and to
facilitate acceptance of re-armament. If Cecil was in the
Cabinet, the Government would find it easier to deal with a
foreign crisis for his lead would be followed by the League of
Nations Union membership and his guidance more readily accepted
by political opponents.
The rumours of an imminent Cabinet reshuffle reached a
climax on 25 February with intense speculation as to the possible
changes figuring in the Sunday press. It was widely believed
that Simon would leave the Foreign Office and go to Home Affairs
but there was no consensus on his successor with Hailsham,
Halifax, and Fden being the names suggested. Other possibilities
mooted were that Cunliffe-Lister, Collins and Betterton might
be sent to the House of Lords while Hilton-Young was regarded as
a candidate for the G-overnorship of Madras. At any rate
Flliot, who lunched with Ramsay MacDonald that very day,"'" did
not figure in any of the various conjectures - it was universally
assumed that he would stay at his Ministry to complete his task
of reconstructing the agricultural industry.
On 27 February, The Times dampened down the rumours by
stating that while Cabinet changes were inevitable they were
2
not imminent. In other papers^however, new speculation
appeared this time that the Cabinet was thinking of appointing a
RM Diary 25 Feb. 1934-
2
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Minister of Housing."'" This, unlike the other rumours, had firm
foundation as it was leaked to the Daily Mail by J.H. Thomas,
after a discussion with the 'Big-Six* - MacDonald, Baldwin,
Simon, Runciman, Chamberlain and Thomas himself. It was
predictably Chamberlain who was behind the idea of establishing
a Housing Department to take some of the work load off Health.
He was furious with Thomas who, when accused of leakage, denied
it and threatened resignation. Simon, too, who had been the
victim of vicious press attacks over several days, was extremely
distressed. The campaign against the Foreign Secretary
ironically made his position more secure for the newspaper attacks
made it almost impossible to shift him. Chamberlain recorded
in his diary that the leaders of the three Cabinet parties were
considering switching Hilton-Young to War to be succeeded by
Kingsley Wood, and ousting Sankey with Hailsham taking his
place at the Woolsack. Sankeythowever^ did not take the idea
too kindly and said he would resign immediately. These were
2
certainly difficult and unsettling days for the Cabinet."
In the end, the rumours were ouashed by an authoritative
denial which appeared in the Daily Mail on 3 March following a
meeting between Rothermere and Ramsay MacDonald.^ The Mail
asserted there would be no Cabinet changes before late autumn.
In the event, there was one change in July when Rlliot's friend,
1
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Oliver Stanley, succeeded Betterton at the Ministry of Labour
upon the latter1s appointment as Chairman of the Unemployment
Assistance Board. Kingsley 'Vood, Chamberlain's special protege
since his time as Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Health from
1924-1929, was already in the Cabinet having entered it in
January as Post-Master General. Those two changes were not
just the only ones made to the Cabinet in 1934 - they were in
fact the only alterations to the Cabinet membership made between
the appointments including that of Elliot in September 1932 and
those of June 1935 when Ramsay MacDonald resigned. it a time
when fascism was taking root in some European countries while in
others like France governments were constantly falling, the
continuity in the British Cabinet stood out in sharp contrast.
Speculation about Cabinet changes did recur more than once
before Baldwin took over but for the present it was at an end.
There was^however, one development outwith the Cabinet that did
not exactly help the cause of unity. Again, it was initiated
by the dominating force in the Cabinet, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Chamberlain was anxious to work out a policy pro¬
gramme for the period before the next election and for the
election itself. He wanted it to be considered not by the whole
Cabinet but just by the Conservative Ministers though he did not
consider such an idea disloyal to MacDonald. Early in February^
he had suggested the establishment of this Committee of Con¬
servative Cabinet members to Baldwin who agreed but Chamberlain
was left in no doubt that he would have to bring the matter up
141.
again before action was taken.In the meantime, he consulted
some of his other colleagues including Elliot, Wood, Hailsham
and Hoare. Chamberlain considered that the biggest nuestion
was what the future would hold for international trade which by
this time had contracted to 33^ of the 1929 level: would economic
nationalism prevail or would there be a meaningful recovery in
international commerce? Chamberlain asserted that "on the
answer to this problem depends our policy in agriculture, in
p
Empire relations and in international affairs."*
Chamberlain had, as he expected, to put further pressure on
Baldwin who much to the former's astonishment consulted MacDonald
before agreeing to a meeting of the Conservative Cabinet Ministers
on 2 March for which Chamberlain drafted a skeleton policy
programme on trade, defence, foreign affairs, education and
social policy including a campaign to regenerate the national
physique.^ Elliot did not attend the first meeting of the
Cabinet Conservative Committee since he was speaking in Edinburgh.
Hilton-Young too was fulfilling an engagement while Hoare and
Cunliffe-Lister were indisposed. To those that did attend,
however, Chamberlain, in his own words, "pretended that this was
a joint effort with 3B."^ The committee met on several sub¬
sequent occasions but its importance is difficult to gauge.
Chamberlain, predictably, makes great play of it in his diary
but it seems to have been primarily a vehicle for him to increase
NC Diary 6 February 1934>
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his already considerable influence on policy development and
his dominance over many of the less individualist Ministers.
Some of his proposals, however, were incorporated at a later
stage into the National Government's election progranme.
Chamberlain played a prominent role in the Cabinet dis¬
cussions on foreign policy and defence that began in the weeks
tha followed the rumours of reshuffle. The first meeting took
place on 22 March."'" The reality of the situation in Murope
was that, while efforts were still being made to reach agreement
on disarmament, Germany was re-arming and intended to carry on
doing so no matter what. Prance was in a paranoically anxious
state about this and sought from Britain a commitment amounting
virtually to a military alliance. In view of the political and
mental instability of France at this time and her provocative
attitude towards Germany since Versailles, it was not surprising
that even the Francophiles in the Cabinet shied away from such
inextricable involvement. There were some Ministers, moreover,
who wanted little or nothing to do with France at all. The
atmosphere in the Cabinet was as usual not captured in the
minutes which with few exceptions only recorded briefly and
tersely the proceedings, often not mentioning which Ministers
took which line.
2
Chamberlain^however^ wrote about the meeting in his diary.
It is of course a very subjective account and full of self-
congratulation but it does give an idea on how the lines were
1
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drawn in the Cabinet at this stage on matters of security and
defence. It is in fact the only source to comment on Elliot's
contribution at this important Cabinet meeting. Chamberlain
recounts that Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial Secretary, asserted
that any further European commitments were impossible. Hitler's
proposal of 10 year non-aggression pacts with his neighbours were
reasonable and Britain should accept them leaving France to do
as she pleased. British interests, he continued, lay in
reaching agreement with Japan and avoiding commitments in Europe.
Chamberlain noted that "somewhat similar suggestions came from
Ormsby-Gore and Elliot and others made observations which seemed
to ma to miss the point." He had told his colleagues that to
defy France and agree with Germany would not do anything for
peace and would encourage France to take rash, drastic action.
The options were for Britain to participate in security arrange¬
ments or face re-armament involving enormous expense. Chamber¬
lain at this stage suggested examining the whole situation to
determine how Britain could limit her liabilities. If the
Cabinet was not prepared to consider some involvement, then
there could be no peace based on security. The Chancellor
indulged in fulsome self-praise at this contribution to the
meeting, seemingly taking great pleasure in getting the better of
Slliot and Ormsby-Gore.
"This allocution, I think the best thing I
have ever done in Cabinet, had an overwhelming
effect. Hailsham said he was in entire
agreement. Baldwin said the same. Fven
Runciman seemed to accept what I had said and
the 'Boys' Brigade' were silenced."
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Elliot, despite this setback, was certainly not going to
be "silenced" for long. The Cabinet referred the ouestion of
security including economic pressure and guarantees to the
Ministerial Committee on Disarmament and agreed that for the
purposes of this reference two Ministers not on the Committee
should attend, Runciman and Elliot. The latter submitted to
the second meeting he attended of this Committee^" a one-page
memorandum on sanctions, not in the capacity of Chairman of the
Sub-Committee on Economic Pressure but as a concise statement of
2
his personal views on the subject. \s it happened, the
Ministerial Committee did not consider this memo but it gives
historians valuable insight on his opinion of the use of
sanctions. Elliot pointed out an aspect that should not be
overlooked namely that the imposition of sanctions signified
that those who took such action meant business, conveying to the
would-be aggressor that it was just the first step. Elliot
held that in severe cases, only the use of force could be
effective but believed of sanctions that "as a preliminary to
the use of force they are very strong measures not only for
themselves but in what they foreshadow."
The Ministerial Committee on Disarmament met regularly
throughout late spring and summer 1954 to consider defence issues
including the formulation of a statement on air armament policy
to be made to parliament. The original membership of this
1
DC (M) 32 35th meeting 28 March 1934 Cab.27/506.
2
Memo, by WE. 27 March 1934- DC (M) 32 96 Cab.27/510.
145-
committee of the Cabinet set up in March 1952 had only consisted
of the Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, First Lord of the
Admiralty and the Secretaries for ''far, India, Dominions and Mr
with either MacDonald or Baldwin in the chair but after May 1934^
most of the other Ministers began attending ouite regularly.
This coincided with the reconvening of the Disarmament Conference
at which Britain's posture was one of sitting and listening
without offering any constructive suggestions.
After attending two meetings in March, Flliot was absent
for some weeks from the Committee and indeed from politics
altogether due to illness. Upon his return;he found that the
question under consideration was that of the proposed guarantee
of Belgian independence. The Prime Minister suggested that
Britain, France and Germany should seek to agree that the Belgian
frontiers should not be crossed without common consent. Flliot
doubted whether it was the right time to announce the guarantee
of Belgian independence. He was of the opinion that Britain
must undergo re-armament before ary such declaration should be
made. In that event, the psychological effect of such a
statement would be very significant. Instead of entering a
commitment to react if the act of aggression matched that
described in a particular agreement, Flliot advocated that
Britain should reserve her action as per Locarno. He asserted
that she had always opposed the idea of drawing up a definition
of aggression with automatic responses.± The following meeting
1
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reached agreement only that the defence of Belgium was of
essential interest to Britain and this was subsequently publicly
announced.
Another major question under consideration was that of
n^val re-armament. The Admiralty's attitude was that Britain
should have the naval strength to meet any danger from Japan —
she would in consequence be more than prepared for a potential
conflict with Germany whereas should she re-arm only with a view
to countering the German threat, she would not be adequately
equipped to meet Japan. This argument was put forcefully to the
Ministerial Committee on Disarmament by Monsell but was opposed
by Chamberlain who challenged the whole conception of naval power,
on the assumption that G-ermany was the more likely, more
dangerous enemy."1" Chamberlain, in a memo on the Report of the
Defence Requirements Committee which hid been set up to consider
the position in the Cast, proposed the scaling down of Admiralty
2
plans and advocated giving priority to air re-armament.
The basic issue was which of G-ermaqy and Japan was the more
probable aggressor— Clliot felt that the Foreign Office should
consider this question earnestly. He asserted that whereas it
was taken for granted that Britain would not have to fight
G-ermary single-handed, the situation was quite different as
regards Japan. It was obvious that Britain could not fight in
the Far Fast alone but since it was quite likely that the United
States would not become involved, Hlliot suggested seeking an
1
DC (M) 32 50th meeting 25th June 1934-
2
NC Memo DC (M) (32) 120.
147-
understanding with the Soviet Union. Baldwin pointed out that
this suggestion involved a total change in foreign policy.
Elliot,however, accepted the implications of his proposal,
emphasising that the other option would be to bear alone the
burden of a naval war. He believed that to send the fleet out
to the East on its 07m would be calamitous.^
Elliot did not attend the last meeting of the Cabinet
Committee before the recess. Chamberlain put his case that
capital ship construction should be stopped for the meantime on
the basis that cost-wise Britain could not contemplate simul¬
taneous war against G-ermany and Japan. The Committee,however
sided with Monsell in so far as retaining a margin vis-a-vis
Japan was concerned^with Eden declaring his agreement with the
First Lord of the Admiralty that Japan should be regarded as the
prime danger. Baldwin advocated postponing any definite
conclusions until after the next Naval Conference. In the
meantime, a progranme for 1935 could be considered in the routine
way. This suggestion by the Lord President was accepted by his
colleagues and thus the fundamental question of naval re-armament
2
was duly shelved.
Elliot's contributions to the discussions on defence
strategy and re-armament exemplified his acute awareness of and
interest in policy matters outwith his own department. He had
no hesitation in speaking his mind on foreign and domestic
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affairs. As far as the latter was concerned, the controversies
surrounding the Unemployment Insurance Act, which had been
:lliot* s main domestic policy concern in 1933, had nuietened down.
In the autumn of 1934, however, the whole issue came to the fore¬
front again. Throughout the summer, the Unemployment Assis¬
tance Board had met to formulate draft regulations as required
by the Act. At the Cabinet meeting of 29 October, Oliver Stanley,
now Minister of Labour^asked that these regulations be given the
immediate, detailed consideration of a Cabinet Committee."'' It
was suggested that the Unemployment Insurance Policy Committee
be reconvened for the purpose. In the event, it was reconstituted
as the Unemployment Assistance Board Committee with virtually the
same composition as its predecessor. Apart from Chamberlain in
the chair and of course Stanley and Rlliot, the other members were
Sir John Gilmour, J.H. Thomas, Sir Godfrey Collins, Hilton-Young,
2
Ormsby-Gore and Sir Kingsley Yood.
"Clliot* s main objection to the regulations was the apparent
injustice of the rent rule. He felt that slum dwellers in
depressed areas paying low rents should not have their basic
relief of 24/- per couple reduced on these grounds. Thomas
too was very apprehensive of its potential political reper¬
cussions. Sir Godfrey Collins, the Scottish Secretary, had
grave doubts about the regulations in general. Responsible for
a country with more than its share of depression and unemploy¬
ment, he shared with his radical colleagues Ormsby-Gore, Klliot,
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and the Minister of Labour himself the belief that the proposed
rates of assistance were inadequate.^ Relations between Stanley
and the Unemployment Assistance Board were already strained by
the time he and Chamberlain came to put to it the Cabinet
Committee's objections to the rigidity of the proposed rent rule.
The final draft xhe regulations as it was presented to
parliament incorporated a modification of the rent rule and the
regulation whereby large families suffered reductions. It also
included three provisos to the effect that the assistance must
not exceed normal earnings, that the Board would have wide dis¬
cretionary powers to vary the relief according to particular
circumstances and that it would be able to cater for special,
perhaps urgent needs, like clothing.
The emotional arguments put forward in ccmmittee in favour
of more generous rates of relief by Rlliot and his progressive
colleagues did not endear them to others with more practical
outlooks. Tom Jones, a member of the Unemployment Assistance
Board, wrote to Baldwin of his disappointment with Rlliot's
behaviour, saying that there was "little or nothing to choose
2
between his methods and the worst Clydesider." Chamberlain
too was critical of the tactics employed by some of his
colleagues. He believed their attitude amounted to saying that
the relief rates should be such that nobody would receive less
than they had from the Public Assistance Committees with of
U. A..R. (34) 4th meeting 26 November 1934.
2
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course the Treasury paying the hill. He felt that these critics
were despite the concessions still frightened of the political
effects of the regulations. Chamberlain, on the other hand,
remained fairly confident, believing that "if the nettle is
grasped boldly there is nothing to fear.""'"
In fact, in the early stages it looked as though Chamber¬
lain' s interpretation would be vindicated. The regulations
were issued on 11 December and received a fairly good press.
They were laid before the House of Commons six days later and
while Labour made the expected noises about the inadeouacy of the
relief rates, the general reception was good. Certainly there
was at this point no indication of the fierce opposition that
would build up throughout January leading to a crisis in early
February. In December it looked very much as if the scheme
would be enacted as planned with the Board taking over on 7
January from the P.A,.C.'s responsibility for those in the
transitional category with 1 March as the second appointed day
when it would take over the charge of all other able-bodied
unemployed from local authorities.
In December, there was much unrest within the Cabinet with
internal speculation about and intrigue towards a Ministerial
reshuffle. Chamberlain's diary provides the fullest account of
these developments. Divisions over social policy did not help
the cause of Cabinet unity but the main factor was the
resurgence of discontent with and manoeuvres against Sir John
1
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Simon at the Foreign Office. The Government's popularity had
fallen recently as proven in "by-election results. The Chief
Whip, David Margesson,felt that one of the major reasons was
discontent with the Foreign Secretary and believed that he must
be removed. This would be facilitated by a general recon¬
struction with a reduction in the number of posts within the
Cabinet. Margesson's candidate to succeed Simon was Neville
Chamberlain. MacDonald and Thomas, however, thought that
impossible with the former saying that the only option would be
for he himself to take the job. Margesson immediately reported
this to Baldwin and Chamberlain.^
On 4 December, Chamberlain was summoned by MacDonald to
discuss the matter. The Prime Minister felt that although there
was discontent at the Government's foreign policy, it was not
directed specifically at Simon and there was no real desire for
a Cabinet reshuffle. Later the same day, Margesson and
Chamberlain got together - the Chief Whip seems to have been the
leading conspirator against Simon. Margesson asserted that
MacDonald did not fully appreciate the opposition in the Commons
to the Foreign Secretary and asked for the Chancellor's consent
to press for a reshuffle. Chamberlain was in a difficult
situation since he was the proposed replacement for Simon
although he himself was not at all keen on moving to the Foreign
Office. He agreed, however, that Margesson should sound out the
opinions of the younger Cabinet members like Stanley and Elliot,
1
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observing that "if anything was to he done it might perhaps come
better from the younger than from the older men."'*' The Chief
Whip did indeed consult Flliot and Stanley along with others
including Cunliffe-Lister, Monsell and Sir Kingsley Wood - all
2
of them were keen for a change. As a result, a special
meeting with Baldwin was arranged.
In the event^however, the meeting did not take place. On
the day before it was due to be held, Chamberlain informed
Baldwin that he would not go to the Foreign Office during the
present Parliament. Sir Samuel Hoare's outrage that the
younger Ministers and the Chief Whip were discussing Cabinet
changes, a matter which in no way was their business, was
another factor in Baldwin's decision not to meet the dissidents
3
en masse - if they wanted to talk it must be individually. As
had happened nine months earlier, the intrigue and speculation
simply faded away. The renewed calm ^however, would not last
for long.
The first ten weeks of 1935 produced a major domestic crisis
for the National G-overnment. The fears of possible social
and political repercussions over the new unemployment assistance
regulations, held by some of the Cabinet particularly Flliot,
Stanley, and Collins^were vindicated. In the days immediately
following 7 January, the first appointed day when the Unemployment
Assistance Board took over responsibility for the transitional
1
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category, a storm of protest swelled against the inadequacy of
the relief rates. It was only now fully apparent that the
Board* s scale of assistance would render many unemployed worse
off than they had been when under the Public Assistance Committees.
The root of the trouble was that P.A.C.s in certain areas had been
more lax in their application of the household means test than
others and had,particularly in the depressed area3^taken full
advantage of their discretionary powers. M.P.s were besieged
with complaints and public demonstrations took place almost
daily.
Elliot found himself having to defend the regulations to
his constituents at the annual meeting of the Kelvingrove
Unionist Party on 15 January. He admitted that the new rates
would mean less for some but pointed out that had the local
authorities continued to be responsible, the city rates would
have had to be increased and thus no one would have benefitted in
the long run. He asserted furthermore that the transfer of the
responsibility for unemployment assistance to the state was a
most significant step towards providing those out of work with
the best conditions while at the same time offering the best
chance of getting them back to being employed. Elliot did
however label the Government's measures as "salvage schemes" and
"ambulance schemes" declaring that the real priority was to
increase employment.^
1
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The storm burst a fortnight later on 28 January when
parliament reassembled after the Christmas recess. Such was
the uproar in the G-allery of the House that it had to be cleared.
On the floorvtoo^there were noisy scenes with the Clydesiders
leading the Socialist outcry. The following day,Labour moved
unsuccessfully to report progress with a view to getting the
operation of the Board's scale of relief suspended pending the
establishment of appeal tribunals. Oliver Stanley found himself
in the unenviable position of having to defend arrangements over
which he officially presided but which he did not control. He
was, frankly, unnerved by the virulence of the opposition to
the regulations. it so happened that the Cabinet was at this
time preoccupied with foreign affairs, in particular the after¬
math and implications of the Saar plebiscite. As a result, it
paid little heed to Stanley's predicament other than to agree to
his request that the committee which had scrutinised the
regulations be reconvened to help him deal with the difficult
parliamentary situation.
The Cabinet Committee met in secret session on 31 January
2
and 4 February. The decision to announce a standstill was
not formally made within its portals but was made in the heat mf
the moment without any other consultation by Stanley and Neville
3
Chamberlain. Stanley made his statement to the House of
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Commons on 5 February - the U.A.B. scales would be suspended in
certain cases: pending reconsideration of the whole matter, an
applicant for relief would get relief according to the Board's
rating or that of his previous P.A.C., whichever was the larger
amount."'" The following day, the Cabinet Committee met again to
discuss procedure. It was agreed that the G-overnment had to
make a statement recognising that local authorities would have
to be compensated in respect of the fact that the Unemployment
Assistance Board would not now be taking over responsibility for
the remaining able-bodied on 1 March.
Oliver Stanley, who was Flliot's most intimate Cabinet
colleague, was profoundly shaken by the furore the regulations
had caused and his own consequent unpopularity. A further blow
was to come: on the morrow of the standstill announcement, the
Government suffered a stunning defeat in the "'avertree by-
election. The circumstances were aclmittedly peculiar with
Randolph Churchill standing as an Independent and splitting the
Conservative vote letting the Labour candidate through the middle.
The defeat was seen^however as partly attributable to the debacle
over unemployment relief. It did therefore not help the state
of mind of the unfortunate Minister of Labour. Cuthbert Headlam
noted that Stanley was near to nervous collapse and "in the
2
depths of despair as a result of his first setback."
In the circumstances, Stanley offered his resignation but
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MacDonald turned it down on the grounds that his departure would
imperil Conservative cooperation in the Cabinet.Stanley went
to see Chamberlain to discuss the issue on 13 February having
talked inconclusively about it with MacDonald. The Minister of
Labour asserted that the Government could not make another error
of judgement over assistance rates. He felt that he might have
to ask for changes so far-reaching that the Cabinet would not
endorse them, leaving him with no alternative but to resign in
circumstances damaging to the Government. He therefore believed
it would be better to resign immediately on the grounds that he
had lost the confidence of the House. Chamberlain, however,
felt that to resign at this stage might damage Stanley's personal
political reputation as he would be charged with failure. It
would not help the government either, rather would the Cabinet
be accused of making Stanley the scapegoat. On the other hand,
if after a review of the regulations there were as Stanley
predicted irreconcilable differences between himself and the
majority of the Cabinet, then each side cculd put forward their
arguments and he could resign with dignity. In this way the
Government would be less damaged than if there was further
2
disruption at this stage. For all that Chamberlain was
frequently exasperated by the argumentativeness and irrepressi-
bility of Stanley and the rest of the progressive bloc in the
Cabinet, he too had been unnerved by the force of protest against
1
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the regulations. Legislation to effect the standstill and
cancel the second appointed day was quickly put through parlia¬
ment. Three months later, the Minister of Health introduced a
bill to compensate local authorities for their retention of
responsibility for poor relief. The regulations would not
reappear until June 1936 after a complete overhaul and several
fractious discussions in the Cabinet.
In February 1935, the fortunes of the National Government
were once again at a low ebb. The storm of protest against
the assistance regulations damaged its popularity and combined
with the shock result in the '"/avertree by-election led to the
resurgence of rumours about a Cabinet reshuffle. The speculation
and the public discontent were greatly increased by the re-
emergence from relative political inactivity of Lloyd George who
in January amid much publicity had produced a 'new deal'
programme for the nation. In a speech at Bangor, he outlined
his policies which were, in essence, a revised edition of
previous programmes^chiefly *'7e can conquer unemployment.' The
main proposals covered agricultural reconstruction, the control
of the Bank of England, the formation of a small inner Cabinet of
5, and the establishment of a Development Council with repre¬
sentatives from industry, commerce, finance and labour to plan
schemes for housing, roads, and the reconstruction of the
depressed industries.
The timing of these proposals could scarcely have been more
inopportune for the National Government. The 'new deal' seemed
full of promise in sharp contrast to the apparent meanness and
158.
economic narrowmindedness of the National Government. .'Whatever
its merits, the Lloyd George progranme constituted a further
threat to the Government's popularity. There was already a
pro-Lloyd George faction in the Cabinet. On the other hand,most
of the senior Ministers were to varying degrees opposed to any
suggestion of his inclusion jn the Cabinet and saw the turn of
events as no reason to change their views. Neville Chamberlain,
who had an intense political and personal dislike for Lloyd
George, refused for one minute to contemplate sitting in the same
Cabinet with him."'' Baldwin, although at first willing to at
least consider working with him, on reflection decided that
notwithstanding any electoral advantage, the inclusion would
disrupt the Cabinet. This was also the conclusion of the Big
Six when it met on 7 February.
That weekend, the Sunday papers were full of rumours of
Cabinet reconstruction. In addition to '/avertree, the regu¬
lations debacle and Lloyd George's spanner in the works, there
was a general impression that the Government lacked energy and
2
direction. After discussions between MacDonald and Baldwin as
well as meetings of the Big Six, it was decided that pending
Baldwin's succession there would be no Cabinet changes. It was
decided however that it was politically expedient to at least
respond to Lloyd George's initiative and to at least appear to be
giving serious consideration to his policy programme.
"*■
NC Diary 28 & 29 Jan. 1935*
John Simon: Retrospect (London: Hutchinson, 1952). Diary
entry li+- Feb. 1933*
159-
The General Purposes Committee was to undertake its
consideration. It was basically the formalisation as a Cabinet
Committee of the Big Six - MacDonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain,
Thomas, Simon and Runciman. It had been Chamberlain who had
suggested towards the end of January the appointment of a
committee to consider broad policy questions. He believed that
membership should not be confined to the Big Six but should also
include some other Ministers, perhaps Hailsham, '"food and Stanley.
MacDonald at first preferred that only the Big Six should sit on
it. Chamberlain however felt that while the danger of jealousy
would be lessened, that of encouraging a split between the older
and younger Ministers would not. He then came up with a solution
acceptable to the Prime Minister - that Hailsham be a member as
the representative from the Upper House while the Committee be
empowered to invite any of their other colleagues to attend any
2
meeting where their presence was considered worthwhile.
Accordingly, at the Cabinet meeting of 30 January 1935
MacDonald had proposed the setting up of the General Purposes
Committee."^ It was given a hostile reception in some quarters
notably by Cunliffe-Lister, Wood and Rlliot, the latter's argu¬
ments failing to impress MacDonald.To Chamberlain "it was
evident that the younger members have been talking things over
among themselves." Prom his protege, Kingsley Wood, the
Chancellor learned that Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial Secretary,
NC Diary 21+ Jan. 1935*
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was the leader of those Ministers who felt that the Government's
economic strategy was wrong."'" Despite resentment at the inner
Cabinet appearance and terms of reference of the Committee, its
establishment was approved. It held twenty-five meetings in
2
all. After the first eight, it dealt almost exclusively with
a memorandum it had invited Lloyd George to submit setting out
his unemployment proposals. In early April, Lloyd George was
invited in person to attend a series of meetings to discuss his
programme. Since agriculture was the major topic, it was
hardly surprising that "Elliot was asked to participate too - he
attended three of the six meetings and in addition held private
3
talks with Lloyd George outwith the Committee.
At first it seems that Lloyd George was confident that his
proposals would make an impact on the Cabinet, feeling that he
could exert powerful influence over some of its members.
"L.G. is getting under the skin of the Govern¬
ment, by trying to split it. Hore-Belisha
is with L.G. He knows he can smash the
Minister of Health. He can smash the
Minister of Agriculture to bits, and
Oliver Stanley and Lady Maureen Stanley
are going down to lunch at Churt on Sunday. ,
That is not a bad wedge into the Government."
As the talks went on, however, Lloyd George realised that the
Government was merely toying with him, keeping him out of mischief.
That this was indeed so is evident from Chamberlain's diary.
1
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His attitude towards the memo on unemployment was one of contempt,
asserting it to be a document of picturesque exaggeration,
alluring promise and false perspective.^ Chamberlain, however,
was well aware of the political capital Lloyd G-eorge might make
out of his proposals and therefore had believed he should be
invited for talks. At no time was there any hope of Lloyd George
receiving an unprejudiced hearing. Chamberlain drew up a
strategy of discussing the memo on a friendly basis but keeping
Lloyd George guessing with the Cabinet representatives reserving
all their fire for the memorandum to be drawn up after the talks
2
were over.
Apart from agriculture, the General Purposes Committee
discussed the proposals relating to coal, housing, town planning
and transport as well as the machinery of the proposed National
Development Board and inner Cabinet. In response to Lloyd
George's decision to publish a revised document, the Committee
drew up and published a reply which amounted to a sunmary dis¬
missal of his proposals. Lloyd George tried to salvage some
political glory. Harly in July, he set up the Council of Action
for Peace and Reconstruction as his intended instrument for
attracting all-party support. This had little impact,however,
and never unduly worried the National Government which by this
time had recovered much of its popularity after the Jubilee
celebrations and the succession of Stanley Baldwin as Prime
■*"
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Minister.
By June 1935 when Baldwin took over from MacDonald, foreign
policy had become the major preoccupation of the National Govern-
ment and was to remain so right up until the outbreak of the
Second World War. The first few weeks of 1935 had been a time
of great anxiety over developments abroad. The major worry
concerned Germany's rapidly increasing military potential.
After discussions with French Ministers, a joint communique was
issued advocating a general settlement with Germany including
an air pact. In response, Germany reauested talks with Britain.
The decision to accede to this and to send the Foreign Secretary
to Berlin was made on 19 February by the Ministerial Committee
on Disarmament, now called the Defence Policy and Requirements
Committee."*" The visit was postponed by Hitler after the
Government* s publication on 4 March of a 'White Paper on defence
policy in which it expressed the realisation that disarmament
was not apy nearer and that in consequence Britain had to
improve and re-equip her defence. It attacked too the
unauthorised re-armament of Germany. Simon*s trip was nearly
cancelled again this time by Britain after Hitler's announcement
on 16 March of the reintroduction of conscription.
Rlliot had not been present when the original decision that
Simon should go to Berlin was taken although he was by now a full
Member of Cabinet Committee on Defence Policy and Renuirements.
1
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He made his feelings known, however, to his colleagues during
Cabinet discussion of the attitude that should be taken at the
Berlin talks. He asserted that the crucial cuestion was whether
or not Germany would rejoin the League of Nations. If Hitler
was invited to return to discuss his grievances and he refused,
that declared Elliot would be tantamount to a declaration of
aggression. In that event, he believed a meeting of the
Council of the League should be convened."
The Berlin talks achieved nothing except perhaps to re-
emphasise the fact that Germany was re-arming rapidly and would
continue to do so regardless of objections from other nations.
It was her considerable expansion of air power that particularly
disturbed the Cabinet. At the Stresa talks in April, Britain,
Prance and Italy expressed a readiness to enter into a convention
to limit air re-armament. The Cabinet however had to take
immediate further steps to increase Britain's own air potential.
Throughout 1934, there had been repeated assurances from the
Government that the German air force was nowhere approaching the
British level. The Air Ministry's estimates were, however,
wildly inaccurate. Hitler told Simon in Berlin that parity had
been attained, this statement being related to Parliament. This
vindicated all the warnings sounded by Vinston Churchill and his
colleagues. The whole question of air defence was urgently
considered by the Defence Policy Reouirements Committee. As
long ago as March 1934 Baldwin pledged that British air power
1
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would not "be inferior to any nation within striking distance.
The Cabinet Committee agreed that another statement should be
made asserting the Government's intention to take the necessary
measures to maintain this position. Elliot, however, felt that
it must first be considered just what was a reasonable estimate
of what could be achieved. He was concerned that the Government
might make a pledge it might subsequently find itself unable to
fulfil for practical re?sons and that this could have serious
implications.
The pledge that parity would be maintained was inevitably
and irretrievably breached. although the German expansion
rate slowed down, it proved impossible for Britain to catch up
or even arrest the increasing German lead despite the resolve
and drive of the National Government. The Air Ministry was
inevitably the target for criticism and blame. Certainly, it
had got its calculations of German air power and expansion
potential hopelessly 'wrong but at a time of tight control of the
Government purse strings and of hopes of disarmament, it had
fought an unremitting battle to increase the strength of the air
force with Londonderry as Secretary of State pleading his depart¬
ment* s case in Cabinet. It was somewhat ironic that having for
years asked for more and more from a reluctant Cabinet, he was
castigated for not asking for sufficient. Londonderry, however,
brought about his own downfall. Instead of taking advantage of
the new facts and pressing for an immediate response from the
x
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now gravely concerned Cabinet, the Ministry and its Minister
attempted to justify their past actions and denied Hitler's
air parity claim.
Baldwin admitted to the House of Commons on 22 May that
the Cabinet had been misled by official under-estimates of the
rate of German Air expansion and asserted that the blame must
not be taken by any individual Minister or department but by the
entire Government. This confession, delivered in typical
Baldwin style, brimming with candour and honesty, was received
extremely well by his supporters in the House. It did not,
however,represent a declaration of confidence in Londonderry
whom he removed from the Air Ministry a fortnight later upon
becoming Prime Minister.
Baldwin made several other Cabinet changes. He had the
difficult task of removing the obvious weak links while retaining
the party balance and thus preserving the facade of a coalition.
He put his Cabinet making problems to Tom Jones in the following
terms.
"It's the balancing which is such a nuisance.
Most would agree that Jimmy Thomas ought to
gOj but then Ramsay clings Jo him and he
must therefore be kept on."
The question facing Baldwin regarding Simon was not whether he
should be moved but where to. Simon's Cabinet colleagues had
lost all confidence in him as Foreign Secretary and in April a
group of 70 M.P.s had protested against his continued tenure
1
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of that office."^ The obvious Ministry to switch him to was the
Home Office. In consequence, Sir John G-iliaour was dropped from
the Cabinet and given a peerage. He was joined in the Upper
House by Hilton-Young, the ineffective Health Minister who was
succeeded by Chamberlain's protege, Sir Kingsley ¥ood. London¬
derry became Lord Privy Seal and was succeeded at Air by Ctsnliffe-
Lister who was in turn succeeded at the Colonial Office by
Malcolm MacDonald. Oliver Stanley was relieved of the Ministry
of Labour which went to Ernest Brown, Liberal National M.P. for
Leith. Stanley succeeded Halifax at Education with the latter
moving to the War Office to replace Hailsham 'who took over the
Lord Chancellorship from Sankey who left the Cabinet. Apart
from Brown and MacDonald, there were three other new Cabinet
members, namely Eustace Percy as Minister without Portfolio,
Anthony Eden as Minister for League of Nations Affairs, and the
Marquis of Zetland who succeeded Hoare as Secretary of State for
India upon the latter's appointment as Foreign Secretary. Elliot
was one of seven Ministers not to move, the others being
Chamberlain, Thomas, Runciman, Monsell, Ormsby-C-ore and Collins
despite speculation that the last named would retire and get a
2
peerage.
Baldwin's Cabinet was to prove far less stable than its
predecessor 'with more Ministerial changes in 2 years than there
had been in the previous four. It broke up for the summer
J.A. Cross: Sir Samuel Hoare (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977)
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recess on 31 July with the intention of resuming in October.
Mussolini's designs on Abyssinia, however, and the increasing
estrangement between Italy and the League of Nations necessitated
the Cabinet's resumption in August. The Government acting with
the French tried unsuccessfully to mediate. On 11 September,
the Assembly of the League of Nations met to consider the matter,
with Hoare and Gden representing Britain. Hoare made a brilliant
speech, reaffirming Britain's belief in the League and in
collective security as the best means of maintaining peace. He
seemed to reflect the mood of the country as indicated by the
answers to the Peace Ballot announced in June and enhanced not
only his own reputation but also that of his country in European
diplomacy. Undeterred, Mussolini's troops invaded Abyssinia
on 3 October.
In the meantime, the Cabinet anticipating the invasion, had
been discussing the question of sanctions. The Advisory
Committee on Trade Questions in Time of Var reported as requested
by the Cabinet on the forms of economic and financial restric¬
tions that could be applied in this case.'*' Klliot as Chairman
was directly involved in this matter in a way that he was not as
Minister of Agriculture. He had, however, at this stage 'played
little part in the Cabinet deliberations on Abyssinia. He was
not on the Cabinet Committee that considered the problem which
in ary case was mainly discussed in conference between Baldwin,
Cab.44 (35) & 45 (35) of 2 & 9 October 1935*
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MacDonald, Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare- Elliot's personal
opinion was that MacDonald and Simon's silence at Stresa had
encouraged Mussolini to believe that he need not fear the reper¬
cussion of an attack against Abyssinia, ostensibly as revenge
for A.dowa-'*" He saw the situation as the crunch test for the
a
validity of collective security as a viable principle."
Baldwin decided to take electoral advantage of the boost
given to the Government* s popularity by Britain's stance at
Geneva. Despite the fact that the unemployment figures for
August were under two million for the first time since 1930, the
Cabinet took the conscious decision to keep social and economic
issues well in the background. As early as August, Chamberlain
had begun anxiously searching for a vote-winning issue that
would keep public attention away from the Government's failure
to solve the problem of unemployment and the distressed areas.
He came up with that of defence with a view to "turning the
Labour party's dishonest weapon into a boomerang", thi# being a
reference to Labour's warmongering charge against the National
Government."^ Chamberlain was Chairman of the Cabinet Committee
set up to make recommendations as to the items to be included in
L
the Election Manifesto. Their Report listed nine areas of
policy in the order the Committee recommended that the manifesto
proper should deal with them. Domestic policy was way down the
list with agriculture dividing it from foreign and defence policy
Colin Coote: Companion of Honour p.181 2-
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g.t the top. The nine items in order were League of Nations,
the Defence programme, imperial policy, Export Trade policy,
Agriculture, Employment, Special Areas, Social Reform and
Scotland."'" The Cabinet approved this order on 23 October^ the
same day as it was announced that the General Election would
2
be on 14 November. Chamberlain was primarily responsible for
drafting the manifesto which was written in general terms,
without any detailed commitments on issues like defence and
the unemployment assistance regulations.
The campaign was hard fought with rowdy scenes in several
constituencies including those of the two MacDonalds and J.H.
Thomas. Elliot too had a rough time in Kelvingrove. There had
been speculation that he was leaving for a safer seat but this
he had firmly denied on more than one occasion ^ As Minister
of Agriculture, Elliot was the target for noisy heckling on food
prices. The fact was that Kelvingrove was a marginal industrial
constituency with no farming within its borders except as he
himself once remarked in window boxes on the sills of tenements.
The constituency did include a sizeable middle class area around
Glasgow University but it had too in Anderston one of the worst
slum areas in a city where in the autumn of 1935 unemployment
was over 35/t* Elliot rarely managed to complete a speech
throughout the campaign, having on one occasionjafter trying in
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exit."'" After two recounts and an amazing episode in which a
ballot box was discovered uponened after the first count had been
made, Elliot was declared elected by just 149 votes over Labour's
Hector MacNeil with Rae, the only Liberal candidate in G-lasgow,
2
coming a poor third.
The National Government won the election easily with 435
M.P.s to the Opposition's 180. Baldwin set about making further
Cabinet changes. Despite Chamberlain's protestations, he
retained both the MacDonalds and Thomas. Ramsay MacDonald,
defeated at Seaham, stayed on as Lord President while his son,
who had been defeated at Bassetlaw, changed offices with Thomas
so that the former became Dominions Secretary while the latter
went to the Colonial Office. There seems to have been argument
and dramatic scenes between Baldwin, Chamberlain, Ramsay
MacDonald and Thomas before the appointments were settled.
Thomas refused to become Lord Privy Seal and resented leaving the
Dominions Office, blaming his troubles on Elliot's meat policy and
not on his bad relationship with Dominion leaders made worse by
3
his coarse manner. MacDonald had told Baldwin that he would
only stay on if his son and Thomas were kept in the Cabinet too.
Thomas however asserted he was double-crossed by MacDonald since
he had approved the switch of offices with Malcolm MacDonald.
Baldwin certainly had a fraught timeA The only other change
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was that Duff Cooper entered the Cabinet as Secretary of State
for War in succession to Halifax who became Lord Privy Seal with
Londonderry being dropped much to his indignation.
The appointment of Duff Cooper, a close friend of Elliot's,
strengthened the voice of the younger Tories in the Cabinet.
Duff Cooper with Stanley and T"lliot formed in later years the
nucleus of the anti-appeasement group in the Chamberlain Cabinet.^"
The events of December 1935 served to cement the unity and con¬
viction of the three-colleagues. A few days after the General
Election, the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions against
Italy. There remained the question of an oil embargo. The
Foreign Office took the view that such an action would lead to
war whereas its main objective as to Italy was to cultivate
Mussolini as an ally against Germany* Sir Sarmel Hoare, the
Foreign Secretary, decided to take the whole Abyssinian affair
into his own hands. His appointment in June had been regarded
2
with profound misgivings by the younger members of the Cabinet.
Indeed, Ormsby-Gore had gone so far as to implore Baldwin not to
make Hoare Foreign Secretary, asserting that "if you do, we are
lost electorally, and worse may befall in Europe, and the League."^
Hoare* s behaviour in December 1935 justified their misgivings
when he and his French counterpart, Laval, drew up proposals for
the partition of Abyssinia which were more favourable to Italy
V.S. Morrison who succeeded Elliot as Minister of Agriculture
in October 1936 was a fourth member of this group.
2
Malcolm MacDonald in conversation with the author, 16 August
1977-
OG to SB 31 May 1935. Baldwin Papers vol 47*
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than anything ever considered by the League. Presented with a
fait accompli, the Cabinet reluctantly approved the submission of
the proposals to the League. Their disclosure in the French
press, however, caused an absolute furore.
The Cabinet at first tried to ride the storm on the grounds
that the proposals were put forward merely to get the views of
Italy, Abyssinia and the League and that the Government had
recommended them only for that purpose. It soon became clear,
however, that nothing short of a complete denunciation would
abate the growing political tempest- "ithin the Cabinet itself,
Flliot, Stanley, Ormsb^-Gore and Duff Cooper had been aghast at
the Hoare-Laval plan from the beginning and pressed The Times
lobby correspondent, Hlliot's friend Colin Coote, to strongly
oppose it." They determined that Hoare must resign. Duff
Cooper saw Chamberlain on 17 December to inform him that such a
demand would be made in Cabinet the following day. Chamberlain
was indignant, telling his colleague that it would be improper
and unprecedented to demand the resignation of a colleague in
his absence, for Hoare was confined to his house following an
injury sustained in Switzerland on holiday after his cataclysmic
2
talks with Laval.
The affair did indeed c ome to a head at the Cabinet meeting
of 18 December. Hoare did not attend but had sent Chamberlain
a copy of the speech he proposed to make to the Commons the
following day in which he defended his policy as the best possible
Tom Jones Diary 14 January 1936.
2
NC Diary 17 December 1935-
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in the form of a negotiated settlement although no longer
acceptable to the British Government and therefore to be contem¬
plated no further. The intended speech which Chamberlain
relayed to the Cabinet also cast doubts on the dependability of
French assistance in the event of war resulting from the
imposition of oil sanctions. Kingsley ?ood and Oliver Stanley
were first to voice their apprehensions, asserting that the
Cabinet would not endorse such a speech. Cunliffe-Lister, now
Lord Swinton, felt that Hoare should speak on his own behalf,
in other words from the backbenches- Thomas agreed, saying
that the whole affair would end after such a personal post-
resignation speech. 'Jlliot too supported this idea but wondered
if the speech should be moderated. All in all, the majority
of Ministers felt that Hoare must resign, with Halifax making
the point that unless the Foreign Secretary resigned, the whole
moral force of the Government would be undermined.
Hoare resigned that same afternoon and spoke from the back¬
benches the following day. In the same debate, Chamberlain
made a brilliant speech which effectively blunted the Opposition's
criticism. The Hoare-Laval plan wr s dead and buried. Klliot
tried to be objective about it in a letter to his friend Jan
Smuts. He explained that Hoare had gone further than anyone
had anticipated but that his colleagues in the Cabinet felt unable
to repudiate the proposals at the outset, particularly since the
1
Cab.56 (35) of Id December 1935* The minutes of this meeting
were separately recorded and are in Cab.23/90B. See also
NC Diary 18 December 1935.
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French press had immediately given the gist of them. The
G-overnment had felt obliged to reach an agreement with Italy,
aware of Britain's military weakness and also that of France.^
Hoare was not destined for a long stay on the G-overnment
backbenches. He had the considerable advantage of having
Chamberlain support his recall to the Cabinet as soon as possible.
Indeed;as early as February 1936 Chamberlain was manoeuvring to
get the man who was later to become his closest colleague back
into the Cabinet. For some time, as foreign affairs and the
question of national security became increasingly dominant,
Baldwin had been thinking of creating the post of Minister of
Defence. His first thought was to appoint Chamberlain himself
but the Chancellor refused to be moved and immediately began
canvassing support for Hoare. It was Margesson, the Chief Whip,
who first suggested Elliot. Baldwin however refused to consider
2
him, asserting that Elliot had to stay at Agriculture.
Elliot himself had very strong feelings on the matter and con¬
veyed to Baldwin that he would resign if Hoare was made Chairman
3
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Eden too was horrified
at the prospect, declaring to Baldwin that Hoare1s appointment
would make things difficult ^o>~ him, the new Foreign Secretary.^
In the end,it was Hoare himself who decided the issue by making
a maladroit speech on defence on 9 March. A few days later,
VTE to Smuts 30 December 1935, Smuts Papers vol 53 letter 24-
^
NC Diaiy 19 February 1936 & 8 March 1936.
3
Norman Rose: Baffy, the Diaries of Mrs. Blanche Dugdale
1936-1947 (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1973) p.6.
^
NC Diary 8 March 1936.
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Sir Thomas Inskip was appointed Minister for the Co-ordination
of Defence. Hoare was however promised the Admiralty in the
near future once Monsell had gone to the House of Lords.
The question that had brought about Hoare's downfall in
December, that of the fate of Abyssinia, still figured quite
highly on the Cabinet's agenda in the first few months of 1936.
After much discussion,the Cabinet finally agreed on 26 February
to support the imposition of an oil sanction against Italy.
Runciman and Monsell recorded their dissent."'" Despite endless
talks at Geneva, however, no oil sanction was introduced.
Attempts at negotiated settlement failed also. Finally, in May,
resistance in Abyssinia totally collapsed leaving Italy in full
control. The Cabinet sought to make an honourable withdrawal
from a lost cause. It was agreed that the continuation of
sanctions was a futile exercise but Ministers were divided as
to when the restrictions should be removed. Klliot was one of
those who opposed immediate unilateral withdrawing of sanctions.
Chamberlain was exasperated by the Cabinet* s procrastination and
brought matters to a head by making an intentionally 1 indiscreet'
speech to the 1900 Club on 10 June in which he declared that
sanctions should be lifted immediately, that collective security
had failed and that henceforth the League* s functions should be
limited to those which accorded with its actual powers.^ A
few days later, Rden told the Commons that Britain would propose
1
Cab.11 (36) of 26 February 1936.
2
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the abolition of sanctions at the next Council meeting. This
announcement was met with charges of defeatism and treachery and
led to a censure debate on foreign policy at the end of which
Harold Macmillan and Vyvyan Adams voted against the Government.
Three months earlier, the Government had in a White Paper
reaffirmed its belief in the League and collective security
only to have it put to the test a few days later by an event
which overshadowed the Abyssinian question, the invasion of the
Rhineland. The Cabinet met almost every day during March 1936
to discuss what to do, in the knowledge that public apathy and
military deficiency made it difficult to contemplate doing very
much. Moreover, despite outward appearances to the contrary,
there was every reason to doubt that France was prepared to join
in any military response. Unlike Abyssinia, there was never
any question of military or economic sanctions. The Council
of the League meeting in London resolved merely that Hitler's
action had broken the Versailles and Locarno Agreements and
invited him to negotiate new security arrangements. In response,
Hitler talked of 25 year non-aggression pacts but then did not
reply to requests for more detailed proposals. By this stage,
Rhineland was regarded as a fait accompli and another lost
cause.
In retrospect, the invasion of the Rhineland can be seen
as the first step along the path that led to the Second World
War. For Klliot, it was a most important turning point in his
political career. Flliot took the view that peace and liberty
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were not brought about by apathy or extreme tolerance but had
to be worked for."'" He pressed in vain for a stronger response
to Hitler's challenge and for concerted action with the French.
This was perhaps unrealistic but in the years that followed^
Elliot was to reproach himself for not resigning over the Rhine-
2
land. Twice more in the years before the outbreak of war,
Elliot came close to resignation. The first occasion was at
the time of Aden's departure from the Cabinet in February 1938.^
Elliot and others including Stanley and Morrison were sympathetic
to Eden but despite pressure from friends such as Colin Coote,
Elliot stayed on. The second occasion was at the time of
Munich when it seemed that Elliot would follow the lead of his
close colleague, Duff Cooper. In the end, however, Elliot
once more failed to resign. Duff Cooper himself advised Elliot
not to go for his intention was not to wound the Government by
more than a personal resignation.^1" It was however the fact
that he had stomached Rhineland that prevented Elliot's resig¬
nation in September 1938 more than anything else- As Minister
of Health at the time of Munich, he was only too well aware of
the total unpreparedness of civilian defence. He felt he had
as a member of the Cabinet to share the blame for the failure
to adequately re-arm. However humiliating the Munich terms
'/alter Elliot: "Peace, '.'ar and Liberty," Birkbeck Oration
given 12 December 1934 (London, 1935).
2
Colin Coote: A Companion of Honour p.152.
Ibid., p.156 and Blanche Dugdale Diary 21/22 February 1938.
^ Viscount Norwich: Old Men Forget (London: Rupert Hart-Davis,
1953) p.242.
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were, they had to he accepted given the weakness of the British
and French forces."*" Elliot felt obliged to stay in the Cabinet
where at least he could have some influence in trying to rectify
the military deficiency while at the same time pressing Chamber-
2
lain to take a forceful line on foreign policy.
Elliot's apparent indecision and recurrent writhing over
resignation undoubtedly did him great political harm. He was
regarded as not having the courage of his convictions, criti¬
cising and threatening but always in the end swallowing Chamberlain's
policy of appeasement and proving in Chamberlain's own words "a
3
weak brother in a crisis." Perhaps this more than anything
else explains why Elliot was cast off into the political
wilderness by Winston Churchill.
Elliot's actions^however^ can be interpreted in a very
different way. He was simply not a resigner and for absolutely
honourable reasons."4" The fact was that Elliot felt if he were to
resign one day, he would not be able to influence perhaps more
crucial decisions the next. At the time of the Rhineland
invasion, there were very good reasons in this respect ouite apart
from European affairs why Elliot should not resign. flfter all,
5
his great work as Minister of Agriculture was not yet completed.
'vE to Blanche Dugdale, 7 October 1958 in Colin Coote: \ Com¬
panion of Honour p.l63.
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For the best coverage of Elliot's attitude in Cabinet to
foreign policy 1936-1959 see Maurice Cowling: The Impact of
Hitler; Ian Colvin: The Chamberlain Cabinet; Keith Middlemas:
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^
NC Diary 19 February 1938.
^ This view is taken by Malcolm MacDonald as discussed in con¬
versation with the author, 16 August 1977-
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Elliot's agricultural policy in 1936 is dealt with in Chapter 7-
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There was of course a close connection between agriculture and
defence policy in so far as adequate food supplies were
essential in time of war- Elliot in fact felt so strongly on
this score that he took it upon himself to appoint a secret
committee with representatives from his own Ministry and the
agricultural departments for Scotland and Northern Ireland to
consider the problem of food production in time of war."^ Its
report included a plan to step up food production by ploughing
up grassland- In May 1936^its work and its report was taken
over by the newly appointed Committee of Imperial Defence Sub¬
committee on Food Supply in Time of 7ar chaired by Inskip with
Elliot as one of its members. This Committee was responsible
for drawing up plans for wartime production* storage and
rationing based on certain assumptions including the estimated
duration of the dislocation of food supplies and the extent of
?
the decrease in imports that would be occasioned by war."
Apart fran his responsibility as Minister of Agriculture,
Elliot had another more emotional reason for pulling back from
resignation. 's long as he was in the Cabinet, he could try and
exert his influence on the future of Palestine.^ Since the
controversial White paper of October 1930 and its subsequent
modification, Jewish immigration to Palestine had continued on
1
K. A. Murray: Agriculture (H.M.S.O. & Longmans, G-reen, 1955)
p.48.
2
Proceedings of the Food Supply in Time of War Committee are
in Cab.16/156.
3
Best source for Elliot's attitude on Palestine is Norman
Rose: The G-entile Zionists (London: "Frank Cass, 1963).
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an unprecedented scale. In May 1936, the Cabinet appointed
another Commission in response once again to \rab riots.
Elliot alone fought against this move, interpreting it as a
concession to violence. Throughout the 1930*s, Tlliot leaked
details of Cabinet discussions on this matter to leading
Zionists, through his friend, Blanche Dugdale. In June 1937^
two weeks before its publication^he went as far as to show her a
copy of the peel Report at a secret midnight meeting at the
Savoy."*" Hlliot in fact supported the Commission's recommendation
of a tripartite division of Palestine. He fought in vain for
such a policy to be taken up and developed in face of the Foreign
Office opposition which led ultimately to another Commission
nicknamed the 'Repeel Commission' which in October 1938 came out
against partition without recommending any alternative. By
this time of course the European situation was demanding all
the Government's energy and attention and as a result the British
mandate in Palestine continued until after the Second World War.
On the home front, Rlliot's desire to continue to exert his
progressive influence on social and economic policy discouraged
thoughts of resignation from the Cabinet on foreign policy.
The "establishment was only too well aware and apprehensive of
the challenge of the progressive, expansionist opinion within
the Cabinet as illustrated by a remarkable memorandum early in
1936. The Committee of economic Information had been asked to
prepare a guiding report on the probable trend of unemployment
Norman Rose p.13^-
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over the next ten years for the Unemployment Insurance Statutory
Committee which was revising the scheme's finance. The ensuing
report was a pessimistic one, estimating that the unemployment
average over the following decade would he in the region of
15-g-l6-g%- Chamberlain's Principal Private Secretary, Ronald
Fergusson, sent a memorandum to his chief putting the Treasury
view that the report should not be circulated to the Cabinet.
It felt that the CHI had put the figures too high and that its
reservations would be ignored. Fergusson went on to say that it
would be a pity to circulate an erroneous conception "especially
as it may lead to agitation on the part of eg. Lord Hustace
Percy, falter Ulliot etc. for grandiose schemes to relieve a
situation /rhich will probably not prove so serious as the SA.C
suggest." Chamberlain agreed that circulation to the whole
Cabinet would be "most dangerous" but favoured showing it confiden¬
tially to the service Ministers in respect of its bearing on the
defence programme.""
One of the two Ministers mentioned by Fergusson resigned
from the Cabinet two months later. Lord Hustace Percy had been
appointed Minister without Portfolio in June 1935« His resig¬
nation in March 1936 was du*~ to various factors including his
Fergusson to NC 6 January 1936 and NC to !?ergusson 7 January
1936, Treasury Papers Tl6l/717/540500.
I am indebted to Dr. Rodney Lowe of Herriot-'fatt University
for passing on this reference.
As a footnote it is interesting if somewhat ironic that
Fergusson was appointed by Hlliot two months later to succeed
Howell-Thomas as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries.
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disapproval of the line taken over the Rhineland invasion and
the conservatism of the Government's social and economic policy.
The main reason, however, seems to have "been that he was not
given arything important to do. His withdrawal depleted the
numbers on the Cabinet Committee which was to undertake the
consideration of the new regulations proposed by the Unemploy¬
ment Assistance Board to liquidate the standstill arrangements
of February 1935- The Committee's composition had been altered
twice by Baldwin since his succession as Prime Minister. The
progressive trio of Hlliot, Stanley and Ormsby-G-ore were dropped
under the second revision. With Percy's resignation from the
Cabinet, the Committee's numbers went down to six. Then in May
came J.H. Thomas's resignation after a tribunal had been set up
to investigate Budget leaks. This left Chamberlain as Chairman
with Simon, Collins, Tood, and Brown. These five Ministers,
together with Ramsay MacDonald who put in the occasional appearance,
met five times in May and June 1936,^ and produced a report for
p>
the consideration of the whole Cabinet." The report was dis¬
cussed at two lengthy sessions on 25 June and a further two on
29 June. All "the old differences of opinion dame to the surface
again with the political and economic argument? put forward being
extensions and revisions of those which had preceded the ill-
fated regulations of December 1934- Cabinet proceedings were
for once fully minuted for which historians interested in what
^
Proceedings of the Cabinet Committee on the U.A.B.'s regu¬
lations: U.A.R. (34) Meetings 12-16 in Cab.27/575>
^
CP 172 (36) in Cab.24 series.
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was the major social policy issue of the decade must be truly
grateful.
Chamberlain told his Cabinet colleagues at the first session
on 25 June that they must realise that the Government would
again be criticised when the regulations were issued since the
revised proposals would still involve a reduction in benefit in
some cases. He maintained, however, that if anything the relief
rates were too generous, increasing assistance to danger level,
that is that which discourages employment. In general, the
Public Assistance Committee standard was lower than that now
under consideration. Chamberlain stressed that those living in
areas which had been extravagant, ignoring the Means Test in
some cases, would be the ones to suffer a reduction in benefit.
There was also a problem with Scotland where hitherto there had
been no discrimination between those under and over the age of
21 whereas the new proposals would introduce such a dividing line
as at present operated in England and "/ales. Chamberlain opposed
attempting to get over a Scottish difficulty by creating bigger
problems in the rest of the country. Collins and Elliot,
however, took a very different view.
Sir Godfrey Collins, Secretary of State for Scotland^had
fought a single-handed campaign in the Cabinet Committee for a
more generous scale of benefit and for concessions in response to
circumstances north of the border. In the absence of success,
he carried this fight on to the whole Cabinet, putting his views
forward in a memorandum."'" Under the Standstill arrangements,
^
GC memo, CP 179 (36) in Cab.24 series.
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56% of the uninsured unemployed in Britain and 70% in Scotland
were receiving assistance according not to the Board's regu¬
lations but to the transitional payment scales which in their
case were the more generous. Collins stressed that the new
regulations would be judged by public opinion not by comparison
with thosesbandoned in January 1935 but in contrast to the
Standstill arrangements and certain pledges made at the November
1935 General Election. In the Cabinet discussion, Collins
warned of the political reaction that would occur if it seemed
that the new regulations involved benefit reductions and that
Election promises had not been fulfilled.
Elliot endorsed and extended the national and Scottish
arguments put forward by Collins. He spoke as a Scot and as a
progressive, critical of the Cabinet's restricted response to
the social and economic implications of unemployment, in
particular its inadequate recognition of regional differences.
He agreed with Collins that in the Commons and elsewhere the
regulations would be compared not with their predecessors but
with the relief given under the Standstill. In the distressed
areas, some unemployed would suffer a reduction in assistance.
As regards the proposed discrimination between those over 18
but under 21, and those over 21 which would be unprecedented in
Scotland, Elliot declared that had he told his constituents at
the last General Election of this and other measures he would not
have been returned to Parliament. Extremists would inevitably
oppose the regulations but Elliot believed that even moderate
opinion would reject them. He could foresee serious political
185-
repercussions even to the extent of riots. He accepted that some
cuts were inevitable but believed that the new regulations went
beyond what could be considered fair and reasonable. Finally,
he asked his colleagues to consider having the whole problem re¬
examined with a view to differentiating between the distressed
areas and the rest of the country.
The Cabinet adjourned after Elliot had put forward his
argument but met again later the same day to continue its
consideration of the unemployment assistance regulations.
Oliver Stanley made a long contribution, seconding Elliot's
view that the whole matter should be looked at again. He
believed the problems had arisen from producing one set of relief
rates whereas social and economic conditions varied enormously
throughout the country. Stanley felt that figures should have
been produced to show the effect the regulations would have on
certain areas. It was not certain which way seme of the
Government supporters would vote after discovering the effect
the proposals would have on their constituents. Malcolm
MacDonald was in total agreement with Stanley that figures, if
only rough calculations, should be worked out indicating the
effect of the regulations on those areas where reductions would
result. He agreed too that opposition from Government M.P.s
was a very real danger since although the new proposals were an
improvement on those of December 1934, they were still
inadequate and liable to be rejected once more. Ormsby-Gore
too supported Stanley and stressed that next to foreign policy
1
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the question of unemployment assistance aroused the keenest
interest and in consequence the regulations would be studied in
minute detail.
After the months, even years, spent considering the whole
question it is hardly surprising that the argument put forward
by the progressive group that it should be re-examined with a
view to providing for regional differences did not go down too
well with their other Cabinet colleagues. Inskip took the view
that if the new regulations would prevent starvation and allow
a decent life then they should be accepted and defended by the
Cabinet. Lord Hailsham agreed. He felt that there was bound
to be same trouble no matter what but believed that if the
Cabinet were content that the regulations were just and humane
then it should stand firm on them regardless of the consequences."^
There was then a fundamental split in the Cabinet over the
new regulations between those who felt that since on the whole
they were more generous than those proposed eighteen months
previously, they should be accepted and their more radical
colleagues who felt most strongly that the new rates were still
inadequate and failed to take account of regional differences.
The Cabinet adjourned in order that Chamberlain could report the
differences in opinion to the Unemployment Assistance Board,
two members of which would be asked to attend the next meeting
of Ministers. Chamberlain himself was irritated by the attitude
taken towards the new regulations by some of his colleagues.
He noted that "once again the timid ones Oliver Stanley, Walter
1
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Klliot, G-. Collins & M. MacDonald are arguing against them."
He believed that what they really wanted was a continuation of
the Standstill arrangements.
"Their arguments lead only to the logical
conclusion that we should leave things as
they are but they daren't advocate that &
confine themselves to further minor
concessions which would conciliate no one
but would jeaken our position & add to
the cost."
That Chamberlain had little respect for the judgement of his
younger colleagues whom he felt had naive and unrealistic
political conceptions and a tendency to respond too readily to
political pressures, is put beyond all doubt by one telling
sentence in a letter to his sister commenting on Ormsby-G-ore's
appointment as Colonial Secretary in succession to J.H. Thomas
2
that "we are not very fortunate in our young men."
The Cabinet discussions of 25 June were reported in the
press the following day, notably in The Times which suggested
that some Ministers thought certain provisions inadequate.^
This press leakage was discussed at the next meeting of the
Cabinet on 29 June before it continued its consideration of the
regulations. Oliver Stanley repeated his doubts that the
question had been examined from every angle and sufficient
statistics drawn up. He supported the Scottish argument put by
Collins and Hlliot and felt that some concessions should be
made. He asserted that he did not seek concessions so as to
NC Diary 28 June 1936.
^
NC to Hilda 1 June 1936, Chamberlain Papers I8/I/963.
^ The Times 26 June 1936.
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obtain public acnuiescence to the regulations but because he
genuinely sympathised with those who would suffer reductions in
assistance. '7ith Lord P.ushcliffe, Chairman of the Unemployment
Assistance Board, in attendance together with his Deputy-
Chairman, Sir Ernest Strohmenger, Elliot took the opportunity to
repeat his objections to treating those in the 18-21 age group
as a separate category. It was not present practice in Scotland
and if adopted would result in widespread reductions in present
assistance. Strohmenger was not convinced. He argued that
the Scottish local authorities had been too generous and spoke
against picking out individual items for criticism.^"
This particular issue was however resolved at the second
Cabinet Meeting held later the same day. Chamberlain announced
his willingness to amend the proposed earnings rule relating to
the household means test. A.dults would be able to retain not
the first Ik/- but 16/- of their earnings plus half of the
remainder, the minimum amount they were to be left with being £1.
Into this category would fall all those over 18 living in the
family home. Those under 18 would retain 12/- and half of any
income left. There would, despite objections from the repre¬
sentatives of the U. A.B.^be no third category of those between
18-21. This major concession was a victory for Collins and
Elliot. The foriner>however^ was not so fortunate in his efforts
to have the rate of relief given to single persons in lodgings
increased from 15/- to 17/-. Chamberlain insisted that his
figure be accepted as standard with the Board having discretion
1
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to raise it in individual cases. Collins declared that the
amount was too little and asked whether it would he politically
wise to publicly assert that the needs of a single man living
in lodgings could be met for 15/-* The majority of the
Cabinet however agreed with the Board that 15/- was enough and
endorsed the provision for the Board to alter it in individual
cases, rejecting the case for regional differentiation put by
Oliver Stanley who had earlier obtained a concession increasing
the period allowed for the liquidation of the Standstill arrange¬
ments by the various areas.^
At Chamberlain's suggestion, perhaps to dispel ai^y possi¬
bility of further objections from the critics of the regulations,
Stanley was reinstated as member of the Cabinet Committee now
charged with preparing a draft White Paper- The new regulations
were issued on 9 July. The real difference between them and
those of December 1934- was that they provided for infinitely
more discretionary and exceptional payments. The basic
standard of relief remained the same but allowances brought the
actual assistance given up to a higher amount than that provided
for in the ill-fated regulations of eighteen months before. The
improvement both in substance and in the flexibility did in no
way^however^placate the Labour Party which remained immutably
opposed to the principle of a means test. The debate on 21 July
on the new regulations was in fact the longest continuous sitting
since 1881, lasting some thirty-six hours. Debates on
1
Cab.47 (36) of 29 June 1936.
190.
unemployment in the 1930's always provoked bitter argument and
often heated scenes. This proved no exception with the
suspension of three members of the ILP during the course of the
debate. The superior numbers of the Government however
provided a massive majority. The new regulations subsequently
came into force with arrangements to liquidate the Standstill
working out as planned. On the first appointed day, 16 November
1936, those in the old transitional category were brought into
line, with the rest of the able-bodied unemployed following on
the second appointed day, 1 April 1937-
The major social policy debate of the 1930's was over.
After months of argument in Cabinet Committee, Cabinet, and
Parliament the new national assistance scheme that Elliot had
played an important role in formulating at last began to
function smoothly. "Whatever the inadeouacies of the actual-
regulations, the establishment of unemployment assistance on a
national basis must be hailed as a great achievement by the
National Government and as a milestone along the way to the
welfare state as we know it today. It was the most tangible
feature of the growth of planning and state intervention of the
1930*s which represented the psychological and physical foun¬
dations on which the social and economic revolution of the 194-0's
was built and accepted.
In September 1936, Sir Godfrey Collins died leaving vacant
the office of the Secretary of State for Scotland. Chamberlain
persuaded Baldwin to appoint Klliot as his successor. After
four years at the Ministry of Agriculture it was time for a
191.
change but Elliot was very reluctant to go to the Scottish
Office*'" for although technically a promotion, the move was very
definitely one away from the public limelight and the mainstream
of policy-making. Indeed, it was precisely for this reason
that Chamberlain pressed for the appointment. Since Elliot
entered the Cabinet in the autumn of 1932, his persistent inter¬
vention in Cabinet discussions of matters outwith his own
department had as we have seen irritated the Chancellor.
Chamberlain too had had many a long wrangle with Elliot over the
funding of the latter's radical agricultural measures. After
four years, Chamberlain had become uneasy at Elliot's political
judgments and would have been in his own words "nervous about
2
him in one of the English offices," fearful of his potential
influence in a department, like the Ministry of Labour.
Collins' death, therefore, presented Chamberlain with the oppor¬
tunity of getting Elliot shifted at least for a couple of years
to a relatively obscure office and one from which few leaders
have emerged.
In his four years as Minister of Agriculture, Elliot had
used his position to bring considerable influence on many important
policy aspects, taking a progressive Tory line on both foreign
and home affairs. His major contribution in those years,
Geoffrey Dawson to Nancy Astor 2 Nov. 1936.
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however, was his sterling departmental work. After four years




The Problems of British Agriculture
a) The State of Agriculture in 19 52
Agriculture in Britain in the autumn of 1932 was in desperate
straits, its future severely threatened by the price collapse
which followed the economic crisis of 1931- British agriculture
had been in a state of continuous decline since the 1870's,
undermined by the importation of refrigerated meat and prairie
grain. With Britain being the major world market for agri¬
cultural produce, successive laissez-faire governments showed
little concern for the fortunes of its own farmers. The advent
of war in 191^, however, brought a dramatic change in attitude
for, with the dislocation of trade, home food production was now
at a premium. Among the Ministries set up in war-time was one
for Food, this being in addition to a new department of food
production attached to the Board of Agriculture. The Corn
Production Act of 1917 guaranteed cereal prices for six years
and thereby stimulated production. The drift from the land was
also arrested by the introduction of a minimum wage for the farm
labourer.
At the end of the warJthe Coalition Government's declared
agricultural policy was to increase home production and to
protect farmers against sharp market fluctuations. In line
with this, the Agricultural Act of 1920 re-enacted on a revised
basis guaranteed wheat and oat returns to the home producer.
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Within a year, however, prices had fallen to such a level due
to over-supply that the subsidy required was enormous. Instead
of fulfilling its obligation, the Coalition G-overnment renegued
and repealed the guarantee provision and scrapped the Agricultural
Wages Board and the guaranteed minimum wage. The cereal farmer
and the labourer were simply cast adrift. British agriculture
as a whole in 1921 seemed to have been abandoned once more to
its fate. In the following eight years, successive governments
did however enact some measures of assistance. The Labour
Administration of 1924, by empowering county agricultural
committees to fix wages, improved the position of the farm
labourer. The Conservatives acted to give rating relief and
finally total derating to agriculture and improved credit and
mortgage facilities for the farmer. There were measures too to
encourage settlement on small holdings. Finally, and with the
most significance for the future, although the idea of a general
wubsidy was rejected, one branch of agriculture was singled out
for special attention: the British Sugar (Subsidy) Act of 1925
subsidised sugar beet production for ten years in the hope of
nurturing the nascent industry to a position of self-sufficiency. ^
G-overnment aid to agriculture in the 1920's was at best
sketchy but, with prices levelling out around 1929» the decade,
although a difficult period for farmers, was not desperately so.
1
For a more detailed account of agriculture in the First World
War and the 1920* s see C."3. Orwin: A History of English
Farming (London: Thomas Nelson, 1949) p.82-89, and S. Pollard:
The Development of the British Economy 1914-1967 (London:
Edward Arnold, 1969) p.134-156.
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The ensuing economic crisis, however, produced a devastating
fall in prices as cheap imported supplies flooded the British
market while tariff barriers went up elsewhere. The home
producer found himself confronted with a price level that did
not even assure him of his minimum replacement requirement let
alone a profitable return. The years of the slump, however,
brought about a revolution in the agricultural policy thinking
within all the major political parties. Addison's Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1951 heralded the opening of a new era in which
the state would take positive steps to protect its agricultural
industry. The Act provided for the drawing up of producer
marketing schemes which would become operative if approved by
Parliament and endorsed by at least two thirds of the producers
involved. Bach marketing scheme, which once approved would be
compulsory, was to incorporate a producer-elected board with
specified powers which could include control by purchase or
regulation of all sales of the commodity concerned and the right
to negotiate prices with the distributors.
The traditionally independent and individualistic farmers
had in the 1920*s begun to appreciate the potential benefits of
organised cooperation in negotiations with distributors. Most
of their post-war voluntary schemes, however, failed mainly due
to undercutting and the fact that the distributors themselves
were highly organised. The Permanent Joint Milk Committee set
up by the National Farmers' Union in 1922 was one such experi¬
ment in cooperation that was undermined in this way and became
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ineffective as prices plunged. It seemed that some aspect of
compulsion would be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of
organisation but Addison's Agricultural Marketing Act, however,
which incorporated this provision found little favour with the
N.F.U. for the Act did not touch on the question of imports: it
seemed futile for home producers to embark on schemes of compul¬
sory combination if imports were not regulated and thus could
undermine a price structure at will."'"
The National (Government came to the assistance of the wheat
grower early in 1932 with the passage of the \7heat Act which
guaranteed prices to home producers, the difference between the
standard price and the guaranteed price being funded by a levy on
all flour most of which was milled from foreign grain. For the
most part, however, the fact that Britain had to import so much
of her foodstuffs meant that apart from balancing the interests
of the home consumers and the home producers, the government had
to consider external factors: the potential political and
economic repercussions of action against imports circumscribed at
all times the scope of possible state aid to British agriculture.
A major consideration was Britain's special trading relationship
with her Dominions and Colonies. In February 1932, the National
Government had taken a major step along the protectionist road
with the Imports Duties Act but despite agricultural protests,
the general tariff imposed did not apply to major foodstuffs nor
was it applicable to imperial goods pending the Ottawa Conference
"*"
P. Self & H. Storing: The State and the Farmer (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1962) p.89»
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which was to he held in July and August. The outcome of this
Assembly was to have major implications for Britain's trade and
agricultural policy for mary years to come.
Frcxn start to finish, Britain put forward weak, unprepared
arguments against the demands made in Ottawa by her increasingly
nationalistic Dominions. The seven-man British delegation had
sailed without any clear policy. J.H. Thomas had wanted to
lead and told Malcolm MacDonald to tell his father that he,
Thomas, would resign unless he got his wish.Chamberlain was
horrified at the prospect. He would have liked to lead himself
but as a compromise suggested to Baldwin that he lead and take
2
both Chamberlain and Thomas. The other four were Runciman,
Gilmour, Cunliffe-Lister and Hallsham. In Ottawa, the British
delegation found itself faced with Dominion leaders determined
against compromise. In particular, the Australian delegation
proved intransigent. Britain's only success was to fight off
Australian pressure for a meat duty on foreign supplies. Apart
from that, she made concessions everywhere else. What emerged
was several agreements all weighted in favour of the Dominions.
They agreed to increase the preference accorded to British
manufactured goods but by raising the tariffs against foreign
supplies rather than by reducing the burdensome duty on British
products. In return, Britain agreed to several measures which
would benefit Dominion producers. Britain promised to impose
new or higher duties on foreign imports and to put quotas on
Malcolm MacDonald in conversation with the author, 28 July 1977*
2
NC to Hilda 27 Feb. 1932. NC Papers 18/1/772.
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foreign meat supplies, controlling their import for 5 years.
There was to he no quota put on Dominion meat till July 1934 at
the earliest while there was to be no import duty before mid
1936. As for dairy products, there would be no duty or quota
on Dominion supplies before August 1935- lu addition, an under¬
standing was reached whereby the Dominions were to get an
increasing share of the British meat market."1"
Scarcely was the ink dry on the Ottawa Agreements when it
became apparent just how onerous the commitments would be to
Britain. In the autumn of 1932;British agriculture was rocked
by something unforeseen at the time of Ottawa. As a result of
the unprecedented saturation of the meat market by excessive
supplies, wholesale meat prices collapsed to such an extent that
there was a very real prospect of a total collapse of the nation's
livestock industry, the major branch of farming in Britain. The
Government found its freedom of action to come to the assistance
of its home producers very severely restricted indeed by the
Ottawa Agreements. It was faced with an unprecedented and
totally unexpected crisis with access to the natural remedies of
tariff and import control blocked by pledges given a few months
previously in a very different economic climate.
British agriculture in the autumn of 1932 needed a saviour*
a Minister who could rescue the industry from its perilous
position and give it hope for the future. He would have to
"**
For an excellent, detailed account of the Ottawa Conference
see chapter 6 of Ian Drummond: Imperial Economic Policy
1917-1939 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974)♦
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balance the interests of the home producers with those of the
Dominions and Britain's foreign trading partners. He would
have to pay heed to the imperialists, free-traders and orthodox
economists in the Cabinet. In the reshuffle which followed the
resignation of the Samuelites against the Ottawa Agreements, the
man who was given this formidable task was Walter Elliot.
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b) Elliot's Philosophy and Agricultural Objectives
The most fundamental principle of Walter Elliot's philosophy
was his belief in extensive social and economic planning to
develop the 20th century state. Elliot was a pragmatist, taking
the view that problems should be dealt with as they arose and
that individual treatment should be accorded to each issue but
always with the guiding principle of working towards a planned
economic structure. Elliot believed in the Corporative State.
Corporatism, however, cannot be simply defined for it is not
one single unified doctrine but has many forms. Elliot's
version was a variation on etatiste corporatism which owed much
to his Fabian years at Clasgow University when he first
considered non-socialist collectivism. Elliot advocated monopo¬
listic self-governing industries, each an organic entity based
on the cooperation of everyone involved, and functioning in
partnership with the State."*"
Elliot was only too aware that Britain was in transition
between two eras. He was profoundly concerned as to what kind
of nation would emerge. He observed the changes in political
and economic life that were taking place with the central feature
being the increasing role played by the state. Elliot believed
that the new conditions of the 20th centuiy demanded state
organisation which at all times recognised the importance of
independence and initiative. It required courage and
The best source for inter-war Corporative thinking in Britain




"We must not be afraid. Production, industry,
government, citizenship itself, all have to be
recast, or restated in the idiom of our own
time."
Elliot believed the classic liberalism of the nineteenth century
was out of date. State intervention in economic development
was not an accident but was "in obedience to a very definite
necessity."^
As Minister of Agriculture, Elliot sought to apply his
theories of economic planning to the nation's least organized,
most individualistic industry. He believed that in the new
circumstances of population stagnation and economic and political
nationalism, organization was imperative for the future of
British agriculture just as it was for other industries. It
seemed to Elliot that British agriculture in 1932 was dying from
3
a surfeit of liberty. He advocated the progressive Conser¬
vative remedy, in the words of R.A. Butler, of organizing this
and other industries "within a framework of organized liberty."^
Elliot held very definite views on the 20th century phenomenon of
economic nationalism. He saw it as a symptom of the development
of the planned State. The industrial and economic problems of
the age could more easily be resolved in smaller areas rather
than on an international basis.
^
WE in his Aberdeen University Rectorial Address 18 January
1934, one of his most lucid expositions of his political
philosophy.
^
The Times 25 June 1934-
3
WE in "'Thither Britain" broadcast, see The Listener 28 March 1934-
^
RAB to Brabourne 20 June 1934» Brabourne Papers.
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Elliot regretted the disintegration of the international
economic organisation which looked to he emerging during and
after the First World War. The post-war trend of diversifi¬
cation of production, growth of secondary industries, and the
consequential sharp increase in trade competition and rivalry
had caused a correlative transformation in national outlook.
To Elliot it was indisputable that those living under an autarchic
regime felt socially and economically more secure especially in
times of depression than those living under a non-totalitarian
government. A democracy like Britain, to combat the insecurity
caused in the main by the high rate of unemployment, had to
develop itself into a more cohesive unit with which its citizens
could more easily identify while at the same time coordinating
with other nations to evolve an economic structure to suit the
changed circumstances of the twentieth century. Until a world
economic organization became a feasible prospect, Britain must
seek to perfect its own national organisation then work with
those nations with common interests."*"
Elliot had been very much involved with a body that had
tried to encourage economic organization on a wider basis than
that of one nation. Indeed it was in the course of his
involvement in the late 1920's with the Empire Marketing Board
now all but defunct that Elliot developed a major tenet of his
agricultural economics namely that the answer to the 20th century
phenomenon of glut caused by over-production was a quota policy
Aberdeen Rectorial Address, 'The Endless Adventure' (London:
Allan, 1954).
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applied to imports or home production or to both. Just as it
seemed obvious to use quantitative control in times of scarcity
to prevent consumer starvation, so it seemed to Elliot that such
a method could be applied in times of abundance to prevent the
bankruptcy of producers. Elliot's analysis of the phenomenon
of glut was derived from his interpretation of the circumstances
which lay behind the current problems of international trade.
"The whole thing is the bringing to birth of
the XXth Century which is a century of glut
as against the XXXth which was a century of
shortage. Similarly, the XlXth was a
century of equipment; the XXth is a century
of production. The ant-like continuous
industry of man in the XlXth century was a
temporary jhenomenon which will not be
repeated."
Elliot's belief in quantitative regulation was an integral
part of the fundamental principle that would underly his agri¬
cultural policy, that was the necessity to organise the home
producers so as to bring efficiency and stability to a fluctuating
industry. Elliot's chosen method was to promote the establish¬
ment of producer marketing boards. In other words, he intended
to build on the foundation of the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1931 put through by the second Labour Government. As a farmer
himself, Elliot was well aware of the tenacious individualism
that was prevalent in British agriculture but the marketing
schemes he advocated were not to be imposed by the state and
ruled from Whitehall but were to be brought forward and run by
the producers themselves. As a further de-veLopment, Elliot
WE to Jan Smuts 27 October 1932. Smuts Papers vol. 49
Letter 34.
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advocated what he termed the Method of Contract, that was the
partnership of producer and distributor working together to
stabilise supply with demand."''
Elliot was absolutely convinced that marketing schemes could
only succeed if accompanied by the regulation of all imported
foodstuffs whether from the Dominions or foreign suppliers.-
Those sentiments of course would bring the new Minister of Agri¬
culture up against the interests of trade and imperialism repre¬
sented in the Cabinet by Runciman and Thomas. Elliot would wage
a continual battle on behalf of the home producers but much of
the ground was already lost. The Ottawa Agreements severely
circumscribed his freedom of action in the pursuit of what he
perceived as his fundamental objective, that was to restore
producer prices to a remunerative level. Elliot, the pragmatist,
was willing to try any reasonable means to achieve that end but
at every turn the commitments made at Ottawa stood blocking the
way.
Experience and ability apart, Elliot1 s distinctive character
was ideal for the job. It needed someone with a strong and
forthright personality to gain the confidence and cooperation of
the traditionally independent farmers and to state forcefully
tho claims and desideratum of home agriculture vis-a-vis those
of trade and economics. It required too someone who would put
the Ministry on the map as it were, someone who would transform
■*" The Times 20 January 1933*
See also '7E to Katharine Tennant 6 Jan. 19 33 in the possession
of Baroness Elliot.
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what had the official status of a second-rank Ministry into one
of major importance and demeanour to parliament and the public
alike similar to what Joseph Chamberlain had accomplished at
the Colonial Office.
Elliot's appointment was welcomed by politicians of all
parties. There was an air of expectancy, perhaps among his
more conventional colleagues somewhat tinged with apprehension,
that an agricultural revolution was on its way. Elliot's leader
and mentor, Baldwin, was convinced that his young protege had
the capacity to cope with the complex and deep-rooted problems
of British agriculture. He was unstinted publicly in his praise
of Elliot and his expectations that all would be done to try and
remedy the unprecedented difficulties of the hitherto neglected
industry.
"For my part, I rejoice to see in what is one
of the most difficult posts in the (Government
a young man, a young man with ability and with
enthusiasm. He will probably make his
mistakes. I hope he will, because I want to
see him act, and every man who acts makes
mistakes. It is only t^e fellows who do
nothing who avoid them."
Lloyd George too expected great things from the new Minister
of Agriculture. Elliot had shared many of Lloyd George's
political beliefs since he entered parliament as a coalitionist
in 1918. This was particularly apparent in agriculture with
Elliot like \ddison adhering to mary of Lloyd George's ideas.
The Liberal ex-Premier compared Elliot favourably with his
predecessor, Sir John Gilmour.
Glasgow Herald 1 Dec. 1932.
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"I am very glad that my right hon. and gallant
friend is in charge. Of his predecessor I
have a very high opinion but his mind is built
on more conventional lines than that of my
right hon. and gallant Friend. There is as
much difference between them as there is
between a tram and a tractor. A tram runs
on very defined lines which have been laid
down for it. It starts at the point which
is indicated, and ends at another point and
never goes beyond. On the other hand, the
tractor cuts fresh ground, and, therefore, we
are all looking forward to the right hon. and
gallant Gentleman - those o£ us who believe in
him - to cut fresh ground."
The opinion that with Elliot in charge agriculture would undergo
radical changes was shared by the Labour Party. Fran the outset,
criticism of his policies was directed at the Cabinet as a whole,
Labour spokesmen implying or even making explicit that Elliot's
more staid and conventional colleagues were preventing him from
going as far as he wished in his new deal for agriculture. As
we shall see, this was a pretty accurate diagnosis although of
course the opposition was unable to appreciate the other major
factor, the intransigence of the Dominions. In Labour circles,
Elliot's advocacy of a planned economy and highly organized
industry was attributed to his Fabian Socialist days. In the
1920's on more than one occasion he had been mourned as a lost
soul. Laski was not alone in foreseeing the possibility of
Elliot adapting certain Labour agricultural policies to his own
use, given that he was no doctrinaire Conservative but that he




7 Nov. 1932, 270 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 70-71-
^
Daily Herald 10 October 1932.
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Elliot must have been encouraged with the almost universal
approval and anticipation that his appointment evoked. However,
he was under no illusions as to the immensity of his task or
indeed to the reputation that the Ministry had of arresting
promising political careers. He wrote to his future wife,
Katharine Tennant, in the following terms:
"I've been rung up & offered Ministry of
Agriculture. A grim prospect & it will ^
probably finish my Parliamentary career."
Elliot was most fortunate in his civil servants at the
Ministry. The permanent head was Sir Charles Howell Thomas but
it was the head of the Marketing Division, A.W. Street, who was
to prove the most indispensible as Elliot produced chapter after
chapter of farming history. Elliot rapidly created around him
an atmosphere of tremendous team spirit and enthusiasm. His
charisma was not the only reason: his enthusiastic advocacy of
import regulation and marketing schemes combined with the necessary
determination and ability to steer such policies through Parlia¬
ment was welcomed by a Ministry which had been working towards
2
such ideas since Addison was in charge.
Elliot inherited, as it were, more than that from Addison
for his parliamentary secretary, the Earl de la Warr, had
occupied the post since 1929. The fact that his number two was
in the Lords and given that Elliot produced so much legislation
meant that he was one of the most freauent Ministerial speakers
^
WE to KT 28 Sept. 1932 in the possession of Baroness Elliot.
2
Lionel Bobbins to Beveridge in Beveridge Papers lib 32
file 72.
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in the House of Commons. He was fortunate to have the occasional
help of Noel Skelton and Leslie Burgin but most of the time he
was on his own. It was in fact however customary for the second
agricultural Minister to be in the Lords for farming policy was
considered to be a major interest of the Upper House. De la
Warr conducted his chief's measures through the Lords with
eloquence and absolute competence. In the country, of course,
he was able to play his full role and made mary excellent
speeches about and explanations of Hlliot's agricultural policy.
The two colleagues had an exemplary working relationship. De la
Warr shared his chief's perception of the novel problems of the
twentieth century state and the necessity to plan every aspect
of social and economic life. Agriculture could lead the way
with comprehensive reorganisation and the development of an
efficient secure industry.
The problems facing Hlliot as he took office as Minister of
Agriculture in 1932 were of unprecedented magnitude. He brought
to the job many qualitiesfnot least of which was a scientific
ability to analyse the fundamental difficulty that lay behind
each issue. He had a clear vision of his objective, an organized
and prosperous agriculture. He was, too, aware of the obstacles
in his path. He had firm conviction in his economic principles
that he had formed during his fourteen years in Parliament.
But more than that, he had a passionate belief that agriculture
was an integral part of the nation's soil. If agriculture
collapsed as it threatened to do in 1932, then so too would the
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spirit of the nation.
"If a nation loses the art of producing food
from its soil, it is not as if it loses some
kind of skill or other: it is as though a
man loses the power to breathe. 'Then a man
loses the power to breathe he dies, and when
a nation lojes the power to till the soil it
dies also."
7 November 1932, 270 H.C. Deb. 5s col 148.
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Chapter 6.
Elliot ana \gricultural Policy Formulation 1932-1934-
Parliament met on 18 October 1932 instead of the 27th as
originally planned so as to get through the legislation
sanctioning the Ottawa Agreements. Elliot did not speak on
the bill which got its third reading on 3 November. In
Cabinet, however, the new Minister of Agriculture entered a
caveat lest the Government found itself heading for a situation
where it had made incompatible pledges to the home farmers and
the foreign food-exporting nations.^ At this early stage in
his time as Minister, Elliot was preoccupied with the development
of policies for two major branches of agriculture - the bacon
and meat industries. On the former, Elliot had just received
the Report of the Lane-Pox Re-organisation Commission which had
been appointed in April 1932 by G-ilmour and Sinclair under
2
Addison's Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931.
The Lane-Fox Commission had been asked to prepare a scheme
to regulate the marketing of pigs and pig products. Consideration
of the effects on the home market of a duty on bacon imports
had not been included in the terms of reference - instead the
committee had been required to estimate the effect of quanti¬
tative regulation. The Commission recommended that a quota
1
Cab.53 (32) of 19 Oct. 1932.
2
Report of the Re-organisation Commission for Pig and Pig
Products. 1932 Agriculture.
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policy be introduced at the earliest possible moment to regulate
both home production and foreign imports, that the requirements
of the British bacon market be estimated annually, and that the
Dominions be given preference over foreign countries but not at
the expense of the home farmers' quota. As far as internal
organisation was concerned, the Report favoured a national
agreement on contract terras and prices between the pig producers
and bacon curers with the establishment of a Pigs Marketing
Board to act as intermediary in every transaction. In addition
to advocating the standardization and rationalisation of the
industry, the Report suggested the appointment of a Development
Board comprising of government nominated representatives of the
producers and curers, quite separate from the Marketing Board
which could be set up, with government approval, by the industry
itself under the 1931 Act.
Reaction to the Lane-Pox Report illustrated ouite clearly
the differing interests of the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Board of Trade, epitomised in Cabinet by a clash of opinion from
the outset between Rlliot and Runciman. With the report Plliot
circulated a covering memo."'" In it he pointed out that the
objective of the Lane-Pox recommendations was the improvement of
market stability in the bacon industry and the attsinment of a
higher price equilibrium. The total bacon supplies would be
restricted by allocating a quota to each exporting nation with a
1
Cab.55 (32) of 26 Oct. 1932.
Memo by Tf5, CP 353 (32) in Cab.24/234.
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maximum increase rate of 10% allowed to the home quota every-
four months. Elliot reminded the Cabinet of the Government's
declaration of 11 February that should an acceptable scheme be
drawn up for the organisation of the bacon industry, it would
be willing to enact a policy of quantitative import regulation.
Elliot asserted his belief that the Report's recommendations
amounted to "a feasible and satisfactory scheme for the
organisation of the bacon industry" and he asked for Cabinet
sanction to announce Government approval in principle.
Runciman offered the Cabinet the other side of the picture
in a memo countering the arguments Elliot had put forward."'"
He elucidated the dramatic effects the proposals if implemented
would have on Britain's trading relationship with foreign
countries, especially the major bacon supplier, Denmark. The
Lane-Fox figures involved cuts in foreign imports of almost 33%,
and more as supplies from the home producers and the Dominions
increased. How could the G-overnment ask Denmark to buy more
coal and other goods from Britain while drastically reducing
their bacon exports which at present amounted to 50% of Denmark's
total exports to Britain. The Lane-Fox plan, Runciman went on,
was far more severe than the cuts on foreign meat agreed at
Ottawa and yet the value of the foreign bacon trade was much
greater proportionately since Britain only produced 12-§% of her
total bacon requirements compared with 50% of meat. The
President of the Board of Trade concluded with a powerful broad-
1
WR memo. Cab.24/234- CP 356 (32).
213.
side against the entire scheme:
"If bacon cannot be produced on a larger scale
in the United Kingdom without such a stunning
blow at a friendly neighbour; if we can only
produce more bacon by paying so heavy a price
in foreign trade; if this new industry
cannot be assisted except by a 35% reduction
in the most important trade of a country
from which we are now engaged in securing
commercial- benefits and consequently more
employment of our own labour - and I have
said nothing of the consumer - then it would
be as well for the Cabinet to consider if it
is really worthwhile."
The battle lines were thus drawn straight away between
Runciman and Elliot. The Cabinet agreed that the latter should
prepare a memo as quickly as possible outlining his general meat
policy proposals. In the meantime, he was to be non-committal
if quizzed in Parliament about Government reaction to the Lane-
Pox Report, saying that careful study was necessary before a
statement could be made. The Cabinet therefore did not grant
Elliot his request to announce Government approval in principle.
This most probably did not come as a surprise to the Minister of
Agriculture for just a few days before the Cabinet meeting,
Runciman had written to the Prime Minister putting his case
forward. It certainly made an impression on MacDonald for he
replied that the Government "really must stop this fooling,
arising from one interest thinking of its own needs, as though it
were the whole country or, alternatively, as though no country
existed at all.""1" At the same time, MacDonald wrote to Elliot
telling him of the concern he felt after reading the President
RM to 7R 24 Oct. 1932, Runciman Papers.
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of the Board of Trade's Memo."'' If Denmark gets the idea, he
went on, that the Lane-Fox proposals have government approval
then Britain will suffer a rebuff in the forthcoming commercial
negotiations and there would be little point in going on with
the preparations for the World Economic Conference. Strong
sentiments indeed, but Elliot had support in the Cabinet too -
Baldwin was always ready to give sympathetic consideration to
proposals to improve the position of home agriculture while
Ormsby-G-ore shared Elliot's progressive Toryism and understood
his intention to put the interests of British producers first at
a time when economic nationalism was on the upsurge and tariff
barriers were being erected all over the world. Britain could
not indefinitely be left as a free-for-all market, vulnerable to
the effects of a fluctuating, unregulated volume of imports.
In the meantime, Elliot had been deliberating on the long-
term future of the major branch of British agriculture, meat
production. He presented his general meat policy proposals to
the whole Cabinet on 2 November, having already the week before
discussed his ideas at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee
2
on Commercial Negotiations with Foreign Countries. Runciman,
presiding, submitted a memo concerning the impending tariff
negotiations with Argentina and Scandinavia and put forward
3
possible concessions that Britain might propose to them.
Elliot's reply focussed on the position of home agriculture,
^
RM to WE 24 Oct. 1932, MacDonald Papers PRO 30/69/2/12.
C.F.C. (32) 1st meeting 24 Oct. 1932. Cab.27/489*
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the claims of which he assumed would be fully examined before
Runciman would be authorised to conclude binding agreements with
foreign trading partners.Elliot drew attention to the criti¬
cal state of the livestock industry with excessive supplies
flooding the market, resulting in extremely poor returns to the
farmer. The Government, he reminded the Committee, had declared
its intention of taking-steps to raise wholesale meat prices.
He pointed out that increases in home production during 1933
would negate restrictions on foreign supplies. In addition,
the Irish Free State had stockpiled supplies in the hope that
2
duties imposed in July would be lifted and might well now dump
them on the British market leading to a potential collapse
altogether.
Elliot's memo left his Committee colleagues in no doubt as
to where he stood on the question of home production vis-a-vis
imported supplies.
"It is obvious that immediate remedial measures
hinge upon the limitation of supplies and I
personally take the view that in the interests
of our national economy we must develop home
production and contemplate the progressive
replacement of overseas supplies by home
products to a greater or less extent according
to circumstances
I am bound to regard with the greatest appre¬
hension ary proposals to stereotype, at the
Ottawa levels, the quantities of meat to be
allowed in from foreign sources."
1
WE memo. CFC (32) 2.
O
When the I.F.S. withheld land annuities on 1 July 1932» the
National Government imposed duties of 20% on Irish live
animals, meat, bacon, poultry, butter, eggs and cream. In
retaliation the I.F.S. imposed 20% duties on British coal,
steel, iron and'cement.
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Elliot concluded by calling attention to the inconsistency
of the policy to hold a meat conference next year with Runciman's
proposal to enter binding trade agreements now. He recommended
instead that the Government "review the whole agricultural
position and determine the lines of its agricultural policy in
relation to competing imports before proceeding to make binding
agreements with foreign countries which are likely to be
prejudicial to our agricultural interests at home."
In the ensuing committee discussion, Runciman proved himself
more than willing to defend his position against the line taken
by the Minister of Agriculture whose memo, he said, traversed
all the conclusions of his own. If Elliot* s recommendation
that no commitment be entered into until the position of home
agriculture was reviewed and remedial measures enacted was
agreed upon, then, said Runciman, negotiations with foreign
suppliers would require to be indefinitely deferred. As it was,
however, representatives from the Argentine and Scandinavia had
already been invited for negotiations and with all nations
having been informed that no agreements were possible till
after Ottawa, the implication clearly was that discussions would now
be initiated without delay. It would be auite impractical to
commence negotiations unless the British Government could give
a general idea of what it desired and what it was prepared to
give in return. It would be futile in response to an approach
by the Argentine or Scandinavia to say that the government was
reviewing its whole agricultural policy and could not at this
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time point to apy potential import concessions.
Elliot intervened at this juncture agreeing that it was
impossible to delay negotiations but insisting that the Govern¬
ment had urgently to determine its policy for the future of
home agriculture, that is to say whether to act towards expanding
or limiting domestic production. liven that the Government had
pledged to stabilise Dominion meat, then home production or
foreign imports had to be cut if wholesale prices were to be
raised by reducing the volume of total market supplies. Chamber¬
lain opined that some restriction of home production might be
pursued for the present with a view to expansion at a later
date. A scheme controlling home production ought to be devised.
With this Elliot concurred but he stressed that any agreement
with foreign suppliers which was in conflict with such a
programme was simply out of the question. or his part, he would
be willing so as to facilitate realistic negotiations to state
the maximum expansion figures he hoped to attain over a given
period. There could be no doubt, however, that in the case of
Argentinian chilled beef, stabilisation of imports on the 1931-
1932 or "Ottawa year" level would be totally inadequate —unless
these supplies were subject to further restriction then meat
prices would continue to fall to the detriment of both the home
and foreign producer.
Chamberlain endeavoured to bridge the gulf between his two
Cabinet Committee colleagues. He suggested that the Minister
of Agriculture draw up a five year domestic meat production
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programme taking into consideration the implications of the
Ottawa Agreements. He emphasised that a satisfactory position
could not be arrived at immediately. The Government must proceed
slowly and cautiously or else the nation's vital meat import
trade might be destroyed. Chamberlain believed that when
Elliot's meat programme was put before the Gabinet, a decision
could be made and he thought it would not prove necessary to
impose severe cuts on chilled meat imports. Negotiations could
then be continued in an open manner. This thesis of Chamber¬
lain's was acceptable to Elliot who said he would be quite
content to have incorporated in Government policy a meat
programme .hieh allowed for the stabilisation and 'subsequent
rational expansion of the home industry. Euncim® n^however^ was
not reconciled. He declared that he could not proceed with
negotiations with the Argentine on the basis that her exports
were to be cut by a percentage unknown as the Minister of Agri¬
culture was unable to state exactly what the level of domestic
meat production would be in 1933 and thereafter. The meeting
ended without further progress —Elliot seemed to have sequred
the sympathy of the Cabinet Committee but in Runciman he had a
formidable and persistent opponent. No definite decision had
been reached to submit for the approval of the whole Cabinet,
instead, Runciman and Elliot were prevailed upon to have further
consultations in the hope that differences might be narrowed.
The Minister of Agriculture had, however, to turn his
attention for the present away from long-term policy development
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to focus on the immediate crisis in the meat industry. 'Vhole-
sale prices had fallen dramatically at Smithfield since August,
most of the decline having occurred in the month of October.
Emergency measures to underpin the livestock industry were
imperative if it was to have a future at all for Elliot to plan.
The Minister of Agriculture had, however, little room for
manoeuvre. The Ottawa Agreements prevented him from imposing a
tariff or quantitative control on Dominion supplies. Instead,
he had to rely on voluntary cooperation for the duration of the
crisis. Eith the Prime Minister, he received a deputation of
M.P.s concerned with the gravity of the situation. Elliot
assured them of the Government's intention to act promptly and
said that the plight of the countryside was the "spur under which
1
the Government was working."
Elliot's submission of an important paper on meat policy to
the Cabinet on 2 November provoked a lengthy debate which
ranged from the fundamental to the short-term problems of the
2
industry and all its ramifications for the import trade.
3
The basic argument of the memo was that the ouantitative control
agreed at Ottawa was totally inadequate. The saturated market
was chiefly due to the considerable increase in the past few
years of imported mutton and pig-meat supplies yet the total
reduction in meat per Ottawa for 1933 would be just if while
cuts in bacon imports would not be imposed until 1 July 1933-
M.A.P. 53/23-21. 1 November 1932, Ministry of Agriculture
Papers, PRO.
2
Cab.58 (32) of 2 November 1932.
^
WE memo. Cab.24/234, CP 368 (32).
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The plethora of supplies would therefore he maintained and the
crisis on the market would persist. The logical conclusion
would he an ongoing decline in prices leading to the bankruptcy
of mary home producers. Measures far beyond those determined
at Ottawa were required to deal with the immediate crisis at
any rate. Voluntary or compulsory short-term limitation had
to he undertaken urgently: Elliot stressed that it might he as
well to have enforcement powers in reserve to use against foreign
suppliers although he hoped some voluntary arrangement could he
reached with them and the Dominions on what were to he regarded
as purely emergency measures. As to the development of a long-
term policy, the Minister of Agriculture advocated the appointment
of a Meat Commission to inauire into the condition of home meat
production and the early assembly of a Meat Conference as
anticipated at Ottawa to which both domestic and Dominion
producers should he asked, not so as to "assist at a new demon¬
stration of economic nationalism, hut to co-operate in the
organisation of one of the great world markets, temporarily
glutted with supplies." Though appreciative of the arguments
of the President of the Board of Trade, Elliot pointed out that
if action was not taken at this stage, it would he necessary at
a later date when repercussions would he no less on foreign
relations and commerce and after avertable damage had been done
to home producers.
In the course of what was described as "a somewhat prolonged
discussion", Runciman declared that the present glut on the U.K.
meat market was due to over-production in the Dominions and not
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to excessive foreign imports. The prospects for the talks with
the Argentine and Denmark were good but the most harmful and
damaging opening gambit would be a drastic reduction in their
most vital exports. Reading between the lines of the terse
Cabinet minutes, it is apparent that the meat policy issue
aroused controversy amongst the Cabinet. It was decided that
this complex and most urgent matter should be remitted to a
meeting of the Ministers most directly concerned.
The Meat Policy Committee, as it was named, met that same
afternoon.'*" Apart from the chief protagonists, Elliot and
Runciman, it was made up of MacDonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain,
Thomas and Collins. "^lliot started proceedings with a resume of
his memorandum-. The seriousness of the present situation could
not have been foreseen at Ottawa. After all, although the agri¬
cultural industry had been on the decline for several years,
livestock farming had till recently been one of the few
profitable branches. The limitations necessary would be
unpalatable certainly but must be taken in haste — action could
not even be delayed until an amergency conference could meet.
Elliot reiterated his preference for a voluntary restriction
agreement but also his belief that the Government should have
statutory powers in reserve to be enforced only if no agreement
could be reached, for the situation was so desperate and experience
had shown that, in the absence of reserve statutory powers, a
voluntary agreement could be violated by an irresponsible
minority. In order to avoid embarrassment, any bill so arming
1
M.P. (32) 2 November 1932, Cab.27/495-
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the Board of Trade should not specifically refer to the Dominions
who could be told that the compulsory controls would not be
enacted against them- The fact that neither home nor Irish
production was on an organised basis was another argument in
favour of arming the Government with statutory powers.
Chamberlain agreed that it was not difficult to defend a
policy of common sacrifice in what was a purely ephemeral crisis
for shared future gains. The real problem, however, was that
the G'overnmen't would have to declare its incapacity to ensure
that the home producers played their part in such a common
effort. It would be necessary to persuade the Dominions that a
programme of limitation not initially involving Britain's own
farmers was a fair proposal. It might be possible to offer to
the Dominions some equitable concession. At this point, Elliot
intervened, as full of ideas as ever, to suggest a tariff with
imperial preference. This had of course been discussed at
Ottawa and had been decided against so Elliot's suggestion was
rather unrealistic though perhaps more an example of his tendency
to think aloud and a sign of his youthful exuberance rather than
a serious proposition. His reaction to Chamberlain's suggestion
that perhaps Dominion and foreign supplies could be restricted
on the basis that they would subseouently be stabilised when home
production, after undergoing organisation, was reduced was that
the home industry had already borne great reductions and could
not withstand any further severe cuts.
Runciman could not at this point refrain from making a jibe
at Elliot by declaring that only those who had been at the
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Ottawa Conference could appreciate how fervent the opposition
would he. If the Government seemed to be reneguing on its
commitments then the Dominions were liable to tear up the entire
Agreements. Elliot in private might well have asserted that
this would be no great calamity, but, sporting his responsible
Cabinet image, he agreed that as far as the Dominions were
concerned, the Government had to abide by Ottawa and could take
no action apart from hopefully securing a voluntary quantitative
control agreement. All further cuts therefore, had to be imposed
on foreign supplies. Runciman "went off the deep end at once""*"
and declared that with the Argentine already badly affected by
the cuts imposed per Ottawa there was little chance of her
agreeing to further reductions. MacDonald was worried about
the effects on Britain's trade and investments in South America.
Rlliot agreed that on pure merits, the Dominions rather than the
Argentine should be required to take the reduction necessary to
restore wholesale prices since their recent immense expansion
of meat exports to Britain was the main factor in the saturation
of the market. Baldwin had supported Rlliot in his opinion
that a policy of voluntary restriction which included the home
farmer would be difficult to justify for it would be argued that
a British industry was being requested to cut production to
benefit not just themselves but foreign suppliers.
This important Cabinet Committee meeting ended after
considerable argument with agreement that Thomas, Runciman and
NC to Ida 5 November 1932, NC Papers 18/1/804.
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Elliot should discuss the present critical meat position as soon
as possible with representatives of the Dominion and Argentine
governments and meat interests. The Cabinet trio should endeavour
to find out the attitudes towards a voluntary scheme of import
restriction but should not make any reference to the possibility
of the National G-overnment investing itself with statutory
powers of compulsion. The discussions that subseouently took
place with the Dominions were the first of many held throughout
Elliot's term at the Ministry of Agriculture. The contentious
issue of the level of quota control would be fixed quarterly
thus imposing a considerable strain on inter-imperial relations
and involving Thomas, Elliot and their respective departments in
continual negotiations and endless paperwork."^ At this early
4
stage, the Government's request for voluntary reductions to
meet the immediate crisis of November/December 1932 evoked a
sympathetic reaction and indeed agreement was reached on 7
November, details of which Elliot announced that same evening
in his first speech to the House of Commons as Minister of
Agriculture.
In the course of his speech Elliot took the opportunity to
refute rumours that Runciman was being intransigent.
"Nothing has given me a greater feeling of -
perhaps nausea is too strong a word - but a
greater feeling of weariness than the
continual suggestion that the President of
^
For detailed narrative of these negotiations and their outcome
best source is Ian Drummond ch. 7 "Ottawa Aftermath: Meat,
Butter and the Dominions 1932-1938."
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the Board of Trade was holding up the whole
policy of this country "because of some
foible of uprightness and was interfering
with the jconoraic development of a great
country."
Rlliot would continue to fight his private battles with Runciman,
often on quite fundamental issues, but outside the Cabinet
room his loyalty to his colleague did not waver. Indeed he
went on in his speech to praise both Runciman and Thomas for their
parts in the discussions with the Dominions and foreign countries.
The Argentine had agreed to an immediate cut of 20% in mutton
and lamb supplies and 10% in chilled beef with a promise to
accept another lO^fc reduction if the situation did not improve.
lustral-ia and New Zealand intended to reduce their frozen mutton
and lamb exports by 10%c while there was reason to expect that
bacon exporters would be amenable to a reduction of 20%.
Remaining optimistic about the long-term prospects of agriculture,
Rlliot stressed the sine qua non of a firm substratum upon
which to build and sought for the moment understanding and
toleration of any shortcomings of the scheme he had just
announced since it was one drawn up in great haste to meet an
immediate crisis.
"The matter has had to be dealt with as a
matter of urgency. It may be that we have
made mistakes. It may be that the
oscillation in prices resulting from our
attempt at control will be greater than we
had anticipated, but we have expressed the
will of the House and the country in
taking action. I beg the House and the
country for indulgence and for clemency in
this matter. We have taken great risks.
1
7 Nov. 1932, 270 H.C. Deb.5s col 155.
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,re have risked many things, both in regard
to trade and administration, which may lead
us much further than we should have gone
had it not been for the emergency with
which the country is face£. But you ask
for action - Here it is."
Hlliot elaborated on this theme a few days later speaking at a
lunch of the Junior Constitutional Club. He spoke of beef
prices having taken "an almost perpendicular nose-dive" since
June with a kO°/c fall at Smithfield and declared that the govern¬
ment had taken positive action, taking "drastic and far reaching
steps, which if they succeed, will be, I am sure, a landmark in
2
the economic history of this country."
Although only in its initial stages, Hlliot did give several
indications as to the direction of his long-term policy formu¬
lation and to the logic behind his thinking in speeches made in
the second half of November.^ He declared that the world was
in for "an era of controlled production", asserting that
"unregulated production in every part of the world, the theory
of Free Trade, belongs to the nineteenth century and cannot
continue." The industrial revolution had had appalling effects
on agriculture and the countryside in general. The government
had to ensure therefore that this new political and economic
upheaval led to their restoration. The central problem of prices
had to be tackled at its roots but not by the application of
1
7 Nov. 1932, 270 H.C. Deb. 5s cols l60/l6l.
2
Glasgow Herald & The Times 10 November 1932.
^ Manchester Guardian 19 November 1932. Speech to Royal Fmpire
Society 22 Nov. 1932 reproduced in United Umpire Journal
Jan. 1933-
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just one method or dogmatic principle. Elliot declared that
"we are not attacking from the lines of preconceived notions,
but from the lines of scientific experiment, of trial and error."
Discussions between Elliot and Runciman and their respec¬
tive departments had been taking place in line with the decision
taken at the Cabinet Committee for Commercial Negotiations with
Foreign Countries. The two Ministers had endeavoured to
reconcile their different attitudes to the Lane-Fox recommendations
and to wider aspects of agricultural policy. The upshot was a
joint memorandum by Elliot and Runciman, G-ilmour in his capacity
as Minister for Ireland, and Collins for Scotland."'" It stated
that quantitative control of imports was justifiable in two
circumstances as a fundamental part of government agricultural
policy: where it was vital for the effective operation of a
reorganisation scheme for a particular branch of the agri¬
cultural industry, as in the case of bacon", or secondly, as had
happened with meat, where it was necessary to meet a crisis
situation. At the same time^the four Ministers were agreed
that the Government must invest itself with powers to control
home production. Cabinet was asked for provisional approval of
the heads of a bill which would amend the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1931 and enable the Government to regulate imports in the
aforementioned circumstances. On the question of the Lane-Fox
proposals, the Memo asked for Cabinet to authorise Elliot to
announce the Government's acceptance in principle, in other
1
Cab.24/235. CP 429 (32).
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words to declare that it was ready to take whatever action was
necessary to constitute a reorganised bacon industry on a
stable basis, to make provision for reasonable expansion, and
to control imports by voluntary agreement or otherwise to the
necessary extent.
In the Cabinet discussion that followed, Runciman made it
quite clear that despite his apparent acceptance of the necessity
of having statutory powers in reserve, he still had grave reser¬
vations about the prudence of supplanting the natural regulation
of the supplies by free market forces with controls that smacked
1
of state socialism. Clearly, the President of the Board of
Trade had not relinquished entirely his laissez-faire ideals.
The Cabinet., however, while n t committing itself on the question
of principle, authorised Rlliot to prepare a draft bill to
provide for agricultural import regulation with the decision to
be made at a later stage as to whether the provision would be
generally applicable or whether it would be restricted to
specified products. ,\t the same time, Rlliot was given sanction
to announce the Government's acceptance in principle of the
Lane-Fox recommendations. This he duly did to Parliament on
2
19 December.
Meat policy was again on the agenda of the next Cabinet
meeting.^ On this occasion, it was the next stages of the
short-term policy that were considered. Flliot, in yet another
1
Cab.67 (32) of 14 Dec. 1932.
2
19 Dec. 1932, 273 H.C. Deb. 5s col 722.
5 Cab.68 (32) of 21 Dec. 1932.
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memorandum, reported that the voluntary restriction agreements
for November and December had for the most part worked satis¬
factorily and without difficulty. The fall in wholesale prices
had been arrested and confidence restored. The prompt and
effective action had been appreciated not only by the home
producers but apparently also by other suppliers. It Vras there¬
fore desirable, asserted Elliot, that the situation should be
reviewed without delay to prevent a similar crisis occurring
again. 'Vith the agreement of Punciman and Thomas, Klliot
advocated that consultations should be entered into as soon as
possible with the Dominions and foreign countries to reconsider
the whole meat supply position, taking account naturally of the
agreements made at Ottawa. Cabinet concurred with this proposal
and authorised the Ministers concerned to negotiate for such
additional voluntary joint action as thought essential on the
understanding that no cuts above those already sanctioned were
under consideration.
The Ottawa agreement that the Dominions should regulate
their supplies from January 1933 until July 1934 came into
effect, with the voluntarily accepted proviso that their mutton
and lamb exports should not exceed those of the Ottawa year.
As far as the Argentine was concerned, the voluntary restriction
on chilled meat agreed for November/December was continued till
the end of March by which time negotiations were in progress
towards a new trade agreement. Bacon cuts too were extended,
1
Cab.24/235- CP 437 (32).
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the major supplier, Denmark, also seeking a new commercial treaty
with Britain. The Minister responsible for these negotiations
with foreign trading partners was of course Runciman at the
Board of Trade but Elliot too was very closely involved for the
agricultural provisions of any commercial agreement inevitably
affected the home producers and the British market situation.
The dairy produce situation was also at this time giving
Elliot cause for concern. Towards the end of January 1933, the
Minister of Agriculture with Thomas and Runciman held the first
in a series of discussions on the matter with the Dominion High
Commissioners. Prom the outset, it was apparent that the Dominions
were not in a receptive frame of mind- They had renuested the
meetings with a view to making foreign suppliers bear the full
burden of the restrictions thought necessary to arrest the
decline in prices and were thus hostile to the Government's
proposals of quantitative regulation of both foreign and Dominion
dairy produce on a 2:1 ratio."'" Instead the Dominions insisted
that Britain adhere to both the spirit and letter of the Ottawa
agreement relating to dairy products, namely that no tariff or
quota would be put on their exports for three years. Australia
was evasive and unco-operative, willing only to contemplate
restricting her exports to the Ottawa year level for a very short
period of time while making impractical suggestions based on the
British Government slashing Danish imports, taking no account
1
13 Feb. 1933, CFC(32) 12 in Cab.27/489-
20 Feb. 1933, CFC(32) 13 or DO 35/289/9291/7.
whatsoever of the effects that would have on the British-Danish
trade talks which were just getting under way.^" These
negotiations on dairy produce adjourned after a few weeks without
agreement leaving the British market open to unrestricted
Dominion dairy exports for three years.
Elliot's major preoccupation in early 1933> however, was
the preparation of his Agricultural Marketing Bill, the draft
2
of which he submitted to the Cabinet on 22 February. In a
covering memo, Elliot summarised the provisions and asked for
authority to present the bill without delay to the Home Affairs
Committee with a view to introducing it in Parliament as soon as
possible.^ Clause 1 empowered the Board of Trade to regulate
imports of any agricultural commodity if necessary for the
successful operation of a marketing scheme already in force or
if essential to deal with a crisis affecting the economic
stability of any part of the agricultural industry. Other
clauses provided for the regulation by Order of the sales of
domestic agricultural products, the appointment of a Market
Supply Committee to advise the Ministers concerned on the dis¬
charge of their functions under the bill, the presentation and
endorsement of development schemes for the purpose of regulating
production of "secondary" agricultural products like bacon and
1
2 March 1933, CFC(32) lk or DO 35/289/9291/10.
6 March 1933, CFC(32) 15 or DO 35/289/9291/13.
For a concise exposition of these and subsequent dairy
produce negotiations see Drummond p-317-327»
2
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^ WE memo. CP 38 (33) in Cab.24/238.
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hams, and certain minor amendments to the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1931- Runciman was not present at this Cabinet meeting
due to bereavement. Since he was known to have strong views
on the matter and his head civil servant had sent MacDonald a
letter conveying the concern felt by the Board of Trade about
Clause 1 in particular, Cabinet decided to postpone consideration
of the bill until the next regular Cabinet meeting when Runciman
would be able to state the case of his Department. Elliot
understood his colleagues' unwillingness to commit the absent
Runciman but at the same time was disappointed that a decision
could not be made and kept on ice until the President of the
Board had given the green light.
Elliot and Runciman managed to reconcile their differences
on the Agricultural Marketing Bill in the week between the two
Cabinet meetings. Elliot agreed to delete the controversial
sub-section which empowered the Board of Trade to regulate
imports in response to a crisis affecting the economic stability
of any part of the agricultural industry. Runciman and his
officials had considered that provision to be too wide in
latitude and liable to be given too broad an interpretation.
Instead the second circumstance in which an Order could be made
would be where the Minister of Agriculture was satisfied that a
marketing scheme for the product in question was, though not yet
in operation, definitely in preparation. The Cabinet accepted
this compromise and authorised Elliot to proceed with the intro¬
duction of the Bill unless the Home Affairs Committee disagreed
on a question of principle in which case the matter would have to
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be referred back to the whole Cabinet."^ In the event^this was
not necessary and this historic bill was laid before the House
of Commons on 6 March 1933*
The Opposition reouested and obtained two days' discussion
of the Second Reading. Elliot welcomed the decision, given
the extremely serious and radical nature of the bill's provisions.
"The proposals which we bring forward are
admittedly drastic, far-reaching and novel,
and our only justification for them is that
they are not more drastic than the situation
demands, that they are not more novel than
the circumstances which confront us, and
that they are not more far-reaching than
the emergency which ha^ brought these
proposals into being.""
Tom Williams led the Labour Party's opposition to the Bill.
While welcoming it as an attempt to assist agriculture, he
criticised its lack of safeguards to prevent price increases,
asserting that it favoured the middleman and that it would lead
to piecemeal schemes for the industry instead of a national plan.
He disliked too the proviso giving the Board of Trade in theory
the power of total prohibition. Aneuran Bevan was extremely
suspicious of the government's motives for introducing such a
bill affecting an industry which could be seen as the last major
bastion of individualism in twentieth century Britain. Somewhat
facetiously, he deduced that the idea was not to bring about the
scientific reorganisation of agriculture but to restore the
currently imperilled revenues of the landlord class which was
1
Cab.13 (33) of 1 March 1933.
2
13 March 1933, 275 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1624-
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the main pillar of the Tory Party. Bevan had something to say
too on the Minister of Agriculture himself and his role in the
Conservative Party. He accredited him with left wing Beliefs
but asserted that "like other Conservative planners, he is
walking backwards with his face towards the future and he is
saying, 'look where I am looking'." Bevan advised Elliot to
look instead where he was going."'" He dismissed the bill as
only pseudo planning and not the progressive measure it appeared,
declaring that Vlliot* s ability to speak left-wing language was
exploited by his party.
"It is certainly not State planning as State
planning has been understood. It is the
substitution of organised plunder for dis¬
organised theft. Whenever the Tories want
any encouragement a id advice they always
borrow from the left. The Tories never
listen in this House to speeches with so much
respect and awe, and, very often, lack of
understanding, as they do to the speeches of
the right hon. and gallant gentleman, the
Minister of Agriculture and the hon. Member
for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr- Macmillan) because
they speak the language of Socialism, and
the Tories pay an unconscious tribute to the
learning and understanding which they lack.
Whenever a job of this sort has to be done
they select the Minister of Agriculture, as
he is able to make a piece of reactioaary
legislation so like the last edict of the
Comintern, and the Tories dearly love to be
considered advanced."
This idiosyncratic passage of Bevan1 s serves to illustrate
Socialist opinion of Hlliot as a left wing Conservative still
influenced by his Fabian past. Indeed the impact of Hlliot's
1
13 March 1933, 275 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 1677/78.
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student days was referred to by Attlee on the second day of the
debate.
"The right hon. Gentleman has some ideas of
planning; he has a good deal more community
sense than most Members of the Government.
That is probably due to his sound early
training though h| has since strayed from
the narrow path."
Attlee also implied that the Minister of Agriculture would have
liked to go much further in the bill had he not been restricted
by the rest of the Cabinet. This sentiment was to be repeated
by various Labour spokesmen throughout Glliot's tenure of the
Ministry, portraying Elliot*s left-wing tendencies as being held
at bay by his less radical colleagues.
Herbert Samuel, not surprisingly, thought the Bill went
much too far, declaring it to be "by far the most Socialistic
Measure that has been brought before Parliament in recent
2
years." He pledged Liberal opposition on the grounds that it
was a policy of Protection, it interfered with foreign trade, and
that instead of being an emergency measure with a time limit, it
was on a permanent basis. For the Scottish Tories, Boothby
could not see much in the bill for agriculture north of the
border.'^ Scottish M.P.s had continually asked the President of
the Board of Trade to restrict oat and malted barley imports
only to be told that the former was still being considered by
the Import Duties Advisory Committee and that there were treaty
1
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complications regarding the latter. The hill offered no new
hope to these mainstays of Scottish agriculture for it laid
down that no import regulation Order should he made in contra¬
vention of trade agreements. The situation was critical
reouiring immediate action and Boothhy advised Elliot to go
instead for a straightforward tariff policy.
The agricultural Marketing Bill received its Second Heading
by a majority of 252 and was referred to Standing Committee C
with Sir Cyril Cobb in the chair."'' Elliot was assisted by
Leslie Burgin, Parliamentary Secretary to "Runciman, and the
brilliant Under-Secretary for Scotland, Noel Skelton. There was
in fact little real controversy during the Committee stage with
the Opposition members adopting a fairly favourable attitude,
attempting only to insert certain safeguards for the consumer.
However, the bill was complex and though there were few divisions,
there were lengthy discussions on several of the 26 clauses.
The result was that the bill was in Committee for almost two
months until 16 May.
The Press reaction to the bill was generally welcoming with
some predictable exceptions. Beaverbrook's Daily Express
despised it and, describing it as a Socialist Bill, declared that
it was "an iniquitous measure which suggests salvation for a
stricken industry but intends to bind the industry with fetters
of control more complete and unyielding than anything ever known
2
in this country." The Daily Express blamed MacDonald, Simon
1
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and Runciman for preventing their Conservative Cabinet colleagues
from going for a tariff.^ Beaverbrook himself, however, did
not think the time was ripe to launch a major campaign against
Elliot's policy and for a tariff on foreign foodstuffs. He
went so far as to seek to withdraw his weekly contribution to
the Norfolk based Agricultural Party which was the only farmers'
organisation that opposed Elliot and the Marketing Bill.
Beaverbrook was impressed with Elliot's confidence conveyed over
dinner that on the mutton and lamb front at any rate, things
2
were improving and that the farmer would soon benefit.
The Economist condemned it as "Major Elliot's Dear Food
Bill", a Marketing Bill only in name for it was principally
designed to raise prices by creating an artificial scarcity
through the policies of "a twin dictatorship by the President of
the Board of Trade and the Minister of Agriculture." If the
bill did succeed in its aim to raise prices, then it would be a
costly failure to both farmer and consumer. The Economist
counselled that "before he commits himself to this preposterous
experiment, the British farmer would be well advised to look
this gift horse in the mouth lest it should turn out to be one
3
of the Trojan breed." The Spectator adopted a more optimistic
attitude. Referring to Bevan's sneer that Elliot was "the
idea factory of the Conservative Party", the Spectator declared
that to be praise indeed and asserted that ^no Minister has more
1
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truly grasped the psychology of this Parliament, which demands
action and yet more action." The hill was designed to make
efficient farming worthwhile by giving protection to any branch
of the industry showing its willingness to reorganise. It had
a commendable basis that Was "the conception of the twentieth-
century State as an organization which is determined to protect
itself both from glut and from scarcity."''"
The remaining stages of the bill proceeded smoothly with
the Third Reading on 30 May. In the Lords, a few minor amend¬
ments were inserted which the Commons then disagreed with but
ultimately reached a compromise on 18 July. '/ith the Royal
Assent, Elliot had put on the statute book an Act that would
have radical effects on many branches of the home agricultural
industry. In contrast to its predecessor, the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1933 was well received by the farmers. Its
import regulation provision mot their main objection to the
1931 Act and in the months to come there was close co-operation
between the N.F.U. and the Ministry of Agriculture in the
formulation of marketing schemes. Elliot's provision for
supply regulation would have considerable bearing on future trade
policy. Trade and commercial matters had in fact been
occupying much of the Cabinet's attention during the Second
Reading and Committee stages of the Marketing Bill. Agreements
with two of Britain's major trading partners had come up for
Spectator 17 March 1933-
^
The NFU Yearbook 193V p.313-314.
239.
renegotiation and renewal and in the negotiations with "both
countries, Denmark and Argentina, Elliot was keenly interested,
so considerable were the implications for the market supply
situation and the state of home agriculture. By the Anglo-
Danish treaty which was signed on 24 April, Britain allocated
Denmark a minimum of 62% of -the foreign bacon import quota,
while undertaking not to impose a tariff for three years.
Regulation of it and dairy products would only occur if necessary
to ensure the effective marketing of home supplies. It was the
Anglo-Argentine agreement of 8 May however that caused the major
controversy in Cabinet and in Parliament.
Runciman asked authority to guarantee to the Argentine that
for 3 years, chilled beef supplies would not be reduced beyond
10of the Ottawa year level."'" Elliot strongly opposed this
and argued that if a maximum figure had to be agreed upon, then
it must be 15% of the 1931-1932 volume of supplies in any one
2
year. This considerable difference in opinion led to some
heated scenes at the Cabinet Meeting of 15 March.3 Elliot
declared that a 15/t maximum reduction was just about defensible
but ary lower figure would ruin the prospects of agricultural
revival in Britain. The 10% restriction agreed in November
had not had the hoped-for salutory effect on beef prices and to
guarantee the continuation of this maximum reduction would have
bad psychological effects on the home producer who was looking
WR memo. CP 65 (33) in Cab.24/239.
^
WE memo. CP 66 (33) in Cab.24/239*
3 Cab.16 (33) of 15 March 1933.
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to supply more of the home market requirements. It was impos¬
sible to tell what lay ahead and it would be unwise politically
to peg the beef market for as long a period as three years.
This line of reasoning was supported by Elliot's predecessor,
Sir John Gilmour, responsible for agriculture in Northern
Ireland,and Sir Godfrey Collins who had an extremely serious
farming situation to deal with in Scotland.
Runciman emphasised how vital the Anglo-Argentine negotiations
were with all their implications for non-agricultural commerce
and British investment. He suggested that if the Government
were set on a figure of more than 10$:, the negotiations would
break down. In that event - and here Runciman played his trump
card - he would resign. After that somewhat dramatic threat,
it was Neville Chamberlain that came to the rescue with the
compromise of a 10$ maximum reduction in ary one year but with
the proviso that the Government was free to go beyond that figure
if other suppliers were comparably restricted. And, to meet
Elliot's concern about the possibility of another drastic fall
in beef prices, Runciman was asked to obtain the Argentine's
agreement to discuss such a situation if it arose with a view
to making a voluntary arrangement like that of November 1932.
The Argentine and Danish Agreements together with an industrial
treaty made with Germary were severely criticised in Parliament,
much of the displeasure emanating from the imperialist and pro-
tariff wings of the Conservative Party which took strong exception
to the concessions made by the Government. Elliot took this
opportunity to make political jibes at his favourite target, the
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Samuelite Liberals. He taunted Samuel and Sinclair for
vociferously attacking the policy of quantitative regulation
when, as members of the Cabinet, they had accepted policy
proposals in February 1932 which included the appointment of the
Lane-Fox Commission with the proviso that if a reorganisation
scheme was evolved, the (government would be prepared to restrict
bacon imports." There was no Commons division on this issue
but the Agreements rankled for some time with many Liberal and
Conservative M.P.s and of course incurred the wrath of Beaver-
brook* s Daily Hxpress.
Whatever reservations Hlliot still had about the trade
agreements, he was obliged to accept them and work within their
framework. At least the policy of supply regulation was now
accepted by Britain's trading partners as a first principle,
even if the terms, especially those of the Argentine Agreement,
were more generous than Flliot would have liked. The chilled
beef concession, in particular, made his dual task of stabilising
the meat market situation whilst improving the position of the
home producers that more difficult. Flliot was determined,
however, that subject to such treaty restrictions, import regu¬
lation, as provided for in the Marketing Bill, would be extensively
employed as it was absolutely essential if the envisaged
reorganisation of agriculture was to succeed. He explained this
position in a speech on 18 May to the Council of Agriculture at
the Middlesex G-uildhall.
1
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"I cannot conceive any marketing scheme which
could be effective if it were to be exposed
to being broken up at ary moment by vast
floods of unregulated imports being dumped
down on our shores. I would accept respon¬
sibility to the full for saying that the
marketing schemes we put forward pivot on
the adequate control of foreign imports, and
those marketing schemes, which we are backing
to the full, will be paralleled by the
regulation of foreign imports to whatever j
point is necessary to make them effective."
It was at this time that the Dominion Secretary, J.H. Thomas,
began to question the direction of Elliot's agricultural policy.
Thinking ahead to the 'forld Economic Council to be held in
London, Thomas wrote to Elliot to convey his anxiety that the
British delegates should have the answer prepared to deal with
the awkward question, certain to be posed by the Dominions, as to
how much of the market would be open to them and to what extent
it was intended to develop home production. Thomas believed
that unless Britain could give the Dominions that kind of
information, it would prove difficult to reach agreement on a
2
common line to be put forward at the Conference. " Elliot
brushed him off, replying very briefly that while he appreciated
his colleague's concern and would consider the points made, he
3
was preoccupied with more immediate problems. Thomas had,
however, given notice of his desire to see more details and
figures put on the agricultural policy framework. It was a
matter in which he was to take on increasingly active and to
Morning Post 19 May 1933.
2
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Elliot what must have been a somewhat irritating interest until
his change of office in November 1935*
Elliot and Thomas were both members of the Cabinet Committee
set up at the Cabinet Meeting of 10 May to consider preparations
for the !Vorld Economic Conference.2 The other members were
MacDonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain, Hailsham, Simon, Hoare,
Cunliffe-Lister and Runciman. 'Vith the exception of the
Lord President and the Secretary for India, the Committee members
formed the nucleus of the British delegation. The Cabinet
Committee met almost daily to complete its tasks of determining
the line to be taken and selecting the subjects to be considered
2
by the main committees of the Conference itself.
Once the Conference got under way under the chairmanship of
Ramsay MacDonald, the British delegates met usually once often
more per day to discuss proceedings.3 There were thirty meetings
in all and this, combined with a concurrent series of thirteen
sessions of the Commonwealth Delegation Committee^4" and of
course attendance at the Conference proper, meant that Elliot and
his colleagues had scarcely a moment's respite from their
labours for the months of June and July. Elliot indeed was also
involved in one of the 9ub-committees of the Commonwealth
Delegation Committee - he did in fact chair the Production and
Supply sub-Committee at which he tried in vain to get the
1
Cab.34 (33) of 10 May 1933.
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M.E.C. (33) 15-26 May 1933: Cab.29/140.
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M.S. (UK) (33) 14 June-26 July: Cab.29/142.
^
M.K. (BC) (33) 12 June-28 July: Cab.29/143-
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Dominions to constructively discuss the changes in the supply and
price situation since Ottawa."*"
Failure to unite in a common policy was indeed the outcome
not merely of the discussions with the Dominions but of the
World Economic Conference itself. It ended in all but the
formalities on 3 July with Roosevelt's rejection of the notion of
an agreement on the international stabilisation of currencies.
Such a common policy would have impeded his New Deal measures
to raise purchasing power by currency regulation - the United
States had after all recently gone off the Gold Standard and
subsequently devalued the dollar. The basic problem was that
two sets of countries attended the conference — those still on
the G-old Standard and those not* Their very different
positions combined with the every-increasing phenomenon of
economic and political nationalism almost inevitably made the
World Economic Conference a mere talking shop. As Mowat so
succinctly describes it, the new motto seemed to be sauve qui
, 2
peut.
The Commonwealth delegations did manage to produce a suitably
vague declaration of cooperation on trade and economic matters."^
No progress had been made on the vital commodities of meat and
butter but a standstill was agreed upon for milk products and
eggs while further discussions were to be held concerning oats
and cheese. Britain had tried without success to get included
1
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in the declaration a paragraph recognising the need to regulate
meat supplies hut "ustralia and New Zealand would not entertain
such a suggestion. One definite decision was reached, a sad
one for Elliot who had spent much of his political apprentice¬
ship as one of its leading spirits, the Empire Marketing Board
-"as to he wound up due to almost total lack of interest on the
part of the Dominions.
Elliot hadjlike the other Cabinet Members on the British
delegation, been obliged to give almost all his attention and
effort to the proceedings of the gforld Economic Conference from
the middle of June until the end of July. That notwithstanding
he did not neglect his departmental concerns nor did he cut down
on his speaking engagements throughout the country. Moreover,
he had to take time off more than once from the Conference to
attend the House of Commons to deal with various aspects of his
policies. Elliot was of course not only Minister of Agri¬
culture but also Minister of Fisheries and it was in this
capacity that he spoke in the House on 27 June 1933- The
occasion was the Second Reading of the Sea Fishing Industry Bill
The measures incorporated in the Sea Fishing Industry Bill
had been foreshadowed in a policy statement made by Elliot in
May when he had established a commission to draft proposals."'"
The Bill's intentions were four-fold: the regulation of mesh
size; the control of the size of the fish to be sold in Britain:
the prohibition of landings from certain areas at certain times;
1
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and the regulation of foreign fish supplies. The Bill also
proposed to set up the Sea Pish Commission to examine the
problems of the fishing industry. Moving the Second Reading,
Elliot spoke of the serious state of the industry which was
primarily due to a glut of supplies as a result of which prices
had fallen below the level necessary to maintain and re-enuip,
in other words the replacement level."'" The use of a tariff on
foreign supplies had not reduced them to an acceptable level and
the government had now decided it must act to enuilibriate supply
and demand by quantitative and qualitative regulation. He
defended his intention of imposing a 10% reduction on foreign
fish by saying it was consistent with the policy of supply
regulation endorsed by the 'forld Economic Conference and that
being the case, it did not signify that Britain was retreating
behind a wall of economic nationalism. Herring was not included
in this bill but was being considered as a separate case. It
did after all present a different issue for the basic problem
here was the under-demand from foreign fish markets for Britain's
herring e:xports.
Tom 'Villiams led Labour's Opposition to the bill on grounds
similar to that taken on the Agricultural Marketing Bill, that
the National G-overnment was restricting essential food supplies
so as to increase profits instead of improving distribution
methods to encourage greater consumption, in other words
instead of restricting supplies to meet demand the government
1
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should be acting to increase demand to the level of supplies.
On the Report Stage taksn on 13 July, the Opposition tried to
insert a time limit of one year on the power of the President
of the Board of Trade to restrict imports after which the position
could be reviewed. However, Elliot had agreed during the
Committee Stage on a three year limit and the amendment was
defeated leaving the Bill to proceed smoothly through its
remaining stages."*" It was followed sane months later by the Sea
Pishing Industry (Regulation of Landing) Order, which imposed a
10/ cut on foreign supplies.
Towards the end of the Parliamentary Session, Elliot dealt
with two other important commodities for which he was responsible.
He announced that the Government would be introducing legislation
in the next session of Parliament to temporarily extend the
beet sugar subsidy due to expire in September 19JU-- This was
to allow for further consideration of the long term future of an
industry that with government assistance since 1925 had developed
from virtually nothing before the war into a substantial branch
of root crop farming. In the meantime, sugar beet manufacturers
were asked to submit marketing schemes under the 1931 and 1933
acts and, in the near future, a committee to make long term
2
recommendations would be appointed. The other commodity Elliot
dealt with was milk, presenting a' marketing scheme for the approval
of the House of Commons. This represented the fourth such scheme
concerning agricultural products to be created under Addison's
1
13 July 1933, 280 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 1259-1362.
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Act and lent impetus by the prospect of import regulation held
out by Elliot's own measure. The first marketing scheme of
them all had been set up by the Hops Industry commencing operation
in September 1932, the month when Elliot had been appointed
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. The other two had been
approved by the Commons only recently, on 26 June, for bacon and
for pigs, measures that had received the full support of the
Labour Party.
In moving the Milk Marketing Scheme, Elliot described its
background and development. His predecessor, Sir John Gilmour,
had in April 1932 set up a reorganisation commission chaired by
Sir E. G-rigg, M.P. Most of the work in formulating the scheme
had been done outwith parliament in consultations between the
various interests. It was to be presented to the producers in
eleven regions of England and 'Vales for their acceptance or
rejection after receiving Parliamentary approval.
The raison I'etre for the scheme was to rescue the railk
industry from its perilous position due to the increasing difference
between liquid and manufacturing milk prices. The Milk Marketing
Board was to be set up as the controlling body with the proposed
eleven regions being required to pool returns from all milk sold
to give a uniform area price. As with the bacon and pigs
measures, the Labour Party gave its full support to the Milk
Marketing Scheme. Tom Williams gave an enthusiastic welcome to
what he called "a gigantic experiment", complimenting Elliot on
his work and congratulating him on "having persuaded the diverse
interests in this giant undertaking to allow the scheme to be
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prepared so that it could come before the House prior to its
adjournment."'*' This latter sentiment was echoed by the Chair¬
man of the Reorganisation Commission, Sir ft. &rigg, who praised
Elliot for his diplomacy, skill and "passionate energy" in
2
bringing forth the scheme so quickly for parliamentary approval.
Similar compliments had been showered on Elliot two weeks
previously when he had again absented himself from his labours
at the World Economic Conference to speak on the Vote on Supply
for his Ministry. Labour spokesmen criticised aspects of the
Government's agricultural policy, interpreting it as that of
organising scarcity to increa.se prices. In the absence of
price regulation by import boards, a policy of mere restriction
could not be a durable solution to agricultural problems."*
However, in the course of the debate the Opposition paid tribute
to the endeavours of the Minister of Agriculture, Williams
asserting that Elliot's work at the Ministry was a<bnired by both
the supporters and opponents of his actual policies.^ Another
Socialist, E.J. Williams, declared that of all Government
Ministers^Elliot was the one possessing "the greatest depth of
5
philosophy" while Rhys Davies praised him for his lucid
exposition of his case and declared that the Minister of Agricul-
6
ture should be raised to a higher Cabinet status.
1
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There can be no doubt whatsoever that Elliot's reputation
at Westminster, with the agricultural interests, and in the
country as a whole had reached a very high level indeed by the
end of his first parliamentary session as Minister. Opponents
and supporters alike had watched with wonder and respect as he
had unfolded the first few chapters of his agricultural policy.
There was undeniably an air of expectancy tinged in some nuarters
with apprehension that the energetic Minister had just laid the
foundation stones on which to construct a completely revolutionised
agricultural policy. The Economist articulated Free Trade
concern. It would have found no quarrel with The Times' opinion
that Elliot's agricultural policy was in Britain "by far the
most obvious instance of an effort to grapple with new economic
problems by new economic methods.""'" The journal did however in
no way share The Times' optimism that the new approach was
worthwhile pursuing. On the contrary, it attacked the keystone
of his policy, namely the Agricultural Marketing Act;as "an
example of the economics of topsy turveydom" and declared that
2
his measures could only worsen the situation." It feared that
Elliot was not finished by a long chalk, anticipating more measures
involving "a degree of State interference as yet undreamed of in
this country."^
The Spectator predictably took a different view. It
asserted that circumstances and Elliot's own character had enabled
■*"
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2
Economist 10 June 1933»
^ Economist 29 July 1933-
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him to develop a more radical policy than Addison could ever
hope to have done but having said that, it declared that the
real merit of the present agricultural policy was that it had
in fact all-party origins. It was commendable also for the fact
that the beleaguered home producers had been given encouragement
and hope."^" The New Statesman and Nation was also, for the
present at any rate, unstinted in its praise for the Minister
of Agriculture. It acclaimed the clarity of his exposition of
policy asserting that his was "the nearest approach in the present
Goverament to a Minister who knows what he is trying to do."
It praised/too/his realism in that while he was absolutely
committed to an elaborate system of protection, he was fully
cognizant of the inherent problems and pitfalls.
Of all his policy critics, Elliot must have valued most
the judgement of the man whom he regarded as his political mentor,
his leader Stanley Baldwin. Baldwin saw agriculture as one of
the major problems of 1953* He was to focus much of his
attention during his appearances on political platforms up and
down the country on the difficulties of British farmers and the
attempts by the Government spearheaded by Elliot to alleviate them.
Baldwin echoed Elliot's belief that town and country had a common
interest and discerned that there was now a general realisation
that "the old feeling that interests of town and country are
x
diverse is not only moribund, I think it is dead for ever."
^
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Baldwin spoke too on the -reorganisation of British agriculture
and the employment of import regulation as an aid thereto,
using words that might easily have come from Elliot himself.
"Such ideas as the regulation of production
and imports would have made your fathers
turn in their graves, but now we all
recognise that those things are essential,
and we are devoting our minds to them.
The interests of our own farmers must come
first, the interests of the Dominion
farmers, second and the jnterests of the
foreign farmers, third."
Baldwin could observe from his position of experience the
zeal and sheer power of work being displayed by the youthful
Minister of Agriculture. He approved both of the content of
Elliot's policy and the manner in which it was being presented
to the nation. In speeches up and down the country, he praised
his younger colleague's devotion and ability and fulsome eulogy
it was, in no way merely that which can be expected to emanate
from one Cabinet Minister about a colleague. Baldwin told the
Primrose League that no Minister had a more complex or responsible
task but that notwithstanding, he was certain that before the end
of the Government's term of office, Elliot would have achieved
so much that he would be remembered by future generations as
2
perhaps their greatest Minister of Agriculture. A few weeks
later at a major speech in Cambridgeshire, Baldwin told his
audience that "when this Government came into power, agriculture
was indeed the Cinderella of British industries, but she has
Glasgow Herald 24 July 1933*
^
The Times 6 May 1933.
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met a fairy prince in v/alter Elliot.
Baldwin* s opinion was strengthened by the Conservative
Parliamentary Agricultural Committee which sought to have the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries raised to the status of a
first class department. The Committee thought it essential to
have continuity of ministerial direction to ensure the success
of the policies of reconstruction at present in progress. Its
primary aim was to safeguard against Elliot being transferred
from Agriculture to another Cabinet post by way of promotion.
The Committee's feelings were conveyed to Baldwin by its Chairman.
"The Committee feel that Walter Elliot has
been and is rendering magnificent services
to the cause of agriculture and that in any
changes his promotion to another Department
carrying higher status is almost inevitable.
They sincerely hope that you will use your
great influence to secure his retention in
the post which he now occupies, and thus
ensure advancement an^ continuity in
agricultural policy."
The N.F.U. shared these sentiments, its President B.J. Gates
asserting that it was not derogatory to any former Minister of
Agriculture to say that Elliot was the best the Union had had to
deal with.^
Elliot's readiness to take unconventional measures for
the benefit of British agriculture included his non-partisan
consideration of candidates for the various appointments he was
empowered to make. In the autumn of 1933, he took the unusual
Glasgow Herald 2k July 1933«
2
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^
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step of inviting Addison, the former Labour Minister of Agri¬
culture to be Chairman of the Reorganisation Commissions for Eggs
and Poultry for England and Great Britain which he, Elliot, was
setting up to prepare marketing schemes. In his letter to
Addison offering him the position, Elliot acknowledged that his
suggestion was unconventional but asserted that the circumstances
were unusual. The fact was that the Commission's terms of
reference covered both the 1931 and 1933 Agricultural Marketing
Acts and, this being so, Elliot believed while respecting
Addison's political allegiances that it offered "an opportunity
for people of different attachments to co-operate with good will
in the fashioning of a scheme that may be helpful, particularly
to a large number of small producers." Addison, after con¬
sulting George Lansbury^ accepted the appointment, appreciative of
the "wide-mindedness" of Elliot's offer and in agreement that it
was not inconsistent with his political allegiance to accept.1
As winter approached, all was not well in certain branches
of the agricultural industry despite Elliot's endeavours. Bacon
was one commodity in great difficulties. The problem was that
when the National Government had fixed the import quotas in the
Spring, it had under-estimated the volume of home supplies that
would be available. Faced with these circumstances, the Govern¬
ment had asked the foreign exporting countries to consent to
voluntary reductions but as agreement had not been forthcoming,
it was decided to impose cuts until the end of February. It
had been hoped that no further restrictions would be necessary
1
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till March 1934 tut with increased Dominion supplies and the
level of domestic production well in advance of estimates,
immediate action to stabilize the supply situation was impera¬
tive to protect the home industry.
The Bacon (import Deflation) Order was moved in the House
of Commons by Leslie Burgin, Parliamentary Secretary to
Runciman, on 15 November. The Order was made under the section
of the 1933 Agricultural Marketing Act which empowered the Board
of Trade to impose import regulation where there existed a
marketing scheme for the product concerned. Burgin told the
House that the actual nuantities of permitted supplies would be
fixed from time to time but the cuts would be in the regior of
15fc of the November 1932 level. For the Opposition, Tom
""illiams trotted out the familiar argument that the government
was organising scarcity instead of organizing distribution of
the surplus food supplies among those in need. He was concerned
too at the unfavourable effect the cuts would have on foreign
relations. The pro-tariff die-hards on the C-overnment back
benches were not too enthusiastic either, disliking Fillet' s
persistence with the quantitative regulation method instead of a
tariff policy. Such a combination of critics however amused
rather than worried Hlliot.
"They may advance against me in battle array,
but I shall not be greatly afraid, because
at an early stage they will no doubt^draw
their claymores against each other."
On a more serious note, Rlliot emphasised the dangers of too
1
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cheap food.
"If we believe in cheapness and cheapness
only, we must be prepared in this country
to see prices sink to a level never reached
before. I have said in the country and I
say again tonight, that it is no advantage
to the housewife to buy at a cut price in
the shop if bj doing so she puts her man
on the dole."
This attack on the pure gospel of cheapness was as Elliot
himself said one he had used before. He was absolutely con¬
vinced that Britain had to abandon permanently the policy of
buying always in the cheapest market. It just did not make
international economic sense to let continue a situation in which
wholesale prices were unremunerative to producers and thus
draining capital resources. One only had to look at the
position in the United States where the agricultural community
had got into immense indebtedness due to receiving prices below
2
replacement value.
The new parliamentary session was not long under way before
Elliot was renuired to make a major speech in defence of his
agricultural policy. Speaking during the debate on the Address,
he countered Lloyd G-eorgian Liberal pleas for more land settlement.
He stressed that the present import levels could not be maintained
alongside any meaningful expansion of home production. Those
who advocated large-scale land settlement and spoke of increasing
consumption to absorb the resultant expansion in supplies were
not being realistic. The fact was that consunption could not be
1
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greatly increased and that for anv expansion of home production
to receive a remunerative price, there would have to he drastic
import cuts which would lead to retaliatory action against
British exports resulting in an increase in unemployment.
Elliot declared his profound enthusiasm for developing small¬
holding hut only in the right circumstances and thus not at this
juncture. He believed that when a remunerative price and share
of the market were available, the expansion of the farming
population would he automatic- For the present, the real problem
was to assist those already on the land.
Elliot pointed out the contradiction in terms of opposing
import restrictions one minute and advocating land settlement and
expansion of home agriculture tl e next. There was, he asserted,
a consensus on the desirability of increasing home production.
The implementation of a scheme to do just that for bacon had
produced such a sudden and dramatic increase that the situation
was very serious indeed demanding immediate action. The Minister
of Agriculture, however, as witty as ever saw the problem in a
lighter vein.
"My difficulty is to deal with the droves
upon droves, the hundreds of thousands,
of pigs which are rushing and squealing
upon us from every part. The^Pied Piper
of Hamelin has nothing on me."
It had been necessary to impose restriction on imports so
as to leave a share of the market for this unexpected expansion
of home bacon. Yet the import Order had been criticised by the
24 November 1933, 283 H.C. Deb. 3s col 473-
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Opposition who in the next breath called for large scale land
settlement, for all that in absence of any such development,
there had taken place a problematical expansion of 70$> in
home bacon production in only a matter of months.
Elliot had some lessons in basic agricultural economics to
give to those on the Opposition benches, now including the
Samuelite Liberals who had ostentatiously crossed the floor of
the House at the beginning of the session. Elliot declared
that the home producer could not survive without assistance in a
market onto which overseas supplies from specialised production
areas were being dumped. It was necessary to insulate British
agricultural production, just as other countries had insulated
theirs, if the home farming industry was to endure the current
international trade depression. It was a contradiction in
terms to preach the gospel of cheap food and at the same time
urge the protection of home producers. Prices were everything:
a remunerative price was the key to the survival of home
agriculture.
Elliot's speech was criticised on the next day of the
debate by Sir Herbert Samuel who repeated the Liberal and Labour
solution of increasing demand instead of restricting production.
This sounded attractive but was not realistic. The naivety of
this analysis was attacked by one of Elliot's young progressive
supporters, Harold Macmillan, who declared that Samuel had failed
to recognise in agriculture as in industry and commerce that "the
increased capacity to produce which the science and invention
of the nineteenth century has brought about must be regulated
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and guided into proper channels if it is to be of service to
mankind.""*" Macmillan declared that only a small minority,
including Samuel, still maintained that there could be a return
to the past laissez faire situation with automatic adjustments
by the free market forces. Certainly Elliot had no time for
such a belief.
"On the contrary, he has done splendid service
in the direction of control and order. He
has been Aaron and Hur rolled into one,
holding up the hands of a some+imes rather
fatigued and uncertain Moses."
Agriculture was showing the way to the long-term reconstruction
and reorganization necessary to restore and maintain economic
equilibrium.
Just a fe# days later^Blliot submitted the memo on the
produce markets situation to the Cabinet which was to lead to a
major change in Britain's trade and agricultural policies.^
Blliot suggested that a Cabinet Committee be set up to give
detailed consideration to certain agricultural policy issues
requiring immediate attention which had implications for inter-
imperial and general trade. He told his colleagues that while
for some commodities measures taken had brought about an improve¬
ment in the market situation, for others they had not. Sheep
and lamb prices were much improved but this was not the case
with fat and store cattle where prices, although stable at the
moment, were actually at a lower level than that of November
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1932 which had stirred the Government into negotiating voluntary
restriction. The situation was such that Elliot felt he must
"draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that we are
rapidly approaching a point at which decisions of considerable
importance will have to be made." Beef was not the only
commodity requiring further action. The import situation of
dairy produce was another problem and unless it could be solved,
the Milk Marketing Scheme would not succeed. Immediate dis¬
cussions were needed too on the future development if any of the
Pigs and Bacon Marketing Schemes. Ouestions like the extent
to which home produce should be regulated in the short term and
in what proportion increased home production should bear on
imported supplies had to be closely examined and answered.
The Cabinet"*" agreed to Elliot's suggestion and set up the
Produce Markets Supply Committee with Baldwin in the chair and
consisting of nine other Cabinet Ministers including Chamberlain,
2
Simon, Thomas, Punciman and of course Elliot. The P.M.S.C.
was to meet on nineteen occasions between "December 1933 and May
1935» For those eighteen months, it was the setting for all
major decisions taken on immediate agriculture problems and for
continued general debate on long-term trade and agricultural
policy options. It was not, however, the establishment of the
P.M.S.C. itself that signalled a watershed in Elliot*s agri¬
cultural policy but the contents of his first memorandum
1 Cab.66 (33) of 29 Nov. 1933.
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submitted at its second gathering but outlined orally at the
initial meeting on 1 December.
It must be remembered that Elliot from the outset had
declared his readiness to use any of the various methods to
alleviate the glut of supplies and depressed prices. For the
major commodities, however, his policy to date had been various
degrees of quantitative regulation based on fixed shipment
quotas within the framework of Ottawa and Britain's other treaty
commitments. The only major exception was wheat which was in
the unique position of being protected by a levy subsidy or
earmarked tariff introduced under the Wheat Act of 1932 by
Elliot's predecessor, Sir John G-ilmour. The use of this
weapon of protection was proving extremely successful as far as
wheat was concerned. Now in December 1933 with beef prices
obviously not responding satisfactorily to the ouantitative
regulation measures, Elliot came out forcefully in favour of
promoting the earmarked tariff as the long-term policy for the
meat industry.
Elliot told his colleagues at the first P.M.S.C. meeting^"
that there were three commodities renuiring immediate attention.
Bacon was one, dairy produce another but the most urgent question
was that of beef. ":ith all three branches of the agricultural
industry, there were two sets of problems - the level of prices
and the position of home production in relation to total supply.
Each commodity had to be dealt with separately. Elliot
1
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declared that the choice was further quantitative regulation
or an import levy with deficiency payments to home producers,
that is a policy of earmarked tariff. This preliminary
meeting agreed that Elliot should submit memoranda on the beef
position with his recctnmended policy and on measures that might
be taken to increase milk consumption. He was to confer with
Collins on the oats question and with those colleagues directly
concerned with the state of home bacon production, chiefly
Runciman and Thomas. Those last two were in addition to draw
up their opinions on the memoranda Elliot would prepare on beef
and milk policy.
On the ten days between these first and second meetings of
the Produce Market Supply Committee, Elliot made two speeches
which for different reasons aroused considerable controversy
and annoyed some of his Cabinet colleagues. The first occasion
was at a performance of a play by Shaw at the Sadlers 'Tells
Theatre given by a drama group on behalf of the National
Federation of Young Farmers' Clubs. Elliot told the audience
that the Government was planning even more rigorous action to
improve the position of home agriculture.
"We have taken some drastic steps, but they are
nothing to the steps we are going to take in
the immediate future. ,\s the road notices
say you have been warned."
Elliot was speaking in a humorous and light-hearted vein at what
was after all a private occasion. But in some quarters, a more
serious interpretation was placed on the speech and his words
were remembered and thrown back at him in the months to come.
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The sentence that caused particular offence was that in which,
referring to his determination to save the home producers,
Elliot declared that the attempt would lead to "a lot of terribly-
nasty food at extraordinarily high prices." This fuelled
accusations that his policy did not take the interests of
consumers into consideration. It also encouraged certain
elements to nickname Elliot "the Pood Dictator". It certainly
was an unfortunate choice of words."'"
It was the second speech, however, that annoyed some of
Elliot's colleagues, in particular incurring the wrath of the
Dominion Secretary, J.H. Thomas. Speaking to the Council of
Agriculture the day after his performance at the Sadlers 'Veils,
Elliot asserted that the question of beef was pre-eminent, in
short that "it is the beef man's turn now." The livestock
problem was a complex one for the very considerable imported
supply had to be taken into account as well as the home production.
Elliot proceeded to ask his farmer audience if they believed
"that some regulation of Imperial supplies, as well as foreign
supplies, is essential if British agriculture is to survive?"
His question was answered with a resounding "yes", to which he
reacted by saying that he took it as an unanimous opinion and
that he could not "exaggerate the importance of the statement just
made." The problem was what could be done in the period before
the expiry in June 193^ of the Ottawa commitment not to impose
quantitative regulation on Dominion imports by legislation.
^
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Elliot declared it was the Government's responsibility and he
accepted it, and would regard the opinion expressed that day as
advisory.^"
J.H. Thomas conveyed his irritation at his colleague* s
speech in a memorandum submitted to the second meeting of the
Produce Markets Supply Committee on 11 December. The Dominions
were, he asserted, already apprehensive about Britain's long-term
trade and agricultural policy intentions with the imminent expiry
of the Ottawa commitment not to introduce statutory import
regulation. Elliot's speech to the Council of Agriculture
would not, Thomas declared, alleviate these fears in the slightest.
As to the proposed levy-subsidy policy, Thomas doubted whether
the Dominions would agree. The most important thing, however,
2
was to commence discussions as soon as possible.
This memo was in response to the one drawn up by Elliot as
requested at the first P.M.S.C. meeting in which he elaborated
on his recommended policy: the home producers should be sub¬
sidised by direct cash assistance within the present quantitative
regulation framework; the details should be worked out by the
Reorganisation Commission for Fatstock; an appropriate statement
should be made before Christmas to announce the alteration in
the Commission's terms of reference to include a plan to ensure
a minimum price to home producers: and negotiations towards
implementing the levy part of the levy-subsidy policy should be
Glasgow Herald 6 December 1933-
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commenced with the Dominions and the Argentine.
Elliot admitted that the Government could try and negotiate
further voluntary regulation but it would be an extremely diffi¬
cult, protracted business- After all, it had proved troublesome
enough to get Australia and New Zealand to agree to a one year
standstill in Ottawa. Elliot regretted the fact that Britain's
treaty commitments precluded ary substantial reduction in beef
imports in the immediate future. He pointed out that even after
the expiry of the commitment not to impose restrictions, it would
be difficult to reconcile ary prospective cuts with the promise
made at Ottawa that the Dominions were to receive an expanding
share of the market. At the same time^under the terms of the
Anglo-Argentine Agreement which did not expire until November
1936, Britain could not restrict Argentinian chilled beef supplie
by more than 10% of the Ottawa year level unless it imposed
corresponding restrictions on the Dominions. So, Elliot
concluded, a long-term policy of quantitative regulation would be
beset with difficulties.
"The truth of the matter is that, though in
theory our treaty engagements leave us with
sufficient room to manoeuvre, we have to face
the fact that, in practice, beef enters so
largely into the export trade of the main
supplying countries that the continual
negotiations that would be necessary under
our treaty commitments to secure the required
adjustments in svpply would lead to con¬
siderable friction."
These then were the grounds on which Elliot recommended adopting
a levy-subsidy policy as the long-term answer to the beef problem
1
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In the discussion that followed, it became very quickly
apparent that Elliot had an uphill battle on his hands, such was
the lack of support for his radical proposals.^ Minister after
Minister produced objections to his levy-subsidy plan, seme
admittedly of real substance. Runciman was not actually
present at the meeting and had not submitted a memorandum but
he did send his Parliamentary Secretary, Burgin, to represent
his views. Burgin expressed considerable doubt whether the
Argentine would entertain ary substantial alteration to the
trade treaty. Runciman would be willing, Burgin continued,
to investigate the possibility of reducing Argentinian chilled
beef beyond 10$ of the 1931-1932 level without having to make
corresponding inroads into other supplies but felt that in the
event of hostile reaction, no other modification to the Anglo-
Argentine agreement should be proposed. Chamberlain predic¬
tably was worried by Elliot's reference that there would be a
corresponding reduction in deficiency payments in the event of a
considerable expansion in home beef production. The Chancellor
stressed that if the levy-subsidy policy was adopted then home
production had to be restricted, otherwise the improvement in
price due to deficiency payments would encourage over-supply
which would in turn further depress the true market price.
Elliot declared that his scheme was intended to be quasi-
permanent, At the veiy least, it should endure until the
trade argeements with the Dominions and the Argentine had
1
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. ,xpired. He accepted Chamberlain* s point about the dangers of
encouraging over-supply and said that safeguards against undue
expansion could be incorporated in the levy-subsidy scheme just
as they had been with wheat. It must be realised that if the
population level remained static then it would not be possible
to absorb increased imported supplies as well as providing a
market for increased home production. Elliot was emphatic that
some drastic measures had to be taken if home beef production
was to be saved from total collapse - economically and politically,
it was impossible for the government not to take vigorous action
quickly.
Interestingly, the Foreign Office was quite enthusiastic
about Elliot*s levy-subsidy proposal. The Under-Secretary,
Anthony Eden, representing Simon at the meeting, commended
Elliot's suggestion of inducing the Argentine to agree to the
change in policy by renouncing the right to restrict chilled
beef imports by more than 10^> of 1931-32 level in certain circum¬
stances. The Foreign Office disliked the quantitative regulation
policy chiefly because of the continual irritations and strain
on relations caused by the necessarily frequent negotiations to
adjust levels that such a policy required. The levy-subsidy
method, on the other hand, would be less flexible and therefore
less liable to arouse perennial argument once the tariff rate
was settled. Baldwin chairing the Committee was sympathetic to
Elliot's problem. He was fully aware of the dangers of a
conflict between Dominion and home producers but pointed out that
the former had never hesitated to safeguard their secondary
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industries by taking action against Britain's manufactured
exports. In the same way, Britain must protect her agricultural
industry.
Elliot's main antagonists, Chamberlain and Thomas, while
rejecting his proposals were unable to offer an adenuate alter¬
native. The Chancellor felt that while Elliot's policy would
help the home producer it would not touch the root of the beef
problem, namely the glut of imported supplies. The Dominions
provided the key to the solution of the whole problem - it was
time that they stood on their own feet and looked for other
markets. Even asking for a further standstill would irritate
them so it might be as well to go the whole way and impose
sufficiently extensive cuts to resolve the depressed price and
flooded market situation. Thomas, however, reminded his
colleagues that freedom to restrict Dominion imports after June
1934 could not be absolute due to the Ottawa understanding that
the Dominions should get an expanding share of the market and
also because of other imperial political and economic consi¬
derations. Elliot underlined the fact that it was an emergency
situation. The quantitative regulation currently in force
was inadequate and while a more far-reaching scheme might be
possible in several months' time, the home producers could not
survive in the interim.
In response, however, to Ormsby-G-ore's inquiry as to whether
he could offer for the first quarter of 1934 any alternative
other than an advance to home producers to be recouped at a
later date after negotiations by an import levy, Elliot
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suggested drastic statutory cuts in fat-stock imports from the
Irish Free State and Canada, in the region, say, of 12-g^.
Such action would of course have political implications.
Furthermore, Elliot asserted that the adoption of such a policy
would not allay his anxieties about the immediate situation of
the home producer. Chamberlain and Thomas, however, declared
their readiness to consider such an emergency plan. The
meeting ended with Elliot being asked to draw up a memorandum on
this short-term policy proposal.
A, fundamental objection to Elliot's levy-subsidy plan seems
to have been that it would be unwise to accept such a radical
change in trade and agricultural policy without lengthy con¬
sideration. His colleagues preferred to contemplate a short-
term plan to meet the immediate situation and to give time to
work out a long-term policy in a less frenetic atmosphere.
Elliot had to accept the force of the objections both to the
precipitancy and the substance of his proposals and without
delay drew up the requested memorandum on the emergency action
he had suggested. He outlined possible quotas that might be
imposed on the Irish Free State and Canada but stressed that even
with such measures, there would still be a huge increase in the
weight of supplies in 1934 compared with 1933* He could there¬
fore not pretend that such proposals would meet the immediate
situation.^"
The Produce Markets Supply Committee met to consider
1
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Elliot's memorandum just three days after the previous meeting,
such was the urgency of the beef question."'" Despite the
reservations in his memorandum, Elliot told his colleagues that
the measures against the Irish Free State and Canada could be
commended to Parliament as an interim step. The imposition of
his suggested ouotas of 40,000 heads of cattle from the former
and 5,000 from the latter was in his opinion the absolute
minimum of what action was necessary to hold the position in the
first ouarter of 1954. Irwin, the President of the Board of
Education and a colleague whom Elliot greatly admired,
postulated that the gravity of the position of the home producers
could not be exaggerated. If it was thought necessary to have
a short-term and a long-term policy, then it seemed to him that
the action proposed against the Irish Free State wculd have
undesirable conseouences - he would prefer the short-term policy
of assistance to take the form of a direct subsidy. Elliot, of
course, immediately gave his support to this proposal and with
Irwin had a conversation a deux as to the possible workings of
such an idea. Elliot had felt unable to suggest such a
solution himself having instead proposed an advance with a
deferred levy. The interchange between Elliot and Irwin,
however, was brought to an end by Chamberlain interrupting to say
a direct subsidy to beef producers was out of the question.
It would be impossible, he declared, to limit such assistance
to one particular industry - others would rush to jump on the
"*
PMS (33) 3rd meeting 14 Dec. 1933-
271
bandwagon.
The Dominion Secretary announced his readiness to accept
the proposed cuts. After all, De Valera had taken strong
measures against British exports. Thomas stated,moreover that
he would agree to an increased cut,say in the region of 22^o,
The Chancellor offered no objection. There was a general
feeling in the Committee that since the Irish Free State was
deliberately damaging British trade, the G-overnment was entitled
to take counter-measures. Flliot believed this more substantial
restriction would be welcomed by the home producers but reaffirmed
that the problem could by no means be wholly solved by such
action. He hoped his colleagues would not rule out consideration
of a subsidy as part of a purely emergency policy to deal with
the anticipated crisis situation of the first half of 195^ and
in particular the second quarter.
Runciman reacted to Flliot's assertion that cuts might be
made in chilled beef supplies from Brazil and Uruguay by stating
that they were not to blame for the saturated market and
suggesting an even bigger reduction in cattle from the Irish
Free State. Thomas then put forward the idea of cutting supplies
in two stages, 22^% straight away and more later. As before,
Chamberlain had no objection: he was not too concerned with the
prospect of lost tariff revenue since he considered it more than
justified by the potential effect such drastic action would
have, bringing to a head relations between Britain and the Irish
Free State and weakening the position of De Valera at home.
Hlliot suggested that his colleagues agree that the cut should
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be considerable, leaving Thomas, Chamberlain, Runciman and
himself to decide on the actual figure on the understanding
that it would be in the region of 50%. The Committee approved
this suggestion and that Thomas should consult Canada while
Runciman commenced negotiations concerning frozen and canned
beef with South American countries. It noted also that Elliot
proposed to make a Commons statement in the near future.
Baldwin, in his capacity as P.M.S.C. Chairman, reported
orally on the Committee's conclusions to the Cabinet on 20
December."*" Elliot's proposed statement was duly approved for
presentation that same day in the House of Commons. The
details of the reductions were prefaced with a resume of the
situation and an explanation of what would happen if no such
action was taken. Elliot explained that a considerable volume
of home supplies had been held back because of the low price
level but would soon appear on the market and further depress
prices. It was thus necessary to help the market situation
and avert a potential price collapse by removing imported fat-
cattle. As far as the Irish Free State was concerned, fat-
cattle exports to Britain were to be reduced for the first quarter
of 1934 by 50% of the equivalent period of 1933* In addition
store cattle was to be cut by 12-g% while a total ban was placed
on beef, veal, and beef and veal offals. The other exporter
of live cattle, Canada;had agreed to stabilise her fat and
store imports for the first quarter of 1934 at the 1933 January-
1
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March level.
Elliot then dealt with earned, chilled, and foreign "beef.
The first had to date been unregulated but it was now intended
to control such imports and arrangements were being made.
Chilled beef imports from foreign countries would be reduced on
the same scale as January-March 1933 while the Ottawa arrange¬
ments for foreign beef would continue with foreign supplies being
reduced by 30^ of the first quarter of 1932. Elliot told the
House that discussions were in progress towards readjusting the
proportions of boned and boneless foreign frozen meat imports.
Finally, he stated that the government had been reviewing the
bacon position including the considerable expansion in home
production and that if justified by the volume of supplies that
was contracted between producers and curers for the period March-
December 1934, the G-overnment was ready to cut foreign imports
in two stages amounting to a 10^> reduction from June on the
present level.
The livestock situation and the measures announced by Elliot
were discussed the following day during the debate on the Christ¬
mas adjournment. Tom Williams, the Labour agricultural spokesman,
attacked the timing of the G-overnment's statement, coming so late
in the session, and described the measures as constituting "a
2
monstrous attack on the Irish Free State." " Elliot rejected
the charge that the policy was precipitate, declaring that it
was the outcome of considerable Cabinet deliberation. The
1
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measures announced in his statement were thoroughly justified
by the critical market situation where prices were still well
below remunerative levels, as a result of which the position of
the home beef producer was becoming desperate. Elliot pointed
out that beef production represented 70% of the entire agricul¬
tural industry and was thus the lynch-pin of the system. He
denied that the measures proposed were an expression of political
hostility towards the Irish Free State, saying that they were
"proposals to deal with an economic and not a political
situation, and on economic and not on political grounds they
will have to be challenged."
Elliot reiterated his conviction that supplies frcm overseas
had to be dovetailed rath home production. He refuted any
suggestion that he was a die-hard protectionist, saying he was
"by no means to be taken as a fierce devotee of the absolute
exclusion of everything from outside our shores.""1" Elliot
reaffirmed that Britain would remain a great trading nation,
pointing out that while other countries took refuge behind
total tariff walls, Britain was still the benefactor of many
suppliers. In the case of the recalcitrant Irish Free State,
87i% of its trade was left untouched. Towards the end of his
speech, Elliot replied to the point made by 'Villiams that while
the farmers did indeed have difficulties, if they were given
assistance then the onus on consumers and in particular the poor
and the unemployed was increased. His response was on a
1
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f miliar note - that of the ineluctable need for a partnership
between industry and agriculture, urban and rural communities.
The intention was to stabilise then increase wholesale prices
but since their decline had not brought about an equivalent fall
in retail prices, it was not expected that there would be a
comparative rise in prices to the consumer as a result of measures
taken to give the home producers a better return.
Elliot was under no illusions that these latest measures
represented anything other than inadequate stop-gap action to
give his colleagues more time to deliberate on a long-term
agricultural policy. Runciman had not relinquished his laissez-
faire ideals altogether, Thomas was apprehensive of what Dominion
reaction would be towards a fundamental change in the policy
formulated at Ottawa, and Chamberlain was determined to resist
any suggestion of direct Exchequer assistance. Among the rest
of Elliot's colleagues, Baldwin and Irwin were generally
sympathetic to the problems of the home producer but not directly
involved. MacDonald was mostly concerned with foreign policy
and rarely sought to direct social and economic policy which was
just as well as he would have faced an impossible struggle
against his Conservative dominated Cabinet. He did however
consider that agriculture received disproportionately greater
attention than ary other industry and that such favours were
received with ingratitude and increased demands by the farming
community.
The attitude of the majority of Elliot's colleagues to the
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problems of the agricultural industry seemed to be one of wait-
and-see, nurturing the vain hope that somehow the saturated
market and depressed price situation would remedy itself without
reouiring too much government intervention, in particular
avoiding measures that would cause irritation to other interests
both at home and overseas. There was an extreme reluctance to
change course at this juncture and go for the levy-subsidy
policy now suggested by Elliot. Indeed, his suggestion of this
totally different approach had come as somewhat of a bombshell
to many of his Cabinet colleagues. Chamberlain holding the
purse strings was the major obstacle in any attempt at formulating
policy, especially in this particular case where Elliot was
asking for an Exchequer advance.
For the present, Elliot was forced to shelve his recom-
mendations;recognising the force of the objections raised both
in principle and substance and being the man he was, he received
the setback graciously. His determination to implement his
new policy, however, was unimpaired. It was to take him six
long months of argument to obtain the Produce Markets Supply
Committee's approval merely in principle. That he was able to
persuade his colleagues to relinquish their vehement opposition
expressed in December 1933 is weighty evidence of his profound
ability to argue his case at the highest level. The Cabinet
had not killed off another major instalment of Elliot's
agricultural revolution - they had merely caused it to be deferred.
As Elliot put it, "when we have done beef we have done
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iverything",^ referring to the fact that beef was the keystone
of British agriculture in the 1930's. Elliot however had
pressing problems with other commodities in the winter of 1933/
193k. In December,he introduced another marketing scheme,
2
this time for potatoes. This root crop presented the most
striking example of the extreme variations in price that could
be caused by small alterations in the supply position. The
Potato Marketing Board was to prevent a surplus by deciding
upon the minimum size of a potato to be marketed at aqy
particular time. Over-production would be discouraged by
making a producer liable to pay a levy if he exceeded his
allocated basic acreage level. Oats too received Elliot's
treatment, much to the relief of Scottish farmers, for in "Feb¬
ruary 1934- the import duty was increased 10% to 20%. A.s far as
the beet sugar industry was concerned, the subsidy given in
1925 and due to expire in September was to be extended for
eleven months to allow the Committee of Inquiry chaired by
Wilfred G-reene more time to consider its long-term future.
Vpart from beef, however, Elliot's major anxiety at this
time was the dairy produce situation. The basic problem was,
like beef, one of a glutted market, in this case due to the
increased milk produce supplies from the Dominions. There was
currently a milk surplus of 20%. This had to be made into
other commodities like butter ard cheese but the manufacturing
milk price was so low due to the oversupply of imported dairy
15 February 1934, 285 H.C. Deb. 5s col 2214-
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products that the whole price structure of the home milk industry
was in danger of being undermined. As the G-overnment was
bound by Ottawa not to impose restrictions on Dominion dairy
produce until August 1935, its only hope was to request volun¬
tary cooperation. Australia and New Zoiand, however, flatly
refused to consider any quantitative regulation of their imports
despite repeated appeals including representations made to their
High Commissioners and to the respective Premiers at the time of
the World Economic Conference. The chairman of the infant Milk
Marketing Board had just returned from New Zealand where he had
been sent to explain the predicament of home dairy producers.
He had to report to Elliot on his return of the total intransi¬
gence displayed by the Dominions."'"
The depressing effect that the excessive cheese and butter
imports had on the domestic manufacturing milk price constituted
a very real threat to the survival of Elliot's milk marketing
scheme. As with beef, he recommended to the Produce Markets
Supply Committee the policy of a levy-subsidy on home, Dominion
and Scandinavian butter and cheese which he thought might appeal
more in the long term, especially to the Dominions, than the
quota policy which they could only fend off for eighteen months.
While negotiations were proceeding, measures should be taken to
stimulate liquid milk consumption and to arrest the increase in
milk that was having to be sold for manufacturing at the low
rate and thus necessitating a considerable increase in retail
"*"
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F 'ices to maintain present pool prices. Elliot suggested con¬
sumption could be stimulated by improving the quality of liquid
milk and by increasing the milk-drinking habit by campaigns like
cheaper milk in schools."'" Runciman expressed his views on the
subject in a memorandum submitted to the same meeting. He
realised fully the urgency and complexity of the problem but
doubted that Denmark or the Dominions would consent to a levy.
He did however lend his support to Elliot's proposals for improving
the supply by clearing up the herds and stimulating consumption.
In addition he felt a case could be made for an inquiry into
2
liquid milk distribution costs.
In the discussion that followed,^ Chamberlain began by
asking why it had not been realised that the establishment of a
pool price would produce a large surplus by encouraging farmers
to divert surplus milk previously turned into cheese and butter
on the farm to the regional pool. Elliot replied that it had
indeed been foreseen that such a thing would happen and the Milk
Marketing Board had been empowered to accept milk from such
quarters but it had just not been possible to deal with more
than one crisis at a time. The first emergency had been the
imminent collapse of the liquid milk price which had been prevented
only by the Board's establishment. Then had ccme the problem
now causing most concern - the impending butter and cheese price
collapse due to increased Dominion supplies. The situation now
^
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was one where there was a considerable gap between liquid and
manufacturing milk prices. Elliot proposed to average out the
costs by a levy both at home and on imported milk products.
The Chancellor opposed the idea of a levy against home
producers asserting the political difficulty of applying excise
duty to any food prepared for domestic consumption. Elliot
however pointed out that collection of' the levy would be made
by the Board and not the revenue machinery of the Treasury.
Moreover, the levy on home produce was not a duty in the real
excise sense but a "sweetener" to encourage the Dominions to
give their consent. Elliot stressed that it was out of the
question to refrain from action and that rather than acquiesce
in such a course he would propose a scheme involving a direct
subsidy to milk producers in Britain. Some of Elliot1 s
colleagues favoured the idea of relating the whole facts to the
Dominions, who seemed to be apprehensive about British intentions,
and setting out the policy options. Baldwin suggested that a
comprehensive agricultural policy should be drawn up to cover
the next ten to fifteen years but Elliot disagreed entirely.
He pointed out that since such a long-term policy would be bound
to give only a minor allocation to the third factor, namely the
foreign supplier, the Board of Trade would be put in an
impossible position. Such a programme was contrary to his
innate pragmatism but Elliot could not attack it along these
lines. Instead he argued that such a policy should cover only
the period up until the expiry of the Anglo-Argentine Agreement
in November 1936.
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Chamberlain disliked the complexity of Elliot's milk policy
and certain of the proposals it contained. He favoured telling
the Milk Marketing Board that it must he the body to take
measures to encourage liquid milk consumption and if a subsidy
was necessary then it should take the form of one for the general
purposes of the Board. He did however agree with Elliot that
such a scheme could be drawn up for a two year period without
having to consult the Dominions and he suggested that he and
Elliot should get together for that purpose.
The P.M.3.C. adjourned its consideration of the dairy
products question pending these talks between the Chancellor and
the Minister of \griculture. On Chamberlain's initiative the
matter was referred for detailed consideration to an inter¬
departmental Committee chaired by Sir Horace Wilson which duly
reported on 12 February. ^h^t same day>Elliot received an
anxious letter from the Prime Minister who had been besieged
with complaints from Conservative M.P.s representing rural
constituencies about the low returns for milk producers. Elliot
replied that he and Chamberlain intended to examine the inter¬
departmental report immediately and if in accord would seek to
have another meeting of the P.M.S.C. convened, the outcome of
which would be brought before the whole Cabinet with a view to
making a statement in the House of Commons."*"
The following day Elliot had another unfruitful meeting with
a Dominion High Commissioner, Sir James Parr, of New Zealand.
1
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There was no movement whatsoever from the hostile attitude
towards Britain's quota proposals.'*' In these circumstances,
Chamberlain and Elliot had no alternative but to press ahead
with the tight schedule envisaged for the consolidation and
introduction of a two year milk plan. They were able to reach
agreement on a tripartite policy which they recommended in a
joint memo drawn up on 14 February for consideration by the
2
Produce Markets Supply Committee. The first proposal put
forward was a price security arrangement by means of Treasury
support of the manufacturing milk price for a period of two
years after which the Board would take over the responsibility
as well as being liable to pay back part of the advances if the
manufacturing milk prices had risen in the interval. Secondly,
there should be a campaign to clean up the milk supply.
Finally, a Milk Publicity Fund should be established with ,S for
£ contributions by the Treasury and the Milk Marketing Board to
stimulate liquid milk consumption, this last provision to
include a cut price milk supply to schools-
In committee, Elliot conveyed his gratitude at Chamberlain's
3
offer of such generous Treasury assistance.' The interdepart¬
mental report had completely rejected his levy-subsidy scheme
but Elliot must have been well pleased with the alternative plan
which at the outset he must have thought would not be entertained
Meeting between TS and Sir James Parr, 13 February 1934-
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by a Chancellor who had in the past opposed any suggestion of
agricultural subsidies, repayable or otherwise. The tripartite
policy was an adequate response to the milk difficulties and had
the additional advantage of avoiding for the present fractious
discussions with the Dominions.
The P.M.S.C. agreed to recommend the milk policy to the
Cabinet which in turn approved both the committee's report and
Elliot's proposed statement."'" In his statement to the House of
22 February 19 34, Elliot gave the details of his tripartite
policy: the G-overnment would for a period of two years from 1
April guarantee a price of 5d per gallon in summer and 6d in
winter to both liquid and manufacturing milk; £750,000 would be
spent over four years to initiate a campaign thereafter funded
by the Milk Marketing Board to clean up the herds and produce a
purer milk supply; and the Government would contribute £1 per £1
with the Board up to a maximum of £1 million over two years to a
milk publicity fund to stimulate liquid consumption, it being
understood that cheaper milk in schools had to be introduced as
2
part of the deal.
Legislation to implement the new milk policy was intended
to be introduced to Parliament early in April. Elliot, however,
became ill and had to undergo a minor operation followed by six
weeks* convalescence. His absence presented certain parlia¬
mentary problems. It was decided to postpone consideration of
the milk bill and also legislation dealing with the beet sugar
^
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industry until his return to Westminster. Other parts of his
legislative programme did go ahead however as planned, with
Burgin, Skelton and Ormsby-Gore doing Elliot's work in the
Commons while de la Warr performed his usual duties as
Parliamentary Secretary in the Lords.
One major debate in Elliot's absence was that on the
Estimates for the various marketing boards which provided the
Government with an opportunity to expound and defend their prin¬
ciples and operations. Ormsby-Gore made an eloquent speech on
behalf of his absent colleague. It was, he asserted, too
premature to pass judgement on the marketing schemes for apart
from that concerning hops, all were still in their initial stages.
However, it was beyond all doubt that British agriculture could
not survive without measures of protection and organisation of
which these boards were an integral part. Of course there
were problems but these could be worked out and he appealed for
patience.
"It really would be a most serious thing for
British agriculture if impatience, if
restlessness because the new marketing boards
cannot work a revolution, cannot produce an
entirely new order of things in the first 12
months cau^e them to be condemned as
failures."
The most important discussion on agricultural policy however
that took place during Elliot's indisposition and absence from
'Westminster came during the debate on Dominions Office Supply
on 7 May. Herbert Samuel, so often the butt of Elliot's
1
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derision, launched a full-frontal attack on the absent Minister
of Agriculture in the course of moving the reduction in the
Vote. Samuel's main contention was that the National Govern¬
ment's trade policy was one of restriction and contraction
causing grave anxiety to the Dominions. Britain was following
a policy of economic nationalism and self-sufficiency which
contributed to the decline in international trade and growth in
unemployment. Samuel asserted that tie cause behind the National
Government's pursuit of such a policy was none other than Elliot
himself.
"I am afraid that the cause is absent from
the House to-day, owing to indisposition.
We all regret the absence of -the Minister of
Agriculture. He is the real reason; those
who belong to the school of thought that he
represents are the reason why the Government,
which has itself condemned economic nationalism
and regrets it, is one of the ijiost active
participants in the movement."
Samuel accused Elliot of basing his policies for the
agricultural industry to an absurd extent on the assumption that
inaction was unthinkable whereas parliament and the nation would
forgive errors.
"He is rather like a man learning to ride a
bicycle. He does not mind very much in what
direction he is going. He lurches frcm side
to side, to the dismay and terror of pedestrians,
but he has to go on for fear of falling off.
He goes on, and the faster he can go the more
likelihood there is that he will be able to
maintain the perpendicular."
Samuel stressed the adverse effect Elliot's measures was
having on imperial relations and accused him of reverting to the
1
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Corn Law era. The economic theory propounded by Elliot was
that which would result in the same decline in commerce, the
same fall in the standard of living and the same depression in
the agricultural industry as had happened when in the past the
belief in economic nationalism was at its peak in the early
part of the 19th century. Elliot was not, declared Samuel,
the progressive thinker he thought himself to be but an apostle
of reaction.
"The Minister is not the radiant pioneer of
a brave new world that he thinks he is; he
is a political Rip Van Winkle who has
awakened after a sleep of 100 years and^is
propounding in 1934 the ideas of 1834."
Leo Amery, representing the die-hard imperialists on "the
Conservative back benches was also critical of the Government's
trade policy, in particular attacking the concessions made to
the Argentine. He voiced the widely-held belief at Westminster
that Elliot and Runciman were in constant conflict over trade
and agricultural policy.
"The Minister of Agriculture has one policy,
the President of the Board of Trade has an
entirely different policy; and the rest of
the Cabinet are in the clouds en route for
Geneva or wherever it may be, and p^y
little attention to these matters."
Lloyd George too perceived contrasting opinions in the Cabinet.
He supported Elliot in his endeavours but asserted the Government
was moving in a contrary direction. The basis of Britain's
imperial trade commitments had to be altered or Elliot* s work
1
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would be in vain.
"The Minister of Agriculture is trying to
reorganise the agriculture of this country,
but every attempt he makes is bound to fail
unless the Agreements which were greeted
with such joy and such extravagant praise
two years ago are altered."
This sentiment that Elliot was being frustrated in his
enthusiastic attempts to reconstruct the agricultural industry
by Cabinet colleagues and trade agreements was echoed in most
parts of the House. The debate showed, once again, that M.P.s
on both sides when criticising the Government's policy portrayed
Elliot as the would-be saviour of British agriculture obstructed
by the incompatible policy pursued by the President of the
Board of Trade and the short-sighted Ottawa Agreements. As
evidenced by their leader's invective, the Samuelite Liberals
did not share this general sympathy expressed for Elliot and his
exoneration from charges of government lethargy and muddle-
headedness. The other conceivable exception, the imperialist
wing of the Tory Party, may have disapproved of measures taken
to restrict Dominion imports but regarded Elliot as the man to
support against their bete noir, Runciman, in the hope that
British and Dominion farmers would share the bulk of market
between them with tariffs being imposed against foreign
supplying nations.
Upon his return to "Westminster, Elliot introduced the Milk
Bill. This was in a way his pe. project of his years as the
Minister of Agriculture,especially the provisions to encourage
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the development of a milk-drinking habit. The nutrition aspects
of the product appealed to him greatly, believing as he did
that the consumption of more milk by poorer families would do
much to alleviate diet deficiency and improve general health.
He had of course worked for many years to promote milk drinking
both under the auspices of the Bmpire Marketing Board and as an
M.P. piloting a Private Member's bill through parliament,
authorising schools in Scotland to supply reduced price milk.
So milk was a subject in which Elliot had a very great interest
not just as a Minister of Agriculture but as a scientist and
doctor seeking to encourage milk consumption on medical and social
grounds.
The Lab cur Party did not oppose the Milk Bill in principle
but attacked it for not going far enough in its provision for
cheap milk for the needy. It contended that milk should be
supplied free in schools with the effect of creating a milk
consciousness in the young generation while at the same time
solving to a large extent the milk surplus problem. Stafford
Cripps put forward the idea of a two-tier manufacturing milk
price with that receiving the higher rate being given to schools.
Cripps proposed that half the surplus 180 million gallons should
be bought by the G-overnment at 8d per gallon and given free to
schools while the remaining 90 gallons would fetch 3d per gallon
from manufacturers. All producers could still receive the
intended 53. price but the difference would be that the surplus
would be subsidised to be given to school children instead of
being made into cheese and butter.^ This analysis, described
1
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by Skelton as "a beautiful arithmetic calculation"^ took no
account of distribution costs and. was rejected on this and other
grounds after elaborate financial argument in the Commons.
The Bill spent two days in Committee where the Opposition
argued in favour of making the subsidy payable for just one
year while the government evolved a bigger and better scheme.
To this, Elliot responded that it had taken him more than twelve
months to consider all sides of the question and ccaie up with
the present scheme. It would not he possible to work out a
scheme covering the entire liquid milk and milk product supply
within a year due to Dominion intransigence.
"Persuasion has been tried to the utmost, and
the Dominion countries, which we can only
persuade and argue with and. not compel, have
not found it gossible to come within ary
such scheme."
This being so, the subsidy had to cover the two year period up
until such time as the government was free to take measures of
quantitative control against imperial dairy products.
The Opposition's one year amendment was rejected as was a
move by some Tory backbenchers to have a maximum figure put on
the proposed subsidy. This was led by Harry Crookshank who
likened Elliot's change of attitude from Financial Secretary to
Minister of Agriculture as "a classic example of gamekeeper
3
turned poacher." Another Opposition amendment was proposed to
ensure that at least 50% of the money given to the publicity
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campaign would be spent on subsidising milk for school children
and mothers with babies, and other deserving cases. Elliot
reassured the House that it was proposed to spend at least
6/7ths of this for these purposes. Then pressed by Cripps for
further details, Elliot declared that it was intended to devise
a scheme based on that presently operated by the National Milk
Publicity Council through which 9,000,000 school children received
1/3 pint every weekday for Id- At the moment, the Milk
Marketing Board was negotiating rates with the distributors and
it was hoped to reduce the price by 50% and extend the scheme to
cover millions."*"
The remaining stages of the Milk Bill passed through the
House without much ado with no division on the Third Reading.
The subsidy underpinned the milk market at a time of glut and
depressed milk product prices due to a plethora of Dominion
imports. The measures to cleanup the herds represented a
significant starttalthough on a small scale and long overdue^to
purify the nation's milk supply. Finally the campaign to
increase consumption by the two methods of sample as with the
milk-in-schools scheme and publicity taken in conjunction with
the improvement in quality had much to do with the fact that in
contrast to most other European countries, milk drinking in
Britain began to show a steady rise from the 1930's. Elliot
himself participated in the campaign to increase consumption by
visiting some schools when the scheme started on 1 October,
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appearing in the daily newspapers taking the liquid through the
obligatory school straws-
The other piece of legislation postponed until Elliot's
return to Parliament was the final stages of legislation to
extend the beet sugar subsidy for eleven months from 30 September
to allow the committee of inquiry chaired by "Vilfred G-reene more
time to consider the long-term future of the industry. Moving
its Second Reading on 19 March, Elliot had declared that the
question to be asked was whether or not the stage had been
reached where a final pronouncement on the pros and cons of the
sugar subsidy experiment started by the 1925 Act could be made.
He felt that it had not and that further investigation of the
whole issue should be made-"'" As he expected, Samuel made an
extremely critical speech in which he reminded the House that
the intention of the 1925 Act had been that the beet sugar
industry in Britain would, nurtured by state assistance for ten
years, become self-sufficient- This had not occurred. The
industry remained uneconomic at a time when the world glut meant
that cheap supplies could be imported. He attacked too the
long delay between Chamberlain* s announcement of the committee of
2
inquiry in March 19 33 and its actual commencement of operations.
Samuel repeated these protests during the Third Reading on 29
June which nevertheless passed without division.
In July, Elliot had the opportunity of reviewing the agri¬
cultural position and defending his policies during a lengthy
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debate on supply. After dealing with the various branches of
agriculture, Elliot went to more general matters. He spoke
of farming problems perhaps requiring irrational solutions.
"It may be that they will not be solved by the
blunt application of logical principles but
will be solved by the working out of a
practical remedy w^ich may very easily defy
logic altogether."
He declared that a hopeful beginning had been made with the
improvement in price levels and wages but although the tide had
quite definitely turned, there was a very long way to go. On
the question of the claims of the home producer vis-a-vis those
of the foreign supplier he made his feelings quite clear.
"No hon. or right hon. Member needs to urge me
to greater vigour in favour of the agricul¬
tural producer. I have a certain amount of
hereditary connection with the agricultural
industry and I have a connection today as an
agricultural producer myself. To urge me
to be more and more rigorous against the
foreign importer is like asking the cat to
be more and more careful of th^ cream so
that no other cats can apply.""
He went on, however, to stress his awareness of the necessity to
balance the interests of trade and agriculture, working in
harmony with his colleague at the Board of Trade. Runciman,
declared Elliot, had a difficult job which would be made much
easier by ignoring one side of the problem, namely the home
agricultural interest but of course that was unthinkable. All
those involved in negotiating trade agreements had to consider
all sides of the auestion— with agriculture now receiving long
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overdue attention, it was imperative not to forget the interests
of Britain's other industries and export trade as had happened
when the position had been reversed.
"Let us not, as agriculturalists, imitate
the terrible errors which the industrialist
committed in the 19th century. Let us not
blind ourselves now to the interests of
industry as the industrialists then blinded^
themselves to the interest of agriculture."
In the course of this debate, Elliot referred only briefly to
the mainstay of British agriculture, the beef industry. He
said only that a statement would be made before the summer
recess. Behind the scenes, every aspect of this critical issue
was being urgently discussed by the Produce Markets Supply
Committee and by the full Cabinet. The whole ouestion of beef
was a pressing one, not just because of the troubles of the home
producer but because of the imminent expiry of the Ottawa pledge
against statutory meat quota control against the Dominions. In
March, Elliot had submitted a progress report on the beef
situation to the P.M.S.C. He reported that supplies from all
sources were up on the equivalent 1933 period and in consequence
prices continued to fall. However, although no improvement
could be expected in the second quarter, there seemed no
prospect of a sudden collapse. Elliot saw no alternative to
"a wait and see policy" for the immediate future but pressed
strongly for a speedy decision on the ouestion of opening
negotiations with the Dominions to formulate the beef policy to
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be adopted after the 1 July expiry of the Ottawa commitment.
The Produce Markets Supply Committee had in March given full
backing to the proposed discussions to be conducted by Elliot,
Thomas and Hunciman. Negotiating tactics were also discussed,
there being general agreement that the British case be put to
the Dominions in an exaggerated version with the proposals put
forward to be of "a more drastic nature than the proposals which
2
we should ultimately be prepared to accept as settlement."
In his March memorandum, Elliot had only referred briefly
to his December 1933 levy-subsidy proposals,acknowledging that
his colleagues had deferred their consideration and asserting
that he had no intention of raising the issue again at the
present time. It is remarkable therefore that at its next
meeting held three months later, the levy-subsidy principle was
endorsed by the Produce Markets Supply Committee. It was to be
the basis of the Government's beef policy and the keystone of
its negotiating briefs for three years. The emphasis did
change somewhat in that it was at first envisaged that moderate
quantitative regulation should complement the levy-subsidy but
later this proviso was all but abandoned in the hope of
facilitating agreement with the Dominions and the Argentine.
glliot in his memorandum to the all-important seventh
meeting of the Committee held on 12 June 1934 outlined five
alternative beef policy options. The first possibility involved
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further cuts against foreign suppliers with increased ouantitative
restriction against the Dominions- Secondly there was the levy-
subsidy scheme as operated in the case of wheat. Then there
was the option of a straightforward tariff. A combination of
quotas and levy-subsidy offered a fourth policy choice. The
fifth and last was a short-term option, that of quantitative
regulation combined with repayable advances to home beef
producers. Elliot pointed out that while the G-overnment was
at liberty to impose regulation on Dominion beef exports from 1
July, the degree of restriction necessary to raise wholesale
prices would be extremely drastic. He reminded the Committee
also of Britain's treaty commitments against meat duties and
thus the implementation of any of the middle three policy options
would have to be by consent of the Dominions and the Argentine -
negotiations towards such an agreement would in all likelihood
be long, delicate and necessitating concessions in return. So,
while making no recommendations as such, Elliot's memo was
weighted in favour of the fifth option, that of a short-term
supply regulation progransne plus a subsidy to home producers
pending the formulation of a longer-term policy.' Elliot had
in no ?/ay changed his mind on his levy-subsidy proposals but
recognised the time factor dictated the necessity for a short-
term policy while the ground was prepared for a more permanent
one.
Thomas,too submitted a memo for the Committee's consideration.
1
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He asserted that all five options would displease the Dominions
since they would involve the diminution of conventional rights
for the purpose of assisting British producers. He believed
that to have any hope of securing Dominion agreement, it was
imperative to put the Dominions fully in the picture as far as
plans for the development and expsnsion of the home industry
were concerned. He accepted,however, the urgency of the meat
situation and was prepared to contemplate a short-term subsidy
as a temporary expedient to allow time to formulate a considered
policy.
In his memo, Thomas continued his campaign to inject
continuity and planning into what he regarded as a fragmented
and piecemeal agricultural policy. He returned to his assault
on the agricultural policy to date.
"The alternative is to continue, as we have
hitherto done, to make ad hoc arrangements,
unrelated to one another, in relation to
each commodity, in order to meet specific
crises as they arise. Such a policy
merely postpones our difficulties. It
does not remove them. Ye cannot hope or
so it seems to me, to arrive at any
permanent solution of these difficulties
until we ourselves know what we want to do
with our own agricultural industry.
Meanwhile every vested interest, that we allow
to grow up, every grievance (justified or
unjustified) that we create renders an
ultimate solution more difficult."
He took the view that a long-term comprehensive agricultural
programme should be formulated incorporating plans for the
future development of British agriculture. Decisions had to
be taken to what extent if any the home industry should be
expanded. Thomas, himself believed in only limited expansion
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in certain areas.
"That our agricultural industry should not he
allowed to decay will not be disputed by
anyone: but I conceive that it may be more
profitable to the nation as a whole to aim
at a limited agricultural development
rather than at a more extensive agriculture
which can only be made remunerative by
quotas, duties, or other extraneous
assistance, and may well inflijt serious
injury on our external trade."
During the Committee discussions, Chamberlain came to
Elliot's defence against Thomas's criticism by emphasising that
each product required special, individual consideration and
action. He was unimpressed at the Dominions' interpretation of
Ottawa but felt that since a growth in population would hold out
the possibility of a larger market, it would not be in Britain's
commercial interest to antagonize the Dominions by imposing
severe restriction on meat supplies. He preferred instead the
levy-subsidy long-term policy option. Hunciman too saw it as
the least objectionable alternative although he asserted that the
meat situation was not as serious as Hlliot was making out and
recommended reconsidering the whole position. Baldwin too
supported the levy-subsidy proposal, preferring it to the prospect
of further regulation, but he recognised that an interim policy
was essential.
Blliot simmed up the position before asserting his policy
preference. \ction of seme kind had to be taken at the end of
the month. So as far as immediate implementation was concerned,
the levy-subsidy policy was impossible. Legally, a strict quota
1
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could "be enforced against the Dominions but politically it would
be undesirable. He preferred therefore to make deficiency
payments to home producers. The Committee agreed that such a
course would be the best solution, that it should be examined in
detail by Interdepartmental Committee with consideration of the
various possibilities of funding such payments including that of
the levy; and that Elliot should draw up a memorandum on the
outcome of the investigation."*"
The Produce Markets Supply Committee at its crucial seventh
meeting therefore reached two conclusions^ namely that it was
necessary to have both a short-term and a long-term beef policy
and that the former should take the form of deficiency payments
to home producers. In additio^it had reached informal agree¬
ment that Elliot's levy-subsidy proposal be adopted as the
long-term policy intention. Thomas, however, still had mis¬
givings about it and its possible reception by Britain's trading
partners. He conveyed these doubts in a letter to Elliot with
copies to Chamberlain and Runciman. He asserted that such a
policy involved at root the subsidy of British agriculture by
that of the Dominions and the Argentine, a situation which
would provoke friction and retaliation. If, on the other hand,
an import duty with imperial preference was coupled with
Exchequer deficiency payments, the result would be the same in
substance but the different form would be more acceptable. The
Dominion producer would not in that event feel he was subsidising
"*"
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his British counterpart yet the amount raised could he that
agreed payable by the Exchequer to the home producers.
"The fact that the U.K. Government had
decided to pay a subsidy to the U.K.
farmer would be a matter which would not
directly concern him. But he would, I
feel sure, object to being made to pay
that subsidy himself, even though the
financial effect of a duty, so far as he
was concerned, was the same."
In other words, while the end result would be the same as
Elliot's earmarked tariff proposal, the mechanics should prove
less objectionable. Finally, Thomas made the more tangible
point that were the deficiency payments to depend directly on
the levy then either had to be variable, a prerequisite that
must be disagreeable to both parties.^"
The Produce Markets Supply Committee held its next meeting
on 18 June to discuss Elliot's memorandum expanding on the
second option, namely the levy-subsidy^ taking the findings of
the Interdepartmental Committee into consideration. Elliot
pointed out that a decision must be made as to what if any
quantitative regulation should be retained to operate in
conjunction with the levy-subsidy and whether a levy should be
put on all meat or just beef. He recognised the view, as put
forward at the last meeting by Thomas and Runciman, that the
most practicable course would be to give up the right of
statutory restriction in return for the acceptance of the
imposition of a levy. Elliot, stressing the necessity of a
Government statement, asked that the Committee decide whether
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to advocate Cabinet authorisation of entering into discussions
towards replacing the right of compulsory quota control with a
policy of import levy by consent. Secondly, the Committee
should determine whether, pending the completion of such
negotiations, the Government should enact an interim policy."'"
The P.M.S.G. discussed three possible bases for negotiating
acceptance by the Dominions and the Argentine of the levy as
the long-temi policy. The first was that Britain would lift all
compulsory regulation in return for agreement to an import levy
on all meats. The second option was to seek a levy to replace
statutory restriction on beef alone leaving the Government free
to quantitatively regulate other types of meat- Finally,
Britain could propose the retention of partial regulation coupled
with the imposition of a levy on all meats with the Dominion
supplies being stabilised at the present level. Tlliot
advocated the first basis but most of his colleagues preferred
the second for a variety of reasonSj mainly that it would leave
the successful regulation of mutton and lamb untouched while
the fact that most of such a beef levy would come from the
Argentine would appeal to the Dominions. Dlliot accepted the
majority view on the understanding that while the talks began
with beef the whole meat situation would have to be discussed.
The Committee agreed that Baldwin should report proceedings to
the Cabinet and ask authority to open negotiations with the
Dominions and the Argentine, the scope of which should be all-
embracing. At the same time, it asked the Interdepartmental
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Committee to draw up two schemes, one based on the levy-subsidy
as the Government's long-term policy objective and the other
consisting of temporaiy measures to be enacted pending the
former's achievement."*"
The Cabinet approved its Committee's recommendation and
2
actions the following day on 19 June. The next step, while
the interdepartmental committee was at -ork on the two schemes,
was a preliminary meeting between Elliot, Thomas and Dominion
representatives, the outcome of which seemed hopeful. Thomas
asserted that Britain would^as she was legally entitled to do
after 1 July^xtend her policy of supply restriction unless
another policy could be agreed whereupon the Dominion spokesman
had suggested an import levy^and the imposition of Id duty on
all meat with 50/' imperial preference had then been discussed.3
This Elliot and r'homas related to their colleagues at the next
meeting of the Produce Markets Supply Committee on 2 July. It
had before it the Deport from the InterDepartmental Committee
chaired by Howell-Thomas, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry
of Agriculture. The Report contained no figures but was merely
a discussion document split into two parts, the first dealing
with the long-term proposals and the second with an interim
scheme to be based on deficiency payments^ voluntary regulation
or a combination of both.^ Elliot submitted too a memorandum on
the short-term policy in which he urged a generous measure of
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assistance for the home producer.
"The conclusion seems inevitable that the
deficiency payment during the interim period
must be substantial, so that we hold the
position if possible, and in arjr event show
a real effort on the part of the (Government
to insulate the home producer from the full
effects of the heavy fall in the beef
markets. This is the more necessary since,
pending negotiations, we are refraining, on
grounds which are admittedly those of high
policy, concerned with other economic and
political considerations, from taking the
action which lies within our powers."
Elliot advocated that for the interim period a scheme involving
the least operational problems should be adopted^namely that of
a flat-rate deficiency payment for six to eight months. On
the assumption that Dominion supplies were stabilised at the
present level, llliot recommended a subsidy of 7/9d per cwt. to
bring the producer's return back to 2+4/6d, the Ottawa year
level. Such a scheme would cost in the region of £3 million.
dlliot concluded by emphasising the urgency of the situation.
It was necessary to introduce and get passed legislation before
the summer recess if the scheme was to begin to function in the
autumn.
During the discussion, Thomas made the very crucial point
that a direct subsidy would make negotiations ?/ith the Dominions
more difficult since they would interpret it as a sign of
Britain's reluctance to exert her legal rights as far as
Quantitative regulation was concerned. They would therefore
not respond in the same way to ary threats of drastic cuts as
WE memo. PMS (33) 19 of 29 June 1934.
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the alternative if no agreement could be reached on the levy-
subsidy proposal. After an abortive debate on the practica¬
bility of a short-term policy based entirely on a programme of
restriction, the Committee went on to agree that in the case of
beef, unlike wheat, a fixed levy with a variable price was the
desired objective, not a variable levy with a fixed price. At
this point Chamberlain put forward his own policy proposals. On
the assumption that the import levy would be Id on foreign and
■gd on Dominion beef,there would be accumulated sufficient funds
to pay the home producers 6/- per cwt. However, he advocated a
subsidy of 5/- with the surplus income being used to repay the
Exchequer advances to be paid pending the implementation of the
full levy-subsidy policy. The interim deficiency payments
should, recommended the Chahcellor, be at the same rate.
Thomas endorsed this scheme as did ^urgin in attendance on
behalf of Hunciman. Elliot asserted his readiness to investi¬
gate it, a sentiment encouraged by Baldwin who reminded the
Committee that previous schemes had been unpalatable to Chamberlain
and the Treasury. It was then formally agreed that the proposals
be examined by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Treasury.
Apart from recommending the continuation of the negotiations with
the Dominions, the Committee put its attitude towards a long-term
policy in more concise terms than previously. It agreed that
there should be a measure of quantitative regulation complementing
a fixed levy with the proceeds of the latter being used to make
deficiency payments to the home producer."1"
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On 11 July, immediately before the conclusive Cabinet
meeting on the interim measures, Elliot and Thomas met the
Dominion High Commissioners, the second in a series of
negotiations between 4 July 1934 and 11 February 1935-The
British Ministers had reiterated their intention to enact a
short-term policy of deficiency payments combined with a
regulated import programme. At the same time they warned the
Dominion representatives that drastic restriction would be imposed
in the longer term if agreement was not reached on the levy
proposal which,contrary to their Commissioners' rea.diness to at
least consider it, had already provoked initial hostile reaction
from the Dominion Governments.
Baldwin in his capacity as P.M.3.C. Chairman submitted a
memorandum for Cabinet consideration spelling out the Committee's
considered meat policy: the long-term policy objective was the
operation of a levy-subsidy combined with a measure of quanti¬
tative import regulation: the Id levy with 50% Imperial preference
would be on all meats excluding bacon with all the proceeds
going into a special fund to pay a subsidy to home producers;
and the rate of the levy and the deficiency payment would be
such that the Exchequer would recoup any advances made prior to
2
the agreement to and imposition of the levy. At the same time,
Elliot presented a draft of his Cattle Industry (Emergency
Assistance) Bill providing for deficiency payments from 1 September
^
Proceedings of the conference between the U.K. and the
Dominions on the Meat Situation, July 1934-February 1933:
TS/R/16 in Cab.27/567.
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1934 until 31 March 1935- During a discussion on the likely
outcome of the levy-subsidy negotiations, Thomas asserted his
belief that the Dominions would not consent to the proposed
rate of levy and reminded his colleagues of the crucial fact
that in the absence of voluntary agreement, no duty could be
imposed against the Dominions until the expiry of the relevant
Ottawa commitment in August 1937» Chamberlain, however, felt
that Britain might be able to persuade the Dominions that a meat
levy would be less onerous on them than a quota. He recog¬
nised however the considerable risk that the advances to be made
to the home producers might not be recoverable. Elliot and
Runciman were in agreement for once that in the event of
Dominion rejection of the levy, the response should be an
immediate quota.
As approved by the Cabinet, Elliot made a policy statement
in the House of Commons. He explained that after careful
consideration the Government had decided to seek a levy-subsidy
with some quantitative control. Pending agreement to that, a
bill would be introduced to provide for a deficiency payment of a
maximum of 5/- per live cwt. and 9/4d per dead weight for a
2
period not exceeding six months from 1 September. Later in
the day, after a meeting of the Ministers directly involved,
the Government issued a White Paper expanding on its meat policy
3
proposals.
1 Cab.28 (34) of 11 July 1934-
2
11 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 321-4-
^ White Paper: The Livestock Situation Cmd 4651-
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The Cattle Industry (emergency Provisions) Bill was
introduced on 17 July, passed through the Commons within a few
days, receiving royal assent on 31 July. This expeditious
time-table was of necessity in order to get the measure on the
statute book before the summer recess to enable the first
deficiency payment to be made to the home beef producer on 1
September. Elliot must have regretted that his Parliamentary
Secretary was not in the Commons to share the work-load during
four days of lengthy debate, coming as it did at the end of what
had been for him an extremely busy session. His first speech
on the bill took the form of a review of the circumstances
which had led to the Government's decision to make deficiency
payments to the home beef producers. Speaking on the money
resolution on 16 July, Elliot emphasised the gravity of the beef
position highlighted by the fact that the index figure for fat
cattle had slumped from 122 in 1931 to 94 at the present time.
Supplies from the Argentine had been greatly reduced but had
been offset by an enormous expansion in Dominion exports. At
a time of falling demand, the home producer had found himself
with a declining share of the market and was as a result in a
critical situation.
Elliot reviewed the various policy options the Government
had considered and informed the House of the lack of progress
so far in the negotiations with the Dominions on the levy-
subsidy proposal. The talks would continue but in the meantime,
he declared, steps had to be taken to assist the home producer.
Elliot stressed that should there be no agreement to the levy
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by the time the temporary subsidy expired, in March 19 55, then a
policy of strict supply regulation would, be enacted-^"
Undoubtedly, Elliot meant his words to reach the Dominions,
making absolutely clear that the National G-overnment would employ
its legal right of quota control unless its levy-subsidy proposal
received endorsement. The Opposition made little contribution
to the debate but their reticence was more than made up for by
the ever-vocal tariff wing of the Conservative Party. It
welcomed the shift in G-overnment policy away from quantitative
regulation towards protection by tariffs and while preferring a
straight import duty, was not averse to the idea of a levy-
subsidy. Boothby sunmed up his colleagues' feelings when he
asserted that the beef subsidy was "the price that we have to
pay for 10 years of deflation, for the Ottawa Agreements, for
the Argentine Agreement, and for the conscience of the President
2
of the Board of Trade." The debate was wound up by Noel Skelton
who assured the House that it need have no fear of the long-term
policy failing - it would either take the form of rraantitative
regulation or levy and the respective precedents of mutton and
wheat had proved success was possible. Skelton in true Tory
progressive vein commended the idea of a temporary subsidy to
see an industry through difficult times, saying he could not see
"a more useful application of national finances than to support
at a time of crisis an industry which is not far off being on a
1
16 July 193k, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 800-814-
2 16 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 856.
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sound basis, but which needs a little extra to tide it over the
crisis.""*"
On the Second Reading on 19 July> Elliot dealt with the
bill's actual provisions. The bill sought to establish a Cattle
Fund with a maximum £3 million resources out of which payments
would be made to producers of steers and heifers. It also
provided for the establishment of an advisory Cattle Committee.
He rejected the Opposition's argument that reorganisation was a
necessary prerequisite to an industry being granted assistance
on the grounds that unless a remunerative price level was restored^
reorganisation alone could not preserve the industry, the process
of rationalisation in arjy case taking a long time.
"It is more important to have an industry to
organise than to have the organisation
without the industry and the danger before
us was that this situation would lead to a
widespread crash in the beef-raising industry,
and certainly a crash which merg reorganisation
as such would not fully avert.""
F.lliot reminded the House of one of the principles of his 1933
Agricultural Marketing Act whereby if a marketing, reorganising
scheme was under consideration, it was in order to give temporary
assistance to the branch of the industry in question.
"To say that we should postpone all action
until reorganisation has taken place, is to
say that when a house is burning we should
summon an architect rather than ring for the
fire brigade."
Leo Amery, one of the leading members of the imperialist,
protectionist wing of the Conservative Party, made a forthright
1 16 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 895-
2
19 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5a col 112.
3 19 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1297/8.
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attack on Ministerial disunity. While respecting individual
ability, he criticised the ineptitude of the Cabinet as a whole
on the development of trade and agricultural policy. He declared
that "nothing could have been more incompetent from start to
finish than the handling of this meat business over the last 24
months.""*" This was due, asserted Amery, to the lack of co-
ordination between departments which resulted in turn in a lack
of continuity in policy. Instead ythe initiative went from one
Minister to another, in the case of trade and agriculture between
Runciman and Elliot to the detriment of the national interest -
"when Walter disagrees with Walter, the taxpayer has to foot
the bill."2
On the whole however, the Cattle Industry Bill was well
received. The various ad hoc groupings of the Conservative Party
lent their support with the Scottish M.P.s particularly enthusi¬
astic since their area had not benefitted from the wheat quota
whereas beef production made up more than half of the Scottish
agricultural industry compared with one third in England and
Wales. The tariff wing was amenable to the temporary policy
in the knowledge that the Government* s new long-term objective
was a variation on the tariff policy it had advocated for so long
against the idea of quotas. All those on the Government back¬
benches who took part in the Second Reading debate complimented
Elliot on his endeavours and expressed their confidence in his
handling of agricultural policy.
1
19 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1322.
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19 July 1934, 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1323.
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The Labour Party employed the emotive argument that the
subsidy preserved the production of the rich man's meat at the
expense of the poor consumer who bought the lower quality foreign
meat. In response, Elliot put forward the counter-argument to
the cheap food gospel, giving as an example the futility of
miners paying such a small price for meat and bacon that the
Argentine could not afford to buy coal from Britain. Bankruptcy
of the primary producer was of no advantage to those involved
in secondary industries. Elliot also criticised the Opposition
for their blithe advocacy of rationalisation, pointing out that
the extent necessary to bring real improvement in beef prices
would reauire many redundancies. On the whole, however, the
Labour Party's opposition to the measure was muted with spokesmen
like Williams and Grenfell quite obviously not against the
measure. The moderate attitude yet considerable interest shown
by the Labour Party was commended by Elliot.
"One of the encouraging features of the present
agricultural situation is the interest taken
by the Labour party in the plight of agri¬
culture, and the determination which they show
in their speeches not to down idly and see
agriculture decay but to take steps and vigorous
steps if necessary - to put the position right.
We quarrel, of course, with mary of their
remedies, but with their approach we all agree:
and those of us who hope for continuity of
policy in the future look on this as one jf
the best auguries for bringing it about."
If Labour's reaction to Elliot's beef policy was not one of
outright opposition, in other quarters the position was quite
different. The Dominions, primarily Australia and New Zealand,
1
21+ July ISy+t 292 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1727/8.
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adopted a hostile and bitter attitude from the outset. They
believed the mother country should give them free and unrestricted
access to her markets and while they might agree to temporary
controls to avert a crisis situation, they were totally against
a long-term policy of quantitative regulation of levy-subsidy.
Unwilling to take account of other trading commitments and
political realities, the Dominions' case was that Britain's meat
market problems should be solved by means of action against
foreign suppliers, in this case chiefly the Argentine. It is
quite clear that the granting of a deficiency paynent to her
home producers severely weakened Britain's negotiating stance with
her obdurate Dominions. This danger was seen at the time but it
is even more apparent in retrospect. Reading through the minutes
of the discussions between Britain and the Dominions which began
in the summer of 193*4- and continued at different levels for two
long, frustrating years, it is abundantly clear that the Dominions
recognised the National Government's threat of drastic quanti¬
tative regulation for the bluff it was. It is true that at
times individual Cabinet Ministers, in exasperation at the
recalcitrance of particularly Australia, advocated imposing the
quota alternative. For political reasons, however, not least of
which was the strong imperialist sentiment in the Cabinet,
Parliament and indeed in Britain as a whole, drastic action of
this kind was the last resort and this the Dominions knew only
too well. Throughout the drawn-out negotiations, the Dominions
felt able to maintain their hostility to the levy-subsidy
proposals in the firm belief that Britain would extend the period
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of Exchequer assistance to her home producers rather than take
punitive action against .them. In this conviction, the Dominions
were vindicated.
Even in the initial stages of the negotiations, the Cabinet
could not be too confident of its ability to secure Dominion and
Argentinian consent to the implementation of its levy-subsidy
proposals. It certainly hoped that some sort of agreement on
that basis could be reached but from the outset the signs were
not propitious with initial Dominion reaction being extremely
discouraging. The Produce Markets Supply Committee met on 25
July to approve the meat import programme for July-December
which had been drawn up by the Interdepartmental Committee as
the other ingredient in the Government's short-term policy.2
The shipment figures were then related to the Dominions not as
a basis for discussion but as a fait accompli when Elliot and
2
Thomas met the High Commissioners two days later. The two
Ministers agreed to a reouest for separate programmes to be sent
to the Dominion governments. The reaction, with the exception
of South Africa, was not favourable, indeed the telegrams from
Australia and New Zealand, as described by Thomas to his colleagues
at the Cabinet meeting before the summer recess, indicated total
opposition to any restriction whatsoever. Clearly, with the
Dominions in an uncompromising mood from the beginning, prospects
for a successful outcome to the negotiations were not good.
If Dominion inflexibility necessitated modification of
1
PMS (33) 10th meeting, 25 July 1934.
2 T.S/R/16 4th meeting, 27 July 1934*
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Elliot* s plans for the reconstruction and development of British
agriculture, so too did the increasing influence and effective¬
ness of his critics within the National Government itself.
Counter-arguments to Elliot* s policies and aims put forward by
the Board of Trade and the Dominions Office had gathered momentum
throughout 193*4- to the point that by June there was a forceful
campaign being waged against both his practice of considering
agriculture as several separate industries requiring individual
treatment and his expansion objectives. The beef subsidy seemed
to cement the various strands of criticism into a discernible
demand for clarification of intended economic strategy in order
to relate Elliot's agricultural policies to those proposed for
industrial development. ks we have seen^J.H. Thomas was
pressing strongly in Cabinet for a comprehensive plan to be
drawn up, not just to bring continuity to agricultural legislation
but also to clarify the role envisaged for home producers which
in turn would enable Ministers negotiating with the Dominions to
be more specific on intended British agricultural development.
The Prime Minister, too^had become somewhat concerned at the
attention the industry had been receiving compared with others.
He had expressed his feelings on the subject in a letter to Baldwin
in April bitterly attacking the campaign by the latter's agri¬
cultural supporters for the repeal of Snowden's Land Tax. Of
course the legislation in question was but a museum piece on the
statute book but for MacDonald its retention was a point of
honour, a measure of proof to others and reassurance to himself
that the Government was of nationalist complexion and that he,
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the Premier, was no mere servant of the Conservative Party-
His belief that Elliot was too responsive to the demands of the
industry under his charge is implicit.
"No interest has received more consideration
than this nor is any which has received
help at the public expense so persistent in
increasing its demands-"
On the Land Tax issue, MacDonald lost as its repeal was included
in Chamberlain's Finance Bill which received its Third Reading
on 22 June. This defeat seems to have made the Prime Minister
more determined to increase National Labour's influence on
domestic policy and endeavour to arrest the growing Conservative
domination of the Cabinet. In a letter to his most intimate
colleague, J.H. Thomas, MacDonald asserted ths.t their Tory
colleagues were "steadily pushing us into a Conservative corner
and keeping us there, until our influence and reputation have
both gone and we can neither escape with effect nor remain there
2
with honour."
whatever the reasons, and certainly the awareness of
Dominion hostility towards Britain's import policy impressed
upon him particularly by communications from the various govern¬
ments and G-overnor-iGbnerals was a major factor,"^ MacDonald
decided to take the initiative on the whole question of the
future development of British agriculture and the implications
for foreign and imperial trade- On 14 June^he reouested the
RM to SB 8 April 1934- Baldwin Papers vol 169-
2
RM to JHT 24 May 1934- J.H. Thomas Papers C-108.
^
See eg. Bledisloe to RM 16 April 1934- Baldwin Papers vol 98.
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Committee of Economic Information, technically a sub-committee
of the Economic Advisory Council but in reality its successor
as the National Government's 'think tank', to examine the nuestion
of the coordination of industrial and agricultural considerations
in the formulation of trade policy. It must be noted that
MacDonald made this request just two days after the crucial
seventh meeting of the Produce Markets Supply Committee which,
apart from endorsing in principle Elliot's levy-subsidy proposals,
had highlighted the difference between him and some of his
colleagues, notably Thomas, in their vision of the future state
of home agriculture. After an initial meeting on 19 June at
which they agreed to the Prime Minister's reciuest, the Members
of the C.E.I, prepared memoranda for consideration at the next
meeting held on 10 July."'"
The Cabinet were informed of the Prime Minister's request
and the consequent beginning of the C.E.I.'s deliberations on
the coordination of trade policy only at their meeting of 25 July.
The subject was on the agenda to allow discussion of yet another
Thomas-written entreaty pressing for the crystallization of the
Government's plans for the expansion of home production and the
coordination of the interests of agriculture and the exporting
2
industries. Unfortunately^, such was the reticence of the
minute-taker on this occasion that the reaction of the individual
^
EAC (El) 35th meeting 19th June 193k & 36th meeting 10 July
193k: Cab.58/l7» Members were Sir Josiah Stamp, G-.D.H.
Cole, J.M. Keynes, Sir Alfred Lewis, Sir Arthur Salter,
H.D. Henderson and Sir F-W. Leith-Ross.
2
JHT memo. CP 199 (3k) of 20 July 193k in Cab.2k/250.
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Cabinet members is not recorded. One must suppose, however,
that Elliot must have felt somewhat aggrieved that such an
investigated had been initiated by the Prime Minister. It seems
likely that he demanded to be authorised to make personal repre¬
sentations to the C.E.I, for one of the Cabinet's conclusions
on this issue was that he should contact Stamp, the Chairman,
and discuss certain points like the implications of the changes
in the pattern of food consumption. At the same time^it was
agreed that Runciman should ask Stamp to report the C.E.I.'s
findings by the end of September and that an Inter-Departmental
Committee of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Sir Horace Wilson and
representatives from the Dominion Office and the Ministry of
'Vgriculture be established to examine the C.E.I. Report and
submit its comment in October."*"
The summer of 1934 can be seen as the turning point in
Elliot's tenure of the Ministry of 'Vgriculture. The setting in
motion of an investigation which would result in the establish¬
ment of limits within which the development of home production
*
could be consistent with trade considerations ended any prospect
of Elliot presiding over a significant expansion of British
agriculture. His political star was still shining brightly but
there had been set in motion a development that would lead to a
definite contraction of the limits within which he had developed
and presented his policies. This unfortunately was to affect
his own prospects in a similar way that Labour difficulties
1
Cab.30 (34) of 25 July 1934-
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hindered the advancement of his closest colleague, Oliver Stanley.
The 1933/1934 parliamentary session had been a historic one for
British agriculture, particularly the Milk and Cattle Industry
Acts, but the report of the C.E.I, was to severely restrict the
future scope and influence of the Minister who had been responr-




Elliot and Agricultural Policy Making 1934-1936
In the autumn of 1934, Elliot's major preoccupation was
keeping a close watch on the operation and effect of the cattle
subsidy. He submitted a progress report to the Cabinet a month
after the start of the deficiency payments. Administrative
arrangements were working well. Prices had in fact fallen since
the first week in September but this was to be expected due to
an increase in Dominion supplies. Elliot predicted that a
further drop in prices would occur as more home cattle were put
on the market but he was not too unhappy with the situation as
a whole. He expected prices to weaken even further as a result
of still heavier marketings of cattle in the near future but
providing that imports were reasonably regulated, the general
outlook was not unsatisfactory."'"
Some of Elliot's Cabinet colleagues, however, were surprised
at Elliot's optimism. They argued that the subsidy had failed to
achieve its main purpose, that was to raise the price the home
beef producer received to a reasonable level. They were
disturbed by the fact that the wholesale price had dropped by
3/- since the deficiency payments began. Elliot insisted, however,
that the outlook was fairly bright so long as foreign supplies
were adequately regulated and reminded his critics that the
question of a minimum price had been considered and rejected
by the Cabinet in the summer. It was quite unreasonable to
1
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expect a rise in beef prices in a situation where total supplies
had greatly increased since last year. The discussions with
the Dominions had had to be suspended during the General
Election in Australia but were soon to be re-convened. 'Every¬
thing, asserted Elliot, rested on whether the Government could
successfully negotiate a long-term beef import programme."
The state of the livestock industry was further discussed
by the Produce Markets Supply Committee on 7 October. Elliot
submitted two memoranda, one on bacon cand the other on meat.
In the first, he reminded his colleagues that the quota schemes
were due to finish at the end of the year and proposed that for
1935 a maximum cut of 12-$> should be made on foreign imports to
compensate for the expected incre se in home *,nd Dominion
supplies. Since this proposal was consistent with the Lane-
pox recommendations, foreign nations should expect and accept
2
it. With Runciman having already reluctantly agreed, the
Committee gave its approval. In the second memorandum,
Elliot reminded his colleagues of the levy-subsidy proposals put
to the Dominions and the Argentine in July and the unfavourable
reaction they received. He declared that a decision had to be
taken on the meat import programme for January-March 1935 and
appended proposals involving considerable reductions. He also
submitted an inter-departmental report which was extremely
pessimistic that the Dominions could be persuaded to accept a
levy plus moderate quantitative regulation. At the same time,
1
Cab. 34 (34) of 10 October 1934.
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WE memo. PMS (33) 24 of 12 October 1934-
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however, it stressed that to implement the alternative policy
of drastic restriction would almost certainly have grave con-
1
sequences and provoke retaliation.
In the discussion that followed^Chamberlain expressed
anxiety that the policy of raising prices and providing by means
of a levy a fund out of which the Exchenuer could be repaid was
not meeting with much success and he saw little prospect at
present of either aspect working out. The alternative policy
of drastic cuts in supplies^hovrever, seemed rather extreme.
Elliot responded by saying that if the Dominions insisted on
rejecting the levy-subsidy proposals then the only option for
the Government was extensive import reductions unless the whole
idea of trying to regulate the meat market was relinquished.
He felt that Britain's negotiating stance would be strengthened
if it was stressed that in the absence of agreement on a levy,
the alternative policy would indeed be imposed. Sir Geoffrey
'Yhiskard, representing J.H. Thomas, agreed but in addition
agreed with Chamberlain that the Dominions should be given full
details of Britain's estimated future meat requirements and the
supplies that would be available. Elliot on the other hand
preferred to proceed step by step, quarter by quarter in the
belief that the Government's negotiating position would be
weakened if it conveyed in advance a comprehensive picture of
the policy to be followed should the levy-subsidy proposals be
rejected. His suggestion of holding a meeting with the Dominions
in the next few days to inform them of the proposed import
WE memo. PMS (33) 25 of 11 October 195^4--
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programme for Jaruary-March 1935 was agreed to by the Committee.
"Elliot's agricultural policy principles were discussed
during the Debate on the "ddress towards the end of November.
Harold Macmillan expressed the sentiments of the young radical
Tory M.P.s when he declared that the National Government was
dominated by defeatist elements with certain exceptions one of
whom was Elliot. The errors were there but so too was the
action and energy giving Britain an active and energetic
agricultural policy. If Elliot's colleagues with responsibility
for the various industries took similar gambles, then their
endeavours would be rewarded by support such as that awarded to
the Minister of Agriculture and their mistakes would likewise
be forgiven.2
If progressive Conservatives were full of praise for
Elliot's pursuit of State capitalism, the opposite view was taken
by the Liberal Party who were alarmed at what they saw as
increasing state encroachment on liberties. Dingle Foot asked
the House to condemn the Tory Socialism created by Elliot and
some other Ministers, asserting that it combined uncontrolled
authority in the political Sphere with regimentation in the
economic sphere." Herbert Holdsworth claimed that the Govern¬
ment had in three years done more towards creating a Socialist
state than Labour would have achieved in a generation.^
Addison, back in Parliament having won the Swindon by-election of
PMS (33) 11th meeting, 17 October 1934.
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25 October followed the usual Labour line of exempting Elliot
from criticism of the G-overnment as a whole. It was, he
asserted, quite impossible for the Minister of Agriculture to
develop a consistent agricultural policy in view of the various
trade commitments undertaken by Runciman. Addison reiterated
Labour's belief that Elliot genuinely 'anted to help the home
farmer but was hampered by restrictions put on him by the rest of
his colleagues."''
Elliot expressed dismay at the Liberal attitude, asserting
that he had made every effort to take agriculture out of the arena
of party politics.
"I have taken action which, no doubt, has
caused misgivings in the minds of many Con¬
servative supporters. I have gone outside
the bounds of party politics in some of my
actions, and X have done so with the
deliberate desire and intention to associate
all sections of the people in a constructive
policy." ""
He accepted that his marketing boards could be criticised but
stressed their inevitable trial and error nature and emphasised
that their principles of cooperation and ordered marketing had
been accepted by all three major parties. The G-overnment, he
declared, had endeavoured to secure continuity in and consensus
on agricultural policy.
Elliot's only other parliamentary action before the Christmas
recess was to introduce the Potato (import Regulation) Order
1934 to supersede the previously voluntary regulation. In
Cabinet, however, Elliot's departmental concerns figured high on
1
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the agenda. One very important issue was the plight of the
herring industry on whose behalf Boothby made a passionate plea
during the Debate on the Address. The Cabinet considered the
main recommendation of the Duncan Report produced by the Sea
Fish Commission that a Herring Board should be established to
reorganise the industry. The appropriate Ministers - Rlliot,
Collins and Gilmour - were authorised to prepare legislation."*"
Any hopes that a bill might quickly be introduced, however, were
dashed by Chamberlain's hostility to the first draft. He
objected most strongly to certain powers being given to the
Herring Board by the Government since that would put the entire
responsibility for unpopular proposals on the latter. Instead,
he advocated the Board being established with the power to draw
up for itself a list of controls it thought necessary to have
and submit such a scheme for the approval of the herring industry.
The majority of the Cabinet accepted Chamberlain's thesis and
ordered that the bill be redrafted. As a result, it was not
2
introduced until February 1935*
At this time, the Cabinet was involved in secret negotiations
with the Irish Free State in the hope of reaching a coal-cattle
agreement to normalise these aspects of trade between the two
countries. The proposed treaty fas referred to the Irish
3
Situation Cabinet Committee for consideration. Rlliot had
previously attended meetings of this committee in the capacity of
1
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Financial Secretary^particularly in July 1932 when it had met
frequently to discuss the disputed land amuities. -\s
Minister of \griculture, he was not at this time a member but
was called to attend the two meetings which dealt with a proposed
pact which would inevitably have implications for British agri¬
culture.
Klliot's attitude to the proposed agreement was hostile from
the outset on the basis that any concession would have cata¬
strophic repercussions on the British meat market. He expressed
this opinion forcefully at the first meeting on 29 November."''
He declared that the present restrictions placed on the Irish
Free State only balanced the plethora of supplies from other
Dominions. He reminded the Committee that he was engaged at
that time in trying to negotiate a reduction in the excessive
Dominion exports which would in turn enable the Government to
impose a further cut on foreign supplies. He asserted his
willingness, however, to agree to an increase in supplies from
the Irish Free State if a corresponding reduction could be made
in imports from elsewhere. Sir John Gilmour, Fillet*s
predecessor at the Ministry of ".griculture, lent his full support
saying that until Ottawa, the Industry had received too little
attention. Runciman, as one might e-qpect, did not share this
view - he opined that the general feeling was that agriculture
had done quite well as far as Government attention was concerned.
Thomas, who as Dominions Secretary was the Minister handling
the negotiations, stressed the need for an urgent decision.
ISC (32) 21st meeting 29 November 19 3^*
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The drastic cuts imposed against the Irish Free State had only-
been possible because of the political dispute - if the two
countries were in the position of negotiating political peace
then there was no <-ray that the special cattle penalisation could
be maintained. Tith Inskip wondering whether the beef position
was not so grave that an increase in supplies from the Irish
Free State would have little effect, and with Runciman going on
about the sanctity of the coal trade which it seemed was threatened
by the possibility of the Irish Free State reaching an agreement
with Germany or another foreign country , Flliot was faced with a
difficult task in trying to convince the Committee. He stressed
that the total collapse of the market had only been averted by
the short-term measures taken, namely the deficiency payments
and the reductions that had been made wherever possible, but even
so survival had still rested on the fact that the Government was
free to impose drastic reductions against the Irish Free State.
He accepted, however, Thomas's point that in the eventuality of
political peace, other arrangements would have to be made and
reductions imposed on other sources. On this theme, Runciman
declared his preference for a cut against Brazil rather than
against the Irish Free State to which Flliot responded by
repeating that he would not oppose restoring cuts against the
latter provided that an equivalent quantitative reduction could
be made against Brazil or another supplier since such an
alteration would not affect the total volume of supplies on the
market.
Chamberlain suggested that it might be possible to arrive
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at soma immediate 'Agreement whereby the cuts would be partially
restored after the end of March 1935 by which time arrangements
could be made regarding the supplies from the other Dominions
and foreign countries. Elliot insisted that either way the
home producers had to know where they stood and if sry increase
in Irish supplies was to be announced then at the same time the
Government must pledge either to impose general cuts after the
expiry of the subsidy or to extend the period of the deficiency
payment itself. Elliot was not too concerned about the prospect
of the Irish Free State concluding a coal-cattle pact with
Germany or Poland instead. He remained convinced that Britain
was the only possible market for Irish cattle. The meeting
ended with the Committee agreeing to Thomas's suggestion that he
should see the Irish High Commissioner and convey British interest
in an informal coal-cattle arrangement.
At the second meeting attended only by Thomas, Inskip,
Gilmour and Tlliot it was agreed that Clliot should discuss the
Irish proposal to increase supplies to a level one third less than
that of 1933. F.lliot pointed out that a ry pact agreed could not
be kept secret and insisted that when it was announced^a state¬
ment on other aspects must be made at the same time to allay
the apprehensions of the home producer."'' In the event, an
agreement was reached on 21 December and made public some weeks
later. The fat cattle quota for 1935 was increased as per the
Irish proposals to 66 /3^ of the 1933 level while store cattle
exports were to be kept to the 1930-1932 level. In both cases,
ISC (32) 22nd meeting, 12 December 1934-
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the new limits represented considerable increases on those
imposed the previous year.
On the same day as the second meeting of the Irish Situation
Committee, the Cabinet had before it at last the Report by the
Committee of Economic Information on the coordination of trade
and agricultural policy together - ith the comments of the inter¬
departmental committee. The Committee of Economic Information
had been asked to report in general terms and not to make a
detailed policy investigation. This had not,however.led its
members to be very amenable to curious Cabinet Ministers who
communicated with the Committee after its latest mission became
known. Elliot had gone as far as requesting an informal dis¬
cussion with the Chairman, Sir Josiah Stamp. This was agreed to
on 19 September but at the same meeting the Committee decided
to keep its own counsel and not to circulate papers outwith
its members.^" Stamp did not see Elliot for more than five
weeks during vfhich time the C.E.I, met on three occasions to
revise their draft Report. Indeed^the meeting with Elliot was
not held until 23 October, the very day the Committee approved
the final draft. This would suggest that Stamp purposely
delayed talking to the Minister of Agriculture until the Committee
had ended its deliberations. The inter-departmental committee
chaired by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the Chi f Economic Adviser
to the Government who also acted as Secretary to the C.E.I.,
^
EAC (El) 3&th meeting, 19 September 193k.
For a full account of the deliberations of the C.E.I, see John
Eyerst 'Government direction of overseas trade policy in Britain
1932-7' D-Phil. Thesis Oxford 1977* I am indebted to John
Eyers for letting me read some chapters in their draft stage.
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was convened to study and comment on the Stamp Report. It had
taken six weeks to submit its comments along with the Stamp
Report itself to the Cabinet which in turn referred the matter
to the Produce Markets Supply Committee.
The principal conclusions of the Report by the Committee of
■economic Information can be summarised briefly. The British
market could not continue to expand as it had done in previous
decades due to the considerable decrease in the birthrate. At
the same time^although prospects for Britain's export trade were
not encouraging, the nation had coped quite well with large scale
losses to the point that it had to be considered whether redevelop¬
ment to previous levels was altogether necessary. The Stamp
Committee felt that it would be unwise to put the considerations
of the export trade before all others and that Britain could be
prosperous with a smaller volume than that of the pre-war period.
The ejqport trade was however extremely vital to prosperity and
the committee was concerned that it would together with the standard
of living be adversely affected by a policy of progressive agri¬
cultural import reduction. The Report supported the policy of
assisting the home producers through the price depression. On
the ouestion of home agricultural development, however, the
Committee's feelings against import cuts and its recognition of
the importance of the population stagnation led it to assert
that expansion should only be very limited and only in particular
branches of the industry, namely fruit, milk, eggs, poultry and
vegetables. Pinally)the Report preferred a levy-subsidy policy
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to that of quantitative regulation.
Although the Inter-Departmental Committee chaired by Sir
Frederick Leith-Ross had spent six weeks considering the C.F.I.
Report, little documentary evidence of its proceedings survives
apart from its final comments incorporated in the report signed
on 3 December. Its conclusions endorsed and expanded on those
of the Stamp Committee. It fully agreed with the C.E.I,
attitude on the question of agricultural development. As far as
the need to maintain the home producers in times of hardship
was concerned, the Leith-Ross Committee asserted that aqy action
to assist them should raise consumer prices as little as possible
and should be so formulated as to promote maximum efficiency in
home production and marketing. One of the most important pro¬
nouncements of the Committee was that a policy of direct subsidies
was preferable to that of quotas. If practicable, of course
subsidies should be financed by import levies but even if the
Exchequer had to fund them, they were still to be recommended
over import restriction. This was indeed a crucial statement
on a fundamental principle. The Report went on to suggest that
the Government might find it necessary to offer concessions, in
the form of assurances that quotas would not be imposed,in order
to secure agreement to its levy-subsidy proposals. Finally it
2
recommended that the bacon scheme be reviewed.
The Leith-Ross committee's main recommendations foreshadowed
1
13th Report of the CEI 23 Oct. 1934- CP 284 (34) in
Cab.24/251.
2
IDC Report 3 December 3934. CP 272 (34).
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later events. The White Paper of March 1933 implied that
significant home agricultural expansion was not a viable
proposition. At the same time, the Government held out the
prospect of a levy-policy without the accompaniment of
quantitative restriction. At a later stage, the Government had
to think in terms of a quasi-permanent direct subsidy in the
absence of an adequate levy to finance deficiency payments to
home producers. The two Reports did not lead to policy decisions
at Ministerial level for although they sparked off lengthy
argument in the produce Markets Supply Committee, it was incon¬
clusive and ultimately overtaken by the need to take decisions
on immediate problems and negotiating strategies. The reports,
nevertheless, signified a contraction in the scope and potential
influence of the Minister of Agriculture anl seem to have encouraged
other Ministers to intervene more forcibly in the departmental
concerns of their hitherto irrepressible colleague.
Rlliot certainly argued against some sections of the reports
at the last two P.M.S.C. meetings of 193k- His Permanent
Secretary, Sir Charles Howell-Thomas,had sat on the Leith-Ross
committee and had succeeded in modifying the conclusions against
any significant expansion in home agricultural production and
qualifying its criticisms of the policy of protection. Neverthe¬
less, the Minister of Agriculture was clearly unhappy with some
of the conclusions. At the meeting of 17 December,he asserted
his general agreement with the inter-departmental report but his
further comments left no doubt that he disapproved of its verdict
on agricultural development. He endorsed the view that the
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emphasis for the time being should be on maintaining the present
population on the land but he believed there was scope for sane
expansion in meat and bacon production in the next few years.
Chamberlain observed that the Leith-Ross committee preferred
to contemplate the perpetuation of the deficiency payments rather
than drastic quantitative regulation in the event of the Dominions
rejecting the levy proposals. From the point of view not only
of the Treasury but of political and commercial interests, he
felt that the continuation of the subsidy was indeed the lesser
of two evils until such time as the Government was freed from
its Anglo-Argentine treaty commitments in November 1936.
Chamberlain did^however lay down two conditions: first that a
decision on the limits of future home production should be taken;
secondly that having been done, the Argentine and the Dominions
should be told that since Britain could not introduce her long-
term policy till 1936, she must continue to protect the interests
of her home producers. In addition, Britain should inform these
trading partners that as soon as freedom of action was restored,
steps would be taken to limit home production while at the same
time an import levy with Dominion preference would be imposed.
Thomas declared his surprise at the Chancellor's generosity.
He felt,however, that to convey that Britain intended to continue
the beef subsidy would weaken her negotiating position and
declared he would not give in to what amounted to Dominion black¬
mail — Australia had sent a hostile telegram practically defying
Britain to do her worst. Ormsby-Gore agreed with Elliot that
Britain should make it abundantly clear to the Dominions that
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Britain had the weapon of strict quantitative regulation in
reserve and that this should he stressed to the High
Commissioners when they met the following day. Pending this
meeting, the Produce Markets Supply Committee adjourned.
At the last meeting of the Dominion Representatives, it had
been agreed to maintain the supply situation until the end of
March while discussions concerning long-term policy were in
2
progress. Elliot and Thomas had therefore been stunned to
receive a very unfriendly communication from the Australian
Government to the effect that it was unwilling to limit meat
exports along the lines of Elliot's quarterly shipment programmes
and furthermore that it would not participate in discussions based
on the implementation of the principle of restriction. The
telegram went on to remind Britain of the pledge made at Ottawa
to give her Dominions a continually expanding share of the
market. It was in response to this communication that the
meeting of 18 December was convened. Elliot underlined the
difficulty with which the market was being held. The extra
Australian beef might not be much in ouantity but it would upset
the agreement made in October. Elliot was however particularly
disturbed at the uncooperative attitude as expressed in the tele¬
gram. He asserted that the Government must not fail in its
duty towards the home producers and those Dominions who had
agreed to the shipment programmes. Moreover, he insisted that
the principle of a regulated market had to be accepted not just
1
PMS (33) 12th meeting, 17 December 1934-
^ T3 /R/16 5th meeting, 30 October 193^«
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for the following quarter but in the longer-term. After the
meetingtthe Government replied to Australia that she must be
bound by the programme and that an Order would be imposed if
necessary. In the event,the Commonwealth Government acquiesced.
The Produce Markets Supply Committee met again later on
the same day to continue its deliberations on the Leith-Ross
Report and Rlliot's memo which favoured some expansion in home
agriculture. The bacon industry was given particular attention:
the inter-departmental committee recommended that the bacon
scheme be subject to a complete review clearly indicating its
dissatisfaction with the present quota policy. Rlliot told
his colleagues that grievances had occurred as regulation had
evened out the pig cycle but at a higher retail price than had
applied previously. He asserted his willingness to agree to
the appointment of a Cabinet Committee chaired by a colleague
with no direct responsibility for trade or agriculture. In
response to Runciman*s point that the potential clash between
home producers and overseas suppliers was creating problems as
far as reaching agreements was concerned, Rlliot insisted that
the Government must take future domestic bacon expansion into
account when negotiating the apportionments of the bacon market.
Runciman then declared his preference for a levy-subsidy policy
rather than that of quotas. As he had asserted at the
previous meeting, he had concluded after three years1 experience
that protectionist duties were a more effective remedy with
^ TS/r/16 6th meeting 18 December 193^- Australian telegram
is annexed to the minutes.
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less commercial repercussions than quantitative regulation.
Rlliot* s attitude was that whatever the main policy method,
market regulation must be continued in all cases. He was
opposed to the idea of sudden policy changes, for instance a
swift repeal of the whole bacon scheme. He was however
amenable to looking closely with Runciman at the effect of an
orderly policy change from the quota method to that of an import
levy. The President of the Board of Trade desired in addition
to examine the effects the plans for home expansion put forward
in Riixot's memo would have on commerce and trade. The Com¬
mittee agreed that the Minister of Agriculture should prepare
another memorandum after discussions with the President of the
Board of Trade on a formula for switching import policy to that
of import levies with special consideration being given to
three propositions: to what extent would it be feasible and
expedient to apply the levy-subsidy policy to the various
sections of British agriculture; to what degree was it considered
desirable to expand the home production of each agricultural
commodity; and what measures should be taken in the short-term,
in other words in the period before the enactment of the levy-
subsidy policy."''
Elliot drew up a memorandum on two of the three issues for
discussion at the next meeting eardy in 1935- He had been
unable as directed to consult with Runciman and thus the opinion
he expressed was his own. The main consideration was the
potential application of the levy-subsidy principle: in oats
1
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and potatoes, he recommended no change in the present arrange¬
ments; bacon presented a complex situation and he suggested a
sub-committee examine it; the decision on eggs and poultry
should be deferred pending discussions with the Dominions —
although Britain would be free to impose a levy against them in
August, the condition of imperial preference and foreign trade
agreements meant that such action was not possible until 1936;
and finally on the question of meat and. dairy produce, the levy-
subsidy principle should be applied as soon as treaty commit¬
ments permitted it. Elliot was convinced that no long-term
meat policy could be developed before the arrival of the Dominion
Prime Ministers in April. Accordingly, he proposed the short-
term measure of extending the beef subsidy to home producers
from 31 March 1935 until the expiry of the Anglo-Argentine treaty
in November 1936. At the same time,, he asked for authority
for Thomas, Runciman and himself to negotiate a further short-
term programme regulating meat imports.
The Produce Markets Supply Committee accepted Elliot's
recommendation on bacon and appointed a sub-committee chaired by
Lord Halifax with Elliot, G-ilmour and representatives from the
Treasury, the Foreign and Dominion Offices, and the Board of
2
Trade. Runciman and Elliot were left to work out the terms of
reference. On the ouestion of the beef subsidy, Thomas pointed
out that the Dominions had been told that it would cease in
1
WE memo. PMS (33) 29.
2
Proceedings of PMS Sub-committee on Pigs & Bacon are in
Cab.27/561.
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March and asserted that if an extension until the end of 1936
was announced, then it would be concluded that the Government
had been bluffing and pressure would begin to mount from both
the Dominions and the home producers for permanent deficiency
payments. He felt that Britain should adhere to her levy or
drastic quantitative regulation line of negotiations. Elliot
disagreed with the argument that an extension would encourage the
Dominions to hold out against an agreement as the time was
nearing when Britain would be free to act as she pleased. He
suggested that the Government might make only short-term orders
to extend the subsidy, perhaps three months at a time. Elliot
stressed the immediacy of the issue - with the present provision
due to expire on 31 March, parliament was bound to enquire as
to the future.
Thomas remained concerned that an early announcement of an
extension would make the Dominions even more resolute and recom¬
mended that before any such statement was made, they should
again be warned that if the levy proposals were not accepted
then drastic quantitative regulation would be imposed. The
Committee agreed that he and Elliot should hold an immediate
meeting with the Dominion High Commissioners for this purpose.
It was anticipated that Australia might ask that negotiations be
deferred pending the arrival of her Prime Minister. The
Committee agreed that it should be made clear that the responsibility
was hers and that it would in no way prejudice Britain's attitude
concerning action taken thereafter. It agreed that levy-subsidy
talks should be opened with the Argentine. Any decision
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regarding the question of the subsidy extension was however
postponed.
Elliot, Thomas and G-ilmour saw the Dominion High Commissioners
on 22 January. The meeting considered the Australian Premier's
request that further discussion on long-term policy be postponed
until he reached Britain at the end of March. This would mean
that there would be no time to evolve a policy before the expiry
of the present subsidy. Elliot stressed that Britain could not
sit back and do nothing since prices were 5/- below summer 1934
level and thus the subsidy to home producers was completely
negated. Elliot put forward the alternatives of a temporary
levy or severe regulation. The High Commissioners objected to
both and suggested an extension of the subsidy. Thomas pointed
out that such a plan would involve going cap in hand to the
Chancellor and reporting that despite assurances the subsidy had
to be continued. He asserted that weighty political and
financial objections could be raised. However, the Dominion
Secretary accepted that an extension offered the best short-term
solution and agreed to recommend it and the expeditious opening
2
of long-term negotiations to the Cabinet.
On the following day, an account of the meeting appeared
in The Times.^ This evident leak was discussed by the Cabinet
when it received an oral report on the proceedings from Elliot.
It approved in principle the subsidy extension but deferred any
1
PMS (33) 14th meeting, 16 January 1935.
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decision as to its duration pending the consideration of the
P.M.S.C."'" Thomas submitted a memo on the talks with the High
Commissioners for consideration at the Committee1s next meeting
on 28 January. He expressed the view held by himself and his
colleagues present at the discussions that an extension of the
subsidy would facilitate long-term policy negotiations whereas
enactment of however temporary drastic restrictions in default of
an immediate agreement to the levy-subsidy proposal would not.
Thomas seemed to have changed his position somewhat from the
previous P.M.S.C. meeting. He recommended that any policy
statement should give confidence to the home producers but refrain
from committing the Exchequer to more than a short-term extension
of the subsidy. He warned the Committee that while it was
imperative not to give the Dominions any inkling that the subsidy
would be extended again, it might be expedient as previously
suggested by Elliot to provide in the necessary legislation for
2
the possibility of extensions by Order until the end of 1936.
In Committee, Thomas put forward the view that the policy
for the next eighteen months had to be considered first and then
that of the post-expiry period. Chamberlain came out in favour
of lifting all restrictions in return for acceptance of a levy-
subsidy. Elliot pointed out that the increased supplies would
result in a price collapse thus necessitating a very high levy-
subsidy. He expressed doubts that the policy negotiations
would result in agreement before the expiry of Britain* s
1
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commitments and reminded Chamberlain that under the Ottawa
U.K.-Australia agreement, Britain had pledged to restrict
Argentinian meat for five years. As for the demand for clarifi¬
cation of Britain's long-term policy intentions, Elliot asserted
that it was self-evident that for the moment they were governed
by Ottawa and as for the future, it was outlined in the White
Paper of 1934. He pointed out that the Dominions were in a
very strong position knowing Britain was against the idea of
imposing drastic cuts.
Lord Hailsham defined the four alternative courses of action
for the next eighteen months: Exchequer subsidy, drastic quanti¬
tative regulation, and levy-subsidy with or without a measure of
quantitative control. Baldwin declared that the continuation
of the subsidy for the next eighteen months could be ruled out
at once. Elliot however tried to inject some realism into the
discussion by saying that since the Cabinet was averse to
resorting to drastic restriction and that the Dominions believed
any such threat was mere bluff, it was not possible to rule
out the possibility of having to continue the subsidy.
Chamberlain spoke out against the idea of not limiting the
period of subsidy and providing for its extension by Order.
Instead he suggested it should be prolonged for three months^
with the provision for a further extension only of another three.
In response to Elliot's objection on grounds of parliamentary
inconvenience and the uncertainty such short extensions would
cause to home producers, Chamberlain asserted that such a
procedure would help maintain pressure on the Dominions to come
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to an agreement. The Committee accepted Chamberlain's proposal
and agreed to recommend it to the Cabinet- It asked the inter¬
departmental committee chaired by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross to
work out a detailed scheme based on the application of a levy-
subsidy without quantitative regulation. It should consider the
rate of the levy and imperial preference, whether it should be
applied solely to beef or to other meats too, how the incidence
of the levy should be arranged, which method of subsidy distri¬
bution to home producers should be employed, and the question of
the limitation of home production and how it could be regulated.
Finally,Elliot was asked to draw up a memorandum showing the
quotas that would be necessary if the market had to be controlled
by quantitative regulation alone.
The Cabinet approved its Committee's recommendation that the
subsidy be extended for an initial period of three months with
provision being made to extend it by order if necessary for
2
another three. Elliot announced the decision in the Commons,
telling the House that negotiations with the Dominions were still
in progress but there were difficulties and the G-overnment
recognising them had decided that the period for discussion
should be extended. He hoped that agreement could be reached
within the first three month period but, if not, then the
provision for extension could be invoked subject to the approval
of Parliament.3 The Cabinet, then, outwardly still expressed
*
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confidence that the negotiations would end in agreement.
Privately, however, they were hy now extremely pessimistic and
despite Baldwin's statement about an eighteen-month subsidy, it
began to look inevitable given the aversion to importing drastic
quantitative regulation.
On the question of the future development of home production,
consideration of the issue had been overtaken by the need to make
immediate decisions on the short-term policy after 31 March.
Early in January, Runciman had drawn up a memo based on the
argument that expansion of home agriculture would have a detri¬
mental effect on Britain's export trade and increase, not lessen,
unemployment."'" Elliot's memorandum in response represented his
last effort to reverse the move of his colleagues towards tacit
acceptance of the arguments against ary significant expansion.
It was strangely lacking in substance and badly drafted. It
may be, as has been suggested, that Elliot composed it himself
2
in haste. He put forward the rather pointless assertion that
if the arguments based on the sanctity of the export trade and
the higher proportionate rate of employment offered by other
industries were taken to their full meaning, then the contraction
of home agriculture would be a desirable objective. For those
already in agricultural production, stabilisation might be
acceptable although difficult to organize. Politically, however,
1
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John Eyers asserts that this memo "effectively left all the
eloquence and weight, and indeed most of the appearance of
logic and evidence" with the arguments of the Board of Trade,
IDC and CEI.
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a 'standstill' declaration would be extremely unpopular especially
in the light of previous statements favouring more land settle¬
ment.
"The intimation that nobody should, even if
only for the present, escape from the dole
into new agricultural production, for the
purpose of making a living, would be a
statement repugnant to the present opinion
of the country. Furthermore this
statement, once accepted, would^go far to
break the heart of the nation."
Neither Runciman's memo nor Hlliot's response were discussed
by the Committee. The same fate befell the written views of
Sir John Simon which took the form of a memo to Baldwin which
was subsequently circulated to the P.M.S.C. on 18 January.
Basically, Simon seconded Runciman's arguments against the
expansion of home production. The Foreign Secretary, however,
had much more to say on the question of a levy-subsidy vis-a-vis
Quantitative regulation. He looked upon the effect of the bacon
quota "with growing apprehension" on the grounds that regular
reductions in imports as prescribed in the Lane-Fox Report would
have worrying political and economic consenuences. As for meat,
substantial reductions had been accepted "with remarkable meek¬
ness" by South American countries hut there were increasing
complaints about the rapid expansion of Dominion chilled beef
supplies, the mainstay of the Argentinian meat export trade with
Britain.
Simon appealed to his colleagues to abandon quota control
forthwith lest the difficulties it was creating in foreign
1
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relations developed into real dangers. He stressed that
economic orientation might be a vital factor in the event of war —
the areas most affected by Britain's quantitative regulation
were Scandinavia, the Baltic and South America. The alternative
of a levy might be unpopular but preferable since "a duty can
be consolidated, and even if the rate be high, it does not
inflict the uncertainty and the insecurity of quantitative
regulation." Moreover, it would have the great advantage of
not causing constant complaint and grievance from foreign govern¬
ments, some of whom would be our natural allies in time of
unrest.
"If our quota restrictions represented a vital
interest for us, the difficulties they create
would have to be faced; but if, as the
Economic Advisory Council Committee suggest,
our domestic interests can be safeguarded by
other methods, I should most strongly urge
my colleagues to elaborate such alternative
methods and put them into force at the
earliest possible moment. Fach week that
passes gives rise to fresh complaints against
our quota policy and engenders in foreign
countries, with whom we want to maintain the
closest ties, widespread suspicion and
resentment, which it may welj take years of
diplomatic effort to allay."
The Foreign Office had from the outset, from the first meeting
of the P.M.S.C. in December 1933» preferred the levy-subsidy
alternative on political grounds. Simon's memo served to
emphasise and crystallize this view.
The P.M.S.C.'s discussion of the fundamental auestion of the
coordination of agricultural and trade considerations came to no
JS to SB 9 January 1935, Baldwin Papers vol 33.
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conclusion but simply tailed off as more immediate practical
questions demanded total attention, in particular the move from
quota control to levy-subsidy- " series of assumptions based
on the arguments put forward by the and I.D.C. had
however embedded themselves into National Government thinking
despite the strong objections and counter-arguments of Elliot
and his Ministry. These were that there was no scope for a rise
in food consumption, that any significant expansion of home
production would require an equivalent contraction in imports,
and that such reductions would lead to corresponding cuts in
British exports. These then were the underlying assumptions of
agricultural policy for the rest of the decade. The Government
did not announce its decision against expansion: it simply
stopped making noises in favour of agricultural development, and
incorporated in measures of assistance provisions for limitation.
The P.M.S.C.'s most immediate task, having dealt for the
time being with the auestion of extending the subsidy, was to
determine to what extent the levy-subsidy policy should be applied,
and whether it should be accompanied by a degree of quantitative
regulation, aid what strategy should be employed in negotiations
with the Dominions. At the meeting of 4 February, it had for
consideration the requested memos from the Inter-departmental
Committee and glliot. The former had been asked to work out a
scheme based on the levy-subsidy principle without import
restriction. Instead, however, it had produced what was
basically merely an aidje^ memoire for communication to the Dominions,
setting out the considerations of the home producer, Dominion
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development, and foreign trade and restating the alternatives of a
levy-subsidy or drastic quantitative regulation."^ For his part,
Elliot considered the extent to which cuts would have to be made
if the market was to be controlled by regulation alone. It
would reouire the stabilisation of Dominion mutton and lamb
supplies and the reduction of beef exports at least to the Ottawa
year level or quite possibly further. In the event of the latter,
Britain would then be able, by virtue of a proviso in the Anglo-
Argentine agreement, to make another reduction in Argentinian
supplies. Elliot came out strongly in favour of adopting a
policy of levy-subsidy with some measure of regulation. He felt
that the Dominions would not accept a straight levy plan on the
basis that they would lose out in competition with the Argentine
and relinquish their expanding share of the market Ottawa
recognition. Even to secure agreement on a scheme incorporating
some regulation would be difficult but a fall in prices was not
in Dominion or Argentinian interests. The knowledge that Britain
would soon be free to act at will just might encourage them to
accept. 2
Chamberlain, however, was firmly in favour of abandoning
quantitative regulation altogether and was supported by Runciman.
Halifax, again taking Elliot* s side, pointed out that an earmarked
tariff might not give sufficient assistance to the home producer.
Runciman disagreed, asserting that a Id levy on beef and veal
1
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looked enough. Elliot eventually agreed that the Committee
recommend that a levy*-subsidy without quantitative regulation
should be the ultimate policy objective but -that the Government
should not commit itself to any specific levy or subsidy figure.
Halifax repeated his objection to a commitment to abolish
quantitative regulation, unless it was certain that the levy-
subsidy would afford the home producer adeouate help. He felt
that the adoption of the proposed policy was somewhat academic,
given that it was practically impossible to predict what the
situation would be in 18 months' time. Chamberlain, however,
dismissed the argument of the President of the Board of Education
on the basis that the Dominions and the Argentine had asked for
clarification of Britain's agricultural policy objectives and
that once the long-term policy had been settled, that for the
interim period could be discussed separately.
At the final meeting with the Dominion High Commissioners
held on 11 February, Thomas reiterated that the deficiency payments
to home producers could not continue indefinitely and that Britain
wished to enact a levy-subsidy policy. It was also clarified
that there were two policy periods, that which led up to the
expiry of the Anglo-Argentine agreement in November 1936 and the
long-term future thereafter. After New Zealand had requested
that mutton and lamb be excluded from any levy-subsidy scheme and
instead continue to be subject to quantitative regulation, the
Dominxon representatives agreed that Britain should open
1
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negotiations with the Argentine towards employing the method of
levy-subsidy with Dominion preference to control the meat market
over the next eighteen months. 4. detailed aide memoire was to
be sent to their respective governments. Negotiations were
adjourned until the arrival of Dominion Ministers."''
In the meantime, Elliot had been preparing legislation to
extend the beef subsidy, in accordance with his Jamary statement,
from 31 March to '30 June with provision for a further extension
by Order until 30 September. In moving the Financial Resolution
on 18 February, Elliot spoke of the Government's disappointment
that the negotiations with the Dominions had not yet produced
an agreement. He explained that in the interests of trade and
commerce it had been decided not to impose drastic restriction.
In these circumstances>it was necessary to extend the subsidy
while the talks continued. Elliot conveyed the recent shift in
Cabinet thinking when he asserted that while regulation might
be necessary in conjunction with the levy-subsidy, it was not
right that Britain should continue to be solely responsible for
2
it. He elaborated on this theme at the end of the debate
after speeches from the tariff wing of the Conservative Party
represented by Lambert and Ruggles-Brise which gave him full
support. Elliot stressed the problem of protecting the home
producers.
"The difficulty of the producers in this
country lies in the fact that we are a
"*■
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world State desiring to maintain a world
trade, and we cannot simply take an axe
and chop off any great section of our
imports."
With this in mind,the Government's policy was to change from a
system under which Britain had the acrimonious responsibility
of controlling imports to one where they could be regulated by
the various suppliers while the home producer would be insulated
from the world conditions by the levy-sub sidy."*"
Elliot's remarks on this subject foreshadowed the publication
of another yhite Paper on agricultural policy which appeared in
early March. It represented an extension of that of July 1934
with the main differences being that the Government's long-term
meat policy objective of a levy-subsidy no longer incorporated
the provision of regulating imports as well and that the Govern¬
ment was prepared to discuss a limited meat levy, namely that for
2
beef alone. The "»hite Paper was referred to during the debate
on the Second Reading of the Cattle Industry ("emergency Provision)
Bill on 8 March. Elliot explained that the bill's primary
purpose was to preserve the British livestock industry. He
reiterated that the Government was voluntarily waiving its absolute
right of restricting supplies for while it would be in the home
producers' immediate interest, it was hoped that the further
time for negotiation provided by its being withheld would lead
to agreement with the Dominions and the ftrgentine.3
The actual working of the bill had alreacfer been discussed
18 February 1935» 298 H.C. Deb 5s col 109.
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during the debate on the Financial Resolution and the Supple¬
mentary Estimate which covered the first period of the subsidy.
On the latter occasion, Elliot had not hidden his disappointment
that in spite of the assistance, the home producer was actually
worse off than he had been before its introduction since whole¬
sale prices had fallen by more than the amount of the deficiency
payment.
"I may be blamed for not having secured a larger
return to the producer during this time. That
is certainly a matter which has been of deep
regret to me, and it is the only matter for
which I feel any regret in bringing forward
this supplementary estimate. The price is
still unreijiunerative and the problem is still
unsolved."
Addison moving the reduction had asserted that the supple¬
mentary estimate proved the failure of the quantitative restriction
method. On the Second Reading of the Bill, the former Labour
Minister of Agriculture declared that Elliot was having to fight
against some of his own colleagues to try and save British
agriculture and suggested somewhat facetiously that the statement
in paragraph 11 of the 'Vhite Paper that "the forces depressing
prices are again in the ascendant" referred to the present
Chancellor of the Excheouer and the President of the Board of
Trade. The Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) Bill passed
through its remaining stages after little further discussion.
The meat problem was Elliot's main concern in the first
quarter of 1935 but of course other branches of the agricultural
1
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industry demanded his attention coo. First,there was the whole
question of sugar. The Government was still awaiting the
Report of the Greene Committee which had "been appointed in April
193*t- to consider the future of an industry which had been
nurtured since 1925 by a state subsidy from virtually nothing to
a position where it provided 33% of the nation* s consumption.
In order to prevent uncertainty while the Government took time
to consider the Report, Flliot announced a further extension of
the subsidy for one year, asserting that the extension would be
made without prejudicing the decision as to future policy.
Around the same time, Flliot announced the appointment of
the Milk Reorganization Commission chaired by A.S. Cutforth
with four other members including at Rlliot's personal insistence^,
2
Sir John Boyd Orr. The Commission was renuested to consider
the operation of organized milk marketing in Britain under the
present schemes and its incidence of production, distribution and
consumption, and to make recommendations for further improvement.
It was also asked to determine to what extent and in what manner
organization could be facilitated by closer cooperation or
amalgamation of some or all of the marketing schemes and to
draw up plans to effect any recommendations on this matter.''
In early 1935, it was the Scottish Milk Marketing soheme
that was giving the most trouble with rivalry between the level-
producers from the east and the seasonal producers from the
1 6 February 1935, 297 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 1126-1127.
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south-west. Pressure from the former led to Sir Godfrey
Collins, the Scottish Secretary making a modification involving
the payment of a premium for level production which aroused the
indignation of the latter. It was Collins too who with Elliot
introduced legislation to set up the Herring Board along the
lines agreed after Chamberlain had objected to the original
proposals. The Board was to draw up its own desired powers
and submit them for approval- The Herring Bill however outlined
the powers that could be taken, including that to promote sales
and market development and to limit the number, or control the
operation, of fishing vessels. The Bill also provided Treasury
loans and grants to provide working capital to finance exports
and the re-equipment, new construction, and purchase of fishing
boats.
Prom the discussion that took place on the Second Reading
on 4 February, it was clear that there was a consensus of opinion
in favour of the Duncan Report and the Herring Bill. The Labour
Party made only minor criticisms while Scottish Conservative
M.P.s representing herring fishing constituencies gave full
support. And, as Elliot pointed out when winding up debate,
the industry itself favoured the measure. He stressed that he
brought forward organization not because he had a passionate
addiction to it but because he could see no alternative.
"If we could run the herring industry or any
other industry with less organization or no
organization, no one would cheer more heartily
than I. The Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries and the Secretary of State for
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Scotland have enough to do and would much
prefer to enjoy a placid and easy life
without any of this sort of thing."
The Herring Industry Bill was given an unopposed Third Reading
on 22 February. Three months later, Parliament approved the
Herring industry Scheme which effectively gave the industry home
rule, with the finances of the Edinburgh based Board being
governed by the Scottish Office.
Earlier in the same month, the report was published of the
Egg and Poultry Reorganisation Commission appointed in October
1933- Addison had been succeeded as Chairman upon his return
to Parliament the following year by F.N. Blundell. Egg imports
had since Ottawa been regulated by voluntary agreement butihis
was now in difficulty with certain suppliers particularly China
and the Netherlands being awkward* Denmark, on the other hand,
had already accepted a cut of 10^ of her 1934 supplies. The
subject was discussed at a special meeting of the Produce Markets
Supply Committee on 26 February after Elliot and Runciman failed
to agree on imposing quantitative regulation by Order. Elliot
submitted a memo putting forward his arguments in favour of
compulsory restriction. He pointed out that some suppliers
would not accept the voluntary reduction of 10/c of their 1934
exports that was being asked of them by Britain. ".'holesale
prices were still low a.nd imports had shown a sudden increase.
Elliot asserted that something had to be done and since Britain
was bound by treaty commitments not to increase the import duty
14 February 1935, 297 H.C. Deb. 5s col <497-
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averaging 20%, it was necessary to continue to control supplies
by quantitative regulation. This could be imposed under the
provision of the 1933 Agricultural Marketing "ct which permitted
regulation by Order if a scheme to reorganise the home industry
was in preparation — that proposed by the Reorganisation Commission
met this condition. Elliot therefore recommended restricting
egg imports by Order until such time as the ouestion of increasing
duties could be considered-''"
Runciman made his objections known during the Committee
discussion. He felt that the voluntary restriction should be
made more effective instead of introducing compulsory regulation.
In arc event, he did not believe the position demanded action for
it seemed to him that egg prices were fairly steady. Elliot
however stressed that prices were under the general agricultural
product level and were liable to fall in the near future as
imports increased. Preventive action had to be taken now. He
reminded his colleagues that the Market Supply Committee favoured
regulation by Order and that the P.M.S.C. itself had supported
a 10% reduction in July 193^-« If egg imports were allowed to
remain unrestricted, it would signify a complete reversal of
policy and would most probably lead to an increase in overseas
supplies. He pointed out too that egg production was one of
those industries considered by the C.E.I, to have expansion
possibilities. The fact was that the voluntary scheme was no
longer working — it was impossible to continue a situation where
1
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some countries accepted the regulation and others did not.
This convinced the Scottish Secretary that compulsion was «
necessary so once again he gave full backing to Hlliot.
The Colonial Secretary, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, however,
perceived a difference between imposing restriction and taking
action to make certain suppliers toe the line of the previously
agreed scheme of voluntary regulation. Halifax gave his
support, albeit reluctantly, to Rlliot; he felt that any reduction
in imports would be negated by increased home production and thus
would not lead to ary improvement in wholesale prices. However,
it xvould look bad if the Government were to reverse its policy.
Regulation by Order might be necessary but he favoured trying
first the policy suggested by Cunliffe-Lister. Hlllot
responded by saying that if the Committes accepted the need to
continue restriction, he would look at the cuestion in the light
of trade agreements. Runciman at once declared that he wculd
not be responsible for acting in contravention to the letter or
spirit of ary such agreement but Rlliot assured the Committee
that was not his intention.
Chamberlain intervened at this point to assert his agree¬
ment that something should be done in response to the sudden
increase in imports and his reluctant acceptance that regulation
by Order might be necessary. He asked Elliot for his reaction
to the suggestion made by G-ilmour and Thomas that he should try
again to secure voluntary restriction, this time threatening
compulsion if no agreement was reached. The Minister of
Agriculture stated his readiness to make one more a.ttempt on that
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basis. The Committee were agreed, with the exception of
Runciman and Simon who had sent a statement of his views, that
something had to be done. It was further agreed that the treaty
position should be examined to ascertain if compulsion was
possible."*" In the event, voluntary regulation continued. In
the summer of 1936, the egg and poultry producers voted over¬
whelmingly in favour of an increased tariff without any marketing
scheme. The following year a subsidy was given to home
producers. Despite the recommendations of the Reorganisation
Commission, no pre-war marketing scheme was agreed upon by the
egg and poultry industry although there was a successful National
Mark Scheme and central packing stations.
In the spring and early sunnier of 1935, many of the Cabinet
were involved, as we have seen in chapter 5, in discussions with
Lloyd George. Igriculture was a major topic with two of the
six meetings between Lloyd G-eorge and the General Purposes
Committee devoted exclusively to its consideration. Elliot, as
Minister, was naturally required to participate. Lloyd George's
basic objective was to increase the farm population within a
year by 500,000. This he sought to do by raising prices, so
raising home production, so increasing employment. The commodities
which he considered provided the best opportunities for home
pr&duction expansion were pig meat, vegetables and fruit. If
there had to be protection, then he favoured an all-round tariff
with Dominion preference rather than quantitative regulation.
PM3 (33) 17th meeting, 26 February 1935*
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Elliot, at the first of the two meetings, declared the crux of
the matter to be what rise in the cost of living could be
contemplated. Prices at present were kept down by cheap imports.
In response to Lloyd Ceorge's assertion that prices had to
rise in the interests of the home producers, Elliot pointed out
that such an increase would have to be considerable before the
farmers would get a fair return. He then cited the bacon
industry as an example when increased production had not been
accompanied by a proportionate rise in agricultural employment.
Finally he suggested that to return to the 1925 price level would
involve an increase of 2231 million in retail prices. On account
of Lloyd G-eorge's disagreement with that figure, consideration
of his agricultural proposals was adjourned for one day pending
discussions between his own experts and those at the Ministry."*"
It was agreed the following day,however that since the differ¬
ences on facts and figures had not been clarified* a further
meeting should take place this time with the attendance of Lloyd
2
G-eorge and Elliot.
The outcome of this and subseouent meetings was a statement
of their respective opinions in the form of a memorandum entitled
"Agricultural Production and Employment"' which was considered
by the Committee on 13 May. Elliot had serious doubts about
the ambitious nature of the proposed programme which would require
1
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a considerable increase in the consumptive capacity of the
home market. The far-reaching reorganizational aspects of the
scheme would only conceivably be accepted by the home producers
in return for a very drastic tariff. He argued, too^ that not
only would a considerable import levy have to be imposed but
also that quantitative restriction would have to be maintained
in order to raise prices to such a level as to attract more
people into agriculture. Lloyd G-eorge was in fundamental dis¬
agreement. He dismissed Elliot's figure of a G120 million
increase in retail prices necessary to secure the home market
for home producers. If the Cabinet accepted it, then there
could be no justification for reconstructing agriculture on the
basis of his proposals. He interpreted matters quite differently,
however, believing that if the methods of production and distri¬
bution were improved then the home producer could receive a
remunerative price without affecting the consumer. He did,
however, agree that the dumping of imports should be stopped and
accepted that the result would be a rise in the consumer price
but he felt that this would be accepted on the grounds that the
home producer was being helped against the foreign supplier."'"
Hlliot was sympathetic to Lloyd G-eorge's expansion objectives
but the reality was that he had already lost that particular
battle, defeated by the Board of Trade, the C.T5.I. and the I.D.C.
which had convinced the Cabinet against any substantial develop¬
ment of British agriculture. Lloyd G-eorge's proposals,
S-P (35) 18th meeting 15 May 1935-
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therefore, had from the outset stood no chance of acceptance.
The General Purposes Committee did in fact consider using part
of the C.E.I. Report in its published reply to the proposals but
thought better of it, deciding to maintain the document's
confidentiality and its authors' anonymity. Section III of the
eventual reply dealt with agriculture and can be summarised
briefly. It stated that a programme of settling 500,000 on the
land could only be done if at all possible at the expense of
large price increases and with immense repercussions on trade.
The Government was not willing "to commit the country to so
hazardous and uncertain an adventure." The possibilities for
increasing consumption of home produce were seriously exaggerated.
In any event, the desired increase in prices would discourage
this. The curtailment of Dominion and foreign exports would
have drastic effects on trade and political relationships,
repercussions in the former leading to increased unemployment in
Britain's industrial population."'"
At the same time as the talks with Lloyd George were being
held, the all important meat policy discussions had begun in London
with the Dominions now represented by their respective Premiers
and Cabinet Ministers. The Australian Prime Minister, J.A.
Lyons, was so concerned that he had arrived early in late March
with his Minister for Commercial Treaties, Sir Henry Gullett, arxl
his Attorney General, Robert Menzies. As a result, a separate
series of meetings on the meat proposals had already been held
1
Government reply is in GP (35) Cab.27/583 later published in
the National Press.
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with Thomas, Runciaan and Elliot patting the British case.
The talks had started off badly and deteriorated as time went on,
with the Australians insisting on their entitlement to an expan¬
ding share of the market at the expense of foreign suppliers.
In particular, G-ullett declared that Australia should be allowed
to switch freely from frozen to chilled beef, the mainstay of the
Argentinian meat trade. He drew up a plan whereby Argentinian
supplies would be reduced with a Id per pound levy on chilled
beef and -gd on frozen. dominion exports, on the other hand,
would not be subject to a quota,with only their chilled beef
being dutiable at the rate of 3/8 per lb. He also insisted that
Australia be permitted to greatly increase her lamb and mutton
supplies to a level that would mean a 50/ increase in five years.
Thomas, Runciman and Elliot seem to have restrained them¬
selves from publicly expressing their exasperation at the
2
Australian attitude but made it quite clear at a private meeting.
The Australian delegation, however, was not exactly confident of
success. Menzies summed up their, pessimism on the way talks
were going in a private letter to a colleague in Canberra in which
he also assessed the British representatives. Thomas he felt
was a shrewd politician but failed to comprehend the Dominion
standpoint and was obsessed with the notion that Australia had
been dishonest at Ottawa. Runciman was "an excellent type" but
espoused his department's apparent preferential consideration for
Economic Discussions with Australian Ministers, eda (a) 35 in
Cab.32/124. For a fuller discussion of the proceedings, see
Ian Drummond: Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939. p.342-344-
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the Argentine over Australia. As for the Minister of Agri¬
culture, Menzies wrote that "Walter Elliot impresses me personally
very much, but is, of course, hard driven by his primary producers,
and is therefore scarcely likely to make bargains which will be
of much use to us.""'"
At one stage, the negotiations were broken off by Australia
but then two further meetings were held with the last being on
20 May at which there was an inconclusive preliminary discussion
of proposals put forward by J.H. Thomas. By this time the New
Zealand Premier,G.W. Forbes, and his Finance Minister had arrived
in Britain for the negotiations. Canada and South Africa
continued to rely on their High Commissioners and were in fact
to play little part in the series of six meetings which began
on 21 May. Throughout the discussions, New Zealand's attitude
was conciliatory, but Australia persisted in being uncooperative.
The British Ministers made their policy quite clear at the first
meeting, namely that expressed in the March "fhite Paper of a
levy with Dominion preference, with supply regulation being done
through the medium of a Meat Council.
Before the second meeting, the Produce Markets Supply
Committee met for the last time to formulate detailed proposals
and negotiating tactics. It had been so authorised by the
Robert Menzies to Richard Casey 18 April 1935 in Sir George
Pearce Papers MS 213 3er.5, National Library of Australia -
quoted in Ian Drummond: British Imperial policy p.224-
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Cabinet on the understanding that there should be a levy sufficient
to cover deficiency payments to home producers, that the beef
market be regulated by a Meat Control Board of British, Dominion
and possibly /Vrgentinian representatives, and that it must be
ensured that no extra onus would fall on the Kxcheouer should the
market situation deteriorate.The P.M.S.C. discussed basic
levy rates of l^d or Id on foreign beef with Id Dominion pre¬
ference in either case. Elliot felt most strongly that the
Dominions should be subject to a token rd levy so as not to
encourage the assumption of the right of free entry. It was
however accepted that although the British Ministers should do
their utmost to have the higher rate accepted, it might prove
necessary to resort to the lower rate in order to secure agreement.
The P.M.S.C. agreed that the duties would be on a sliding scale
governed by beef prices for which an upper and lower price level
would be defined and that there should be an excess levy on
2
shipments exceeding the allocations of the Meat Board.
1 1
At this stage only the l^d and j-"d subsidy plan was shown to
the Dominions and the Argentine. The proposals were not
acceptable to either with the Argentine declaring the lrd levy
on chilled beef as out of the question and the Id preference as
3
excessive. The second and third negotiating sessions made
little progress with Sir Henry G-ullett insisting that action be
1
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taken against the \rgentine and not the Dominions and repeating
his demands for a sizeable preference and a guaranteed expanding
share in the chilled beef market. Elliot, Thomas and Runciman
were not unnaturally in despair at his attitude. They asserted
that if their proposals were to be modified at all, it would be
in the Argentine's favour in order to secure agreement. Elliot
threatened that unless the Dominions could come up with a scheme
agreeable to the Argentine}then an all-round cut would be imposed.
The impasse was discussed at a private meeting of the British
Ministers on 24 June. The intransigence of Sir Henry Dullett
had brought the negotiations back to square one. Thomas and
Runciman felt it might be necessary to break off discussions
but Elliot disagreed, believing that some agreement could be
reached based on the continuation of the subsidy for some months,
a smaller levy, and some concession to Australian chilled beef.
At two meetings with the Dominions that same day it was
agreed that the proposals again be put to the Argentine for
consideration as a three year policy, this time omitting any
suggestion of a guaranteed expanding share of the chilled beef
market for Australia.'' The final plenary session took place on
3 July after British and Dominion officials had worked out the
details. Thomas informed the Dominion delegates that the talks
would resume upon receiving a reply from the Argentine. He
also clarified the lamb and mutton position, affirming that
1
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Britain would continue to regulate supplies, and an import
programme for 1936 was subsenuently arranged. The draft
proposals, therefore, were solely concerned with beef."'"
The negotiations, in reality, achieved very little. The
Dominion Governments accepted a revised draft only as the basis
for further talks while the Argentine did not respond for many
months. In the event, meat discussions had to begin all over
again in the spring of 1936 by which time the Dominions had
hardened their attitude even more and refused to consider the Id
a-
chilled beef duty they had agreed to in August 1935- In the
meantime, of course, Elliot had to act to protect the home
producers. In the circumstances, it was ouite evident that the
only possible solution was yet another extension of the subsidy.
In the middle of the negotiations with the Dominions, Elliot
had introduced in parliament an Order to extend the subsidy for
three months until the end of September. This was done under a
proviso of the Cattle Industry ("Emergency Provisions) Act of
March 1935* To extend the subsidy beyond September, however,
required new legislation.
The Cabinet, meeting the same day as the last meeting with
the Dominions, agreed that Elliot should introduce a new bill to
extend the cattle subsidy from September 1935 to June 1936, with
provision for a further and final extension if necessary until
2
the expiry of the Argentine agreement in November 1936. In
his memorandum covering the draft bill, Nlliot accepted that a
^DD (35) 6th meeting, 3 July 1935*
2
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conclusion to the difficult and protracted negotiations "will
clearly he at best a matter of weeks, if not months." There
would be further delay before any levy-subsidy could be operated
while meat supplies in transit were landed and the proposed Meat
Conference organized. Elliot admitted that the cattle section
of the livestock industry showed no improvement from the 1934
position for the increase in Dominion supplies had neutralised
the effect of restrictions on foreign and Irish Free State
supplies. Pending agreement on the levy-subsidy proposals, the
only alternative to a continuation of deficiency payments to
home producers was drastic cuts in Dominion supplies. It was,
however, only a theoretical alternative for although no longer
under any Ottawa commitment on this score, it was generally
recognised that such a policy "would in present circumstances be
politically impracticable.""'"
In moving the money resolution of the Cattle Industry
(Emergency Provisions) (No.2) Bill, Elliot restated the Govern¬
ment's long-terra policy.
"The proposals before the Committee lead towards
and interlock with the arrangements which the
Government will bring into operation as soon
as agreement can be reached or* failing agree¬
ment, as soon as treaty obligations permit.""
There was no question of indecision on the Government's part,
rather was it a case of having a scrupulous regard for treaty
obligations that necessitated taking these transitional measures.
The Government had a clear vision of wh^t it was aiming at but it
1
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could not bring it about immediately and, adhering to its under¬
taking to safeguard home producers, it regarded the extension of
the subsidy which was, Elliot reminded the House, a recoverable
advance, to be the best line of action at the present time.
The Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions) (No.2) Bill
received its Second and Third Readings without much ado, with
only token Opposition resistance on the grounds that the Govern¬
ment was not taking complementary measures to promote efficiency
in the livestock industry. The beef question was certainly the
predominant one in the summer of 1935 tut the Government took
action in several other branches of agriculture at this time,
with Elliot as Minister having one of his busiest periods as the
Parliamentary session drew to a close.
The bacon industry had been subjected to a complete review
by a sub-committee of the P.M.S.C. appointed on 16 Jaruiary.
Its terms of reference were threefold: to review the workings
of the relevant marketing schemes with consideration as to whether
home production should be limited and whether there could be an
immediate relaxation of the existing limit of total supplies
without serious repercussions on price levels; to examine the
possibility of adapting a levy-subsidy policy to replace wholly
or partially that of quantitative regulation; and to investigate
the extent of and reasons behind any disparity in the cost of
pig and bacon production between Britain and foreign countries.
The Committee was chaired by Lord Halifax with civil servants
representing the Foreign Office and the Dominions and junior
Ministers for the Treasury and the Board of Trade. Elliot,
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however, attended the Committee in person. He favoured the
retention of the main features of the bacon scheme instead of
re-opening negotiations with a view to effecting a complete
change of policy but he had to compromise given the wishes of
the majority. After three meetings and consideration of
memoranda and reports from Elliot and from a sub-committee of
officials, the Committee drew up its report. Its main conclusion
was that it would be practicable to adopt a levy-subsidy policy
while maintaining quantitative regulation although same increase
in foreign supplies would be allowed. The home industry should
face a two year stabilisation after the Q0% rise in home production
that had occurred under the bacon and pigs marketing schemes.^"
Early in June 1935» Elliot announced in the Commons the
intended change in bacon policy that the (Government was planning
for 1936 subject to the agreement of those foreign countries
2
currently permitted free entry. The following month, he
introduced the Bacon Development Scheme which established a
board comprised of representatives from both the pigs and the
bacon marketing boards plus three delegates appointed by the
Minister of Agriculture. The new board, envisaged by the
Lane-Fox Report and supported by both producers and curers, had
powers to determine such things as what the factory capacity for
the bacon-curing industry should be and to grant licences and
Proceedings of the Produce Markets Supply Sub-Committee on
Pigs & Bacon: Cab.27/5bl. Report: PMS (33) 39 of 15 May 1935-
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indeed to close down factories. Such powers were unprecedented
and represented an experiment as indicated by Elliot.
"We have had to move between the Charybdis of
chaos and the Scylla of over organisation and
all that one can say is that, when a scheme
is criticised from one quarter on the ground
that it is not doing enough and from another
on the ground that it is doing too much, it
is possible that tijie happy medium is some¬
where in between."
Sugar was another commodity dealt with in the summer of
1955* The Cabinet had hoped that the Greene Committee of Inquiry
would report before the sugar beet contracts for 1955/1936 were
issued but as this had not been possible^it had been announced
in February that the subsidy would be extended for another year.
Elliot introduced legislation to effect this, stressing that it
was an interim measure to allow the Government to consider the
2
Greene Report which it had now received. Labour spokesmen
talked of the need for reorganisation but did not oppose the
continuation of the subsidy. The main opposition as with the
previous extension came from the Liberals.
In the meantime, the Cabinet had appointed a Ministerial
Committee to consider the Report of the Commission of Incuiry.3
The Beet Sugar Committee was chaired by Chamberlain with Elliot,
Runciman, Thomas, Malcolm MacDonald, Percy, and Collins as its
other members. The Greene Report was not unanimous. The
majority of the Committee of Inquiry were against continuing to
assist the beet sugar industry and suggested farmers find
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alternative crops. If the (Government did however decide to
continue aid, then it should he in the form of an Exchequer
subsidy as at present and in that event, the industry should be
reorganized with control by a permanent commission and with the
amalgamation of the beet sugar factories.^" The Beet Sugar
Committee, with only Runciman dissenting, rejected the majority
recommendation that the subsidy should be tapered off. Instead
it reported to the Cabinet that there was no practical alter¬
native to the continuation of the subsidy and proposed that the
measures recommended by the (Greene Report to be taken in event of
2
such a decision, should indeed be introduced. The Cabinet
accepted the Report of the Beet Sugar Committee and authorised
Elliot to make a policy statement in the Commons after informing
the industry itself.^
Elliot announced the tripartite policy to the House on 30
July: the subsidy was to be continued for an unlimited period
of time but only for a volume of 560,000 tons which was the
amount grown at present; an independent sugar commission was to
be set up to supervise the industry; and the beet sugar factories
were to submit a scheme for amalgamation to the commission which
in turn would submit it to the (Government with a view to having
legislation introduced to make a beet sugar corporation operative
by 1 April 1936.^" There was at this stage only a short discussion
^
Report of the United Kingdom Sugar Industry Inquiry Committee:
Cmd.4871.
2
Proceedings of the Beet Sugar Committee: Cab.27/586.
5 Cab.40 (33) of 24 July 1935-
4
30 July 1935, 304 H.C. Deb. 5s cols 2469-2471.
369.
in the Commons of the proposals. The real debate was to take
place in February 1936 with Elliot*s introduction of legislation
to effect the long-term sugar policy.
In addition to his statement on beet sugar, Elliot in July
1935 made a policy statement on dairy products. In 1934, the
Government had failed to get the Dominions to agree to voluntary
restriction and in consequence had given a two year subsidy to
dairy farmers. Elliot now favoured reiterating to the
Dominions at this stage the Government's intention to implement
a levy-subsidy policy. Thomas, however, felt that a detailed
plan should be worked out by an interdepartmental committee.
In turn, the committee favoured deferring a policy statement
until early 1936, before the expiry of the Milk Act in March.
After all, a levy-subsidy could not be imposed before January 1937
as foreign agreements ruled out any increase in duty and thus,
given the Ottawa pledge to maintain the imperial preferential
margin, no levy could be put on Dominion dairy products until
that on foreign supplies was increased. In fact, however,
Elliot went ahead and explained the position to the Dominions.
In the meantime, Thomas assured them that the Government did not
intend to impose quantitative control on Dominion produce until
March 1936 at the earliest although the relevant Ottawa commit¬
ment expired in August 1935*''" In his Commons statement of 25
July, Elliot declared that the Government intended to implement
a levy-subsidy policy in the future should home producers require
1
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further assistance and that the whole dairy products situation
would be reviewed before March 193&.^
Agricultural policy including the commitment to a levy-
subsidy for many products figured highly in speeches made through¬
out the country in June and July 1935 not only by Elliot but by
the new Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. Both stressed the
success of the levy-subsidy method in its present one application
under the Wheat Act. Baldwin, speaking at Halstead in Essex
from a brief from Elliot's Ministry, reviewed and compared the
past and present state of British agriculture. Protection by
tariff worked well for certain products like oats and potatoes
but would not do for staple foods as it would have a severe
effect on retail prices. Ouantitative regulation had been
experimented with but the Government now believed that it should
be superseded.
"We have learned by experience. We want to
get rid so far as possible of those perpetual
alterations of quotas which cause nothing
but friction in our Dominions and among
those who should be our best trade friends."
The exception to this was mutton and lamb for which quantitative
regulation had been successful. For other commodities presently
controlled in this way like beef and bacon, the Government had
decided that the best method would be a levy-subsidy as in the
2
case of wheat.
Elliot spoke in similar terms of the Government's long-term
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policy intentions. He also, however, dealt with a more immediate
matter. The requisite number of milk producers had demanded
a poll as to whether the Milk Marketing Board should be retained.
Elliot confirmed that the Government would accept a negative
verdict but stressed the Board's achievements. There were
three objectives common to both producers and the Government:
higher consumption of milk; cheap supplies to where they would
benefit most, for instance in schools; and cooperation between
the industry and the G-overnment. The question to be asked,
asserted Elliot, was whether these three objectives would be
i
helped or hindered by the abolition of the Milk Marketing Board."
In the event, the producers overwhleraingly voted to retain the
Board, the results of the poll being announced in August 1933*
After a busy summer of policy formulation,negotiations and
legislation, agriculture all but faded from the political scene
during the second half of 1935• The fact was that every
pressing agricultural question had been dealt with and thus
there was a lull in policy-making. The Produce Markets Supply
Committee which had under MacDonald acted as the agricultural
mini-Cabinet was not re-appointed by Baldwin when he took over
as Prime Minister in June 1935 and no committee to take its
place was appointed until 1936. Agriculture featured prominently
in the National Government's Election Manifesto, "A Call to the
Nation", but received no mention whatsoever in the King's Speech
after the November poll in which Elliot was so narrowly
^
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re-elected. As the Christmas recess approached, Elliot made
no major speeches in Parliament. Apart from a short debate
on the Bacon Development Board, the only other matter of note
was legislation to effect certain modifications to the Pigs
Marketing Scheme as a result of a public inquiry."*"
The most immediate auestion facing Elliot in early 1936
concerned the milk and dairy products policy with the Milk Act
due to expire in March. In his July statement, Elliot had
promised a complete review of the whole dairy produce situation
but with the Government's hands still tied by treaty obligations
and with the report of the Milk Reorganisation Committee not
now expected until early summer, "Elliot saw no alternative to
extending the provisions of the Milk Act for 18 months until 1
October 1937* The money resolution of the Milk (Extension
of Temporary Provisions) Bill was moved on 17 February by
Herwald Ramsbotham who had succeeded Lord de la Warr after the
General Election as Elliot's Parliamentary Under-Secretary.
His appointment took a lot of pressure off Elliot as far as
conducting legislation in the Commons was concerned. The Liberal
and Labour Opposition repeated their arguments in favour of
subsidising all surplus production to provide cheap milk in
needy areas as well as increasing school supplies. To Tom
Johnston, the word surplus was a misnomer for "there has never
been a surplus, and there cannot be a surplus until every human
1
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being in this land gets enough."1 All Opposition speakers,
however, knew how passionately Elliot felt about improving
public health and nutrition standards and their criticism was
frequently laced with references to his own beliefs. Ellen
Wilkinson was just one speaker to touch on this.
"Ye ought to have a nationalised milk supply
and nobody knows it better than the Minister.
Nobody could make a more impassioned speech
on this subject than the Minister could if
he were whejje he ought to be, and that is
over here."
In reply, Elliot warned against fusing the two objectives
of maintaining milk production and securing the health of the
future generation.
"If we advance the cause of health in the
schools on the grounds of merely finding
a receptacle for the surplus of milk or
anything else, we shall defeat our own
objects. People do not like an approach
like that: they will not stand it. The
children ought to be treated from the
point of view of citizens whom we wish to
upbuild, not as ash-cans into which we
can tip any surplus we may happen to have
at the time."
He stressed too the value of subsidising the surplus milk for
manufacturing purposes since it meant that more nutritional
milk products like butter and cheese were available. Elliot
returned to this theme three days later, moving the Second
Reading of the Bill. Without Exchequer assistance, there would
have been widespread bankruptcies in the dairy and liquid milk
17 February 1936, 308 H.C. Deb. 5s col
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industry. Elliot emphasised that the very fact that the
subsidy benefitted everyone was the fundamental justification
for extending the legislation and in this connection, he compared
it to the housing subsidy.
"In both cases the great majority, the great
weight, of the subsidy goes right through to
the consumer, of the house in the one case,
of the butter and cheese in the other, and I
say that an injustice is dona by merely
considering this as a subsidy to the agri¬
culturalist, as if it was something being
pocketed by the farmer and^not passed on to
the community as a whole."
In Committee, the Labour Party moved an amendment to cut
the Bill's intended duration from eighteen to six months but
it was withdrawn after Elliot stressed that a short-term
extension would serve to keep the milk industry in constant
turmoil. The Government had to have time to consider both the
report of the Milk Reorganisation Commission and that of the
Committee of Investigation presently arbitrating in the price
dispute between the Milk Marketing Board and the Central
Distributive Committee. The six month limit was moved again
in the Third Reading but to no avail and the Milk (Extension of
Temporary Provisions) Bill was passed unaltered.
The Committee of Investigation sat for thirty-six days to
consider the complaint by distributors that the Milk Marketing
Board was asking too high a price, more than the average pool
price paid to the producers. In April, it reported against the
Board and declared that the proper price should have been 15/3d
1
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per gallon and not 15/6. This was to be rectified by a
reduction in cost during the second quarter of the year."*"
The Milk Reorganisation Commission sat for infinitely longer
than expected and did not report until November 1936 by which
time Elliot was no longer Minister of agriculture. His
successor, W.S. Morrison, introduced in the following year
legislation to carry out the far-reaching reorganisation proposed
by the Commission, primarily the establishment of a Milk
Commission with overall control of all the schemes. Opposition
to this measure was such, however, that the Government had to
withdraw it, the episode doing great damage to Morrison's
personal political reputation.
In February 1936, Elliot introduced legislation dealing
with another commodity, beet sugar. The Sugar Industry
(Reorganisation) Bill was to implement the measures announced
by Elliot in July 1935> namely the establishment of a sugar
commission and the amalgamation into one financially assisted
company of all factories manufacturing sugar from home grown
beet. Elliot declared that the proposed economies were drastic
but had to be so to justify such a scheme and were made possible
by the strides made towa.rds cheaper manufacturing. The Greene
Report had stated that Britain's sugar industry could not be
self-sufficient or thrive in face of world competition. Elliot,
however, pointed out that many other agricultural products were
in the same situation with imported supplies sold cheaper than
the home production cost. His policy would protect and improve
^
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the home industry while allowing the consumer to continue
enjoying cheap sugar."'"
The Labour Parly, on the other hand, sought public owner¬
ship and control^arguing that the Government was setting up
and assisting a private monopoly. 4..V. Alexander declared
that the Bill was a mgjor instalment of the corporate State by
legislation which was in fact Elliot's true objective.
"He is the man who really believes in his
heart that capitalism on the old basis
cannot live. He is the man, if he had
his way, who would by ary kind of legis¬
lation introduce the corporate state ^
tomorrow and do his utmost to work it."
Opposition Liberals took the view that L»tate assistance to the
sugar industry should be phased out altogether. Ramsbotham
however dismissed the notion that the industry could tail off
rather than shut down immediately. If assistance was withdrawn,
thousands of acres would go out of cultivation, there being no
serious alternative crop, and thousands would be rendered
unemployed. If the measure was as interpreted in some quarters
a small dose of socialism then it could be defended, asserted
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary on the grounds that "it is
common medical practice to inject small doses of virulent
bacilli into a patient in order to secure for him some sort of
immunity."^
The Sugar Industry (Reorganisation) Bill spent eleven days
10 February 1936 , 308 H.C. Deb. 5s col 591-606.
^
10 February 1936, 308 H.C. Deb. 5s col 682.
^ 10 February 1936, 308 H.C. Deb. 5s col 702-
377.
in committee^" finally reaching the Report Stage and Third
Reading in early \pril. Elliot once again stressed the
experimental nature of his legislation.
"No practical agriculturist will deny that
we have made a bold new experiment. We
may be blamed by some for going too far
and by others for not going far enough,
but it is an experiment which has been ^
boldly conceived and vigorously executed."
The revolutionary effect of introducing a root crop into
rotation had first been proven by turnip growing and now
beet had already proved its worth by preventing the depression
of agriculture in the Eastern Countries. The measures taken
to maintain the sugar beet industry on a permanent basis
represented the creation of a new British enterprise.
In the meantime, Elliot's colleague,the Minister of Labour
was initiating legislation in the formulation of which 'Elliot
had been directly involved. This measure provided an unemploy¬
ment insurance scheme for agricultural workers. The first
step towards this had been taken back in 193^- with the
Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee chaired by Sir
William Beveridge and set up under the Unemployment Insurance
Act being asked to give the issue its immediate consideration.
Its Report was examined by a Cabinet Committee set up in
January 1935 of which Elliot was a most vocal member.^
Elliot was not however present at the first meeting, the outcome
Standing Committee D: Official Report 1936.
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of which was merely to recommend to the Cabinet that it agree in
principle with the insurance of agriculture against unemploy¬
ment.^" Despite the fact that time was short for legislation
to be introduced providing for the payment of benefits in the
winter months after a period of six months of contributions,
the Cabinet seemed uj-sinclined to move quickly on this issue.
By the time the Cabinet Committee met again, it had to
contemplate the possibility of a three month period of contri¬
butions with the Exchequer providing the balance to facilitate
2
the commencement of benefit payments in December.
The Commmutee rejected the 4d contribution rate suggested
by the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee on the grounds
that the scale of benefit it would provide would be so low as
to require simplementation and thus negate the actuarial
principle of unemployment insurance. Instead it considered
a contributory rate of 4?d or 5<1. Elliot argued strongly in
favour of the lower rate asserting that anything higher would
cause considerable hardship to many agricultural workers and
indeed the Committee came out in favour of the lower rate.
As regards the timing of the scheme, Elliot did not accept the
point made by Thomas and Stanley that the Government would be
criticised if it produced an insurance scheme for agriculture
before announcing its decision on the Unemployment Assistance
Board regulations. Elliot declared that ary comparison made
^
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would be with unemployment insurance benefit and not assistance."*"
He did however accept that it would not be possible to intro¬
duce legislation during the current session to provide for
benefit to be paid in the winter months since a scheme
necessitating initial Treasury contributions would constitute a
breach of the contributory principle and might create a pre¬
cedent. At the Cabinet meeting of 1 May no decision was taken
on the timing of legislation. Indeed it was only at this stage
that the Cabinet formally accepted the principle of unemployment
2
insurance for agriculture. in the event, legislation was
postponed until after the G-eneral Elec jion but it did appear
before the issue of the new unemployment insurance regulations
with the Bill's introduction just before the Christmas recess
and the remaining stages in the first half of 1936.
At this time too, the G-overnment was putting the finishing
touches to a historic piece of legislation to extinguish tithe
rent charge. As Minister of Agriculture, Elliot was responsible
for dealing -with this age-old and thorny question which had
long since been a source of grievance particularly on
ecclesiastical-tithed land. The fall in agricultural prices
had led to mary tithe payers being unable or unwilling to maks
prompt payment. In 193^, Lord de la 7arr, at that time
Elliot's Parliamentary Under-Secretary, had introduced in the
Lords a bill to mitigate certain features of tithe payment but
this had been dropped after strong agricultural protest. Elliot
"*"
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had favoured proceeding with the hill and then setting up a
Royal Commission hut he had heen overruled in Cabinet,^ the
hill abandoned and the Royal Commission under Sir J. Fischer-
'/illiams appointed straightaway to examine the whole question.
In their Report submitted to the Cabinet in November 1935, the
Commission recommended the extinguishment in 40 years of all
tithe rent charge, be it lay or ecclesiastical, on urban or
agricultural land. This was to be achieved by the present
tithe payer paying the Treasury a fixed sum for 40 years, the
amount received being used to compensate the Church and lay
tithe owners.
The Commission did not however touch on the question of
compensation to local authorities for the loss in rates that
would ensue since the tithe was a rateable hereditament. It
was this aspect that caused considerable argument in the Cabinet
p
Committee set up to consider the Report. " Chamberlain produced
a self-financing scheme encompassing evey; aspect including
that of compensating local authorities but it was to take 60
years, not 40. Elliot was strongly opposed to such a plan
since he felt that tithe payers should not alone have to compen¬
sate local authorities and he produced a rival scheme based on
a 50 year time-scale which required moderate exchequer
contributions. Chamberlain however stood firm and refused to
consider ar$r proposal which involved additional costs to the
Exchequer. The rest of the Committee supported him leaving
1
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Elliot alone in dissent."'" Ultimately, however, although
still unhappy at his colleagues* departure from the Commission's
Report at the expense of the tithe payer, Elliot accepted the
views of the majority and worked towards introducing legis¬
lation based on Chamberlain's scheme.
The Royal Commission Peport was published together with a
policy statement from the Government towards the end of February
2
1938. With a few minor changes, legislation to enact the
proposals was introduced by Elliot in May. Former agricultural
tithe payers were to pay £91-11.2d per £100 rent charge for 60
years with the proviso that where the ademption annuity
exceeded 1/3 of the schedule B value of the agricultural
holding, the excess was not payable. Present urban tithe payers
were to pay £105 per £100 rent charge also for 60 years. In
both cases, the payments with income tax remission^ were deemed
as a personal liability to be collected for seven years by the
Tithe Rent Charge Commission and thereafter by the Inland Revenue.
Payments received were to be put into a special account out of
which compensation was to be paid to various bodies. The
Church of England was to receive a £2 million lump sum with in
addition annually the difference in -the redemption annuity paid
by the former urban and agricultural clerical tithe payers.
TR (35) 2nd & 3rd meetings 12 & 18 December 1935-
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Lay tithe owners were to be compensated with £70 million of
guaranteed stock at 3/fc> redeemable at par in 60 years.
Finally, local authorities were to receive 60 annual payments
of £600,000 in compensation for a lost rateable source.
The Labour Party made predictable noises about -the need
for public ownership of lend and -tJie f-allure of the bill to
adeouately remove the financial burden on the former agricul¬
tural tithe payers. Hlliot's conduct of the Tithe Bill in
the Commons was, however, acclaimed by its supporters and
opponents alike. He showed a complete understanding of every
aspect of the complex legislation and at every stage impressed
with lucid expositions and explanations of the provisions of
the bill. On the Third Reading, Ramsbotham paid fulsome
tribute to his chief for successfully steering a course between
the tithe owners and the tithe payers without being wrecked on
the Treasury rocks."1" Flliot's industry and parliamentary
competence was a major factor in the expeditious passage of the
legislation and was universally admired, albeit grudgingly by
the Opposition who resented the limitation of potential amend¬
ments by the terms of the money resolution. For Flliot himself,
the Tithe Bill presented a first-rate opportunity to demonstrate
his political versatility. On a lighter note, the irony of a
Presbyterian Scot presiding over legislation dealing with one
aspect of the establishment of the Church of Hngland appealed
to him greatly. In departmental terms, however, the Tithe
1
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Bill was completely overshadowed by the major agricultural
question facing Elliot in his last few months as Minister,
that of the Government* s long-term meat policy.
In April 1936,in response to a suggestion "by Elliot and
Runciman, the Cabinet set up the Trade and Agriculture Committee
to consider pressing policy questions."'" The Committee was in
effect the successor to the P.M.S.C. and although it dealt with
other commodities during Elliot's last few months as Minister
of Agriculture, its major preoccupation was meat policy.
By April 1936, there had still been no formal reaction from the
Argentine on the policy agreed between Britain aft! the Dominions
in August 1935, the main proposal of which was a l^d per lb.
levy on chilled beef imports with Id Dominion preference. At
the time, the Dominions had accepted such a scheme as a basis
for further consideration pending Argentinian comment. Howeyer,
in the intervening months between August 1935 and April 1938,
Australia had changed her mind and was n<r-r insisting on free
1 1
entry for her beef. Although levy rates of ljj-d and j-d per lb.
on foreign and Dominion chilled beef had been enshrined in
the proposals of August 1935» in private Elliot and his
colleagues had doubted ever getting the Argentine to accept
such a high levy on her own imports or to concede a Id Dominion
preference. In early April 1936, a committee of officials set
up by the T.A.C. asserted that in its opinion the highest levy
3
that would be acceptable to the Argentine would be ^d per lb.
1
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The question then for the T.A.C. was to decide whether Britain
should denounce the Anglo-Argentinian Agreement by 6 May so as
to be free to take such action as it liked after the Agreement's
expiry in November^or to open negotiations with the Argentine
3
towards securing an agreement built round a £d per lb. levy
on chilled beef."'"
It was at the third meeting of the T.A.C. on 4 May. that
the decision was made which held out a real prospect of agree¬
ment and at the same time spelt the abandonment of a self-
financing levy-subsidy beef policy. Until this meeting, it
had been assumed that the levy must pay not only for a comple¬
mentary subsidy to home producers but also for the Exchequer
advances made since July 1934* The proposed Lpd and id on
fox'eign and Dominion chilled beef respectively would accomplish
just that. Chamberlain however took the view that if at all
possible Britain's long-term meat import policy should be
implemented by agreement, not unilaterally, and he accepted the
opinion that there could be no agreement centred round a levy
3
of more than £d per lb. on Argentinian chilled beef. In these
circumstances, Chamberlain, albeit reluctantly, declared his
willingness to forego arrears and to continue an Exchequer
subsidy to home producers indefinitely regardless of apy levy
yield. The unthinkable had occurred: Chamberlain, the most
inflexible of Chancellors, was offering major concessions both
in principle and substance which would facilitate an end to
T. A.C. (36) 2nd meeting, 27 April 1936.
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the protracted beef negotiations while at the same time
guaranteeing long-term Kxcheauer assistance to home producers.
The Trade and Agriculture Committee immediately agreed that
3
a jjd per lb. levy should be put on Argentinian chilled beef
with corresponding duties on other beef, that the Dominions
should be allowed free entry and the right to switch from
frozen to chilled beef, and that there should be a Meat
Conference to regulate market supplies."1" 'Vith agreement also
that there should be an indefinite "exchequer subsidy to home
producers, it seemed that the course was set fair towards
implementing the two now separate and no longer interdependent
parts of the levy-subsidy policy. There remained/however, one
considerable obstacle, v,lli0-(;, s total rejection of Chamberlain's
assertion that the amount of the subsidy must not be increased
from its present level. Elliot pointed out that prices were
now below the 1934 level when the subsidy was first introduced
and declared that he would not accept the rest of the proposals
until the question of the subsidy had been discussed further.
In response, the T.A.C. agreed that "Rlliot, Chamberlain and
Collins should confer on the matter.
The three Ministers met on 25 May in the Treasury Chambers.
After bemoaning the fact that he had agreed in the first place
to pay the subsidy in the expectation that it was temporary
and repayable, Chamberlain made what he termed his maximum
offer, a subsidy of £4.3 million per amum. Klliot, however,
■*"
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supported by Collins, asserted that the rate of subsidy should
be such as to ensure an average return of 42/- as had been the
premise of the 1934 subsidy. This would require an annual
payment of £5-2 million. If Chamberlain's proposal was
implemented then production would fall leading to later agri¬
cultural problems and political repercussions. Elliot did
accept Chamberlain's idea of the subsidy being decreasable in
times of better prices but with the proviso that it could be
increased too in times of lower returns. On the fundamental
question, however, neither man would compromise and thus the
conference ended in deadlock over the amount of the subsidy.^"
Chamberlain reported the stalemate to Baldwin who informed
the rest of the Cabinet of the position two days later. He
told his Ministers that Chamberlain as Chairman of the Trade and
Agriculture Committee had reported that both its work and the
Anglo-Argentine meat negotiations were being held up by the
deadlock between himself on the one hand and Elliot and Collins
on the other. Chamberlain with the concurrence of both his
adversaries suggested that the matter be reviewed by a committee
2
of impartial Ministers. In other words, the difference was
so acute and with neither side prepared to give an inch, the
issue had to go to arbitration! The Cabinet agreed to this
proposal and appointed a committee with Lord Hailsham in the
chair and with Simon, Wood and Stanhope^ as its other members
1
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to consider the arguments of each side and report to the Cabinet
which would then make a decision.^"
The Cattle Subsidy Committee met twice the following day.
At the first meeting, Elliot and Chamberlain put their arguments
in turn. After reviewing the circumstances that had led in
193*4- to the introduction of the subsidy and the political reasons
for its extension in preference to drastic quantitative control
of Dominion supplies, Elliot insisted that home beef production
could not be maintained on less than a 6/6d subsidy per live
cwt. or £5«2 million per year and stressed the dangers of
neglecting food production as had happened with munitions and
armaments. He sought, too, safeguards for the home producer
in the event of a meat crisis leading to a price collapse.
Colville, deputising for Collins, asserted his a">r»%nt with
Elliot before Chamberlain presented his case. It began with
an account of what he termed the ill-treatment of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer. All along the way, he had been assured that
the subsidy was only a temporary advance. It was the old story
of any concession by the Treasury leading to further and greater
demands. He had made the supreme gesture of foregoing arrears
and making the subsidy permanent only to be entreated to
increase the subsidy amount. In an effort to reach agreement
after his initial offer to continue at the present rate of £4
million per annum had been disdained, he had come forward with
his maximum offer of £4-3 million.
Proceedings of the Cattle Subsidy Committee are in Cab.27/605.
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Chamberlain argued that agriculture was not unique and
other industries for which a tariff would not be practical
might justifiably quote the beef precedent and demand an
Exchequer subsidy. Indeed, he doubted whether beef producers
had ary real claim at all to the present subsidy let alone the
increased rate proposed by Elliot. In conclusion, Chamberlain
declared that if the Committee did not endorse his argument in
its entirety and instead recommended an increase in the amount
of the subsidy, he could only accept such a verdict if it
included certain safeguards. There had to be a maximum limit
to the amount of subsidy payable and if prices rose beyond a
certain level, the rate of subsidy would be correspondingly
reduced. In addition, the Government must ensure that any
agreement with the Dominions and the Argentine left Britain
free to act in the event of a price collapse. Finally,
Chamberlain wanted an undertaking that the Treasury would not be
asked for ary subsidy on oats. After Colville replied that
the oats question should be separately considered, the Cattle
Subsidy Committee adjourned until later the same day."*"
At the second sitting, Elliot responded to Chamberlain's
statement. After stressing that for defence purposes it would
be dangerous to abet the decline of food production, he offered
to accept a maximum ceiling of 7/^ per cwt., agreeing that the
Treasury should not be called upon to meet unlimited liabilities.
He agreed too that if prices rose above a certain level, the
^
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subsidy should be reduced and for this purpose suggested 44/6d
as the level beyond which a reduction would be effected.
Finally, he suggested that the rate of subsidy be subject to
review by an outside body. W.S. Morrison, deputizing for
Chamberlain, announced formal agreement with the proposal to
reduce the subsidy if prices rose beyond Mt/6d and went on to
state that whatever figure the Committee decided upon in its
arbitration between that of £U-3 million and S5-2 million must
be regarded as a fixed amount in order that the Chancellor might
be sure of his exact position. At this point, Elliot intervened
to assert that he was not asking for the figure of £5-2 million
to be put into legislation only for it to be considered as the
maximum amount since he would prefer to enact a flexible
provision. Elliot, Morrison and Colville then left the meeting.
After further discussion, the Committee reached agreement and
drew up its report for the Cabinet based on a fixed annual
subsidy amount of £5 million.
The Cabinet discussed the findings of the Cattle Subsidy
Committee on 10 June. Apart from recommending the £5 million
annual subsidy which should work out at £3 million from the
proposed levy on foreign beef plus £2 million from the Exchequer,
the Committee agreed that the subsidy should be reduced if prices
went beyond 44/6d. It recognised the objections to subsidies
in principle and the dangers of that for beef being invoked as
a precedent but it felt that in this case a subsidy was necessary.
CS (36) 2nd meeting, 28 May 1936.
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It stressed that the Chancellor could not have unlimited
liability and that Britain must reserve freedom of action in
the event of a meat war. It recommended that the subsidy be
so adjusted as to encourage efficiency and ouality production.
Finally, it re jected Elliot's suggestion that an outside body
review and fix the subsidy rate annually. Neither Elliot
nor Chamberlain emerged as clear victor in the subsidy dispute.
The Cattle Subsidy Committee had perhaps leant more towards
Elliot, certainly on the question of the amount of the subsidy,
but at the same time it had met mapy of Chamberlain's anxieties.
Its Report was fully approved by the Cabinet which then
authorised Elliot to prepare interim legislation to extend the
present subsidy arrangements for a short period until the long-
2
term policy could be brought into operation.
Under the terms of the Cattle Industry (Emergency Provisions)
(No.2) Act of 19 35, the. beef subsidy due to end on 30 June
could be extended for a further four months by Order. This
the Government duly did with Herwald Ramsbotham conducting the
measure through on 29 June.'^ This allowed Elliot time to
prepare new legislation to cover a further extension of the
subsidy pending the introduction of a long-term measure.
Before its introduction in the Commons, he made a major policy
statement in which he outlined the Government* s permanent
proposals for safeguarding the livestock industry. At this
^
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stage, Runciman was still negotiating with the Argentine ar*l so
no figure was mentioned hut Rlliot did say that legislation
would he introduced in the following session to provide for
the collection of a duty levied on foreign chilled and frozen
heef and veal. This revenue would go to the Exchequer which
was to fund the £5 million subsidy, legislation to effect which
would likewise he introduced after the summer recess."''
A few days after his policy statement, Klliot introduced
the new Cattle Industry ("Emergency Provisions) Bill to extend
the present subsidy arrangements from 31 October 1936 until 31
July 1937 at the latest. The measure was greeted with criticism
from every side. The Labour Party chiefly represented by Tom
'Yilliams and A.V. Alexander opposed it on the grounds that agri¬
culture should not continue to be dealt with sectior by section.
Instead there should be a comprehensive policy covering all
commodities and promoting efficiency and reorganisation. These
arguments were echoed by Robert Boothby on the Conservative left.
He could perceive no fundamental principle underlying Rlliot's
agricultural policy. Not that Boothby objected to agricultural
subsidies. On the contrary, he argued that other commodities
like oats and barley should be similarly protected but as part
of a long-term a11-inclusive policy covering all cereal and
livestock instead of the present piecemeal policy of "picking
out one commodity here and another commodity there, and
2
subsidising it at the expense of other commodities." Conser-
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vatives from the tariff wing of the Party felt that the subsidy
was not sufficient and regretted that the longer-term arrange¬
ments could not be introduced immediately.
Elliot made a spirited and skilful defence of the bill and
his agricultural policy in general. He defended the policy he
had followed since becoming Minister of \griculture, that of
considering each commodity as a separate issue requiring
individual treatment. He argued that the danger of over-
organization and Whitehall bureaucracy was greater for agriculture
than that of temporary measures."'" With regard to the actual
measure under discussion, Elliot emphasised that the beef subsidy
benefitted not only producers but consumers too.
"The fact that we have been able, by means of
a subsidy, to absorb a greater quantity of
beef shows that at ary rate in this instance
the suggestion that the policy of the
G-overnment is one of restriction and gf
cutting down supplies does not hold."
Indeed, it was the very fact that beef prices were at such an
economic level and thereby a boon to consumers that production
was now falling off and could not be maintained unless the
subsidy was increased, as intended in the forthcoming long-term
3
legislation.
In the course of the debate on the Cattle Subsidy Bill,
Elliot made no apology for the length of time the negotiations
with the Dominions and the \rgentine had taken. In reply to
criticism that the Bill represented the sixth extension of the
1
17 July 1936, 314 H.C. Deb. 5s col 2494.
2
24 July 1936, 315 H.C. Deb. 5s col 995-
3
13 July 1936, 314 H.C. Deb. 5s col 1697-
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cattle subsidy since its initiation in 1934» Ramsbotham declared
that a three year subsidy introduced then would not only not
have commended itself to those who criticised now but would
have prejudiced the negotiations and the hopes of agreement
that had prevailed at the time."'" As it turned out, the talks
had been difficult and protracted. Only now in the summer of
1936 was there a real prospect of agreement and that had come
about because of Chamberlain's decision that British beef
producers should receive a permanent subsidy from the Exchequer
regardless of any revenue that it might recoup from a duty on
foreign imports.
The two parts of the Government's beef policy, the subsidy
and the import levy, for so long regarded as interdependent,
were treated from this stage onwards as two separate matters
requiring independent legislation. ir/ith regard to the former,
Elliot submitted to the Cabinet in October 1936 an outline of
legislation encompassing the permanent subsidy proposals,
measures for the promotion of efficiency, and provision for
2
import regulation. These were incorporated in the Livestock
Industry Bill which became law in mid-1937- As far as the
other issue was concerned, after further talks the Government
finally reached agreement with the Argentine towards the end of
1936 on the terms envisaged by the Trade and Agriculture Committee
following Chamberlain's decisive action. The Beef and Veal
Import Duties -Aet Bill which put a ^d per lb. levy on foreign
1
17 July 1936, 314 H.C. Deb. 5s col 2411.
2 Cab.60 (36) of 28 October 1936.
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chilled beef, 2/3d per lb. levy on frozen beef and other varying
ad valorem duties, was introduced just before the Christmas
recess and went on to become law in 1937* The divorce between
the levy and the subsidy parts of the Government's beef policy
was complete.
It is somewhat ironic that by the time legislation covering
the levy and the subsidy was enacted, Elliot was no longer
Minister of Agriculture. Pate took a hand in October 1936
when, amidst the preparations of the permanent subsidy and
just before the levy agreement was signed with the Argentine,
Sir Godfrey Collins died and Elliot was appointed his successor
at the Scottish Office. As discussed in Chapter l+, it can be
assumed that Neville Chamberlain had more than a little to do
with it. The Chancellor had so often been the target and
indeed victim in Elliot's battles in Cabinet on behalf of
British agriculture. Elliot himself was most reluctant to go
to the Scottish Office for although it offered a new challenge^
it meant a definite move out of the mainstream of British
politics. Two years later, he was appointed to his third and
final Cabinet post, the Ministry of Health, where he did such
sterling work in the preparations for civil defence including
the detailed planning of emergency medical services and
evacuation. ^he zenith of Elliot* s political career, however,
was the four year period he spent at the helm of British agri¬
culture, guiding it through the worst of the Depression and
enacting measures which both enhanced its contribution and




Yesterday1 s Man of Tomorrow
Walter Elliot in his four years at the Ministry transformed
completely the face of British agriculture. In the autumn of
1932, it was made up of highly individualistic and traditionally
independent farmers apparently helpless against the catastrophic
fall in prices. By 1936, it had "been welded into a highly
organized and stable industry with its component branches
protected by varying means against the worst effects of the
market forces. in the case of beef, the mainstay of British
agriculture, Elliot's policy had gone through three stages.
In the beginning, quantitative import regulation was employed
to try and stabilise prices. Elliot had then waged a successful
campaign to have the xdea of a levy-subsidy adopted by the
Cabinet only to see it founder on the rock of Dominion and
foreign opposition. Finally, the Exchequer subsidy, introduced
as a temporary repayable measure of assistance while the levy
negotiations were conducted, was put on a permanent basis and
augmented by a small duty on certain kinds of foreign beef and
by market regulation by the Empire Beef Council and the
International Beef Conference.
The fact that the levy-subsidy policy for beef was abandoned
after four years can be explained not merely on the grounds of
the hostile attitude adopted by overseas suppliers but by a
change in economic thinking at the Treasury. For Chamberlain}
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at the time of the Cabinet's acceptance of the levy-subsidy
objective, the idea of a direct "Exchequer subsidy to private
producers was totally contrary to his political principles.
A levy-subsidy policy on the other hand seemed in 1934 an
attractive proposition;being a self-financing scheme and perhaps
more palatable to the Dominions and foreign suppliers than the
strongly disliked quota control policy. In the protracted
negotiations that followed, however, it became apparent that
the Dominions and the Argentine would never accept a sufficiently
high levy to subsidise British producers and were unimpressed
by British threats of drastic import cuts if agreement was not
reached. The introduction of the cattle subsidy proved that
such threats were indeed empty and allowed the Dominions and
the Argentine the luxury of sitting back and waiting on the
British Government making the concessions.
In the end^it was Chamberlain who backed down in May 1936
by withdrawing his insistence that the levy-subsidy scheme
should be self-financing and offering instead a permanent
Exchequer beef subsidy regardless of any revenue from an import
levy. This sharp change in attitude was not occasioned solely
by a realisation of the intensity of overseas opposition to the
British proposals and the magnitude of potential political and
commercial repercussions. The fact was that after many months
of Exchequer subsidies to both beef and milk producers,
Chamberlain had gradually become resigned to an interventionist
policy with permanent Exchequer assistance to directly protect
British agriculture without prejudicing trade policy. The levy-
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subsidy idea lingered on for another year as the policy objec¬
tive for bacon and butter but was then formally dropped by the
Cabinet. In the case of the former, imports continued to be
subject to quota control and as far as the latter was concerned,
the outcome was similar to that of beef with the temporary milk
subsidies which underpinned the manufacturing milk price being
put on a permanent basis-
One of the cardinal principles of Elliot's policy was that
the various branches of agriculture should be assessed
individually and protected by the most appropriate method in
each case rather than by a common policy. Accordingly, apart
from the commodities already mentioned, a straight tariff was
employed for the protection of the home production of oats,
quantitative regulation for mutton and lamb, an Hxrhenuer
subsidy for beet sugar, and a levy-subsidy with an excise duty
on flour for wh at. Elliot* s insistence on considering each
commodity independently reflected his pragmatism. His
objective was a highly organized and efficient agriculture but
with each section of the industry retaining its individual
identity.
The introduction of farming subsidies as a permanent
feature of British agriculture was one of the two most important
legacies of Elliot's policies. The other was without a doubt
the creation of the producer marketing boards. Some worked
better than others. The Potato Board was the most successful
of all. It solved the problem of a consistent demand and
variable yield by stabilising the acreage of production and
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undertaking regulation by griddle to iron out seasonal
variations."'' The Government lent a hand by imposing and
lifting import restrictions as the supply situation demanded.
As with all but one of the Marketing Boards, the operation of
the Potato Marketing Board was suspended during the Second
World War but it was reconstituted by the Conservative G-overn¬
ment in 1954-
The three boards covering the bacon industry proved to be
the most complex and least successful. One major problem was
the difficulty in reaching agreement on prices profitable to
both producers and curers. The Pigs and Bacon Boards had the
almost impossible task of simultaneously estimating the cost of
feeding stuffs and the selling price of bacon when trying to
agree on a contract price. Their problems were aggravated by
the fact that they had no control over the pork market. Pig
production increased substantially but the producers over¬
estimated their capacity and failed to supply the curers with
the agreed quantity. By 1937 the scheme collapsed altogether.
In the same year^the Government gave up the idea of a levy-
subsidy and instead continued with its import quota policy,
introducing a direct subsidy to producers in 1938.
The Milk Marketing Board had its teething troubles but went
on to become a national institution. Its regional pool system
supported by the Government subsidy brought stability to an
^
Regulation by griddle involved altering the gauge of the
sieve to select more or less potatoes for marketing
depending on the supply situation.
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industry in which the prosperity of a producer was previously
determined by his accessibility to the limited liquid milk
market. The main pre-war problem was negotiating prices with
the distributors. During the Second World War, the Milk
Marketing Board remained in operation under the general super-
vision of the Ministiy of Food but its price fixing powers
were permanently withdrawn and instead producer returns were
guaranteed by the Government, a policy enshrined in the 1947
Agricultural Act which introduced the annual Farm Price Review
covering all commodities. Since 1942, the Milk Marketing
Board and its three counterparts in Scotland and one in Northern
Ireland has been responsible for the formidable task of
collecting all the milk produced from farmers except those of
the small minority of less than 10/<, who are produce " retailers.
The sterling work of the boards with their publicity campaigns
and quality improvement measures have dramatically increased
the liquid milk consumption figures in Britain over the past
forty years.
The pre-war marketing board system had its origin in both
Labour and National Government legislation but it was Flliot who
was responsible for its development and must be regarded as its
founding father. It represented the basis of the efficient
organization of production and marketing that characterises
today what was at the beginning of this century the most
anarchic of all British industries. Producer cooperation has
become a sacred principle of British agriculture. It remains
^
Stanley Baker: Milk to Market p.149-
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to be seen, however, what the long-term effects Britain's
entry to the E.E.C. and the development of the Common Agri¬
cultural Policy will have on the structure of British
agriculture.
The producer marketing board system was a practical
illustration of Elliot*s corporate state philosophy. He did
not believe that dictatorship and the corporate state were
inseparable partners: the British were empiricists not theorists
or logicians and planned capitalism could be achieved without
turning to fascism and all its trimmings."'" Firm in his belief
in a positive, constructive alternative to the extremes of both
left and right, Elliot was not frightened by logic and freouently
adapted the principles of both for his own pragmatic ends.
Elliot's personality was a crucial factor in the formulation
of and reaction to the National Government's agricultural
policy 1932-1936. His energy and enthusiasm had a tremendous
psychological effect on everyone involved. In his own
Ministry, he was in the words of his principle lieutenant on
2
marketing "the source of a 13. our inspiration." He gained the
confidence of the traditionally independent-minded farmers and
reconciled them to organization and self-discipline. In
Cabinet, his intrepidity led to frequent success against those
colleagues whose departmental interests conflicted with his own
and in Parliament to the respect and indulgence of both sides.
^
The Times 25 June 1934*
2
A.W. Street: Agricultural Organization Today and Tomorrow
(Privately Published).
4-01.
Elliot's years at the Ministry of Agriculture brought him
to the forefront of public and political life. His dynamism
and enthusiasm stood out in a Cabinet not notable for many
individual personalities. Always a stimulating guest and
speaker, Elliot graced many of the social and political
gatherings of the 1930's. H; was a frequent visitor to
Cliveden where he indulged in constant debate with his free
thinking mind unfettered by departmental briefs and restrictions.
In later years, he recalled in vivid phraseology the atmosphere
of the great house on the Thames and the personality of its
hostess, Nancy Astor. 7eekend guests would arrive on Friday
at tea-time which resembled "a Bedouin encampment" with a
multitude of tables, cushions, papers and people over which
Nancy Astor would preside "like a blend between Juno at the
siege of Troy, and one of the leading Valkyries caracoling over
an appropriate battlefield." Conversation at dinner "was a
debate, it was a riot, it was a tidal wave, in the midst of
which small islets might be seen holding out determinedly in
private talk till they too were borne away by the ever-rolling
flood."1
From Elliot's earliest days in Parliament, many political
observers had been predicting a great future. By 1934, their
expectations reached their climax. The popular press led the
way, its tone and style epitomised by the words of the Sunday
Dispatch.
1
Walter Elliott 'The G-reat House', essay written in 1935 for
Michael Astor. Copy in Elliot Papers box 4 and reproduced
in part in Christopher Sykes: Nancy. The Life of Lady Astor
(London: Collins, 1972).
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"The one man who obtrudes as being of
immediate 'presidential timber' - to use
a telling American phrase - is the man
who has cast himself for the role of the
English Roosevelt, the man who has
repeated Joseph Chamberlain's trick of
taking a relatively minor office and
making it the very hub of the government's
policy. That man is Walter Elliot."
Of course, one should not place too much emphasis on the
political prophecies of the press although in this case the
sentiments of the popular press were echoed in the more serious
newspapers like the Manchester Guardian which declared that
there was no-one at Westminster "whose political future arouses
2
more expectation." Of much greater importance was the opinion
expressed by some of Elliot's contemporaries at Westminster.
Robert Boothby, attempting to persuade the undecided Harold
Nicolson to enlist under Baldwin's banner, declared that "either
Walter Elliot or Oliver Stanley will lead both of whom are
Liberals."^ R.A. Butler was another who linked these two
names asserting that their political talents far outweighed those
of other leadership candidates.^" Malcolm MacDonald saw Elliot
as the best of the most hopeful Conservative prospects, well
5
ahead of Stanley and Ormsby-G-ore. Tom Jones, the former
deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, believed that of all the
g
political runners considered by Janitor in 1928, Elliot was in
Sunday Dispatch 8 April 1934.
2
Manchester G-uardian 26 January 1934-
^ Harold Nicolson Diary p.151.
^
RAB to Brabourne 22 February 1935> Brabourne Papers.
5
Malcolm MacDonald in conversation with the author 16 August 1311.
^
Pseudonym of Mary Lyttelton & J.G. Lockhart.
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front by several lengths.
The expectations of Elliot's friends and colleagues were,
however, often accompanied by a certain element of doubt. Some
expressed concern that he might get detrimentally entangled in
the complex problems of agriculture. Tom Jones and '/aldorf
Astor were among those who were hoping halfway through his
term of office that Elliot would try and move from the Ministry
2
of Agriculture for the sake of his political prospects.
Butler too was concerned about the chances of Elliot emerging
unscathed from a Ministry with a hoodoo reputation but there
was another aspect that worried him.— Elliot's one great
failing was indecision caused by his ability to see all points
of view rather than by any weakness of character. This was
interpreted in some quarters as a lack of judgement and in
others as a lack of courage. J.L. Garvin asserted of Elliot
that "if only he had, which he has not, that extra touch of
dynamic decision which makes a leader, nothing could stand in his
L
way. Both he and Butler, however, in company with many others,
saw that Elliot's marriage in the spring of 1934 might well
supply the missing ingredient for it seemed that his wife could
5
provide "the necessary ballast".
Elliot's bride was Katharine Tennant, second youngest
New Statesman & Nation 18 November 1933*
Kingsley Martin discloses Jones's authorship of this
anonymous profile in Editorial (London: Hutchinson, 1968)
P-59-
2
Astor to Garvin 23 February 1934-. Astor Papers.
^
RAB to Brabourne 1 March 1935- Brabourne Papers.
^
Garvin to Astor 25 February 1934-. Astor Papers.
5
Ibid, and RAB to Brabourne 22 February 1934. Brabourne Papers.
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daughter of the redoubtable Sir Charles Tennant. Katharine
was one of the most prominent young Scottish Liberals in the
1920*s and early 1930's. An extremely active speaker and well-
known public figure, she had been asked by Lloyd George to
stand for Parliament.^ She preferred, however, to continue an
active political life outwith Parliament, to play golf and to
work to help the poor in London's east end with other young
women including Nancy Astor*s daughter, '/issie. Katharine
Tennant was a Liberal by upbringing and conviction. Her father
and half-brother had both been Liberal M.P.s and her half-sister
was Margaret, Countess of Asquith. However, another sister
was married to John de Vere Loder, a progressive Tory M.P. who
had been one of the authors of "Industry and the State" in 1927,
and Katharine frequently moved in the same social circles as
some of the younger Conservatives. She vta,s a pppular hostess
and her Westminster house was a popular setting for political
and social gatherings of young politicians from all parties.
From the late 1920*s Elliot had been one of the regular guests.
The fundamental difference in the characters of Walter
Elliot and Katharine Tennant was that whereas he was not good
at coming to a decision, she was extremely decisive. Like
Elliot, she had a very strong personality with a similarly
scintillating sense of humour and a penchant for political
argument. They were exceedingly well matched and had an
extremely happy partnership of equals for twenty-four years until
■*"
Baroness Elliot in conversation with the author, 13 April
1977-
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his death in 1958 whereupon she became one of the first four
women life peers and she remains greatly active in the upper
House to this day.
Even the considerable attributes of Katharine Elliot,
however, could not catapult her husband to the leadership of
the Conservative Party. If in retrospect the expectations of
his friends and colleagues seem somewhat fanciful, it must be
remembered that around 1934-» there was no real prospect of
another world war ani there was every chance that Baldwin would
leave the political scene at the same time as MacDonald. As
for Chamberlain, his health was not good and he was a much
older man. Apart from Chamberlain, there were others ahead
of Elliot in the Conservative promotion table. For Elliot to
directly succeed Baldwin assuming the retirement of Chamberlain
would have meant leapfrogging over men like Hoare and Cunliffe-
Lister. In 193^> therefore, it was unrealistic to think of
Elliot as a successor in the short term. It was however quite
reasonable to portray him as a potential leader and Premier in
the longer term. For the young war generation to look in their
own ranks for a future leader was both natural and realistic
and to many of them, Elliot stood out as the brightest prospect.
By 1936, however, Elliot's political prospects had slumped
dramatically. Chamberlain was well and truly ensconced as heir
apparent to Baldwin and had become increasingly irritated at
Elliot's outspokenness in Cabinet on matters outwith his
departmental concern and his relentless battles against the
Treasury on issues within his Ministerial scope. Elliot's
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agricultural policy intentions had been restricted by imperial
and foreign political and commercial considerations ana by 1936
it seemed that the scope for further innovation was severely
circumscribed. Moreover, by 1936 foreign affairs had become
predominant and circumstances no longer favoured an essentially
domestic politician and social reformer like Elliot. His
appointment to the Scottish Office took him right out of the
political limelight. Two years later, he reappeared on centre
stage as Minister of Health but just as it seemed that perhaps
his prospects were spiralling upwards again, they crashed
permanently in May 1940 with the fall of the Chamberlain Govern¬
ment.
Elliot chose the wrong side in the Chamberlain versus
Churchill question of the late 1930's. Despite his strong
anti-appeasement stance in the Cabinet, Elliot did not resign
and in so doing aroused the distrust and scorn of both sides as
a wobbler without the courage of his convictions. No matter
how honourable Elliot's reasons for not resigning may have been,
his fate was sealed. Elliot never again held Cabinet office:
Brendan Bracken tried to have him appointed Minister of Education
in 1951 but Churchill only offered him a post outwith the
Cabinet - the Ministry of Pensions or the Postmaster Generalship -
tooth of which Elliot refused. In the eighteen years between
losing office in 1940 and his death in 195H, Elliot did however
serve his party and country in many capacities. He was briefly
Director of Information at the 'Tar Office: Chairman of the
Elliot Commission on Higher Education in 'Test Africa, the outcome
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of which was the establishment of universities in Nigeria and
the Gold Coast; leader of official Parliamentary visits for
various purposes to other parts of Africa and the Empire; and
High Commissioner for the Church of Scotland. Perhaps, however,
his greatest contribution in those latter years was his role of
elder statesman, always accessible to younger politicians.
As a true philosopher, '/alter Elliot would have felt at
home in 18th century Edinburgh such was his passionate curiosity
about life. A prodigious talker, he combined a tendency of
thinking aloud with that of throwing out ideas both in private
conversation and policy discussions with the sole intent of
stimulating some sort of positive reaction. Frequently he
would start from a premise he himself did not uphold just to
provoke a battle of words."' He could not only see every point
of view on a subject, he could often put each argument more
succinctly than its actual exponent. His philosophy was that
of attack taking an opponent's arguments to pieces. This did
not accord with the technique employed by most successful
politicians, that of adopting the ostrich head-in-the-sand
position and letting the enemy pass harmlessly by.
Elliot's qualities prevented him from fitting in easily to
a party system. A determined enigma, unpredictable and full of
paradoxes, Elliot made an uncomfortable colleague in his own
party. His rollicking Toryism constituted a true Tory
i.Ialcolm MacDonald in conversation with the author, 16 August
1977-
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philosopher independent in mind and action. He had the
exuberance of a rebel rather than the zealous obduracy of a
potential party leader. The times were not propitious to his
ideals and talents. Above all, however, falter Elliot did not
have what Napoleon regarded as the supreme talent for luck was
not on his side at the end of the day. By the 1940's, Elliot
had become "yesterday's man of tomorrow", the leading Tory
"with the best future behind him"."'' He disappointed only
those who had predicted that he wculd bee one a Conservative
Prime Minister. In all other respects, falter Elliot
disappointed no man.
Michael Foot in the Daily Herald 21 September 1948.
APPENDIX I
Versions of verse composed by Osborne Mavor about the use of
Elliot's flat as an asylum for drunken university friends.
l) John Boyd Orr to Colin Coote, *pril 1963, Papers Box 7*
Should you comrades reel and falter
Stumble down the union stairs
Lead the blind ones round to Walter
They will find a refuge there.
2) Scots Review, March 1947-
Should their footsteps fail and falter
Climbing down the union stair
Take the blind ones round to Walter
They will find a refuge there.
3) Professor J.D. Mackie in conversation with the author,
15 Feb. 1975-
When his footsteps fail and falter
When he stumbles on the stair
Lead that blind one round to ''alter
He'll get bed and breakfast there-
APPENDIX II
MACFLECKNOE VERSES: - "When Pound, Make A Note Of."
Baldwin has a policy, a little fiscal policy,
Based upon suggestions by his followers and friends
(Noted very carefully and treasured up with reverence) -
Little hits of tariffs and of quotas and of preference,
Safeguarding and subsidies and other odds and ends.
Baldwin gets a telegram, a little dally telegram
(From Amery or Chamberlain or Brentford, let us say),
Or a letter, or a phone-call, or a postcard, just a penny one
(From Beaverbrook or Rothermere or practically anyone),
To tell him what his policy had better be to-day.
Baldwin keeps a diary, a little pocket diary,
For noting down his policy at each successive stage.
He knows what it was yesterday, because he made a note for it;
But neither he nor we can tell (although he'd have us vote for it)
His policy to-morrow, when he's turned another page.
APPENDIX III
Elliot's letter to the national press. 11 December 1930
Labour M.P.s* Manifesto.
The recent manifesto by Sir Oswald Mosley and the 16
Labour M.P.s deserves our close attention. In the first place
let us note that it declares for a reduction of taxation on
earned incomes, it admits that no improvement in the social-
services is possible while the national finances are in their
present state, and it emphasises the fact that the present
immediate question is not the ownership but the survival of
British industry. That 17 Labour members should have come out
openly and recognised these facts as the essential preliminary
to all discussion is an event of prime importance.
Therefore the remedies proposed are entitled to attention.
Two, at least, of these will be greeted by Conservatives with
full agreement. The first is control of imports by tariff or
licence - in short, protection. The second is the necessity
for inter-Imperial planning. A third, the constitution of a
smaller Cabinet, a "War Cabinet", five being the number suggested,
is a reform which many of us would consider almost essential if
responsibility is to be fixed and vigorous executive action
facilitated.
Finally, the argument from which the whole document proceeds,
that the increasing industrial depression confronts us with a
series of wage struggles which if not averted will bring ruinous
results, is true and fearful. The opposing pulls in this
country have halted the nation at a dead centre and we are
drifting down stream. The importance of this document can only
be gauged by the trade union support which it eventually evokes.
But to frame and publish it must have reouired much courage; and
courage, whether right or wrong, is no quality to be light-
heartedly dismissed under the prospect in which we stand to-day.
APPENDIX IV
Letter of 17 December 1930 signed by Elliot, Home, Buchan and
Stanley
The National Need.
"Ve are convinced that throughout the country for men and
women of every class the national problems have acquired a new
and intense personal interest, and that these problems are
viewed in a better perspective and with a clearer vision than
by most politicians. 7/hoever is blind to the gravity of our
situation, it is not the ordinary citizen. He has no confidence
in any party as a party; he is not disposed to pin his faith to
any programme as a programme. His instinct tells him that it
is not the party or the programme that matters, but the spirit
behind it; and beyond question that instinct is right.
The naked facts are not in dispute. '79 have lost many
of the assets which gave us our lead as an industrial country.
Other nations have climbed to our level, and take less of our
products because they can make them for themselves. The
result is widespread unemployment, which began long before the
present world depression, and which is to a large extent
independent of it. Much of that unemployment is not an acute
temporary malady, but a chronic disease, since certain staple
industries must face the fact of a permanent decline to a
lower level. To add to this, we have embarked upon costly
social services to an extent unknown elsewhere, and our
industrial products are therefore burdened with costs which
greatly lower their competitive power. We are spending money
lavishly, and daily the assets from which we spend are shrinking,
and some have gone beyond hope of recovery.
The general lines on which a remedy must be sought are
sufficiently clear. In the first place rigorous economy is
needed to ensure both that no penny is spent for the moment
except on the hare necessities of our national life, and that
full value is got for all expenditure. This involves the
refusal, under present conditions, to expand social services,
however defensible that expansion may be in theory, and a
drastic inquisition into the costs of the whole administrative
machine. In the second place an effort must be made to
conserve such assets as remain by the adoption of more scientific
methods of production and of a reasonable measure of protection.
In the third place the oversea markets which we have lost
must be regained and extended, partly by bargaining under a
system which will regard our home consumers' market as an
asset and not only as a liability, and partly by Imperial
reorganisation. These lines of solution may still be formally
in dispute, but we believe that by the vast majority of thinking
people they are not seriously nuestioned.
The point which we urge is that all the items of such a
policy involve for their success a spirit of discipline and
sacrifice. They have no facile popular appeal. They axe a
challenge to the nation to think clearly and to act resolutely.
They mean the facing of new facts and the recognition of changed
conditions, and that is never easy. They mean the renun¬
ciation of creeds which are hallowed to many by sentiment and
tradition. They mean the abandonment of the secular habit
which constrains parties to bid against each other with the
people's money. The opportunities for making prejudice are
many. The revision of the National Insurance system, for example,
gives a superb opportunity for demagogic mischief. But we
believe that the mood of the nation is so serious that, if the
truth is plainly spoken, the demagogue will find his occupation
gone.
The cardinal fact is that sacrifice and discipline are
required from every class. If there is to be a revision of
wages in certain sheltered industries, it must be accompanied
in the management of such industries by a wholesale revision of
methods, and sacrifice on the side of capital as well as of
labour. It is most necessary that the intelligence and the
sympathy of organised labour should be enlisted in the solution
of the problem. If the trade unions are called upon to relax
rules, the establishment of which has been the work of
generations, the employer also must revise his practice. So,
too, in the sphere of doctrine. If the Free Trader must
relinquish his formulas, a certain type of Protectionist must
abate his intransigence. The situation is too grave to
tolerate ar\y dogma which cannot meet the acid test of facts.
We believe that the British people is more truly responsive
to an appeal to duty than to self-interest, and that a call for
a great effort of sacrifice and discipline has never been
refused, if courageously and honestly made. The nation at the
moment is in a grave mood and will not be trifled with. It
will not be put off with fiddling while Rome burns.
Nor is it only our national future that is at stake, for
democracy itself is threatened. The problems before us are
all business problems, and in the minds of many a suspicion
is growing that representative government may be inconsistent
with efficiency. That is a view which has already spread
over Furope, and has led in various countries to the
renunciation of democratic institutions. We believe that the
suspicion is baseless, and that, just as democracy proved
itself the most effective form of government in winning a great
war, so it may be made not less effective in the more difficult
contests of peace. It lies with the British people to






Your letter gave me great pleasure.
Never for a moment have I doubted your loyalty - to me or
to the parly. I may have doubted your wisdcm.
But fundamentally you share my outlook (see my speeches
passim for many years past) and unless we can inoculate our
party we perish. I look on you as one of the torchbearers in
the years to come. My opinions - and criticisms - can only
affect the party for a few years at the most. You are one of
the men who will influence it for the next generation. That
is why I watch you with an affectionate but jealous eye.
Jealous, not for myself, but for your position with your own
contemporaries, your co-equals and co-eternals. That is why
I have spoken out that those who run may read. I have been in
politics many years, and seen many a good man, of whom high
hopes were held, totter off and fail to stay the course.
I have no fears of you and I hope I may have a period
presently when I may be an onlooker with sufficient wit left
to me to follow the causes of those of whom to-day I cherish
high hopes.
All my best wishes go out to you, my dear Walter, and a
good New Year to you and mary of them.
Yours very sincerely,
STANLEY BALDWIN.
Written in great haste.
APPENDIX VI
MACDONALP'S CABINET September 1951 - June 1935
Prime Minister: Ramsay MacDonald.
Lord President: Stanley Baldwin.
Chancellor of the Exchequer: Neville Chamberlain.
Home Secretary: Sir H. Samuel-^ Sir J. Gilmour (Sept. 1932).
Lord Chancellor: Lord Sankey.
Secretary of State for War: Lord Hailsham.
Foreign Secretary: Sir J. Simon.
Lord Privy Seal: Lord Snowden Stanley Baldwin (Sept. 1932-
Dec. 1933).
Secretary of State for India: Sir Samuel Hoare.
Dominion Secretary: J.H. Thomas.
Colonial Secretary: Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
Secretary of State for Air: Lord Londonderry.
Secretary of State for Scotland: Sir A. Sinclair Sir G-.
Collins (Sept. 1932).
Minister of Health: Sir E. Hilton-Young.
President of the Board of Trade: Walter Runciman.
First Lord of the Admiralty: Sir B. Eyres-Monsell.
President of the Board of Education: Sir D. Maclean -> Lord
Irwin (July 1932).
Minister of Agriculture: Sir J. Gilmour Walter Elliot
(Sept. 1932).
Minister of Labour: Sir H. Betterton ->■ Oliver Stanley
(July 193k).
First Commissioner of Works: W. Ormsby-Gore.
Postmaster General: Sir K. Wood (from Jan. 193k).
BALDWIN'S CABINET June 1935 - May 1937
Prime Minister: Stanley Baldwin.
Lord President: Ramsay MacDonald.
Chancellor of the Exchequer: Neville Chamberlain.
Lord Chancellor: Lord Hailsham.
Home Secretaiy: Sir John Simon.
Foreign Secretary: Sir Samuel Hoare -» A. Eden (Dec. 1935).
Lord Privy Seal: Lord LondonderryLord Halifax (Nov. 1935)•
Secretary of State for War: Lord Halifax Duff Cooper
(Nov. 1935).
Dominions Secretaiy: J.H. Thomas M. MacDonald (Nov. 1935).
Secretaiy of State for Air: Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
Secretaiy of State for India: Marquis of Zetland.
Secretaiy of State for Scotland: Sir G. Collins Walter Elliot
(Oct. 1936).
Colonial Secretary: M. MacDonald *■£> J.H. Thomas (Nov. 1935)"*'
W. Qrmsby-Gore (May 1936).
President of the Board of Trade: Walter Runciman.
First Lord of the Admiralty: Sir B. Eyres-Monsell Sir Samuel
Hoare (June 1936)
Minister for League of Nations Affairs: \. "Eden.
Minister for the Coordination of Defence: Sir T« Inskip
(March 1936).
Minister without Portfolio: E. Percy (resigned March 1936).
Minister of Agriculture: 'alter Elliot -> W.S. Morrison
(Oct. 1936).
President of the Board of Education: Oliver Stanley.
Minister of Health: Sir Kingsley Wood.
Minister of Labour: Ernest Brown.
First Commissioner of Worics: W. Ormsby-Gore -*■ Lord Stanhope
(May 1936).
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